False Torpedoes in Mobile Bay

[MasonDixon]

@UCVRelics at the Mobile Muster brought up a very good point about the Battle of Mobile Bay.

Psychological Warfare was used regarding minefields in the Bay. Imagine the South being short on primers for the Sea Mines. Farragut was quoted as "**** the Torpedoes" but it was heroics out of risking 2 out of 3 sea mines were just submerged barrels. Maybe Admiral Farragut was using the thinking of "Big Sea Little Barrels" in the hopes he could prosecute his attack. The CSA judiciously used sea mines or sea mimes in the bay to thwart earlier invasions.

False Mines have been used in many wars to deny or channel the attackers into a kill zone. It makes me think that since there were a lot of empty barrels the CSA was singing the Beer Barrel Polka sometimes.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The threat of mines as a means of denying access is all out of proportion to the literal number of "infernal devices" deployed during the Civil War.

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

The threat of mines as a means of denying access is all out of proportion to the literal number of "infernal devices" deployed during the Civil War.

I don't agree with that. The mouth of the Blakely River was well-mined and I believe Thatcher? Was very cautious about that and his caution turned out to be a Good Thing. Farragut, in 1864, was able to to figure out that the torpedos had been sitting too long in the water and had become soaked. Unfortunately for the Tecumseh that wasn't the case but for the rest, they had. When the ships pushed up against them, they could hear the percussion caps going off but there weren't any explosions. Farragut was very brave and he intuited a lot and he was right with what he did but by 1865 the CSA engineers had figured out ways around that little problem. The mines were very deadly and to be respected. Even though the Feds were sweeping for mines, some would float downstream and still explode and sink a ship.

I don't believe Farragut could have done what he did in 1865, but then the CSA engineers wouldn't have realized they had a problem if he hadn't done what he did.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I don't agree with that. The mouth of the Blakely River was well-mined and I believe Thatcher? Was very cautious about that and his caution turned out to be a Good Thing. Farragut, in 1864, was able to to figure out that the torpedos had been sitting too long in the water and had become soaked. Unfortunately for the Tecumseh that wasn't the case but for the rest, they had. When the ships pushed up against them, they could hear the percussion caps going off but there weren't any explosions. Farragut was very brave and he intuited a lot and he was right with what he did but by 1865 the CSA engineers had figured out ways around that little problem. The mines were very deadly and to be respected. Even though the Feds were sweeping for mines, some would float downstream and still explode and sink a ship.

I don't believe Farragut could have done what he did in 1865, but then the CSA engineers wouldn't have realized they had a problem if he hadn't done what he did.

My post referred to a recognized military principle. The threat of mines, as is all too evident in Ukraine today, is sufficient to inhibit & complicate operations.

I just read an article about drones scattering little butterfly mines to intimidate civilians. An interviewee is afraid to pick tomatoes in his garden for fear of having his foot blown off. By the same token, the modest number of CSA torpedoes had an outsized impact on Union operations.

 

[Piedone]

I'd wonder if Farragut had obtained some insider information about the declining quality of the mines before he decided to take the risk to run over them?

 

[MasonDixon]

Reasoning and @UCVRelics made a excellent point was it was lack of chemicals for the detonators. In the end it sounds like a Meatloaf song line... "Two out of three detonators aint bad" This was a discussion post war room between ucv and Mr Brueske and it somewhat made sense, about a poor man war.

 

[MasonDixon]

Reasoning and @UCVRelics made a excellent point was it was lack of chemicals for the detonators. In the end it sounds like a Meatloaf song line... "Two out of three detonators aint bad" This was a discussion post war room between ucv and Mr Brueske and it somewhat made sense, about a poor man war.

One more point in this. In 1983 as a junior engineer officer, I was in a strategy lesson on "Area Denial". One of the lessons was the psychological impact of fake mines. Sometimes you try to deny an enemy access to an area by just making lumps of dirt making it look like mines were planted. Sometimes you just placed minefield signs, In 1864 maybe float an empty beer barrel? Farragut being quoted "**** the torpedoes" was a great line for the press, but for the ship of the line captains it was a pucker factor check unless you are the last ship in the line. Added caution leads to self doubt in commanders, slows operations, causes mistakes, buys time for defenders etc. If so that was brilliant as it would have tripled the viewable mines.

