Ewell dies at Gettysburg

[Stryker65]

Hey folks,
In this thread, I brought up the question of what would've happened had Ewell died at Gettysburg. My idea is about what would happen if, say, he was actually killed at Second Winchester, by the "spent bullet" that hit him there, or on July 1. What are your thoughts? Probably Culp's Hill would've went differently.
-Stryker
Note: Thanks to @10thMichiganInfantry for suggesting I do a thread on this topic

 

[Luke Freet]

Hey folks,
In this thread, I brought up the question of what would've happened had Ewell died at Gettysburg. My idea is about what would happen if, say, he was actually killed at Second Winchester, by the "spent bullet" that hit him there, or on July 1. What are your thoughts? Probably Culp's Hill would've went differently.
-Stryker
Note: Thanks to @10thMichiganInfantry for suggesting I do a thread on this topic

1.) Wouldn't change anything I'd say. Ewell didn't do anything egregiously wrong, as most modern historians have pointed out, by the time he had the forces on the field to assault Cemetary & Culp's Hill, it was night and the Union had already been significantly reinforced. Really don't see how anything else could have changed.
2.) If he were killed (or more likely incapacitated due to wounding or simply had his health collapse like it did near the end of the Overland Campaign the next year), command of the corps would have gone to Jubal Early, the senior division commander of the corps (date of rank to Jan 17th; compared to Ed Johnson, Feb 28th; & Rodes, May 2nd).

 

[ErnieMac]

I agree that Early would have been Ewell's successor. Who would have been Early's successor?

John Gordon, who eventually received Early's Division after the Wilderness in May 1864, had only been a brigadier for two months. Harry Hays was the senior brigadier in Early's Division. He was coming off of excellent performances at Salem Church and 2nd Winchester.

On the other hand, the ANV had a spare major general during the campaign in the person of Isaac Trimble. Trimble's slow recovery from his 2nd Manassas wound meant the division he was slated to receive went to Edward Johnson instead. Unassigned during the opening of the campaign, Trimble quickly wore out his welcome with Lee and Ewell by the end of July 1. Lee, however, did not hesitate to assign Trimble to command Pender's Division when that officer was mortally wounded on July 2.

I am leaning toward Trimble.

 

[Jim Heen]

I agree with Luke Freet in the above post. Lee told Ewell to take Cemetery Hill, if practicable, but not to bring on a general engagement. Ewell considered his forces. Early's division was down two briagdes because "Extra Billy" Smith's brigade had been sent out to the York Road to investigate a report of advancing Union troops (since there was no JEB Stuart) and Gordon's brigade was then sent out to reinforce Smith based on Smith's report of a large approacing force. Rodes division had suffered a lot of casualties earlier in the day and Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division was still on the road to Gettysburg.

Ewell asked Lee what troops would support him if he advanced on Cemetery Hill, but Lee told him he was on his own as Hill's troops were fought out and Longstreet was too far away. Then, Rodes told Ewell that his men were too exhausted to assist Early in an assault on Cemetery Hill, which looked to Ewell to be a very strong position with fresh infantry and artillery.

About this time, Ewell was notified that Culp's Hill was unoccupied by Union troops and it dominated Cemetery Hill. He was also notified that Johnson's division was only an hour away. Ewell decided that Johnson's fresh troops would be sent to occupy Culp's Hill when they arrived. This would force the federal evacuation of Cemetery Hill without bringing on a general engagement, as Lee had ordered.

However, Johnson arrived just before dark - 2 hours later than projected. He still planned to advance on Culp's Hill, but the 20-man scouting party he sent up to confirm the hill was still unoccupied was frightened off in the dark by a 7th Indiana 3-man picket detail. It was the final Union picket detail on the hill. Had Johnson's scouting party gone up 100 yards further south, they encounter no Union soldiers and his 8,000 man division occupies Culp's Hil. If so, Gettysburg is probably a one-day battle.

Ewell's actions were reasonable under the circumstances, though he came in for some later second guessing with the benefit of hind-sight, including Trimble's "Give me one brigade - nay one regiment - and I will take that hill." Trimble was a bit of a pain and this was not the first time he used that "Give me one brigade, etc." speech.

 

[10th Michigan Infantry]

1.) Wouldn't change anything I'd say. Ewell didn't do anything egregiously wrong, as most modern historians have pointed out, by the time he had the forces on the field to assault Cemetary & Culp's Hill, it was night and the Union had already been significantly reinforced. Really don't see how anything else could have changed.
2.) If he were killed (or more likely incapacitated due to wounding or simply had his health collapse like it did near the end of the Overland Campaign the next year), command of the corps would have gone to Jubal Early, the senior division commander of the corps (date of rank to Jan 17th; compared to Ed Johnson, Feb 28th; & Rodes, May 2nd).

