Evacuating the Peninsula

[tony_gunter]

Out of curiosity, I've been reading the communications between Lincoln / Stanton / Halleck / McClellan in early August 1862.

What a clown car. Halleck tells McClellan July 31 to evacuate his sick and wounded, but doesn't tell him why. McClellan assumes it's in reference to his non-ambulatory sick and wounded to relieve him of having to utilize transports for hospital supplies. Halleck on the 3rd (received on the 4th) orders him to evacuate the peninsula to Aquia Creek. McClellan briefly objects and is overruled.

Here's where the real clown car stuff begins.

Halleck orders McClellan to make a reconnaissance in force toward Richmond. McClellan sends two corps ten miles, which elicits a Confederate movement toward him.

Halleck orders McClellan to prioritize his withdrawal thusly:

1) Send a brigade of cavalry and six batteries.
2) Evacuate the sick and wounded.
3) Evacuate transportation and materiel.
4) Evacuate the remaining troops.

But all of his cavalry is engaged in the reconnaissance previously ordered.

The problem with this is that McClellan is at Harrison's Landing.
1) Harrison's Landing is an unimproved riverboat landing, only a handful of boats can load/unload at any time.
2) Most of the boats at the landing are already encumbered with supplies.
3) Most of the transport available to McClellan are deep draft vessels incapable of docking at Harrison's Landing.

McClellan IIRC has 12,000 sick and wounded. Now that the Confederates have pushed up to within sight of him, he has to keep a strong force deployed to guard against attack. It's not until the 14th that he begins loading the last of his sick and wounded and now begins marching some of his force to Fort Monroe where they can load into deep draft vessels.

How did the federal high command not recognize the potential issues with withdrawing so large a deployment from a riverboat landing, or that if McClellan began marching away from the landing Lee would recognize the opportunity to defeat Pope's army before McClellan could reinforce him?

 

[Saphroneth]

How did the federal high command not recognize the potential issues with withdrawing so large a deployment from a riverboat landing, or that if McClellan began marching away from the landing Lee would recognize the opportunity to defeat Pope's army before McClellan could reinforce him?

It seems based on my understanding that Halleck was using Burnside's movement to Aquia as his proxy for the time taken, without realizing that Burnside's forces were (1) infantry only, no cavalry or artillery, (2) had all the transports they needed to be afloat at once, and (3) were already basically embarked, at most the men needed to get on their individual ships. So the basis for comparison was completely unworkable - Burnside had no allocation or loading problems.

The fact that this tied into the strategic design Halleck preferred in the Corinth campaign (amassing a large body of troops and advancing straight towards the enemy target, so that the enemy can't beat you in detail) and also suffered from the same problem as the Corinth campaign (the time taken for the concentration of the troops producing a vulnerable period) might just mean that it's a Halleckian blind spot of sorts.




It would be interesting to model how fast troops could have been got from Harrisons to Northern Virginia if McClellan had sent off his fighting echelon first (in defiance of orders) but the much lower number of ships that could reach that far upriver leads me to suspect that it wouldn't actually have improved things much - the round-trip time per tranche of troops means that it's somewhere around 6-7 days per tranche, probably closer to 7 owing to loading at a river landing not a sea one with proper wharves, so the first tranche of troops reaches Aquia or Alexandria about the 7th, the second tranche the 14th, the third tranche the 21st and the fourth tranche the 28th. (Later than the historical disembarkation of 6th Corps at Alexandria, and they didn't manage to reach Pope in time to contribute to 2nd Bull Run - so if this is the only change they wouldn't have in this alternative.)

The thing is, the troops that did reach Pope historically were all of 3rd and 5th Corps - five divisions, albeit Sykes and Morell were a little smaller than normal. So you need each tranche to be two full divisions (i.e. enough available transports can reach Harrisons to carry two full divisions) for this to result in any kind of improvement of the Second Bull Run situation, and in that case it only improves things by one division.

The improvement isn't very large; meanwhile back at Harrisons under this model McClellan has 2-4 divisions protecting a giant pile of supplies and wounded - and if Lee moves against Harrisons at that point (as he well could) McClellan would be crushed.


