Doesn't Pass the Common Sense Test:

The British had developed a very effective device for throwing lead at an opponent on the battlefields of Europe in the mid 18th century, firing by platoons, sometimes three ranks deep, which kept an enemy force under a constant barrage. The troops had been rigorously trained to load and fire as quickly as possible with individual marksmanship unknown. This so impressed other armies, and later writers, that few seemed to notice that during the French and Indian war the British did quite a bit of reevaluating that tactic. Platoon firing clearly did not work at Braddock's defeat in 1755, though it did work quite well for Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham. But with much fighting taking place in heavily forested regions, the British did some soul searching and under the leadership of the Howe brothers developed light infantry who were trained to fight in open order, as skirmishers, and who were trained to individual marksmanship, such as was possible with the Brown Bess. During the revolution the British made good use of these light companies, often detaching these companies from their regiments and then massing them in battalion strength for special operations. At Lexington and Concord there were several detached companies of light infantry and they gave a very good account of themselves on the retreat back to Boston. Despite much nonsense being written about the British soldier from that period he was better trained, armed and supplied than his Continental counterpart and generally could be expected to defeat anything like equal numbers on any battlefield against anybody's army.

This changed with the year 1778 with better equipment coming out of the French Alliance but also because of the Training of baron Von Steuben, who not only taught the Continentals in how to use their bayonets for something other than roasting potatoes, but also taught them how to march in column (before then the Continental Army often marched in a single line miles long and almost impossible to form into a battle line in a short order). We today sometimes think all that training in how to march and maneuver a senseless preoccupation but the ability to get marching columns into line of battle quickly was essential to massing fire power. At Monmouth Court House in June of 1778 Washington intercepted the British army which had just evacuated Philadelphia and was on its way back to NYC. The number of troops was about even and with Von Steuben's training behind them the Continentals stood their ground and in a fight that seesawed back and forth for hours under a broiling sun (heatstroke killed many of the troops who died there) the battle ended in a tactical draw with casualties almost exactly evenly split. From that point on till the end of the war the Continental soldier was a match for any British soldier and that was saying great deal.
It never changes enlisted will always find a way to cook food.......
 
Even the rifled musket was a new thing. It had a low muzzle velocity. At 300 yards the bullet would drop about 16 feet. At that range soldiers had to accurately estimate range and set their sights. I do not think that many soldiers were taught this. I believe that Pat Cleburne taught his soldiers this but I don't know of anyone else who did.

Another problem was the amount of smoke that black powder generates. After a few shots, troops essentially laid down smoke screens that greatly reduced visibility. I read an account of a soldier at Shiloh being asked why he was not firing. He answered that he could not see anything. Soldiers often fired into a thick cloud of smoke.
Many sharpshooter units on both sides trained in range estimation. By 1864 you had a trained sharpshooter battalion in almost every brigade in the ANV. Berdan's U.S. Sharpshooters and a few other Federal units did as well. In the hands of trained soldiers fighting in skirmish formation the rifle musket could be put to better use, but in two-rank battle line with a combination of untrained soldiers, smoke, confusion, rough terrain, etc., it was not much better than a smoothbore, and battles still took place within smoothbore range without any major difference.

Those sharpshooter units were good for certain tasks, but they couldn't hammer in an attack like that of troops in close order formation. They could support an attack to some degree - often their job was to lead the way in an advance - but they didn't have the firepower and mass to breakthrough a defensive position alone.
 
Didn't American soldiers of the American Revolution fight in three lines?
An earlier generation (seven years war and earlier) - by the time of the Am. Rev. it had shrunk down to two ranks. Interestingly (to me), British troops were trained to March and fight at open order (an arms length apart) and extended open order (something like ten feet apart). Obviously, troops must be well trained to pull off maneuvers at open order and it's believed by most historians of the period, that American troops never attempted this.

Interestingly, the French under Napoleon were still using the three-rank formation through Waterloo, though the British had adopted the two-ranks. That allowed the British to cover proportionally wider ground, but of course the weight of firepower was still a prime consideration. It should be noted, however, that in proper deployment, a battalion in line was placed between two on either side formed in compact assault columns in what was called ordere mixte that was supposed to favor assaults though they could suffer greatly from artillery fire.
 