Assuming Ewell is killed, do you think Early would be all that more capable? I mean we know how the 1864 Valley Campaign went.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

In this thread, I brought up the question of what would've happened had Ewell died at Gettysburg. My idea is about what would happen if, say, he was actually killed at Second Winchester, by the "spent bullet" that hit him there, or on July 1. What are your thoughts? Probably Culp's Hill would've went differently.

Thought this is an interesting question. I don't normally venture into the speculation of 'what ifs'. But the question raised made me think about who were the capable Southern Division commanders at the start of Gettysburg who might have capably filled the Corps command role in the event of Ewell's unavailability.

To begin. Following Jackson's death, I thought Ewell deserved at the time to take over Second Corps, even though he was previously untested at Corps command level. Thought Ewell earned his May 23 promotion on the basis of seniority of rank and for his performances as a division commander during Jackson's Valley Campaign in the previous year. (On May 30, A. P. Hill, who similarly had no prior Corps command experience, also got command of the newly established Third Corps).

On July 1, the reorganized Second Corps contained several able brigade commanders, including Gordon, Daniels, Doles and Ramseur. But none of these had experience in higher command roles – it was too big a leap in command responsibility to elevate any of them at this time to Corps command.

Without considering the possibility of transferring Division commanders from other Corps, the list of eligible Division commanders within the Second Corps on July 1 from which a possible substitute for Ewell could be considered were:

Jubal Early

Edward Johnson

Robert Rodes

Of these three Division commanders within Second Corps, only Early had sufficient prior Division command experience. Johnson had no prior Division command experience, and Rodes, as capable as he was, had only brief experience in acting command of a Division.

From within Second Corps thought Early was the most eligible replacement for Corps command because he previously performed capably as a field division commander and because he was resourceful, fearless and demonstrated a capacity for acting independently and with initiative. Early also had a proven ability of following Lee's orders, including discretionary ones (like at Fredericksburg).

It's worthwhile considering that if 'Old Jube', not Ewell, had command of Second Corps on July 1, whether the actions and outcomes might have been different on that day. In this regard, it's interesting to contrast Early's views/attitudes with Ewell's at the time. Early repeatedly urged Ewell to take the apparently unoccupied Culp's Hill with Johnson's division and was confident of taking Cemetery Hill if an immediate assault was launched by both Ewell's and Hill's corps and he pressed for this action with both Corps commanders. But Ewell was tentative and hesitated. Even when he received Lee's discretionary orders to take Cemetery Hill 'if practicable', Ewell chose not to make the assault. (That would not be the only time during war that Ewell seemingly became paralyzed and indecisive at crucial moments ).

One can only wonder what would have happened if Early commanded the Second Corps that day in these same circumstances.

 

[John Wolf Smith]

Thought this is an interesting question. I don't normally venture into the speculation of 'what ifs'. But the question raised made me think about who were the capable Southern Division commanders at the start of Gettysburg who might have capably filled the Corps command role in the event of Ewell's unavailability.

To begin. Following Jackson's death, I thought Ewell deserved at the time to take over Second Corps, even though he was previously untested at Corps command level. Thought Ewell earned his May 23 promotion on the basis of seniority of rank and for his performances as a division commander during Jackson's Valley Campaign in the previous year. (On May 30, A. P. Hill, who similarly had no prior Corps command experience, also got command of the newly established Third Corps).

On July 1, the reorganized Second Corps contained several able brigade commanders, including Gordon, Daniels, Doles and Ramseur. But none of these had experience in higher command roles – it was too big a leap in command responsibility to elevate any of them at this time to Corps command.

Without considering the possibility of transferring Division commanders from other Corps, the list of eligible Division commanders within the Second Corps on July 1 from which a possible substitute for Ewell could be considered were:

Jubal Early

Edward Johnson

Robert Rodes

Of these three Division commanders within Second Corps, only Early had sufficient prior Division command experience. Johnson had no prior Division command experience, and Rodes, as capable as he was, had only brief experience in acting command of a Division.

From within Second Corps thought Early was the most eligible replacement for Corps command because he previously performed capably as a field division commander and because he was resourceful, fearless and demonstrated a capacity for acting independently and with initiative. Early also had a proven ability of following Lee's orders, including discretionary ones (like at Fredericksburg).

It's worthwhile considering that if 'Old Jube', not Ewell, had command of Second Corps on July 1, whether the actions and outcomes might have been different on that day. In this regard, it's interesting to contrast Early's views/attitudes with Ewell's at the time. Early repeatedly urged Ewell to take the apparently unoccupied Culp's Hill with Johnson's division and was confident of taking Cemetery Hill if an immediate assault was launched by both Ewell's and Hill's corps and he pressed for this action with both Corps commanders. But Ewell was tentative and hesitated. Even when he received Lee's discretionary orders to take Cemetery Hill 'if practicable', Ewell chose not to make the assault. (That would not be the only time during war that Ewell seemingly became paralyzed and indecisive at crucial moments ).

