Fredericksburg, what if?

roundball1

Private
Joined
Dec 12, 2010
Location
Columbus, Georgia
Forgive me if this has been discussed before. I have not been to Fredericksburg and have not seen the terrain going down to the river. I am sure that the ravages of time and "progress" have changed it , anyway. In watching "Gods and Generals" for the upteenth time, I was wondering if the Union crossing of the river could have been delayed any more than it was or maybe indefinItely if the South had, in preparation and under the cover of darkness, placed some 12 pound napoleons in camouflaged positions to cover the river. Some case shot and certainly canister would have made for some rough going in those boats.
 
The CSA Cannons on the Hights could reach the river but weren't accurate enough from what I read!
 
What would be the advantage of the CSA in delaying the Union crossing? Longstreet made mincemeat of the actual assault against Mayre's Heights, while Jackson was able to stem the half-hearted Union advance near Hamilton's Crossing. Delaying the Union attack might have given Burnside pause about commencing a direct assault against Longstreet or caused him to revise his overall plans (although I doubt it). In any event, by beating the AotP to Fredericksburg, the ANV had already ensured itself of a commanding defensive position that was difficult to carry, which is actually what ended up happening.
 
The AoP had 150 cannons across the river. A few Confederate cannon would likely have been neutralized quickly.
Totally agree. The federal position at Chatham, Falmouth and Argyle heights provided superior range and observation over the river front on the south side of the Rapphannock.
 
If I were on that Hill as Lee was, I would have made sure they came it across that river while pretending that I did not want them too. If your job is to destroy the enemy, he needed them to cross that river. And the trap was set.
 
Since this is a what if...what if you exchange Sumner and Franklin. Franklin attacks the Heights with one division while Sumner goes all in.
That would perhaps have been a more appropriate exchange of commands. The Heights were supposed to be a diversionary attack, the main one being down river to flank Jackson's Corp at Hamilton's Crossing. Sumner would likely have gone all in, as Franklin did not, given Burnside's half-hearted orders.
 
That would perhaps have been a more appropriate exchange of commands. The Heights were supposed to be a diversionary attack, the main one being down river to flank Jackson's Corp at Hamilton's Crossing. Sumner would likely have gone all in, as Franklin did not, given Burnside's half-hearted orders.
Franklin was never an "all-in" type anyway. Sumner might have been an interesting substitution. The outcome over there was not a given, especially in light of the inept gap in Jackson's front. But, with the exception of Meade, everybody else - Franklin, Birney, Reynolds, Gibbon - seems to have been "stoned" and that allowed Jackson, Hill, et al, to recover the situation.
 
One has to clear the town to hit the troops crossing the river. Line of sight and all.
Meade achieved his orders. The union artillery turned Jackson's artillery spot into "dead horse hill". Meade asked for reinforcements but was denied. Reynolds stopped the confederate counterattack that followed Mead's withdrawal.
 
One has to clear the town to hit the troops crossing the river. Line of sight and all.
Meade achieved his orders. The union artillery turned Jackson's artillery spot into "dead horse hill". Meade asked for reinforcements but was denied. Reynolds stopped the confederate counterattack that followed Mead's withdrawal.
You touch on an interesting point. Fighting on the west bank of the river on the Union right was an issue for the federal batteries who actually got there, for very obvious reasons. As for the left, Reynolds unfortunately was one of those who could have acted more promptly on that end. There was an opportunity but "time was of the essence". In addition to being a cautious plodder, I believe that Franklin and Burnside had disparate maps.
 
You touch on an interesting point. Fighting on the west bank of the river on the Union right was an issue for the federal batteries who actually got there, for very obvious reasons. As for the left, Reynolds unfortunately was one of those who could have acted more promptly on that end. There was an opportunity but "time was of the essence". In addition to being a cautious plodder, I believe that Franklin and Burnside had disparate maps.
If I remember correctly Meade requested support who would have been Reynolds, but the order was not sent by I forget who had command on that flank. That left Reynolds to beat back Jackson's counter attack.
 
I would say, Major(?) John Pelham and his CSA Stuart's horse artillery battery were the closest to the Union lines and did superbly well. Gen. Lee called him the, "Gallant Pelham." During the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. Lee observed Major Pelham and his artillery who were doing so well and said, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young."
 
I would say, Major(?) John Pelham and his CSA Stuart's horse artillery battery were the closest to the Union lines and did superbly well. Gen. Lee called him the, "Gallant Pelham." During the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. Lee observed Major Pelham and his artillery who were doing so well and said, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young."
You are kind of right - Excluding the hand-to-hand fighting at the Union break-through along the RF&P rail road tracks, and the supposedly Irish Brigade getting within a hundred feet of the Stone Wall, actually Lee, Jackson and Von Brcok got to within about 400 yards of the enemy while on a reconnaissance, as depicted by Mort Kuntsler https://www.mortkunstler.com/html/store-limited-edition-prints.asp?action=view&ID=131&cat=158. Mr Kuntsler, who is know for his accuracy was spot on with his print. I have been near the place the event occurred. Its on private property and Mr. Kuntsler hit it on the head with his rendition.
 
Last edited:
You are kind of right - Excluding the hand-to-hand fighting at the Union break-through along the RF&P rail road tracks, and the supposedly Irish Brigade getting within a hundred feet of the Stone Wall, actually Lee, Jackson and Von Brcok got to within about 400 yards of the enemy while on a reconnaissance, as depicted by Mort Kuntsler https://www.mortkunstler.com/html/store-limited-edition-prints.asp?action=view&ID=131&cat=158. Mr Kuntsler, who is know for his accuracy was spot on with his print. I have been near the place the event occurred. Its on private property and Mr. Kuntsler hit it on the head with his rendition.
I had no idea that Lee, Jackson and Von Borcke did that. As for Mort Kunstler, he does a great job and never saw this picture before. Thank you for sharing!
 
Franklin was never an "all-in" type anyway. Sumner might have been an interesting substitution. The outcome over there was not a given, especially in light of the inept gap in Jackson's front. But, with the exception of Meade, everybody else - Franklin, Birney, Reynolds, Gibbon - seems to have been "stoned" and that allowed Jackson, Hill, et al, to recover the situation.
At the time the Confederates start recovering the situation, Gibbon had left the field with a wound.
 

Learn About Us
About CivilWarTalk
Contact the Webmaster
Meet the Staff
Link to CivilWarTalk
Join Our Community
Register
Browse Forums
View Today's Discussions
Search the Forum
Get Help
FAQ
Student Guide
Forum Rules & Etiquette
Copyright / DMCA

     Contact Us CivilwarTalk on Facebook CivilWarTalk on YouTube CivilWarTalk on Twitter RSS Feed

Bringing the American Civil War and More to Life.
© 1999 - , CIVILWARTALK, LLC - Site Version 10.0

SlaveryTalk.com - SecessionTalk.com - CivilWarTalk.com - ReconstructionTalk.com
Back
Top