Explain To Me Why Pickett's Charge Started So Late

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Longstreet didn't want to make any attacks at all, preferring a defensive/maneuver campaign, which is probably why he delayed and delayed some more.

IIRC, Longstreet was originally expected to attack the Union left on July 3, but as with July 2 the original intent of the attack was rendered impractical by Union deployment. Thus the audible to an attack on the center.

Longstreet claims he never received the order from Lee to attack in the morning, and he did not know what to expect until he met with Lee the morning of the 3rd.

I think Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell all failed to meet with Lee on the night of July 2-3. They weren't summoned and didn't go on their own accord. A serious mistake on Lee's part, even if he intended only to issue orders and not ask for any opinions.

Lee only met with Stuart, due to the latter reporting the return of his three cavalry bridges from their long adventure. (A meeting imagined or embellished by Shaara and others.)

 

[Bill Mountjoy]

The ANSWER lies in this:

 

[jackt62]

I think Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell all failed to meet with Lee on the night of July 2-3. They weren't summoned and didn't go on their own accord. A serious mistake on Lee's part, even if he intended only to issue orders and not ask for any opinions.

I think that points to one of the major problems with the way that Lee conducted operations. For such critical and major battle plans that involved multiple corps and divisions, spread out along a +10 mile front, Lee's haphazard method of communicating his instructions and ensuring that everyone was on the same page seemed amateurish. Lee was obviously not a practitioner of pre-op briefings with key subordinates (but I suppose that was expecting too much in those days).

 

[Johnny Shafto]

General George Gordon Meade…
"I shall remain in my present position tomorrow but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character."

On July 2nd, 3rd, and even on the 12th, the Union General utilized his Councils of War to better determine the operational environment. In doing so he gained a clearer picture of overall operations, the environment, and the intelligence information of both his army and that of the enemy.

It would seem that perhaps a lack of communication was the culprit for the Confederate cause. But why? A clash of personalities? A lack of the professionalism as demonstrated by Meade and the Union? A general misunderstanding?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

On July 2nd, 3rd, and even on the 12th, the Union General utilized his Councils of War to better determine the operational environment. In doing so he gained a clearer picture of overall operations, the environment, and the intelligence information of both his army and that of the enemy.

Lee had two brand new corps commanders for the campaign. Even if Lee wasn't angry at Longstreet for how things went down July 2 they don't seem to have gone down as Lee wished. Even Lee preferred to be hands-off this was a time that called for being more hands-on than normal.

I doubt I'm the first person to speculate that between frustration will all four of his corps commanders (each for a different reason) and his own health issues Lee simply wasn't in the right frame of mind on the night of July 2-3.

Meade recognized not only was he new to command, but also his shaky command structure due to casualties and questionable ability.

 

[Johnny Shafto]

Lee had two brand new corps commanders for the campaign. Even if Lee wasn't angry at Longstreet for how things went down July 2 they don't seem to have gone down as Lee wished. Even Lee preferred to be hands-off this was a time that called for being more hands-on than normal.

I doubt I'm the first person to speculate that between frustration will all four of his corps commanders (each for a different reason) and his own health issues Lee simply wasn't in the right frame of mind on the night of July 2-3.

Meade recognized not only was he new to command, but also his shaky command structure due to casualties and questionable ability.

"Meade recognized "…this says a lot. In his presentation Ranger Atkinson draws a parallel between the Lee - Longstreet relationship with that of a parent and child with a bad attitude. The implication is that Longstreet's attitude was of paramount importance. As proof Atkinson points out that Longstreet left the decision for Pickett to advance with Colonel Alexander based on Alexander's assessment of the success of the artillery bombardment. Basically a passing of the buck. An interesting theory. These observations, along with how Meade and his subordinates approached their work, seem to point to differences in levels of professionalism.

 

[jackt62]

It would seem that perhaps a lack of communication was the culprit for the Confederate cause. But why? A clash of personalities? A lack of the professionalism as demonstrated by Meade and the Union? A general misunderstanding?

Lee's usual practice was too paint the "big picture" and let his subordinate corps commanders figure out how to accomplish it. That worked reasonably well when he was dealing with Jackson and Longstreet, but after Chancellorsville that dynamic was very different. Not to mention the general lack of command and communication that was inherent in Lee's use of his limited staff.

 

[thomas aagaard]

Lee's usual practice was too paint the "big picture" and let his subordinate corps commanders figure out how to accomplish it. That worked reasonably well when he was dealing with Jackson and Longstreet, but after Chancellorsville that dynamic was very different. Not to mention the general lack of command and communication that was inherent in Lee's use of his limited staff.

What the prussians would call Auftragstaktik (mission command)

 

[johncla]

A lot of preparation and coordination were required.

