Fredericksburg - WHY and HOW?

[nrogers]

I am currently reading Bruce Catton's trilogy and have just finished the chapter on the Fredericksburg campaign in 'Glory Road'. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I'm new to the study of the Civil War and this is the first detailed look at the battle that I've had. Two questions immediately spring to mind -

WHY was this terrible battle ever fought?
HOW could Burnside repeatedly throw men against that solid wall of Confederate troops? Did he not realise what was happening?

The whole campaign was a disaster from the word go, starting with the delayed arrival of the bridging crews. What I find astonishing is that Burnside didn't think to change his plans at any point in response to the developing situation. He wasn't a stupid man and he must have understood the futility of flinging men at such well-prepared positions. I just don't understand it.

I have some sympathy for Burnside - he was clearly an affable, likeable person who understood the limits of his capabilities and was thrust into a position for which he knew he was not qualified. He had seen McClellan booted out for his caution and presumably wanted to take a different, more aggressive approach so the same would not happen to him, but it seems that once his plan was underway he felt that he had to go through with it at all costs, with no deviation whatsoever. Is this pig-headedness, stupidity, lack of imagination, or what? And did any of his generals tap him on the shoulder and whisper that maybe he should think again?

It all makes for desperately sad reading.

 

[dlofting]

And did any of his generals tap him on the shoulder and whisper that maybe he should think again?

Following the failed attacks on Marye's Heights, Burnside reportly wanted to lead the 9th Corps en masse against the stone wall but was dissuaded by his subordiantes.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Pretty fair summation, that. Meade apparently thought Burnside had been pushed too hard:

Dec 20, 1862
Yesterday I went to see Burnside, and found him engaged with the War Investigating Committee of Congress. They were just going to lunch and insisted on my going in. Zach. Chandler, Ben. Wade, John Covode and others were there, all of whom treated me with great distinction, particularly Covode, who claimed me as a Pennsylvanian. Old Chandler inquired very affectionately after you, but did not refer to your loyalty. They examined Burnside, Sumner, Hooker and Franklin. What the result will be I don't know, though it is said John Covode affirmed that when he got back he was going to raise a howl, and intimated it would not be against Burnside. Burnside proved that the crossing of the river had been peremptorily ordered from Washington, in the face of his opinion and of the majority of his principal officers. It is understood Halleck says: "This army shall go to Richmond, if it has to go on crutches," which (as over ten thousand cripples were made the other day) seems likely to occur before long. The army are willing enough to go to Richmond, if they could only see the way to get there. Two routes have already been tried this fall — the one by Gordonsville and this by Fredericksburg. Both have failed, and the only one deemed by military men as practicable they obstinately refuse to let us take — by the Peninsula.

 

[PeterT]

I am currently reading Bruce Catton's trilogy and have just finished the chapter on the Fredericksburg campaign in 'Glory Road'. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I'm new to the study of the Civil War and this is the first detailed look at the battle that I've had. Two questions immediately spring to mind -

WHY was this terrible battle ever fought?
HOW could Burnside repeatedly throw men against that solid wall of Confederate troops? Did he not realise what was happening?

The whole campaign was a disaster from the word go, starting with the delayed arrival of the bridging crews. What I find astonishing is that Burnside didn't think to change his plans at any point in response to the developing situation. He wasn't a stupid man and he must have understood the futility of flinging men at such well-prepared positions. I just don't understand it.

I have some sympathy for Burnside - he was clearly an affable, likeable person who understood the limits of his capabilities and was thrust into a position for which he knew he was not qualified. He had seen McClellan booted out for his caution and presumably wanted to take a different, more aggressive approach so the same would not happen to him, but it seems that once his plan was underway he felt that he had to go through with it at all costs, with no deviation whatsoever. Is this pig-headedness, stupidity, lack of imagination, or what? And did any of his generals tap him on the shoulder and whisper that maybe he should think again?

It all makes for desperately sad reading.