The exact modelling is tricky as it depends on how much shipping is actually available and what it can be loaded with*, but the information available suggests that McClellan actually did better than could normally be expected - he gave a timetable for how long it would take to send off all the sick, and managed to stick to it despite the "send off cavalry and artillery" instruction being added afterwards. He followed the priority order, and marched away from Harrisons Landing at great speed once the sick were almost all off (I believe Porter's corps leads the march, and in three days and one night of marching it covers 60 miles).




* On the 7th Ingalls puts together an analysis of the available shipping:
Transports being used by medical staff: 12,000 man capacity once no longer used for that purpose
Transports which cannot reach up to Harrisons Landing: 8,000 to 10,000 men
Other transports: 5,000 man capacity
So maximum lift at one time is 25,000 to 27,000 infantry from Fort Monroe, or about 17,000 from Harrisons - which is if anything a bit less than two divisions of AP from Harrisons.

What the "other transports" were doing before this point, I'm not sure, but I wouldn't want to automatically assume they were standing idle. It's possible they were evacuating some of the horses and wagons, as I know 3rd and 5th were able to draw transportation at the other end but 2nd and 6th were not.

 

[Saphroneth]

As a further note about the time and distance stuff, as of the 9th-11th Lee is ordering Longstreet (6 bdes), DR Jones (3 bdes) and Evans (3 bdes) to Gordonsville, respectively, cutting the amount of troops in Richmond by almost half (there's still DH Hill's reinforcement column which is essentially a corps of DH Hill-McLaws-Walker, Anderson's separate division, and a couple of brigades of GW Smith that didn't accompany DH Hill later in the month).

On the 12th the sick were nearly all off (the last of them would leave on the 16th) and McClellan's whole army is still based at Harrisons Landing, and he detects that Lee has weakened Richmond after his cavalry does recce work (the message Lee gets is that McClellan is advancing onto Malvern Hill, which may have happened and which prompts Lee to concentrate all his remaining force to give battle), and McClellan goes to ask Halleck for permission to attack Richmond, going so far as to travel all the way down the James and to the Eastern Shore to get in direct telegraph contact with Halleck; Halleck refuses to alter McClellan's orders, and leaves the telegraph office.

McClellan pulls back on the 13th, and on the 14th he begins leaving Harrisons Landing (this is when Porter's corps marches for Fort Monroe). That same day (the 14th) is when Lee commits to strike Pope; DH Hill's corps remains in Richmond until McClellan is confirmed to be gone.

The what-if of a sudden dash for Richmond on the 13th or 14th is interesting, and it might not have succeeded, but one thing it could have done is force Lee to make a difficult decision - if it had pulled Longstreet's corps back towards Richmond then it might actually have been of benefit to Pope, for example.

But if McClellan had somehow managed to get the sick off a day or two earlier, it just accelerates the timeline of everything including the Confederate actions. Only if McClellan is actually leaving Harrisons Landing substantially earlier (probably before the 10th?) does it offer the possibility of getting inside the Confederate cycle of movement north for their own Northern Virginia Campaign actions, and at that point it's expecting to do the whole thing twice as fast or more.



Halleck's actual complaint was

The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every available steam vessel in the counter is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York would interfere with the transportation of army supplies and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly 13,000 troops to Aquia Creek in less than two days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that 8,000 or 10,000 of your men could be transported daily.
In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could be used as transports.
The bulk of your material on shore it was thought could be sent to Fort Monroe, covered by that part of the army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the Government here. Perhaps we were misinformed as to the facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intent on harsh or unjust, but the delay was so unexpected that an explanation was required.. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington.

Halleck's claim about the transports being sent back to McClellan appears to be incorrect. More interesting though is the bit about "the delay was so unexpected..." because, well, McClellan had given a fundamentally correct estimate of how long it would take back near the start of the process.

Amazingly, Halleck seems to have thought that McClellan could send off all his sick at once in a couple of days...

 

[67th Tigers]

It is clear that Halleck was living in a bit of a fantasy world regarding troop movements. The only troop movements he ever commanded was the Corinth campaign, and that is not often held up as a model of celerity.

Assuming McClellan did have the capability to transport 8,000 or 10,000 daily, which would be far quicker than the movement to Fort Monroe, then it would take 11 to 13 days to load the 102,184 aggregate present on the 10th August. The number present on 10th July was 106,466.

