Gen. Lee's Lost Order

[RevJohnRoss]

But for the "loss" of Special Orders 191, would the battle have happened at Sharpsburg?

 

[SWS]

The Battle of South Mountain is inevitable by the afternoon of the 13th. Both D.H. Hill and Longstreet, whose divisions, supported by Stuart's troopers, according to the language of Special Order 191, occupied Boonsboro, and not Hagerstown near the Pennsylvania State line as suggested by prior intelligence, conjectured that without the Lost Order, McClellan might've elected to concentrate against Crampton's Gap and Brownsville Pass on his left rather than Turner's and Fox's on the 14th for the relief of Harpers Ferry.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Interesting question posed in the OP.

At first instance, thought the answer might fundamentally lie in determining what effects knowledge and acceptance of the 'Lost Order' had on the pursuing McClellan's psychology.

Thought Lee was always going to 'stand and fight' if pressed, and this resolve was reinforced in the Maryland Campaign by him knowing he was up against McClellan, whom he believed was cautious and tentative by nature.

Judging by McClellan's reported conversations on Sept. 13, his possession of the 'Lost Order' certainly emboldened and encouraged him to confront Lee on the field and launch his assaults as soon as he did. Venture to say, don't think McClellan would have engaged Lee 'where' and 'when' (at Sharpsburg, on Sept. 17) he actually did, without the knowledge contained in Special Order 191.

 

[Harms88]

When recounting the Lost Orders, the order of two events gets messed up many times.

The way it's generally told is: a) Lee writes the orders. B) soldiers misplace the orders. C) Union soldiers find the orders. D) McClellan receives the orders. D) upon recieving the orders, McClellan makes his move.

Problem is….McClellan was already on the move when he got the Orders. In fact, one reason he was able to get the Lost Orders as quickly as he did was because the Army of the Potomac was in a traffic jam in Frederick, Maryland because the army was moving both faster and at a greater volume than the road network was capable of handling.

Nor did the Lost Orders change the direction McClellan was heading. He was heading towards South Mountain, and Antietam/Sharpsburg was behind the mountains. Part of the reason he was headed that way was because he already knew Lee was that direction. The Lost Order's biggest thing really reinforced information and rumors he already had coming in from cavalry and spies such as Pinkerton.

Would Sharpsburg have happened? Biggest question was Jackson and Harpers Ferry. Lee was already planning on leaving Maryland due to how aggressive McClellan was reacting to his invasion but it was the speed of the victory at Harpers Ferry that convinced Lee to fight it out at Antietam Creek.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Interesting question posed in the OP.

At first instance, thought the answer might fundamentally lie in determining what effects knowledge and acceptance of the 'Lost Order' had on the pursuing McClellan's psychology.

Thought Lee was always going to 'stand and fight' if pressed, and this resolve was reinforced in the Maryland Campaign by him knowing he was up against McClellan, whom he believed was cautious and tentative by nature.

Judging by McClellan's reported conversations on Sept. 13, his possession of the 'Lost Order' certainly emboldened and encouraged him to confront Lee on the field and launch his assaults. Venture to say, don't think McClellan would have engaged Lee 'where' and 'when' (at Sharpsburg, on Sept. 17) he actually did, without the knowledge contained in Special Order 191.

Think it through.

 

[GilbertFarney]

But for the "loss" of Special Orders 191, would the battle have happened at Sharpsburg?

No, it would not have. Lee intended to bring his army back together for a fight between Hagerstown and Boonsboro. Had the orders not been lost, yes, lost, not deliberately misplaced, the fight would have taken place along the heights north of Beaver Creek. This is all documented and verified by evidence.

 

[RedRover]

General McClellan, in "McClellan's Own Story" he notes that his army was pressing on Lee with the dual purpose of catching Lee's army in battle before he could abandon Maryland at or about Williamsport, and relieving Harper's Ferry, From a letter of the evening of Sept. 12th:

Then on the evening of the 13th he received the copy of Lee's order of Sept. 9. Mac says the receipt of the "Lost Order" the relief of Harper's Ferry became secondary...as he believed he had a chance to actually cut Lee off from the river at or about Boonsboro, so the army's forward movement was directed principally thither: p. 572:

By the night of the 14th, per McClellan, Franklin's corps was within six miles of Harper's Ferry...

