Disappointed in the Timothy Smith book

[tony_gunter]

Ugh … he drills down into the details of troop movements, but completely ignores the big picture. By his narrative, Grant arrives at Oxford and suddenly has the idea to split his army and attack at Chickasaw Bayou.

Nothing about the repeated hints by Halleck to do so. Nothing about Halleck asking Grant to give him a plan for doing so. Nothing about the peremptory order for Grant to do so. Nothing about Halleck telling Grant to stop going south.

Chickasaw Bayou wasn't Grant's idea. Chickasaw Bayou was foisted upon Grant by his superiors.

 

[huskerblitz]

Why don't you post the appropriate primary sources to help make your case? So far, it doesn't seem you convinced very many here.

 

[tony_gunter]

It's all laid out in Grant's Papers, it's just a pain to wade through. Seems like we've condensed that two-month-long telegraph discussion between Halleck and Grant here before, haven't we?

Regardless, Smith details all of the troop movements in great detail, but never details the lengthy telegraph discussion between Grant and Halleck that was going on behind the scenes, and I'm shocked that he doesn't.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

This thread prompts me to make a general comment, without considering the content of the particular work.

In my view,

Believe everyone is entitled within the limits of public decency and as long as they are not personally disparaging to express their own opinions and viewpoints about read published material. It's based on their own perceptions, interpretations and expectations (which often varies between individuals).

It's only when someone purports to represent their comments as facts which are untrue, where they could leave themselves open to valid criticism.

Perhaps reviewers who preface their reviews with merely the words, 'in my view' or 'in my opinion' might lessen the likelihood of attracting any wide criticism.

 

[Rusk County Avengers]

Ugh … he drills down into the details of troop movements, but completely ignores the big picture. By his narrative, Grant arrives at Oxford and suddenly has the idea to split his army and attack at Chickasaw Bayou.

Nothing about the repeated hints by Halleck to do so. Nothing about Halleck asking Grant to give him a plan for doing so. Nothing about the peremptory order for Grant to do so. Nothing about Halleck telling Grant to stop going south.

Chickasaw Bayou wasn't Grant's idea. Chickasaw Bayou was foisted upon Grant by his superiors.

Interesting, as every Timothy Smith book I ever read was filled with good information.

My complaint is his style of writing, its kind of boring in comparison to other great authors and has put me to sleep. But never his research, always in depth and so on.

 

[huskerblitz]

It's all laid out in Grant's Papers, it's just a pain to wade through. Seems like we've condensed that two-month-long telegraph discussion between Halleck and Grant here before, haven't we?

Well, it's been the long time standard here for the person making the claim to provide the evidence to back their claim. Links, clips, passages....something other than just saying it.

 

[AA484]

Well, it's been the long time standard here for the person making the claim to provide the evidence to back their claim. Links, clips, passages....something other than just saying it.

Well, if this thread is any indication, he already started "speed reading" and forming opinions on it less than 3 hours after he got it. Take that for it's worth. I don't mean to be disparaging, but it would seem hard to form honest opinions on a work that quickly.

 

[huskerblitz]

Well, if this thread is any indication, he already started "speed reading" and forming opinions on it less than 3 hours after he got it. Take that for it's worth. I don't mean to be disparaging, but it would seem hard to form honest opinions on a work that quickly.

No, he's been saying this for over a year now. And I have no issue with his interpretation. Just that he will not provide the relative primary sources that other can then read and make up their own minds up as to that interpretation.

 

[tony_gunter]

This thread prompts me to make a general comment, without considering the content of the particular work.

In my view,

Believe everyone is entitled within the limits of public decency and as long as they are not personally disparaging to express their own opinions and viewpoints about read published material. It's based on their own perceptions, interpretations and expectations (which often varies between individuals).

It's only when someone purports to represent their comments as facts which are untrue, where they could leave themselves open to valid criticism.

Perhaps reviewers who preface their reviews with merely the words, 'in my view' or 'in my opinion' might lessen the likelihood of attracting any wide criticism.

Point taken, but there aren't any "alternate facts" in history.

It's not a matter of opinion that Halleck immediately began hinting that Grant should conduct a riverine campaign when Grant unveiled his plan to proceed down the railroad.

If we start from that point there's a 34 day conversation between Halleck and Grant that Smith mostly ignores, in which Halleck more and more strongly pushes Grant to move down the river culminating with a direct order to have the largest number of troops possible back to Memphis by December 20th for an attack on Vicksburg.