Beating a dead horse, but...
Lately I'm fond of repeating that I'm neither a historian or military-trained, but...I note that Gottfried writes in his book 'Brigades of Gettysburg' that Lane and Scales brigades didn't receive orders to move into their starting positions until NOON. (I'm thinking that's how long it took, not that there was a plan to keep them fresh, out of the sun. Two to three hours exposed in 85 degrees open sun is still a lot.)

Wow, that's late. I scanned through the replies on this thread. The consensus seems to be "that's the way they rolled back then". Did I misread?

Are we sure they couldn't have started the charge round 10am? Just asking. I'm thinking especially of all the heatstroke occurring in the infantry laying around, deployed in the open for hours, waiting. Waiting. Waiting.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I'm thinking especially of all the heatstroke occurring in the infantry laying around, deployed in the open for hours, waiting.

Were they waiting in the open or among the shade of the trees on Seminary Ridge?

 

[Cornpone and Molasses]

Were they waiting in the open or among the shade of the trees on Seminary Ridge?

I imagine both.

 

[GwilymT]

It didn't start late. It started exactly as quickly as Lee's planning and orders dictated.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Three relevant pieces of information to add to this discussion.

First, Maj. Gen. Trimble. Lee met him mid-morning on July 3 and the two of them went to the cupola of the Alm's House for observations before returning to Ewell's headquarters, who had been absent. Just guesswork, but that was valuable one-on-one time for these men. Within an hour or two, Trimble received orders to take command of Pender's division and did so in the late forenoon. It was probably then that he visited his new command: "Trimble rode down the line and halted at different regiments and made us little speeches, saying that he was a stranger to us and had been sent to command us in the absence of our wounded general, and would lead us upon Cemetery Hill at 3 o'clock."

Next, I recently came upon this item, by W. H. Jenkins, a courier assigned to A. P. Hill: "The morning hours had been spent ... in massing the troops and arranging for a decisive effort about the noon hour or a little after. ... At A. P. Hill's headquarters a courier was called, and your correspondent answered, and the General said, 'Here is a circular message to the commanders of the artillery which you will deliver.' He handed me an open order to the officers of the Third Corps artillery, which I at once proceeded to deliver. This order was short, directing the artillery officers to open fire upon the Union lines at a signal which was to be given at a certain time from the Washington Artillery." At a minimum, the courier would likely have visited Col. R. Lindsay Walker and the five artillery battalion commanders spread out along the line for some 1.5 miles. This took time.

Finally, there is the question of Culp's Hill. Johnson, bolstered by Walker, O'Neal, Daniel and Smith, fought hard until nearly 11 a.m. - Lee may have been waiting to learn the outcome of this effort, which if successful, would have greatly altered the tactical situation for the Confederates. At the very least, it tied up and wore down significant Federal forces that otherwise would have been fresh and readily available to counterattack the charge of Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble, in other words, improving the latter's chances of success.

 

[WScott]

I think that Lee really didn't know what he wanted to do on July 3rd. Stuart just got back with his cavalry, Longstreet was stalled on the right and the plan for taking Culps Hill was a day late. Lee decided to send Stuart on a circular attack mission and to attack Meade's center. To give this plan any hope of success Lee needed to get all elements in place as early as possible. To me it was already to late for Pickett's attack to succeed.

Lee got involved in a battle on July 1 that he didn't plan on. He was consolidating his army but undertook an attack on his right. With faulty intelligence, that attack got started to late in day and needed to be just a little further to the south. And his solution to victory on July 3rd was an undermanned attack on the center of the Union line. It seems that Lee was always just a step behind at Gettysburg. Maybe July 3rd should have been a day for evaluation, preparation, planning and than execution.

 

[rpkennedy]

Lee decided to send Stuart on a circular attack mission and to attack Meade's center.

That's not accurate. Stuart had two roles when he was sent out off to the left. First, he was to protect the flank of the army. Secondly, being so close to the Baltimore Road, he was to watch for an opportunity to sow chaos in case the Union army was forced to retreat and potentially force a rout with his cavalry. This is why the fight between Gregg and Stuart was so important. Gregg was blocking Stuart from accessing the Low Dutch Road which led to the Baltimore Road due east of the Round Tops.

Ryan

 

[thomas aagaard]

That's not accurate. Stuart had two roles when he was sent out off to the left. First, he was to protect the flank of the army. Secondly, being so close to the Baltimore Road, he was to watch for an opportunity to sow chaos in case the Union army was forced to retreat and potentially force a rout with his cavalry. This is why the fight between Gregg and Stuart was so important. Gregg was blocking Stuart from accessing the Low Dutch Road which led to the Baltimore Road due east of the Round Tops.

Ryan

Stuarts job was making sure that federal cavalry did not get into Lee's rear.

Technically the federal cavalry was actually in Lee's rear, since the csa lines basically had a rear from south west to east. (clockwise)
But as long as both groups of cavalry was combat ready they where basically pinning each other in position.
(the rather minor casualties sow that both sides where willing to accept that)