What McClellan did was ship all his sick, equipment etc. off as ordered, and he had enough transports at Harrison's to embark one division. The division he embarked was the Pennsylvania Reserves, who left 11th-13th to rejoin 1st Corps. It was typically a two day journey to Aquia Landing, and the Pa Reserves finished offloading around the 16th. They were south of the James at Coggin's Point, and so had to be embarked anyway. The siege artillery and part of the reserve artillery also went directly from Harrison's, as did the 1st NY Cavalry and 4 btys of arty to become part of 9th Corps.

The details are below, but divisions moved as fast as possible, excepting a disappointing delay by Franklin because he didn't want to tire his men. The arrival schedule is:

15th-16th August: The Pennsylvania Reserve Division, part of the reserve artillery, 1st NY Cavalry and the siege arty are disembarked at Aquia, having steamed directly from Harrison's.
21st: Morell's Division disembarks at Aquia
22nd: Sykes' ditto, and Kearny's Division disembarks at Alexandria
23rd: Hooker's Division disembarks at Alexandria
24th: - (Franklin was scheduled to be landing this day, but he delayed his march)
25th: Slocum's Division disembarks at Alexandria
26th: Smith's Division disembarks at Alexandria
27th: 2nd Corps starts disembarking at Aquia, but is ordered back on ship and to Alexandria
28th: 2nd Corps disembarks at Alexandria
29th - 1st September: Couch's Division is disembarked at Alexandria in packets
31st - 2nd September: Pleasonton's cavalry brigade disembarks at Washington
4th - 8th: Averell's cavalry brigade plus the 6th Pa Cavalry disembarks at Washington
Then the hospitals followed by the wagon trains were embarked and sent.

This is amazingly fast.

Appendix: Movement Timings

5th Corps

14th-15th: Depart Harrison's Landing
18th: Vanguard reaches Hampton
19th: Morell's Division, with artillery plus 2 batteries of the reserve arty, embark and sail immediately
20th: Sykes' Division etc. embark and sail immediately
21st: Morrell's Division disembark at Aquia Creek, the first disembarked brigade (Griffin's) marches out immediately, the rest are disembarked too late to move on the 21st.
22nd: Sykes' Division disembarks

3rd Corps

15th: Depart Harrison's Landing
18th: Vanguard reached Yorktown, no transports available
20th: Kearny's Division embarks and sails immediately
21st: Hooker's Division embarks and sails immediately
22nd: Kearny's Division disembarks at Alexandria, and moves immediately to support Pope
23rd: Hooker's Division ditto
5th September: Start embarking the trains from Yorktown
11th: Trains completed disembarking

6th Corps

16th: Depart Harrison's Landing
19th: Corps at Yorktown, ordered to march to Hampton the next day, and reach Fort Monroe the middle of the 21st.
21st: Corps reaches Hampton, a day late.
22nd-23rd: Slocum's Division embarks at Newport News.
22nd: Smith's Division marches to Fort Monroe
23rd-24th: Smith's Division embarks at Fort Monroe
25th-26th: The infantry of the 6th Corps disembarks at Alexandria


2nd Corps

16th: Corps departs Harrison's Landing in the evening
20th: Corps at Yorktown
22nd: Corps reaches Newport News
24th: Richardson's Division embarks at Newport News, a day late due to Franklin's delay
25th: Sedgwick's Division embarks at Newport News
27th: 2nd Corps disembarks at Aquia Creek
28th: 2nd Corps reembarks
29th: 2nd Corps disembarks at Alexandria and ordered to the Chain Bridge in the Washington defences

Couch's Division and the Cavalry

11th - 12th August: 1st NY Cavalry start embarking directly from Harrison's, along with four batteries, as the ordered contribution towards 9th Corps, and sails immediately
15th: 1st NY Cav, with batteries, reaches Aquia Creek and disembarks

24th August: 1st and 2nd Bns, 1st Mass Cavalry reach Fort Monroe from the south, and are ordered to press on. They will go to Aquia Creek land a battalion and then reembark it, and then land at Alexandria 1st-2nd September