How does Smith pose this conversation? Grant stops at Oxford to think, and comes to the conclusion on December 4th that he would like to split his force, planting the seed in Halleck's mind to send most of the army downriver. (Pages 167-168)

That's like the opposite of how that transpired

 

[tony_gunter]

Well, if this thread is any indication, he already started "speed reading" and forming opinions on it less than 3 hours after he got it. Take that for it's worth. I don't mean to be disparaging, but it would seem hard to form honest opinions on a work that quickly.

My apologies for being able to consume information too quickly for your comfort.

 

[7th Mississippi Infantry]

I do enjoy a good book or film review from many perspectives.
And opposing views often put the overall work into a different light.
But I will still read the book or watch the film and develop my own opinion.

However, anytime I see a personal attack from the original critic toward
those that may disagree with him/her ... the original critic automatically
looses any validity with me.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

However, anytime I see a personal attack from the original critic toward
those that may disagree with him/her ... the original critic automatically
looses any validity with me.

The best advice I got from someone wiser than myself for handling criticism. One can choose to either accept the criticism or reject it.

 

[tony_gunter]

I think opinion comes into play when Grant says he has two plans he's considering, sending troops down the river or cutting loose from his base and living off the land. He says he favors the former.

Matter of opinion: does he favor the former because he knows that's what the president wants and knows that McClernand will be gifted the operation if he doesn't pursue it, or does he truly find it to be the correct course of action?

*In my opinion* it's the month's worth of hints Halleck has provided. And I base this loosely on 1) Grant doesn't know jack about the terrain there (message to Steele) and is making plans blindly 2) after arriving at Young's Point Sherman urges him to return to central Mississippi and proceed the way Grant wanted to in the first place

 

[dlofting]

I'm not totally up on this discussion but can't the author cover the aspects of the Vicksburg campaign that he chooses to cover and leave other things out, or just deal with summarily.

I think the overall campaign to capture Vicksburg is a large subject, so maybe it makes sense to cover a part of it in detail.

 

[tony_gunter]

I'm not totally up on this discussion but can't the author cover the aspects of the Vicksburg campaign that he chooses to cover and leave other things out, or just deal with summarily.

I think the overall campaign to capture Vicksburg is a large subject, so maybe it makes sense to cover a part of it in detail.

I mean, sure, but the Halleck/Grant conversation from November 2nd to December 5th is absolutely critical to understanding the central subject matter of the book

 

[huskerblitz]

I mean, sure, but the Halleck/Grant conversation from November 2nd to December 5th is absolutely critical to understanding the central subject matter of the book

So you have said, several times. And still no links or quotes from the primary sources.

 

[tony_gunter]

Interesting, as every Timothy Smith book I ever read was filled with good information.

My complaint is his style of writing, its kind of boring in comparison to other great authors and has put me to sleep. But never his research, always in depth and so on.

His writing in this book follows the "cover everything in great detail" style of Ed Bearss. If you don't like reading Bearss, you won't like this book. I thought his Champion Hill book, however, was a fluid read without skimping on detail.

I just think everyone in the biz has told tour groups and round tables "Grant had a two-pronged plan" for so long it's kinda embedded itself in their DNA and they can't stop it from popping back up. Kinda like herpes.

 

[tony_gunter]

So you have said, several times. And still no links or quotes from the primary sources.

Hey, I've moved 5 times in almost as many years and don't know where my notes are. So sue me
Here's what I grabbed from PUSG today:

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------
p 199
Oct 26th
You have never suggested to me any plan of opperations in this Department and as I do not know anything of those of commanders to my right or left. I have none therefore that is not independent of all others forces than those under my immediate
command.
As situated now, with no more troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them without first consulting you. I would suggest however the destruction of the rail-roads to all points of the compas from Corinth by the removal of the rails to this place or Columbus and the opening of the road from
Humboldt to Memphis. The Corinth forces I would move to Grand Junction and add to them the Bolivar forces except a small garrison there. With small reinforcements at Memphis I think
I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo river.
I am ready however to do with all my might whatever you
may direct, without criticism.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

