Lee D. H. Hill Takes a New Command

[NH Civil War Gal]

@lelliott19 this one is for you! Here is your boy! No mincing words here!

D. H. Hill Takes a New Command - Emerging Civil War

On this date in 1863, Daniel Harvey Hill took command of the district of North Carolina (an assignment that would stretch up to the south bank of the James River in Virginia). Hill had earned a well-deserved reputation as a fighter, but, being a prickly fellow, he also earned a well-deserved...

emergingcivilwar.com

D. H. Hill Takes a New Command

War

Chris Mackowski February 25 " data-medium-file="http://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg?w=220" data-large-file="http://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg?w=257" loading="lazy" class="size-full wp-image-151883" src="https://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg" alt="" width="257" height="350" style="border: medium; max-width: 100%; margin-bottom: 24px;">Daniel Harvey "D. H." Hill On this date in 1863, Daniel Harvey Hill took command of the district of North Carolina (an assignment that would stretch up to the south bank of the James River in Virginia). Hill had earned a well-deserved reputation as a fighter, but, being a prickly fellow, he also earned a well-deserved reputation as a difficult subordinate. Following the battle of Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee had looked for a convenient way to shuffle Hill aside; even Hill's immediate superior, his own brother-in-law, Stonewall Jackson, assented to Hill's reassignment. (Hill would soon get his irascible revenge by denying Lee reinforcements in advance of the Gettysburg campaign.) To get some great insight into Hill's personality, look at the general order he issued to his new command on the day he took charge. This has to be some of the most colorful language used by a general officer in an official communication! This comes from O.R. XVIII, pp. 894–5. I have added a few paragraph breaks to make reading easier. ------------ Headquarters, Goldsborough, V. O., February 25, 1863. The undersigned has been placed in charge of the troops in North Carolina. In assuming command he would address a few words of exhortation to his forces: Soldiers! Your brutal and malignant enemy is putting forth efforts unexampled in the history of the world. Having failed to subjugate you, he is maddened with the thirst for vengeance, and is pushing forward his foreign mercenaries to plunder your property and lay waste your homes. But his marauding hosts have been so often beaten and baffled that they are now discouraged and demoralized. Should you be able to check them everywhere for the next sixty days the 300,000 whose time expires in May will not re-enlist, and the war will end before July. Should the scoundrels, however, gain a single substantial success at any one point the war will be prolonged during the entire administration of Lincoln. It becomes a solemn duty then to labor and fight during the next two months as we have never done before. We must make the war unpopular with the mercenary vandals of the North by harassing and annoying them. We must cut down to 6 feet by 2 the dimensions of the farms which these plunderers propose to appropriate. You will have to endure more hardships and to fight more desperate battles than you would have done were your ranks properly filled. Our cities, towns, and villages are full of young and able-bodied skulkers, wearing the semblance of men, who have dodged from the battle-field under the provisions of the exemption bill. The scorn of the fair sex and the contempt of all honorable men have not been able to drive these cowardly miscreants into the ranks, so long as they can fatten upon the miseries of the country and shelter their worthless carcasses from Yankee bullets, but they are insensible to shame. But a day of retribution awaits these abortions of humanity. Their own descendants will execrate their memory when the finger of scorn is pointed and the taunt is uttered, "He is the son, or grandson, or great-grandson of an exempt and extortioner." Do your full duty, soldiers, and leave these poltroons and villains to the execration of posterity. All commanding officers are hereby enjoined to furnish the names of officers and men who distinguish themselves in pitched battles and skirmishes. Those so distinguishing themselves will be recommended for promotion and their names published in the principal papers of their respective States. The infantry have to bear the brunt of every battle and to endure special hardships in every campaign. The post of danger and of suffering is the post of honor. If our liberty be ever won it will be due mainly to the indomitable pluck and sturdy endurance of our heroic infantry. The Confederate artillery has behaved most nobly, and the wonder is that with inferior guns and ammunition it has been able to cope successfully with the splendid armament of the enemy. It has been a mistake, however, to contend with the Yankee artillery. Reserve your fire, as at Fredericksburg, for the masses of infantry, and do not withdraw your guns just when they are becoming effective. It is glorious to lose guns by fighting them to the last; it is disgraceful to save them by retiring early from the fight. The cavalry constitute the eyes and ears of the army. The safety of the entire command depends upon their vigilance and the faithfulness of their reports. The officers and men who permit themselves to be surprised deserve to die, and the commanding general will spare no efforts to secure them their deserts. Almost equally criminal are the scouts who, through fright, bring in wild and sensational reports. They will be court-martialed for cowardice. Many opportunities will be afforded to the cavalry to harass the enemy, cut off his supplies, drive in his pickets, &c. Those who have never been in battle will thus be enabled to enjoy the novel sensation of listening to the sound of hostile shot and shell, and those who have listened a great way off will be allowed to come some miles nearer, and compare the sensation caused by the distant cannonade with that produced by the rattle of musketry. D. H. HILL, Major- General.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Does the term 'blowhard" come to mind?