27th: McClellan orders Couch's Division sent ASAP, an argument will break out in the following days as Pleasonton has also been ordered to send his cavalry ASAP
31st : McClellan is told some of the transports available at Yorktown are unsuitable for cavalry, and these were the ones Couch are bring embarked upon.
28th-31st: Couch's Division embarked in penny packets on whatever was available.
29th August - 1st September: Couch's Division disembarks at Alexandria
29th-31st: Pleasonton's Brigade embark at Fort Monroe
31st August - 2nd September: Pleasonton's Brigade disembark (5 coys on 31st from the 8th Illinois and 8th Pennsylvania)
1st - 3rd September: 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry (Averell's Bde) embark and leave Yorktown on 3rd
2nd: 4th Pa Cavalry (Averell's Bde) embark
3rd: 6th Pa Cavalry embark
4th: 4th Pa Cavalry (Averell's Bde) disembark at Washington
6th: 3rd Pa Cavalry (Averell's Bde) and 6th Pa Cavalry (independent) disembark
8th: 5th US Cavalry (Averell's Bde) disembark

 

[Saphroneth]

5th September: Start embarking the trains from Yorktown
11th: Trains completed disembarking

And of course this had a huge influence on the later part of Northern Virginia - there simply weren't the wagons to operate the whole of the transferred Army of the Potomac, which was a major problem with Halleck's entire plan of quickly uniting the armies. The transport has to be available before the combined army is in any meaningful sense able to operate.

 

[67th Tigers]

The report I found was the 3rd Corps trains, however, it's clear the movement was made in the following phases:

1. Sick and excess stores shipped off, including the siege artillery.
2. An infantry division, a cavalry regiment and a number of batteries shipped directly from Harrison's to round out 9th Corps (which was just infantry at this point). These batteries were shipped with horses etc.
3. The remainder marches to deep water embarkation points and the infantry and artillery (much without horses) is shipped off ASAP.
4. Then the cavalry is shipped off.
5. Then the hospitals
6. Finally the trains.

This was what Halleck ordered. The problems of corps arriving without most of their wagons (there was an allowance that went with them, but it was small) seems to have been lost on him.

 

[67th Tigers]

I must correct myself with respect to the Pennsylvania Reserve Division. The short version is:

The 2nd Brigade was embarked on the 11th August and reached Aquia on the 13th.

The 1st Brigade was embarked on the 14th and 15th (from Coggin's Point I believe), and half of it was held at Fort Monroe until the 19th because stormy weather prevented the movement to Aquia. They reached Aquia on the 20th. The other half arrived on the 16th and 17th.

The 3rd Bde, plus the Bucktails were the rearguard on Coggin's Point, and embarked on the 15th and 16th, and arrived at Aquia on the 20th.

 

[rbasin]

It really wasn't. Halleck's explanation to McClellan is very thought out, based on the information available to him.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

How did the federal high command not recognize the potential issues with withdrawing so large a deployment from a riverboat landing, or that if McClellan began marching away from the landing Lee would recognize the opportunity to defeat Pope's army before McClellan could reinforce him?

Did McClellan ever request to march the AOTP back to Fort Monroe instead of using Harrison's?

I think Halleck, Staunton, and Lincoln were aware of the risk of a defeat in detail but didn't see any alternative. Lincoln seems to have concluded no amount of reinforcement was going to get McClellan to advance the army so there was no point in leaving it there. Lee seems to have correctly appraised McClellan would remain safely idle.

The longer the army stayed there the longer the sick list would grown too: it just wasn't a healthy area in summer.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think Halleck, Staunton, and Lincoln were aware of the risk of a defeat in detail but didn't see any alternative. Lincoln seems to have concluded no amount of reinforcement was going to get McClellan to advance the army so there was no point in leaving it there. Lee seems to have correctly appraised McClellan would remain safely idle.

I don't think this is true though?

McClellan didn't get reinforced - for the whole of July he is waiting on promised reinforcements which do not arrive. In early August (when it becomes clear he's not getting Burnside's corps and when Halleck tells him to launch a recce towards Richmond) he advances, but is ordered off the Peninsula by Halleck a few days later.

Lee keeps almost the whole of his army at Richmond (and Jackson's force under orders to dash back to help defend Richmond if needed) until McClellan has already been shipping off his sick for over a week - and even then, Lee actually moves Longstreet's force away too early if anything, because on the 13th McClellan goes to get permission to advance on Richmond (which Halleck refuses).



So it's pretty clear McClellan was willing to advance. He wasn't willing to advance either "while he was waiting for promised reinforcements" (July) or "In violation of orders" (August).