 

[Rhea Cole]

One more point in this. In 1983 as a junior engineer officer, I was in a strategy lesson on "Area Denial". One of the lessons was the psychological impact of fake mines. Sometimes you try to deny an enemy access to an area by just making lumps of dirt making it look like mines were planted. Sometimes you just placed minefield signs, In 1864 maybe float an empty beer barrel? Farragut being quoted "**** the torpedoes" was a great line for the press, but for the ship of the line captains it was a pucker factor check unless you are the last ship in the line. Added caution leads to self doubt in commanders, slows operations, causes mistakes, buys time for defenders etc. If so that was brilliant as it would have tripled the viewable mines.

Library Catalog - Kentucky Historical Society

Search books, manuscripts, photographs, oral histories, microfilm, and other genealogical resources. Advanced Search Search by County Please select a...

kyhistory.pastperfectonline.com

There was an elaborate complex of battery detonated mines (to use the modern term) installed at Columbus KY in 1862.

This was an example of the potential of asymmetric warfare that could have rewritten the history books. Why wasn't Vicksburg defended by an elaborate barrier festooned with electrically detonated mines?

Timeline of Michigan Copper Mining Prehistory to 1850 - Keweenaw National Historical Park (U.S. National Park Service)

www.nps.gov

It wasn't, as one would imagine, Confederate gov't incompetence or a clever Yankee plot. The reason had to do with an extraordinary deposit of metallurgical copper in the U. P. of Michigan.

Mine Warfare in the Civil War - The Army Historical Foundation

Written By: John Grady Early in the Civil War, hard-pressed Confederate Army officers in the West, like Major General Leonidas K. Polk, knew they were particularly exposed to the Union […]

armyhistory.org

As shallow as 8' a vast deposit of copper was exploited until after WWII. As a result, all of the copper mills & wire producers in the country were near the source.

After secession there was no reserve of telegraph wire anywhere in the Confederacy. By chance a ship laden with copper wire foundered & was salvaged by CSA authorities. That was the source of absolutely vital telegraph wire during the war.

Even though the designs of "infernal devices" were well known, there was no wire to construct them with.

A similar happenstance created the crippling war long shortage of of chinchona bark that was refined into quinine. In 1860 the only port receiving shipments from Peru was New York City. That was because the only facilities for processing the raw bark was there. The loss of access to quinine was a strategic disaster.

Unlike the Jesuit's bark, the CSA did have very limited copper production at Copper Hill near Chattanooga. Industrial level copper mills were never built up during the war. As a result, only very limited use of a potential game changer was ever implemented.

 

[Piedone]

Unlike the Jesuit's bark, the CSA did have very limited copper production at Copper Hill near Chattanooga. Industrial level copper mills were never built up during the war. As a result, only very limited use of a potential game changer was ever implemented.

If @NH Civil War Gal is right …

When the ships pushed up against them, they could hear the percussion caps going off but there weren't any explosions.

…then I'd say the old-fashioned detonators (without electricity and copper wiring) worked pretty well …
but the powder seems to have been the problem
(probably they couldn't seal the barrels really water-tight -

and obviously nobody thought about replacing the barrels after some time and drying the soaked powder.

This should have been a case of negligence -

as there definitely should have been enough powder to be had in Mobile

(a large part of the town was blown up when vast ammunition dumps exploded there immediately after the war)…

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

probably they couldn't seal the barrels really water-tight -

That was the real problem in 1864. They were getting it right by 1865.

 

[USS ALASKA]

One of the lessons was the psychological impact of fake mines.

Mines were, (and are) a danger. Just the threat of their employment, (real or imaginary), changes an adversaries tactical and operational dispositions, (like snipers / Quaker Guns / running trains all night...).