It would be interesting to know whether any of Burnside's subordinates said anything to him about the folly of the charge. But perhaps like Longstreet at Gettysburg saying something to the guy in charge may not have done any good anyway.

 

[brass napoleon]

What I find astonishing is that Burnside didn't think to change his plans at any point in response to the developing situation.

That's a big chunk of it right there. Burnside tended to get totally flustered whenever his plans were changed and had no ability to roll with the punches. The same thing happened at the Battle of the Crater.

He had seen McClellan booted out for his caution and presumably wanted to take a different, more aggressive approach so the same would not happen to him, but it seems that once his plan was underway he felt that he had to go through with it at all costs, with no deviation whatsoever.

And that's the other part of it. McClellan had made one excuse after another, and Burnside knew that any reason he came up with for delaying his attack would be seen as an excuse as well, no more how good the reason. He felt he HAD to go forward. Now combine that with a total inability to adapt to the changing situation, and the rest is a very sad history.

 

[JCM6395]

I think that the heavy gunfire smoke kept him from knowing the full extent of the carnage. It amazes me how those Union troops kept up the assaults stepping over their dead and wounded comrades as they advanced. I don't get why he didn't rethink his plans when bridging crews and equipment didn't show up on time. If Meade had been supported he might have turned the battle around when he advanced through the swampy terrain part of the reb line.

 

[dlavin]

In God's and Generals, if memory serves Hancock and another staff member confronted Burnside about an alternative attack and it was shot down by Burnside under the premise that Washington was all over his rear to attack and he had no flexibility.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

It's good to know that a movie backs up what Meade wrote (quoted in full above):

"Burnside proved that the crossing of the river had been peremptorily ordered from Washington, in the face of his opinion and of the majority of his principal officers"

 

[rbasin]

It's good to know that a movie backs up what Meade wrote (quoted in full above):

"Burnside proved that the crossing of the river had been peremptorily ordered from Washington, in the face of his opinion and of the majority of his principal officers"

Lincoln approved the plan, if Burnside moved quickly. Unfortunately, Burnside requested pontoons that were in Harper's Ferry, and didn't ask for them fast enough to get them to Fredericksburg.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Not according to some. Burnside set off briskly expecting the boats to arrive in a timely fashion. He moved quickly but Halleck, knowing that the pontoons would not be ready, had refused to warn Burnside to delay his march. It was Halleck who (and some suspect purposely) delayed the pontoons. But the comment below on November 27th is also interesting - why that delay?

 

[rpkennedy]

I am currently reading Bruce Catton's trilogy and have just finished the chapter on the Fredericksburg campaign in 'Glory Road'. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I'm new to the study of the Civil War and this is the first detailed look at the battle that I've had. Two questions immediately spring to mind -

WHY was this terrible battle ever fought?
HOW could Burnside repeatedly throw men against that solid wall of Confederate troops? Did he not realise what was happening?

The whole campaign was a disaster from the word go, starting with the delayed arrival of the bridging crews. What I find astonishing is that Burnside didn't think to change his plans at any point in response to the developing situation. He wasn't a stupid man and he must have understood the futility of flinging men at such well-prepared positions. I just don't understand it.

I have some sympathy for Burnside - he was clearly an affable, likeable person who understood the limits of his capabilities and was thrust into a position for which he knew he was not qualified. He had seen McClellan booted out for his caution and presumably wanted to take a different, more aggressive approach so the same would not happen to him, but it seems that once his plan was underway he felt that he had to go through with it at all costs, with no deviation whatsoever. Is this pig-headedness, stupidity, lack of imagination, or what? And did any of his generals tap him on the shoulder and whisper that maybe he should think again?

It all makes for desperately sad reading.

Burnside had a good plan; the pontoons just didn't arrive in time.