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't think this is true though?

McClellan didn't get reinforced - for the whole of July he is waiting on promised reinforcements which do not arrive. In early August (when it becomes clear he's not getting Burnside's corps and when Halleck tells him to launch a recce towards Richmond) he advances, but is ordered off the Peninsula by Halleck a few days later.

Lee keeps almost the whole of his army at Richmond (and Jackson's force under orders to dash back to help defend Richmond if needed) until McClellan has already been shipping off his sick for over a week - and even then, Lee actually moves Longstreet's force away too early if anything, because on the 13th McClellan goes to get permission to advance on Richmond (which Halleck refuses).



So it's pretty clear McClellan was willing to advance. He wasn't willing to advance either "while he was waiting for promised reinforcements" (July) or "In violation of orders" (August).

And if they were aware of the risk of Pope being defeated in detail before McClellan could reasonably vacate the peninsula, why not order him to withdraw to a more defensible position and await reinforcements?

 

[Belfoured]

I don't think this is true though?

McClellan didn't get reinforced - for the whole of July he is waiting on promised reinforcements which do not arrive. In early August (when it becomes clear he's not getting Burnside's corps and when Halleck tells him to launch a recce towards Richmond) he advances, but is ordered off the Peninsula by Halleck a few days later.

Lee keeps almost the whole of his army at Richmond (and Jackson's force under orders to dash back to help defend Richmond if needed) until McClellan has already been shipping off his sick for over a week - and even then, Lee actually moves Longstreet's force away too early if anything, because on the 13th McClellan goes to get permission to advance on Richmond (which Halleck refuses).



So it's pretty clear McClellan was willing to advance. He wasn't willing to advance either "while he was waiting for promised reinforcements" (July) or "In violation of orders" (August).

When was he "promised" reinforcements? Not when did he make requests for large numbers of reinforcements from all over the map in late July/early August [OR Vol. XI Part 3, 333-34, 337-38, 342, 345-46; Vol XII Part 2, 5-9]. The latter were made in the context of the representation to Halleck at the July 25 meeting regarding the estimate of 200,000 ANV strength, confirmed in Halleck's August 6 letter to McClellan - "you and your officers" - which McClellan never refuted to Halleck or to anyone else, including Ellen. We've seen claims elsewhere that the estimate was only Keyes's - as if McClellan was some passive bystander and not the CO. McClellan's military duty - IF Halleck misunderstood McClellan's alleged disagreement with the estimate - was to tell his superior that he disagreed and that his estimate was "X". Crickets ...

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

James Havelock Campbell, in his attempted vindication of McClellan's military career, suggested that Halleck may not have given a reliable account:

"These details of the interview [given in Halleck's "Memorandum for the Secretary of War" dated July 27, 1862] are so utterly at variance with McClellan's numerous letters touching the same matters as to raise the strongest suspicion of their correctness, and to make us regret that we have no detailed statement of the interview from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The work upon his Own Story was evidently little more than half done when he died. Like Carlyle's French Revolution, his first manuscript was destroyed, but, unlike Carlyle, McClellan did not live long enough fully to repair his loss."

Of course, that casts doubt on Halleck's supposed response to McClellan's proposal "to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south ..."

Just because something has been written doesn't make it a fact.

 

[Belfoured]

James Havelock Campbell, in his attempted vindication of McClellan's military career, suggested that Halleck may not have given a reliable account:

"These details of the interview [given in Halleck's "Memorandum for the Secretary of War" dated July 27, 1862] are so utterly at variance with McClellan's numerous letters touching the same matters as to raise the strongest suspicion of their correctness, and to make us regret that we have no detailed statement of the interview from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The work upon his Own Story was evidently little more than half done when he died. Like Carlyle's French Revolution, his first manuscript was destroyed, but, unlike Carlyle, McClellan did not live long enough fully to repair his loss."

Of course, that casts doubt on Halleck's supposed response to McClellan's proposal "to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south ..."

Just because something has been written doesn't make it a fact.

Your concluding sentence applies likewise to McClellan's written statements, doesn't it. And anybody relying on Campbell for veracity and objective analysis probably should also look to Prime for that. But I think you know that.

As for reinforcements, we've seen McClellan's own (varying) requests for substantial reinforcements in late July. Even in his August 4 letter objecting to the withdrawal order McClellan stated "Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere."