Mines have value in both offensive and defensive applications. For the non-peer or non-near-peer competitor, they are an excellent cost-effective, asymmetric option. For the stronger adversary, they can wreak havoc on the enemy - please see 'Operation Starvation'

Mining has a long history. Their first recorded use was by the Chinese in the 14th century.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[MasonDixon]

Mines were, (and are) a danger. Just the threat of their employment, (real or imaginary), changes an adversaries tactical and operational dispositions, (like snipers / Quaker Guns / running trains all night...).

Mines have value in both offensive and defensive applications. For the non-peer or non-near-peer competitor, they are an excellent cost-effective, asymmetric option. For the stronger adversary, they can wreak havoc on the enemy - please see 'Operation Starvation'

Mining has a long history. Their first recorded use was by the Chinese in the 14th century.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Thank you for the quote...

 

[52ndFandS]

I'd wonder if Farragut had obtained some insider information about the declining quality of the mines before he decided to take the risk to run over them?

Spies, literally everywhere. Either side. And I'm sure double agents as well.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Near Murfreesboro TN in 1863 a family in a carriage retuning from church were killed by an IED. As was an engine & ten car lash up that burned for three days. Nothing civil about that war. Of course, black powder & electricity was not the only way to create an infernal machine.

A recent discovery in Germany has resonance with this thread. In front of their works the Romans dug small holes & planted barbed spikes in the bottom. ( Grim looking examples pictured below. ) The holes were covered with bracken. Given the ignorance of sepsis, a wound like that was probably fatal, albeit, slowly. Interestingly, the Incas did the same thing to cripple Conquistador horses.

Roman defensive spike discoveries unveiled in Germany

Archaeologists from Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main have uncovered a series of wooden defensive spikes at a Roman fort in Bad Ems, western Germany

archaeologymag.com

Caltrop… what a strange word ?no? It is shocking to imagine the damage a barbed spike would do to a horse's hoof. Yet, here we are…

https://lieber.westpoint.edu/caltrop-ancient-weapon-modern-warfare/

 

[MasonDixon]

The Caltrop is still a modern day weapon against rubber tire vehicles. A new version is used by law enforcement to stop fleeing vehicles. It is also the symbol of the Third US Corps and Third Marines

 

[Rhea Cole]

Spies, literally everywhere. Either side. And I'm sure double agents as well.

Spies everywhere is exactly how Patric Cleburne characterized the slave population.

 

[UCVRelics]

When the ships pushed up against them, they could hear the percussion caps going off but there weren't any explosions.

They were just hearing the ship hit the barrel as not all the torpedoes/mines in Mobile Bay even had powder in them.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The Caltrop is still a modern day weapon against rubber tire vehicles. A new version is used by law enforcement to stop fleeing vehicles. It is also the symbol of the Third US Corps and Third Marines

RE: The link l posted up thread:

https://lieber.westpoint.edu/caltrop-ancient-weapon-modern-warfare/

 

[MasonDixon]

The army has lost the remembering of steel shank boots...

 

[Bruce Allardice]

@UCVRelics at the Mobile Muster brought up a very good point about the Battle of Mobile Bay.

Psychological Warfare was used regarding minefields in the Bay. Imagine the South being short on primers for the Sea Mines. Farragut was quoted as "**** the Torpedoes" but it was heroics out of risking 2 out of 3 sea mines were just submerged barrels. Maybe Admiral Farragut was using the thinking of "Big Sea Little Barrels" in the hopes he could prosecute his attack. The CSA judiciously used sea mines or sea mimes in the bay to thwart earlier invasions.

False Mines have been used in many wars to deny or channel the attackers into a kill zone. It makes me think that since there were a lot of empty barrels the CSA was singing the Beer Barrel Polka sometimes.

The Brazilian navy (in the contemporaneous War of the Triple Alliance) wasn't stopped by the mines that Paraguay laid in the Parana River at Humaita. The Brazilian ironclads passed the fortress, just as Farragut did at New Orleans and Mobile Bay.
One Brazilian ironclad was sunk by a free-floating mine later on.