As for the attacks against Marye's Heights, they were supposed to pin the Confederates in place while Franklin and his Grand Division were to attack another point (Jackson's line). While there was a small breakthrough by elements of Meade's Division, Franklin and his subordinates never followed up while Burnside was left to think the attacks were taking place. By the time he figured it out, the frontal assaults had taken on an importance far beyond what they were supposed to and became the focus of the offensive.

It really boils down to the fact that Burnside was a mediocre commander thrust into a position he was ill-suited for.

R

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

I don't want to be fair to Franklin. . . but I do think that Burnside gave him rather wishy-washy orders and he was unwilling to take on the kind of responsibility that a Grant or Jackson would have relished.

Meade's breakthrough (and don't forget Gibbon) was rather more than "small". Had Franklin not suffered from piecemeal tactics and reluctance to assume positive interpretation of orders (choosing the negative instead), that breakthrough stood a more than fair chance of breaking Jackson's lines in depth.

The plan of Burnside was sensibly not to push Lee south off Marye's Heights, but to trap him there by putting his main attack even further south. Even a fool could see that the opportunities around Prospect hill were by far superior to the meat grinder west of the town

 

[Jamieva]

Everyone pretty much nailed it.

Halleck dragged his feet getting the pontoons there.
The overall plan was for Marye's heights just to be a holding attack so that Longstreet could not help Jackson.
The attack on Jackson was to be the main effort.
Burnside gave orders that Franklin did not interpret as Burnside wanted, and only used a very small portion of his Grand Division. That small portion made a breakthrough. If supported with a larger attacking force Franklin would've put Jackson in a very, very bad position.

Burnside's plan for the next day was to renew the attack on Marye's Heights. His subordinates did have to talk him out of that.

 

[kevikens]

When I taught history to high school students I would tell them that "Burnside did not get many ideas into his head but once he did he could not get rid of them". We are going to cross that creek on that stone bridge no matter how shallow it is. We are going across that river whether the pontoon boast get here or not.We are going up to that stone wall because it is there. We re going into that crater because we just spent weeks making it. Probably not a fair explanation of Burnside's decision making process but it does explain a good deal of his lack of success on the battlefield. It may be a sophomoric explanation but my students were 10th graders.

 

[rpkennedy]

I don't want to be fair to Franklin. . . but I do think that Burnside gave him rather wishy-washy orders and he was unwilling to take on the kind of responsibility that a Grant or Jackson would have relished.

Meade's breakthrough (and don't forget Gibbon) was rather more than "small". Had Franklin not suffered from piecemeal tactics and reluctance to assume positive interpretation of orders (choosing the negative instead), that breakthrough stood a more than fair chance of breaking Jackson's lines in depth.

The plan of Burnside was sensibly not to push Lee south off Marye's Heights, but to trap him there by putting his main attack even further south. Even a fool could see that the opportunities around Prospect hill were by far superior to the meat grinder west of the town

I don't disagree. I only used the world "small" because the breakthrough itself was fairly limited but, if followed upon, had the potential to cause serious problems for Jackson in his sector.

R

 

[rpkennedy]

When I taught history to high school students I would tell them that "Burnside did not get many ideas into his head but once he did he could not get rid of them". We are going to cross that creek on that stone bridge no matter how shallow it is. We are going across that river whether the pontoon boast get here or not.We are going up to that stone wall because it is there. We re going into that crater because we just spent weeks making it. Probably not a fair explanation of Burnside's decision making process but it does explain a good deal of his lack of success on the battlefield. It may be a sophomoric explanation but my students were 10th graders.

To be fair to Burnside, the attack on Marye's Heights were only supposed to hold the Confederates. Their success was fairly inconsequential to the grand plan.

R

 

[nextcity]

Was it really necessary for the Union Army to pillage and destroy much of the town?

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Well, it was there.....

 

[rpkennedy]

Was it really necessary for the Union Army to pillage and destroy much of the town?

Of course not. But these things happen in a war, not to mention that the Confederates fought street-to-street and house-to-house within the town.

R