Even the rifled musket was a new thing. It had a low muzzle velocity. At 300 yards the bullet would drop about 16 feet. At that range soldiers had to accurately estimate range and set their sights. I do not think that many soldiers were taught this. I believe that Pat Cleburne taught his soldiers this but I don't know of anyone else who did.

Another problem was the amount of smoke that black powder generates. After a few shots, troops essentially laid down smoke screens that greatly reduced visibility. I read an account of a soldier at Shiloh being asked why he was not firing. He answered that he could not see anything. Soldiers often fired into a thick cloud of smoke.

Another thing is most soldiers will not intentionally aim at an enemy. The notion in the British army up into the Napoleonic wars was that aiming was murder. If everyone just pretty much fires in the general direction, it is seen as fair. Death is a matter of statistics.

Studies made of front line American soldiers in WWII discovered that most soldiers would not intentionally aim at enemy individuals. Soldiers have to be conditioned to do so. Our soldiers now do this. The problem is that most soldiers believe that killing is wrong. They come back after combat with severe psychological problems like PTSD. Apparently, teaching people to kill is easy. Teaching them how to survive doing so is not. Our military can teach them to kill. But our military has not figured out how to teach their killers how to bear the guilt and trauma of killing.
I think The ability to straight out kill another was 2nd nature for man till consciousness was taught from generation to generation, to get around the act troops are broken down then rebuilt, man (enemy) is simply a variation of the man shape paper target or your shooting at a piece of equipment the paradigm shift makes it easier to pull the trigger. The conscious act at close range is more personal because its not just a shape its a human, I know for me its the most sickening feeling in your gut, but you have to pull the trigger. Now in the "fog of war" the solider may not see the enemy except shape, fear plays a part, adrenaline kicks in, then after the shooting stops your wading trough carnage, effects of adrenaline goes away all of which takes a toll some end up with what is now termed PTSD. The development of the Minne (spelling?) bullet increased the effectiveness of the musket, being made of pure lead and size/shape the wound was devastating and allowed more accurate shots, ability to load/shoot more rounds.
The rifled musket was in used during the French and Indian wars, 1 rifled musket was assigned to each of Maj. Rodgers's squad. British Major Ferguson had already developed the Ferguson breech loading rifle as well as a original (Lawrence? breech loader - favored by John Brown) which C Sharps improved the design. Col Berdan ordered double set triggers to it for the union sharpshooters. The use of smoke today is for concealment when advancing or other movement in open terrain as well as signal. The Guidon Bearer was an important element in control of movement as well as bugles, whistles, signal corps in balloons or(1st start towards establishment of the AF) on a rise. Sorry going too far, LOL I do appreciate everyone's thoughts, perceptions and experiences. I learn something every day
 
Group participation definitely increase the courage of individuals. This has been demonstrated in crime studies, where average, ordinary people have been proven to be more likely to behave much more aggressively in groups than they otherwise would on their own, whether the behavior being encouraged is criminal or otherwise.
 
The rifled musket was in used during the French and Indian wars, 1 rifled musket was assigned to each of Maj. Rodgers's squad. British Major Ferguson had already developed the Ferguson breech loading rifle as well as a original (Lawrence? breech loader - favored by John Brown) which C Sharps improved the design. Col Berdan ordered double set triggers to it for the union sharpshooters.

Rifles had been around for a century before the ACW, but during most of that time only in small numbers. There were manufacturing difficulties and the grooves wore out quickly and/or became clogged with powder.

The Kentucky long rifle was much slower to fire than a smoothbore musket of the time and couldn't take a bayonet. I doubt those were uncommon issues for early rifles.
 
Rifles had been around for a century before the ACW, but during most of that time only in small numbers. There were manufacturing difficulties and the grooves wore out quickly and/or became clogged with powder.

The Kentucky long rifle was much slower to fire than a smoothbore musket of the time and couldn't take a bayonet. I doubt those were uncommon issues for early rifles.
The Ferguson ifle was the answer, but he Br Leadership thought them to be too complicated for conscripts and common soldier as well as other reasons.
 