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Hill would soon get his irascible revenge by denying Lee reinforcements in advance of the Gettysburg campaign.)

I didn't even realize this was a thing! That an inferior officer could deny a superior officer reinforcements!

 

[Bruce Vail]

I didn't even realize this was a thing! That an inferior officer could deny a superior officer reinforcements!

My understanding of this incident is that Lee was not Hill's superior officer in that particular time and place. Hill had resigned his position in the ANV in Jan 1863 and been appointed chief of the Dept. of North Carolina in Feb 1863 by President Davis. This was an independent command, and Hill answered to Davis and the War Department in Richmond, not to Lee. Thus Lee had to negotiate the transfer of troops from the Department of North Carolina to the ANV and Hill was within his rights to hold on to his troops, unless he received orders otherwise from the War Department in Richmond.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Have always been ambivalent about the worth of D.H. Hill as a senior military commander. On the one hand, he was clearly a competent combat commander (at least at division level). But on the other hand, he was a difficult personality, and did not fit well into an Army command structure.

In the first half of '63, when Hill took charge of the defenses of Richmond then the Dept. of N.C. & S. VA., included in his charges were four veteran brigades detached from the ANV. These four veteran brigades were led by four of Lee's best Generals – Robert Ransom, John Cooke, Montgomery Corse and Micah Jenkins.

Shortly after Lee devised the plan for his Pennsylvania Campaign, he needed reinforcements and requested the return of these four veteran brigades, whom he always regarded were on loan to Hill.

After to-and-fro communications with Hill, Lee would get none of these veteran brigades from Hill for his march north. Instead, he was finally sent two different brigades of inexperienced troops from Hill's command to fill out Heth's new division, in the newly formed Third Corps of the ANV. One enlarged NC brigade was led by Johnston Pettigrew; the other brigade comprised one NC regiment and three MS regiments, led by the President's nephew, Joe Davis, who had no command experience.

Whichever way one looks at it, it was a bad exchange for Lee. Lee lost four battle-hardened brigades ably led, and he gained two relatively raw brigades, with one untried commander.

Most of us know that both Pettigrew's and Davis's brigades suffered heavy losses on the first day at Gettysburg.

But have always wondered what real difference, if any, would have been made if Lee had had the benefit of his four veteran brigades under Ransom, Cooke, Corse and Jenkins present instead, during the same course of events that occurred at Gettysburg.

I would argue, not much. Presumably, Ransom's and Cooke's brigades would have filled the gap left in Heth's division, by not including the brigades of Pettigrew and Davis, and suffered the same heavy losses on July 1. And if both brigades of Corse and Jenkins were reattached to their original division (Picketts), then they would probably have ended up being slaughtered with the rest of that division in the final assault made on July 3.

 

[gjpratt]

Does the term 'blowhard" come to mind?

Or John Pope.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Have always been ambivalent about the worth of D.H. Hill as a senior military commander. On the one hand, he was clearly a competent combat commander (at least at division level). But on the other hand, he was a difficult personality, and did not fit well into an Army command structure.

In the first half of '63, when Hill took charge of the defenses of Richmond then the Dept. of N.C. & S. VA., included in his charges were four veteran brigades detached from the ANV. These four veteran brigades were led by four of Lee's best Generals – Robert Ransom, John Cooke, Montgomery Corse and Micah Jenkins.

Shortly after Lee devised the plan for his Pennsylvania Campaign, he needed reinforcements and requested the return of these four veteran brigades, whom he always regarded were on loan to Hill.

After to-and-fro communications with Hill, Lee would get none of these veteran brigades from Hill for his march north. Instead, he was finally sent two different brigades of inexperienced troops from Hill's command to fill out Heth's new division, in the newly formed Third Corps of the ANV. One enlarged NC brigade was led by Johnston Pettigrew; the other brigade comprised one NC regiment and three MS regiments, led by the President's nephew, Joe Davis, who had no command experience.

Whichever way one looks at it, it was a bad exchange for Lee. Lee lost four battle-hardened brigades ably led, and he gained two relatively raw brigades, with one untried commander.

Most of us know that both Pettigrew's and Davis's brigades suffered heavy losses on the first day at Gettysburg.

But have always wondered what real difference, if any, would have been made if Lee had had the benefit of his four veteran brigades under Ransom, Cooke, Corse and Jenkins present instead, during the same course of events that occurred at Gettysburg.