J/K LOL HALLECK DOESN'T RESPOND LOL J/K

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 210
Oct 29th
Everything now indicates an early attack on Bolivar or Corinth. The Rebels have been largely reinforced & are moving precisely as they did before the last attack Price is at Ripley whilst a force is in front of Bolivar with Cavalry thrown out in large force toward Somerville. I will be ready to do all that is possible with the means at hand Reinforcement not arrived

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 210n
Oct 30th
Reinforcements for your army are moving from Wisconsin, Minnesota & Illinois.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 243
Nov 2nd
I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here tomorrow evening and take command in person. If found practicable l will go on to Holly Springs and may be Grenada completing Railroad & Telegraph as l go. Bolivar has been threatened for some days but it may be a feint to cover a retreat.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 243n
Nov 3rd
I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong enough for that purpose. The Minn & Wisconsin regts should join you very soon & the Governor
of Ill. has promised ten regts this week. I have directed Genl Curtis to reinforce Helena & if they cannot operate on Little Rock they can cross the rtver and threaten Grenada. l hope for an active campaign on the Miss. this fall. A large force will ascend the river from New Orleans.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 256
Nov 4th
Troops from Corinth & Bolivar reached here today occupy the line of Scott Creek & Wolf River2 from two & half miles South of Grand Junction to a short distance west of Lagrange. Gen McPherson Com'dg Right wing Hamilton left will remain here for few days to get up stores by Railroad & to reconnoitre the front perfectly Enemys Pickets occupied this place on our arrival & hvo 2 captured Bridges over Woolfriver at this place are safe Gen Sherman moves out from Memphis to attract attention in that direction. My moving force will be about 31,000.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 261n
Nov 5th
Had not troops sent to reinforce you better go to Memphis hereafter? I hope to give you twenty thousand additional men in a few days.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 261
Nov 6th
Send sixteen ( 16) Regiments of Infantry and all Cavalry & Artillery to Memphis this will give two full Divisions to move from there & leave a sufficient garrison.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 268
Nov 7th
I will make a reconnoissance in force tomorrow towards Holly Springs. Will not attack or advance however unless it is ascertained that the Enemy are evacuating, until re-inforcements are up. Will have the railroad complete to Davis Mills on Monday. I have not the slightest apprehension of a reverse from present appearances.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 279n
Nov 8th
Reinforcements are arriving very slowly If they do not come on more rapidly 1 will attack as I am. But one Regt has yet reached Memphis.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 278-279
Nov 9th
[Two] Divisions and twelve hundred cavalry are now out on reconnoissance towards Holly Springs The whole under Col Lee1 Seventh Kansas-Had two skirmishes yesterday in which they took one hundred and two prism1ers & killed 17 that they saw Our reported loss two wounded- Rebels commenced evacuating Holly Springs last Thursday, but Pemberton come up & turned them back. This army should be supplied with fifteen thousand (15,000) muskets & accoutrements complete of uniform pattern, delivered at Jackson to supply recruits & replace arms requiring repairs this number would enable us by making some changes to have more uniformity of calibre in the different Regts May I expect forces from New Orleans and Helena to cooperate ?

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 279n
Nov 10th
Five regiments and one battery left Ill for Memphis last week; six or seven more will leave this week. Others will be sent from Ohio & Kentucky. Memphis will be made the depot of a joint military & naval expedition on Vicksburg.

------------------ GRANT TO TUTTLE -----------------

p 279n
Nov 9th to Brig. Gen. James M. Tuttle
Report to me what troops have passed down in the last three days and wl1ere ordered also
report as fast as troop go forward.

------------------ TUTTLE TO GRANT -----------------

p 279n
Nov 9th from Brig. Gen. James M. Tuttle
Regts that have left here in last three days-95th-11Sth-I06th116th-and 83d lndiana l have sent them all to Columbus by order of Gen Davies I dont know what he has done with them- I find some Regts with a kind of loose order to report to Gen McClernand.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 288
Nov 10th
Am I to understand that I lay still here while an expedition is fitted out from Memphis or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman move subject to my order or is he & his forces reserved for some special service ? Will not more forces be sent here?

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 288n
Nov 11th
You have command of all troops sent to your Dept, and have permission to fight the enemy when you please.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 299-300
Nov 12th
If it is the intention to permit this column push South by the Mississippi Central road, and supply it from Memphis by way of the Miss. & Ten. road after reaching Grenada it will be necessary to have six additional locomotives as early as practicable. Three of them should be sent to Memphis as all material for repairs would have to be taken from that end. If there is no expectation of using this route three additional engines would still be required. I would respectfully request that they be ordered. Our present force of engines is twenty-two of which eighteen are in working order, three of them being in the shops for repairs about one half the time.