Some say that powder fouling soon jams up the works.
I have seen them up close but never had the opportunity to fire one. I have noticed that the mechanism had very close tolerances and required a screw mechanism to raise and lower part of the breech. Given that much of the black powder in the 18th century was a mixture not a compound and often uncorned it just may have become inoperable from fouling. I wish I knew more about them under actual combat conditions. Anybody here ever fire one for more than a few shots?
 
The Ferguson ifle was the answer, but he Br Leadership thought them to be too complicated for conscripts and common soldier as well as other reasons.

More likely was the cost involved in manufacturing a weapon of such tight tolerances; far cheaper to continue to pop out Brown Bess muskets. Interestingly, when it's inventor Maj. Patrick Ferguson was seriously wounded while leading his small corps of sharpshooters at Brandywine, hide-bound British commander Sir William Howe disbanded the unit and put their rifles in storage!
 
More likely was the cost involved in manufacturing a weapon of such tight tolerances; far cheaper to continue to pop out Brown Bess muskets. Interestingly, when it's inventor Maj. Patrick Ferguson was seriously wounded while leading his small corps of sharpshooters at Brandywine, hide-bound British commander Sir William Howe disbanded the unit and put their rifles in storage!
He eventually survived that just to be KIA Kings Mt in NC, I think Kings Mt battle was prior to Cowpens.
 
He eventually survived that just to be KIA Kings Mt in NC, I think Kings Mt battle was prior to Cowpens.

Yes; ironically, Ferguson was probably the only actual Englishman (Scotsman, actually) at King's Mountain; all his men were Tories, many from New York State, and the Americans were all militia, many so-called overmountain men from what's now Tennessee.
 
Even the rifled musket was a new thing. It had a low muzzle velocity. At 300 yards the bullet would drop about 16 feet. At that range soldiers had to accurately estimate range and set their sights. I do not think that many soldiers were taught this. I believe that Pat Cleburne taught his soldiers this but I don't know of anyone else who did.

Another problem was the amount of smoke that black powder generates. After a few shots, troops essentially laid down smoke screens that greatly reduced visibility. I read an account of a soldier at Shiloh being asked why he was not firing. He answered that he could not see anything. Soldiers often fired into a thick cloud of smoke.

Another thing is most soldiers will not intentionally aim at an enemy. The notion in the British army up into the Napoleonic wars was that aiming was murder. If everyone just pretty much fires in the general direction, it is seen as fair. Death is a matter of statistics.

Studies made of front line American soldiers in WWII discovered that most soldiers would not intentionally aim at enemy individuals. Soldiers have to be conditioned to do so. Our soldiers now do this. The problem is that most soldiers believe that killing is wrong. They come back after combat with severe psychological problems like PTSD. Apparently, teaching people to kill is easy. Teaching them how to survive doing so is not. Our military can teach them to kill. But our military has not figured out how to teach their killers how to bear the guilt and trauma of killing.

In "War" by Gwynne Dyer he talks about the Gen. S.L.A. Marshall studies on American WWII soldiers including 400 infantry company interviews. It was concluded only about 15% of WWII soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy. It was also suggested that German and Japanese soldiers were firing about the same. This was to be corrected and by Vietnam 90% of US soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy. http://www.straight.com/article-390...posttraumatic-stress-disorder-among-us-troops
 
Interestingly, when it's inventor Maj. Patrick Ferguson was seriously wounded while leading his small corps of sharpshooters at Brandywine, hide-bound British commander Sir William Howe disbanded the unit and put their rifles in storage!

I don't think Howe was hide-bound, he doted on his Light Bobs after all. Anyway, maybe he knew something about the Ferguson rifles or their use we don't. Maybe.
 
I don't think Howe was hide-bound, he doted on his Light Bobs after all. Anyway, maybe he knew something about the Ferguson rifles or their use we don't. Maybe.
Apparently they were presented to Sr. Br War Officers who thought it too complicated to operate by peasants and conscripts. I think production cost was also a factor, talk about a missed opportunity.
 
The US had Lawrence breechloaders (1853?) prior to the Sharps in 1859

The army had a breechloader called the M1819 Hall which was used a bit in the 2nd Seminole War.
The Prussians were early breechloader adopters, going whole hog with the Dreyse Needle Gun around 1850.
 

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