But Franklin was directed to Rohrersville, to straddle the road to Harper's Ferry, BUT to WATCH out for attack from the presumed (per Lee's Lost order) Confederate army at Boonsboro rather than move direct to the relief of Harper's Ferry. Franklin to attempt to "cut off" any retreat by Lee from Boonsboro toward the river at Sharpsburg...

On the 15th Franklin couldn't cut Lee off from withdrawing to Sharpsburg, as he was already concentrating there about the time Mac's orders above were cut...

From Longstreet:

And Harper's Ferry capitulated to Jackson that day.

Franklin reported to Mac at 8:15 A.M. that per his 1 A.M. orders, he was concentrating to attack Rohrersville...

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Do we take your word that "this is all documented and verified by evidence?"

Think it through students.

 

[GilbertFarney]

Do we take your word that "this is all documented and verified by evidence?"

Think it through students.

There is no need to take my word for it. Read Their Maryland, Lee's Beaver Creek Plan in the June 2022 North and South, Calamity at Frederick, and The Tale Untwisted by Alex Rossino, and you'll see all the evidence laid out for you as plainly as day. Meanwhile, please show us the evidence for Lee ordering the "loss" of S.O. 191 outside of Frederick. For that matter, show us the evidence for Lee intending to fight at Sharpsburg before the morning of Sept. 15 when he first saw the landscape with his own eyes. We'll wait.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Think it through you serious students. Ignore the romantic fiction and put yourself in Gen. Lee's shoes. Given the objective circumstances, what would a reasonable person probably do in his shoes? Go with the fiction writer, or go with the reality confronting you? You decide.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Given the objective circumstances, what would a reasonable person probably do in his shoes?

Thought Lee's generalship was distinguished by him being 'audacious' and 'confrontational' in field conditions.

Perhaps the test (i.e. 'the reasonable person in his shoes') could be slightly rejigged to ask, ...'What would a general with Lee's peculiar/distinctive mindset do with the same knowledge possessed in these circumstances?'...

 

[RevJohnRoss]

There is no need to take my word for it. Read Their Maryland, Lee's Beaver Creek Plan in the June 2022 North and South, Calamity at Frederick, and The Tale Untwisted by Alex Rossino, and you'll see all the evidence laid out for you as plainly as day. Meanwhile, please show us the evidence for Lee ordering the "loss" of S.O. 191 outside of Frederick. For that matter, show us the evidence for Lee intending to fight at Sharpsburg before the morning of Sept. 15 when he first saw the landscape with his own eyes. We'll wait.

 

[RevJohnRoss]

Of all the silliness printed as civil war history, what comes from Mr. Rossino takes the cake. We are told to read his stuff, for what? An objective statement of reality as it was in September 1862? Hardly. Take, for example, the North/South Magazine piece Rossino wrote in 2022 and repeats, titled "Lee's Beaver Creek Plan." You must be a very gullible civil war buff to take the piece seriously. In fact, the reason Longstreet "moved down to the Boonsboro Valley" on September 14 was to protect McLaws from being attacked by the enemy. For objective proof of the point see Chilton's message to McLaws dated September 14.

Serious students of the campaign know, from the objective evidence in the record, that, by the evening of Sept. 14, General Lee understood the day had gone against him and he ordered his army, with Longstreet being the rear guard, to move to Sharpsburg and cross the river. His several messages sent to McLaws between Sept 14 at 8:00 p.m. and 11;15 p.m. make that fact indisputably clear. The only thing that kept Lee from moving directly across the river at dawn of the 15th, was the necessity to protect McLaws from attack as he abandoned Pleasant Valley, and then, miraculously, came word from Jackson that Lincoln's brigadier had surrendered the Ferry without a fight, and General Lee stopped his army in its tracks and formed a line of battle at the Antietam. It appears the fiction writers will continue to float their romance into the next century.