As for the statement in Halleck's August 6 letter to McClellan regarding the 200,000 estimate at the July 25 meeting - "you and your officers" - point us to any source showing that McClellan refuted that to Halleck or to anybody else. If it was a misrepresentation or a misunderstanding, that's what people do every day in the real world. In the case of a military officer, that was McClellan's obligation - unless, of course, it was true. If you're familiar with McClellan's history of estimating his opposition, you know that the number is hardly a radical outlier. This, after all, is the guy who testified under oath in March 1863 that six months earlier on September 17 at Antietam Lee had outnumbered him by 25,000 - 30,000.

 

[67th Tigers]

James Havelock Campbell, in his attempted vindication of McClellan's military career, suggested that Halleck may not have given a reliable account:

"These details of the interview [given in Halleck's "Memorandum for the Secretary of War" dated July 27, 1862] are so utterly at variance with McClellan's numerous letters touching the same matters as to raise the strongest suspicion of their correctness, and to make us regret that we have no detailed statement of the interview from the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The work upon his Own Story was evidently little more than half done when he died. Like Carlyle's French Revolution, his first manuscript was destroyed, but, unlike Carlyle, McClellan did not live long enough fully to repair his loss."

Of course, that casts doubt on Halleck's supposed response to McClellan's proposal "to cross the James River at that point, attack Petersburg, and cut off the enemy's communications by that route south ..."

Just because something has been written doesn't make it a fact.

Indeed, Halleck stated McClellan wanted to be withdrawn!

The plan to cross the James is pretty well substanciated in others writings. He told Burnside it was his back-up plan before he sailed in April. I should look up Rowena Reed on this...

 

[Joseph A. Rose]

Indeed, Halleck stated McClellan wanted to be withdrawn!

The plan to cross the James is pretty well substanciated in others writings. He told Burnside it was his back-up plan before he sailed in April. I should look up Rowena Reed on this...

Then it would seem that those individuals who rely on Halleck's authority might need to be careful.

 

[rbasin]

I don't think this is true though?

McClellan didn't get reinforced - for the whole of July he is waiting on promised reinforcements which do not arrive. In early August (when it becomes clear he's not getting Burnside's corps and when Halleck tells him to launch a recce towards Richmond) he advances, but is ordered off the Peninsula by Halleck a few days later.

Lee keeps almost the whole of his army at Richmond (and Jackson's force under orders to dash back to help defend Richmond if needed) until McClellan has already been shipping off his sick for over a week - and even then, Lee actually moves Longstreet's force away too early if anything, because on the 13th McClellan goes to get permission to advance on Richmond (which Halleck refuses).



So it's pretty clear McClellan was willing to advance. He wasn't willing to advance either "while he was waiting for promised reinforcements" (July) or "In violation of orders" (August).

He did up his # of requested troops. The only troops readily available were under Pope. Halleck's explanation is very sound based on the info he had. He wanted the armies united, given the numbers if the enemy that were being sent to him.

 

[Saphroneth]

He did up his # of requested troops.

While I realize this is to some extent a matter of interpretation, what he actually says in his letter to Halleck is an urging that he be sent all the disposable troops. What he's doing is requesting everything that can be spared, because the Confederates have already concentrated everything that can be spared at Richmond to defend it.




"Allow me to urge most strongly that all the troops of Burnside and Hunter* together with all that can possibly be spared from other points**, be sent to me at once. I am sure that you will agree with me that the true defense of Washington consists in a rapid and heavy blow given by this army upon Richmond.

Can you not possibly draw 15,000 or 20,000 men from the West to re-enforce me temporarily***? They can return the moment we gain Richmond. Please give weight to this suggestion; I am sure it merits it."



* this is the stuff he was already promised and which Halleck said he could be given - Burnside and Hunter both contributed troops to what would become 9th Corps
** this might be anything from, say, Pope's force - Pope at this point has about 60,000 men and that's more than is needed to hold a strict defensive - or from, for example, the forces defending Baltimore which is dozens of miles behind the front lines
*** and this is anything from Halleck's army, because McClellan was originally promised 25,000 men from this army by Lincoln; Halleck refused because of the planned offensive into East Tennessee, but that offensive hasn't happened and it wouldn't happen. This is not an unrealistic suggestion.