At present we draw all our forage for this place from the
country, and about one half of it for the balance of the Department, except the District of Memphis. This supply will probably continue until the 1st of January when it may become necessary to bring a great part of it over the road.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 304-305
Nov 13th
Col Lee with cavalry entered Holly Springs this morning driving the enemys pickets from there and far beyond He has taken about one hundred prisoners and killed
and wounded many Lee still in pursuit The enemy are now south of the Tallahatchie I do not deem it advisable to move from present position until prepared to foll ow up any success
Twelve additional Locomotives are required to supply the Army Three at Memphis Will you direct them ordered Can I not have an Ordnance Officer from St Louis ordered to Memphis

------------- GRANT TO SHERMAN -------------
p 310
Nov 14th to Sherman
After writing to you by Col. Grierson1 l received a dispatch from Gen. Halleck stating that in addition to troops already ordered to this Department some from Ohio and Ky. were also ordered. All to be collected at Memphis from which place a combined Military & Naval expedition would move on Vicksburg. This taken in connection with the misterious rumors of
McClernands command left me in doubt as to what I should do. I therefore telegraphed Halleck to know if that movement was to be made independent of mine here. If I was to lay still where I am, or to penetrate as far south as possible with the means at hand. He replied that all troops sent into the Department would be under my controll. Fight the enemy in my own way ... I am ready to move from here any day and will only await your movements. You can inform me by messenger what day you will start, with what force and by what route and I will make my calculation accordingly.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 305n
Nov 15th
Twelve additional locomotives cannot be sent to you for they cannot be procured without seriously deranging other lines. It is not advisable to put rail roads in operation south of Memphis. Operations in northern Miss. must be limited to rapid marches upon any collected forces of the enemy, feeding as far as possib1e on the country. The enemy must be turned by a movement down the river from Memphis as soon as a sufficient force can be collected.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 346n
Nov 23rd
Report approximate number of men in your command, and number that can be sent down the river to Vicksburg, reserving merely enough to hold Corinth and West Tennessee.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 345-346
Nov 24th
Memphis has 18,262 men for duty-being well fortified 16,000 can be spared From other portions of Department troops cannot be spared except to move south on their present lines. I have contemplated attack upon Pemberton and given my orders accordingly. Sherman will move on Wednesday and form junction with my forces south of Holly Springs on Sunday next Steele has been written to to threaten Grenada and Como Porter has sent some Gunboats to operate about the mouth of Yazoo. Must I countermand the orders for this movement? It is too late to reach Sherman or Steele before they will have moved.
Within the Dep't I have 72.000 men.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 346n
Nov 25th
Proposed movements approved. Do not go too far.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 371-372
Dec 3rd
How far south would you like me to go? We are at Yocona and can go as far as supplies can be taken. I will cut the Mobile road south of Tupila. Would it not be
well to hold the Enemy south of Yulebusha & move a force from Memphis & Helena on Vicksburg with my present force it would not be safe to go beyond Grenada & attempt to hold present lines of communication. I have heard nothing from Steele's Expedition but from the precipitate flight of the enemy I think it must have been successful.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 372n
Dec 5th
I think you should not attempt to hold the country south of the Tallahatchie. The troops for Vicksburg should be back to Memphis by the 20th. If possible collect at that place for that purpose as many as twenty-five thousand. More will be added from Helena, &c. Your maln object will be to hold the line from Memphis to Corinth with as small a force as possible, while the largest number possible is thrown upon Vicksburg with the Gunboats.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 390
Dec 5th
If the Helena troops were at my command I think it practicable to send Sherman to take them & Memphis troops south to mouth of Yazoo River & thus secure Vicksburg & the state of Mississippi.

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 401
Dec 7th
I will send two Divisions to Memphis in a few days as soon as I can learn the designs of the enemy. Do you want me to command the expedition on Vicksburg or
shall I send Sherman?

-------------- GRANT TO HALLECK ------------

p 403
Dec 8th
Gen'l Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men-will land above Vicksburg-up the Yazoo if practicable and cut the Mississippi Central R.R. and the Rail Road running East from Vicksburg where they cross Black river. I will cooperate from here. My movements depending on those of the Enemy. With the large Cavalry force now at my command I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie & Y allabusha and where an opportunity occurs make a real attack. After cutting the two Rail Roads Gen Shermans movements to secure the end desired will n ecessarily be left to his judgement. I will occupy this Rail Road to Coffeeville.