One can only wonder what would have happened if Early commanded the Second Corps that day in these same circumstances.

Edward Johnson commanded a small division under Jackson at McDowell with two brigades under colonels William Campbell Scott and Z. Turner Conner.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Edward Johnson commanded a small division under Jackson at McDowell with two brigades under colonels William Campbell Scott and Z. Turner Conner.

Not sure whether Johnson's command (comprising two brigades, of three regiments each) at McDowell was organized and officially designated as a division. (At the time, he was a B-G, not a M-G).

 

[Belfoured]

Assuming Ewell is killed, do you think Early would be all that more capable? I mean we know how the 1864 Valley Campaign went.

Regarding only July 1 and the (endless) Cemetery Hill discussion, it's important to recall what appears to have been Early's input to Ewell that he took into account - along the lines of "go get 'em, tiger - but not with my exhausted/fought out division ..." (And we know that Rodes's division was truly fought out)

 

[Desert Kid]

Thought this is an interesting question. I don't normally venture into the speculation of 'what ifs'. But the question raised made me think about who were the capable Southern Division commanders at the start of Gettysburg who might have capably filled the Corps command role in the event of Ewell's unavailability.

To begin. Following Jackson's death, I thought Ewell deserved at the time to take over Second Corps, even though he was previously untested at Corps command level. Thought Ewell earned his May 23 promotion on the basis of seniority of rank and for his performances as a division commander during Jackson's Valley Campaign in the previous year. (On May 30, A. P. Hill, who similarly had no prior Corps command experience, also got command of the newly established Third Corps).

On July 1, the reorganized Second Corps contained several able brigade commanders, including Gordon, Daniels, Doles and Ramseur. But none of these had experience in higher command roles – it was too big a leap in command responsibility to elevate any of them at this time to Corps command.

Without considering the possibility of transferring Division commanders from other Corps, the list of eligible Division commanders within the Second Corps on July 1 from which a possible substitute for Ewell could be considered were:

Jubal Early

Edward Johnson

Robert Rodes

Of these three Division commanders within Second Corps, only Early had sufficient prior Division command experience. Johnson had no prior Division command experience, and Rodes, as capable as he was, had only brief experience in acting command of a Division.

From within Second Corps thought Early was the most eligible replacement for Corps command because he previously performed capably as a field division commander and because he was resourceful, fearless and demonstrated a capacity for acting independently and with initiative. Early also had a proven ability of following Lee's orders, including discretionary ones (like at Fredericksburg).

It's worthwhile considering that if 'Old Jube', not Ewell, had command of Second Corps on July 1, whether the actions and outcomes might have been different on that day. In this regard, it's interesting to contrast Early's views/attitudes with Ewell's at the time. Early repeatedly urged Ewell to take the apparently unoccupied Culp's Hill with Johnson's division and was confident of taking Cemetery Hill if an immediate assault was launched by both Ewell's and Hill's corps and he pressed for this action with both Corps commanders. But Ewell was tentative and hesitated. Even when he received Lee's discretionary orders to take Cemetery Hill 'if practicable', Ewell chose not to make the assault. (That would not be the only time during war that Ewell seemingly became paralyzed and indecisive at crucial moments ).

One can only wonder what would have happened if Early commanded the Second Corps that day in these same circumstances.

Early was a bit of an acolyte of and protoge of Stonewall himself.

Force and aggression would be how he'd approach July 1st.

 

[Belfoured]

Early was a bit of an acolyte of and protoge of Stonewall himself.

Force and aggression would be how he'd approach July 1st.

If we're referring to Cemetery Hill on July 1, that's not quite what he told Ewell. Rodes's division was already out of the mix for good reason. Ole Jube took his out, as well. That left only Johnson, once he arrived. Ewell made the right decision given his ambiguous orders, Lee removing any support from Hill, and two of his three divisions unavailable. Early's leaving it to Ewell/Johnson reminds me of the soldiers' take on Patton's "Old Blood and Guts" nickname - "our blood and his guts'. Here, "Johnson's blood and Jubal's guts" ...

 

[Stryker65]

I agree that Early would have been Ewell's successor. Who would have been Early's successor?

John Gordon, who eventually received Early's Division after the Wilderness in May 1864, had only been a brigadier for two months. Harry Hays was the senior brigadier in Early's Division. He was coming off of excellent performances at Salem Church and 2nd Winchester.

On the other hand, the ANV had a spare major general during the campaign in the person of Isaac Trimble. Trimble's slow recovery from his 2nd Manassas wound meant the division he was slated to receive went to Edward Johnson instead. Unassigned during the opening of the campaign, Trimble quickly wore out his welcome with Lee and Ewell by the end of July 1. Lee, however, did not hesitate to assign Trimble to command Pender's Division when that officer was mortally wounded on July 2.