However, notably, McClellan is not saying "I won't attack unless I get these troops" or anything like that. He is suggesting to Halleck - who is, after all, the person who should be asked - that this would help.

As we subsequently see in early August, McClellan is willing to attack even without reinforcement - but what he's not willing to do is to attack a stronger enemy when he has been promised reinforcements who will soon arrive.

 

[rbasin]

While I realize this is to some extent a matter of interpretation, what he actually says in his letter to Halleck is an urging that he be sent all the disposable troops. What he's doing is requesting everything that can be spared, because the Confederates have already concentrated everything that can be spared at Richmond to defend it.




"Allow me to urge most strongly that all the troops of Burnside and Hunter* together with all that can possibly be spared from other points**, be sent to me at once. I am sure that you will agree with me that the true defense of Washington consists in a rapid and heavy blow given by this army upon Richmond.

Can you not possibly draw 15,000 or 20,000 men from the West to re-enforce me temporarily***? They can return the moment we gain Richmond. Please give weight to this suggestion; I am sure it merits it."



* this is the stuff he was already promised and which Halleck said he could be given - Burnside and Hunter both contributed troops to what would become 9th Corps
** this might be anything from, say, Pope's force - Pope at this point has about 60,000 men and that's more than is needed to hold a strict defensive - or from, for example, the forces defending Baltimore which is dozens of miles behind the front lines
*** and this is anything from Halleck's army, because McClellan was originally promised 25,000 men from this army by Lincoln; Halleck refused because of the planned offensive into East Tennessee, but that offensive hasn't happened and it wouldn't happen. This is not an unrealistic suggestion.

However, notably, McClellan is not saying "I won't attack unless I get these troops" or anything like that. He is suggesting to Halleck - who is, after all, the person who should be asked - that this would help.

As we subsequently see in early August, McClellan is willing to attack even without reinforcement - but what he's not willing to do is to attack a stronger enemy when he has been promised reinforcements who will soon arrive.

I'm not home but I'll find it. Halleck replied to McClellan about wanting 30k troops. McClellan didn't object to that number, so I'm assuming it was discussed when Halleck went to McClellan.

The 20k from the west was when Halleck was still in the west. Halleck said if they were sent, something would have to be given up in the west. Halleck's reply was to place someone over the entire eastern military area, as as Halleck was in the west, and hold that person accountable. Halleck wrote he didn't want to go to DC and get caught up in the fight between the administration and McClellan.

I'm definitely not quoting exactly but that is the best of the correspondence

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not home but I'll find it. Halleck replied to McClellan about wanting 30k troops. McClellan didn't object to that number, so I'm assuming it was discussed when Halleck went to McClellan.

That's a very weak reed to hang it on, to be honest - not least because you're basing your claim on McClellan upping his number of requested troops on the idea that McClellan requested 30K troops in the same conversation.

So that's not "upping". That's just asking - there is one request, in your model, and it is 30K (which is still less than the 50K that Lincoln originally promised McClellan)

In fact, if McClellan had asked for 30K troops in the Harrisons Landing meeting, then the message McClellan sent after the meeting is downgrading his request - because he asks for Burnside and Hunter (about 15K) and anything else that can be spared if possible.

The 20k from the west was when Halleck was still in the west. Halleck said if they were sent, something would have to be given up in the west.

Yes, the East Tennessee offensive - which never happened anyway.


But Joshism's claim was:

Lincoln seems to have concluded no amount of reinforcement was going to get McClellan to advance the army so there was no point in leaving it there.

And what actually happened, I'll point out, is that McClellan was promised reinforcements, never got them, and advanced (in early August) anyway. Perhaps Lincoln did conclude that no amount of reinforcement was going to get McClellan to advance, but the evidence that Lincoln would have been correct by that is rather weak - and, of course, if the problem was McClellan, McClellan could easily have been replaced.



Ed: As I've been at pains to point out before, if the problem is the availability of possible reinforcements, there's another option. Wait a month.

Something approaching 300,000 more troops become available starting at the end of August and the beginning of September. It would have been totally within the means of the Union by mid-September to have reinforced both McClellan and Pope to the tune of about 30,000 men each, and at that point all the resource allocation problems go away completely and the Union has a massive army on the James.