Deputy commander

[atlantis]

What was the thinking on both sides about the utility of having a deputy for each army commander, someone not tasked with commanding a Corp but at headquarters, fully briefed on the commanding officer's plan and receiving reports as they come in thus able to assume army command if commander is rendered incapacitated.

 

[BCD]

Would've been very useful, especially out west where commands were spread out over large geographic areas. But even more useful than an ACG tied to headquarters would have been one who could go out and supervise the execution of orders in far-flung sectors.

The CoS was already very similar to what you describe: day-to-day duties kept him tied to the secretaries and telegraph operators at HQ, where he could easily take command in a crisis (e.g. Garfield at Chickamauga). What Rosecrans really needed in that campaign was someone who could hold his commanders' feet to the fire, as when the cavalry and XX Corps tarried for several days before crossing Lookout Mountain. For that reason, modern staffs keep the CoS and assistant commander as two separate billets.

 

[BuckPvt]

I had thought about this before as well. The problem with it is that you're essentially wasting a highly skilled general in a fairly passive role. If it's a deputy army commander then that deputy has to have seniority over all of the corps commanders, and both sides were already struggling with finding capable corps commanders without taking their best ones and putting them into administrative roles.

 

[BCD]

I had thought about this before as well. The problem with it is that you're essentially wasting a highly skilled general in a fairly passive role. If it's a deputy army commander then that deputy has to have seniority over all of the corps commanders, and both sides were already struggling with finding capable corps commanders without taking their best ones and putting them into administrative roles.

That's a fair concern, but the real solution was to get a lot more aggressive about promoting talented divisional commanders while cashiering/demoting those who failed to perform. Corps command was still basically a tactical role, with a smaller leap in complexity than the jump from corps to army.

It also would have helped to institute a proper general rank structure. Trying to juggle a passel of major generals who shared the same rank as their army commander caused way more trouble than it was worth.

 

[gary]

I had thought about this before as well. The problem with it is that you're essentially wasting a highly skilled general in a fairly passive role.

Like Halleck did to Grant during the Corinth Campaign.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

The problem with it is that you're essentially wasting a highly skilled general in a fairly passive role.

That's a good point made. But the problem of not readily having a number 2 available at corps level was apparent when Jackson went down at Chancellorsville.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

That's a good point made. But the problem of not readily having a number 2 available at corps level was apparent when Jackson went down at Chancellorsville.

He had a #2 Hill was experienced but when he got wounded as well right after, command fell to Rodes who wild then turn it over to Stuart.

 

[fyrd3]

The role politics played in the chain of command probably renders this more problematic than helpful.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

That's a fair concern, but the real solution was to get a lot more aggressive about promoting talented divisional commanders while cashiering/demoting those who failed to perform. Corps command was still basically a tactical role, with a smaller leap in complexity than the jump from corps to army.

It also would have helped to institute a proper general rank structure. Trying to juggle a passel of major generals who shared the same rank as their army commander caused way more trouble than it was worth.

I concur. The Confederacy handled this issue much better.