I am leaning toward Trimble.

I just realized something...

Trimble was appointed on the same day as Early, January 17, 1863

What if Trimble was assigned to the command of the corps instead? He was one of the main proponents of taking Culp's Hill; could he have done it? Lee might not have trusted him with the corps, but then again Early wasn't a cheerful, friendly guy either...

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Assuming Ewell is killed, do you think Early would be all that more capable? I mean we know how the 1864 Valley Campaign went.

Early beat Crook at Kernstown, and did fine in the thrust and parry with Sheridan before Winchester. Even then he was beaten in no small part because he was outnumbered and his cavalry was bad (especially after Moorefield). Cedar Creek was bold, but overly ambitious (shades of Hood).

The Valley did expose Early's weaknesses as a commander, but I think he was still probably the best corps commander Lee ever had not named Jackson or Longstreet. And I say that as someone who finds him insufferable as a person.

 

[rpkennedy]

I just realized something...

Trimble was appointed on the same day as Early, January 17, 1863

What if Trimble was assigned to the command of the corps instead? He was one of the main proponents of taking Culp's Hill; could he have done it? Lee might not have trusted him with the corps, but then again Early wasn't a cheerful, friendly guy either...

Just as a note, Early was still senior as his appointment to brigadier general preceded Trimble's. Early's date of rank was 7/21/61 (backdated to 1/23/61) while Trimble's was 8/9/61.

Ryan

 

[Luke Freet]

Just as a note, Early was still senior as his appointment to brigadier general preceded Trimble's. Early's date of rank was 7/21/61 (backdated to 1/23/61) while Trimble's was 8/9/61.

Ryan

That would not matter. As far as I've come across, the Confederates don't care about previous rank but current rank. This was the case at Ezra Church; Corps commanders A. P. Stewart and S. D. Lee held the same date of rank as Lt. Generals, though Stewart had been a Major General before Lee and a brigadier years before Lee. Despite this neither man had seniority at the battle, and Stewart chose to defer to Lee's judgement as the guy on the scene.

 

[rpkennedy]

That would not matter. As far as I've come across, the Confederates don't care about previous rank but current rank. This was the case at Ezra Church; Corps commanders A. P. Stewart and S. D. Lee held the same date of rank as Lt. Generals, though Stewart had been a Major General before Lee and a brigadier years before Lee. Despite this neither man had seniority at the battle, and Stewart chose to defer to Lee's judgement as the guy on the scene.

I stand corrected. I was under the impression that the CSA followed the same rules in regards to seniority as the US.

Ryan

 

[jackt62]

Ewell actually performed very well in the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign. He effectively led his Corps as the ANV's vanguard, creditably assaulted and captured Winchester, and quickly re-concentrated his disparate divisions in obedience to Lee's orders on July 1st. Given his on-site analysis to not attempt carrying Cemetery (or Culps) Hills, the very discretionary orders from Lee, and Ewell's experience with Jackson's absolutely explicit means of conveying instructions, Ewell's decision was properly made. Whether Early, Johnson, or Rodes would have acted differently in Ewell's absence is mere speculation, despite Trimble or Early's braggadocio about assaulting the hills. To be sure, Ewell did manifest leadership deficiencies as time went on, and which became particularly acute during the Overland Campaign. But as far as Gettysburg is concerned, I don't see a difference in the ultimate outcome of the battle without Ewell.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

Hey folks,
In this thread, I brought up the question of what would've happened had Ewell died at Gettysburg. My idea is about what would happen if, say, he was actually killed at Second Winchester, by the "spent bullet" that hit him there, or on July 1. What are your thoughts? Probably Culp's Hill would've went differently.
-Stryker
Note: Thanks to @10thMichiganInfantry for suggesting I do a thread on this topic

As long as we are being hypothetical, what IF Stonewall Jackson, instead of dying, had recovered just in time, and was assigned to command the corps that Ewell had? I would see a probability of aggression, probably with some twist in tactics, that would have resulted in a prompt Confederate occupation of Culp's Hill. After that the entire battlefield situation would of course have been radically different. My view would envision a Federal retreat.

 

[jackt62]

I would see a probability of aggression, probably with some twist in tactics, that would have resulted in a prompt Confederate occupation of Culp's Hill.

In alternative storytelling, Stonewall often gets posthumous "credit" for being able to carry Cemetery or Culps Hills with ease. But let's not forget Stonewall's own admission of the limits of his offensive vs. defensive capabilities: "My men sometimes fail to take a position, but to defend one, never!"

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

In alternative storytelling, Stonewall often gets posthumous "credit" for being able to carry Cemetery or Culps Hills with ease. But let's not forget Stonewall's own admission of the limits of his offensive vs. defensive capabilities: "My men sometimes fail to take a position, but to defend one, never!"

Accepted.