---------------- GRANT TO SHERMAN -------------
p 404
Dec 8th
The following is Copy of dispatch just received from Washington.
Washington Dec. 7th

GEN. GRANT.
The capture of Grenada may change our plans in regard to Vicksburg. You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the great object in view. You will retain
till further orders all troops of Gen. Curtis now in your Dept. Telegraph to Gen. Allen in St. Louis for all steamboats you may require. Ask Porter to co-operate. Telegraph what are your present plans.
H. w. HALLECK,
Gen in Chief

I wish you would come over this evening and stay to-night or come in the morning. I would like to talk with you about this matter. My notion is to send two Divisions back to Memphis and fix upon a day when they should effect a landing and press from here with this command at the proper time to cooperate. Tf I do no[t] do this I will move our present force to Grenada, including Steeles, repairing road as we proceed, and establish a
Depot of provision there. When a goo[d] ready is had move immediately upon Jackson, cuting loose from the road. Of the two plans I look most favorably upo[n] the former. Come over and we will talk this matter over.

------------------- GRANT TO STEELE -----------------------

p 408
Dec 8th to Steele
I have just received authority to retain all Gen. Curtis' forces now within my Dept until further orders. This is from the Genl in chief and contemplates their being used in a cooperative movement to effect the capture of Vicksburg. If these troops have gone back to Helena I wish you would return them to Friar's point or the most suitable place to march them directly upon Grenada or embark them for Vicksburg as I may decide on. Gen. Halleck's dispatch was only this moment received and my mind is not fully made up as to the best method of capturing Vicksburg. I can by the time our troops could r each there, have the railroad completed to Grenada and a supply of provisions thrown in there. From that point Jackson, Miss. could be reached without the use of the road, Jackson once in our possession would soon insure the capitulation of Vickbw-g. I rather incline however to the plan of sending your forces and all I can spare from M emphis and here, say 25.000 in addition to yours, down the Miss. to effect a landing above Vicksburg., probably a short distance up the Yazoo and have them cooperate with the Gun Boats, whilst I move south with the remainder of my forces from here. Please inform me by return Couriers all you know about the present position of our Gun Boats, You having been so long on
the Miss. river looking towards Vicksburg are possessed of much information as to the best method of attacking that point that I am not possessed of. I would be very glad to have your views. I shall send Sherman if the Miss. route is determined upon and would be very glad if you could accompany him.

-------------- HALLECK TO GRANT -------------

p 402n
Dec 9th
The President may insist upon designating a separate commander; if not, assign such officers as you deem best. Sherman would be my choice as the chief, under you.

 

[huskerblitz]

Hey, I've moved 5 times in almost as many years and don't know where my notes are. So sue me

Thank you for supplying the sources. All you had to say was you didn't have them immediately.

With small reinforcements at Memphis I think
I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo river.
I am ready however to do with all my might whatever you

I guess I'm confused as to your stance. It still sounds as if Grant is still the one with Vicksburg on his mind and Halleck is simply rubber stamping his idea to try to reduce Vicksburg. I mean, Grant is the first to even mention Vicksburg.

 

[Sid J.]

Thank you for supplying the sources. All you had to say was you didn't have them immediately.

I guess I'm confused as to your stance. It still sounds as if Grant is still the one with Vicksburg on his mind and Halleck is simply rubber stamping his idea to try to reduce Vicksburg. I mean, Grant is the first to even mention Vicksburg.

Grant's supply line for the troops at Corinth is the railroad back to Columbus KY. Most of Grants troops have been garrisoned at various points along this line since May. What Grant proposes in late October, and several times afterward, is moving his supply base to Memphis, freeing up all those garrisons for an overland move. Halleck, rejects this proposal multiple times, in favor of the river expedition from Memphis. Halleck sets the date (12/20) for the riverine expedition and also requires Grant to return troops supporting his movements (Sherman's column from Memphis and Steele's from Helena) by the required date.

Halleck sees Grants operations in Northern MS as a diversion. Grant kinda plays along with that, but once his advance reaches Grenada, Halleck seems to be changing his mind ("The capture of Grenada may change our plans … ").