Ewell's Corps Redeploys to Right Wing

[General Butterfield]

Hello,

During the meetings on the night of July 1st, Ewell expressed to Lee his fears on attacking the entrenched Union positions on Cemetery and Culp's Hill. In response to this some discussion was made of pulling back the Confederate left and redeploying the bulk of Ewell's Corps on the right wing. This seems like an interesting option to me because it would have concentrated Confederate forces for the attack on the afternoon of July 2nd. Ewell could have been in position to enhance either Longstreet's or A.P. Hill's assaults. I do think Cemetery-Culp hills is the more important positions to take but the chances of a major breakthrough seems greater on the right/right-center

With hindsight would this have been a better move? Could it have lead to decisive results on July 2nd?

 

[infomanpa]

I think with all the great complexities of this battle, it would be almost impossible to predict.

 

[PeterT]

I think with all the great complexities of this battle, it would be almost impossible to predict.

True. Would they be readily observed redeploying? I think so. Meade then utilises his numerical advantage by moving more troops to his left and left/centre while holding the right. Too hard to know.

 

[General Butterfield]

True. Would they be readily observed redeploying? I think so. Meade then utilises his numerical advantage by moving more troops to his left and left/centre while holding the right. Too hard to know.

Yeah I think it could go either way. The Confederates might have been able to pull off a secret redeployment or not. Neither side really had a handle on where everyone's lines were located exactly. I recall Sickles through he was position at the end of the Confederate line when it actually went on much further.

 

[Carronade]

True. Would they be readily observed redeploying? I think so. Meade then utilises his numerical advantage by moving more troops to his left and left/centre while holding the right. Too hard to know.

Good thought. Perhaps the Confederates would leave one of Ewell's divisions to demonstrate against the Union right, keep them from realizing what the rebs were really up to.

It would be a complicated series of movements, with Ewell's corps moving across the Confederate position while Longstreet was coming up, both of them needing to form up on the right. Lee's staff would have to manage the road network to avoid conflict.

 

[Greywolf]

If I recall correctly Oates Alabamians nearly broke the union left. It wouldn't be a stretch to say if there was even 1 or 2 more brigades on the right they may have at least partially rolled up the union left. Now would it have meant a huge breakthrough or complete unraveling of the left? That would be impossible to answer.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think if Ewell's corps had been withdrawn and moved completely to the right, Lee would have had to adopt Longstreet's flanking proposal and maneuvered his army to the south to get between the Army of the Potomac & Washington. Otherwise his army would have been in real danger of being cut off from the Chambersburg Pike/Cashtown Pass, which might have been disastrous.

If Ewell's corps had been withdrawn, Meade would had been able to reseize the town. I think Lee had to maintain a force within the town, so I'm not sure how much punch could have been safely added to the attack on the right.

Withdrawing Ewell's corps would also have allowed Meade to straighten his own line by occupying Benner's Hill and Brinkerhoff Ridge. This would have eliminated two of the weaknesses of Meade's position -- the vulnerability of the Baltimore Pike lifeline, and the vulnerability of the Cemetery Hill position to be attacked from the east and the west at the same time. In other words, Ewell's withdrawal would have strengthened Meade's hold on Cemetery Hill

 

[rpkennedy]

If Ewell moves away, Meade can leave a skeleton force on Culp's and Power's Hills, leaving the Twelfth Corps to move to the left. The real difficulty is moving Ewell without the Union seeing. With possession of Cemetery Hill at one end and Little Round Top on the other, there is no way for Ewell to leave without it being seen.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

If I recall correctly Oates Alabamians nearly broke the union left. It wouldn't be a stretch to say if there was even 1 or 2 more brigades on the right they may have at least partially rolled up the union left. Now would it have meant a huge breakthrough or complete unraveling of the left? That would be impossible to answer.

Of course, the soldiers that could be moved from the right to the left may have been able to stop the Confederates.

Ryan

 

[ivanj05]

The closest that Lee's army probably got to victory at Gettysburg was late on July 2 on Culp's and Cemetary Hills. While I agree with the conventional wisdom that Ewell's corps was mostly wasted where it was on the second and third days, it also bears noting that such a serious redeployment of Confederate forces isn't likely to go unobserved, and Meade is the guy with the larger army and the interior lines.

 

[Greywolf]

Of course, the soldiers that could be moved from the right to the left may have been able to stop the Confederates.

Ryan

Absolutely right, as several have mentioned, that would be the near impossible task. Maybe a brigade could have been moved without as much notice or federal concern, especially at night. The whole corp, not likely at all. Also, the lack of Stuart's cavalry covering this flank would severely limit any such move.

 

[jhill49913]

Harry Pfanz reached the conclusion that Lee's failure to redeploy Ewell, was his undoing on the second day. Historically, Ewell spent most of the day doing nothing, which allowed Meade to shift most of the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Corps to oppose Longstreet. Had Ewell shifted Johnson's division to the right and in position on Anderson's left, it seems likely that Lee's attack in echelon would have tested Meade's entire line. With the entire attack's success depending on Ewell, wouldn't he try to redeem himself following his failure to take the heights the day before?

 

[rpkennedy]

Harry Pfanz reached the conclusion that Lee's failure to redeploy Ewell, was his undoing on the second day. Historically, Ewell spent most of the day doing nothing, which allowed Meade to shift most of the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Corps to oppose Longstreet. Had Ewell shifted Johnson's division to the right and in position on Anderson's left, it seems likely that Lee's attack in echelon would have tested Meade's entire line. With the entire attack's success depending on Ewell, wouldn't he try to redeem himself following his failure to take the heights the day before?

Historically, the attack broke down at Mahone so Johnson further down the line won't help much. Anderson needed to be much more on the ball at Gettysburg.


Ryan

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Historically, the attack broke down at Mahone so Johnson further down the line won't help much. Anderson needed to be much more on the ball at Gettysburg.


Ryan

Pender's division was deployed in that general area I believe. Other than Pender being wounded, this may be the part of the battle I least understand. But his division was supposed to attack the western side of Cemetery Hill, which never happened. Had the attack taken place in conjunction with Early's division on the Eastern side, the Confederates may very well have seized the hill.

 

[BillO]

If I recall correctly Oates Alabamians nearly broke the union left. It wouldn't be a stretch to say if there was even 1 or 2 more brigades on the right they may have at least partially rolled up the union left. Now would it have meant a huge breakthrough or complete unraveling of the left? That would be impossible to answer.

Or if AP Hills men had done something other than watch.

 

[Jimklag]

Harry Pfanz reached the conclusion that Lee's failure to redeploy Ewell, was his undoing on the second day. Historically, Ewell spent most of the day doing nothing, which allowed Meade to shift most of the Fifth, Sixth and Twelfth Corps to oppose Longstreet. Had Ewell shifted Johnson's division to the right and in position on Anderson's left, it seems likely that Lee's attack in echelon would have tested Meade's entire line. With the entire attack's success depending on Ewell, wouldn't he try to redeem himself following his failure to take the heights the day before?

Except he had no idea he had failed. All of Ewell's self-recriminations came much later. On July 2, he had no idea he had something to atone for.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Pender's division was deployed in that general area I believe. Other than Pender being wounded, this may be the part of the battle I least understand. But his division was supposed to attack the western side of Cemetery Hill, which never happened. Had the attack taken place in conjunction with Early's division on the Eastern side, the Confederates may very well have seized the hill.

I meant Rodes's division should have assaulted the western side of Cemetery Hill.