Expanding the CS army

[atlantis]

In 1861 it was decided to expand the CS army from 100,000 to 300,000. Does anyone know how this size was determined? I have read that Northrup worried how he was going to feed the increase when he was already struggling. This gives me the sense that the support bureaus of the war department may have had little or no input on force size.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would guess that it was related to an interplay between the concerns of the support bureaus and the fact that the Union was asking for 500,000 volunteers. You need something within shouting distance of the expected Union force or you'll lose anyway.

 

[Lubliner]

Do you think the Government in Richmond had access to the census of the southern states of the confederacy, and made a call for what they determined to be available?
Lubliner.

 

[Gavrilo Sartorys]

From what I've read, it seems that the number of volunteering men in 1861 largely filled this quota but only 100,000 could be armed at that time. Therefore, 200,000 potential recruits were useless for the Confederacy because of a lack of weapon. I've also read that Davis refused the opportunity to use a dozen of commercial ships for early transactions with Europe (allowing the army to get the necessary material faster). At the contrary, he believed that the embargo policy was the best way to get a diplomatical advantage, a huge mistake considering the weakness of the Confederate States Army. Davis cancelled this decision too late.

 

[Bruce Allardice]

The Confederacy had approximately 1 million male citizens of military age (18-45) within its borders.
The leaders of the Confederacy were aware of the 1860 census numbers, if for no other reason than as politicians, they'd be well aware of the Congressional redistricting that would accompany the census numbers.
In 1861 they lacked the arms and equipment to create a large army. Ted Savas points out that throughout 1861, the CSA had only enough gunpowder for about 2 major battles. Even if they won those 2 battles, they'd have no gunpowder to fight a third. Plus they lacked, and would continue to lack, the transportation infrastructure to move needed food and supplies to where they were needed.
And while President Davis probably should have allowed more cotton to be shipped out prior to the blockade, David Surdam's book on the Blockade makes it clear that the Confederacy lacked the ships to transport large amounts of cotton to Europe, and to bring back large amounts of arms.

 

[Saphroneth]

It's simply impossible to put the whole of a population into arms.

The best example of this is probably 1945 Germany, where there were still male civilians even though they were extending conscription down as far as boys of 12 years.


Given the relative populations you'd expect the CSA to be outnumbered between 2:1 and 2.5:1. In general they were outnumbered by less than this, which suggests that they were doing better than the Union at mobilizing their populace.

 

[Rhea Cole]

First off, the CSA never had control of all of its territory. The gaudiest example is, of course, West Virginia. Add to that East Tennessee, Western North Carolina & North Georgia. In Tennessee, the three great divisions of the state East, Middle & West had radically different reactions to secession. Shelbyville, the town where Bragg made his HQ after Stones River was referred to as "... that Union hole..." With the loss of Middle Tennessee after the fall of Fort Donelson, the most densely populated counties in the state were permanently outside CSA control. With the concurrent capture of Memphis, the single major population center in West Tennessee was lost, about 2/3rds of the state population was lost to CSA control. Resistance to CSA in East Tennessee began almost the second the ink dried on the state's secession declaration.

The most hapless, sad & tragic group of soldiers I am aware of were overage men in their 40's drafted by the CSA from Strawberry Plaines. After nearly freezing to death in the winter, they were sent off to Vicksburg just in time to suffer the siege. As a living history program, my wife & I have used the letters that a family where one of those men was sent to recover after the surrender. As he lay dying, he repeatedly expressed concern about his bee hives. Needless to say, he & his neighbors did not give a fig about fighting for the right to hold other human beings as property.

My point is that just because there was a certain number of men of military age in a given county in 1860, that does not translate into men of military age who can be brought into the ranks. As Jefferson Davis so rightly stated, the CSA did not have enough white males of military age to both fight the war & stay at home to control the servile population. Throughout the war, CSA military planning was caught on the forks of the dilemma created by maintaining the absolutely essential slave patrols & recruiting. The infamous 20 slave rule that was such a propaganda disaster sprang from that conundrum.

As the consolidation of regiments as the war went on demonstrates, whatever the raw number of white men in their middle 20's was, the CSA simply did not have any means of filling out its ranks. I am probably able to write this because my ancestor drew a straw to stay home when the State Army of Tennessee was formed before secession. It was recognized that not all the men willing to join up could go. A lottery was the best way to be fair & also maintain dignity. The fall of Donelson placed him firmly behind Union lines & safe from CSA enrollment officers for the duration. You might say that worked out just fine for me.