I would argue, not much. Presumably, Ransom's and Cooke's brigades would have filled the gap left in Heth's division, by not including the brigades of Pettigrew and Davis, and suffered the same heavy losses on July 1. And if both brigades of Corse and Jenkins were reattached to their original division (Picketts), then they would probably have ended up being slaughtered with the rest of that division in the final assault made on July 3.

Lee originally planned for Ransom, Cooke, Pettigrew, and Davis to form Heth's division with the Light division staying intact. Either way Ransom's brigade was 3k and Cooke's over 2k. I don't see either committing the mistake Davis did at the railroad cut, and both would of handled going toe to toe with the Iron Brigade better. I was a horrible exchange for Lee. Even IF he doesn't get Pettigrew and Davis, those two brigades were actually more men, and veteran status. Smarter move would of been to exchange Heth's and Archer's brigades for Cooke and Ransom, as those two units needed to rest and refit.

 

[Bruce Vail]

Have always been ambivalent about the worth of D.H. Hill as a senior military commander. On the one hand, he was clearly a competent combat commander (at least at division level). But on the other hand, he was a difficult personality, and did not fit well into an Army command structure.

In the first half of '63, when Hill took charge of the defenses of Richmond then the Dept. of N.C. & S. VA., included in his charges were four veteran brigades detached from the ANV. These four veteran brigades were led by four of Lee's best Generals – Robert Ransom, John Cooke, Montgomery Corse and Micah Jenkins.

Shortly after Lee devised the plan for his Pennsylvania Campaign, he needed reinforcements and requested the return of these four veteran brigades, whom he always regarded were on loan to Hill.

After to-and-fro communications with Hill, Lee would get none of these veteran brigades from Hill for his march north. Instead, he was finally sent two different brigades of inexperienced troops from Hill's command to fill out Heth's new division, in the newly formed Third Corps of the ANV. One enlarged NC brigade was led by Johnston Pettigrew; the other brigade comprised one NC regiment and three MS regiments, led by the President's nephew, Joe Davis, who had no command experience.

Whichever way one looks at it, it was a bad exchange for Lee. Lee lost four battle-hardened brigades ably led, and he gained two relatively raw brigades, with one untried commander.

Most of us know that both Pettigrew's and Davis's brigades suffered heavy losses on the first day at Gettysburg.

But have always wondered what real difference, if any, would have been made if Lee had had the benefit of his four veteran brigades under Ransom, Cooke, Corse and Jenkins present instead, during the same course of events that occurred at Gettysburg.

I would argue, not much. Presumably, Ransom's and Cooke's brigades would have filled the gap left in Heth's division, by not including the brigades of Pettigrew and Davis, and suffered the same heavy losses on July 1. And if both brigades of Corse and Jenkins were reattached to their original division (Picketts), then they would probably have ended up being slaughtered with the rest of that division in the final assault made on July 3.

Thanks for this elucidation of Hill-Lee quarrel.

Given Hill's personality problems, it wouldn't surprise me that personal animus against Lee was part of his motivation in the troops quarrel, but otherwise a desire to retain possession of trusted troops would be a normal reaction by any general in Hill's position. He had been given command of these troops by Davis in the first instance, so it only natural that he would object to giving them up, especially with a Union force already landed on the North Carolina coast threatening Wilmington or Raleigh.

In any event it's hard to imagine that the transfer of troops that Lee wanted would have changed the final outcome of his Pennsylvania Campaign.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Thanks for this elucidation of Hill-Lee quarrel.

Given Hill's personality problems, it wouldn't surprise me that personal animus against Lee was part of his motivation in the troops quarrel, but otherwise a desire to retain possession of trusted troops would be a normal reaction by any general in Hill's position. He had been given command of these troops by Davis in the first instance, so it only natural that he would object to giving them up, especially with a Union force already landed on the North Carolina coast threatening Wilmington or Raleigh.

In any event it's hard to imagine that the transfer of troops that Lee wanted would have changed the final outcome of his Pennsylvania Campaign.

You think that if Lee had 5k more troops on day 1 it woukdnt of made a difference. If Lee just gets the 4 extra brigades he wants that's 9k more troops altogether.


Day 1 - Lee originally envisioned Heths division as Ransom 3.5k/Cooke 2.6k/Pettigrew 2.8k/Davis 2.4k. That means when Heth initially confront Buford and then the iron brigade its not Archer's depleted brigade but most likely Cooke or Ransom both large verteran units. On top of that the iron brigade wouldn't of been able to overlap any of those units in the way they did TN brigade. It's not hard to envision them pushing buford first Corp back to seminary ridge much sooner. Then when he strikes with his other two brigades it's Pettigrew and Cooke or Ransom striking that's going to be much more force. Behind that when Pender assaults he would have 6 brigades instead of 4 as the light division would of been kept together.


If the 1st Corps is still on seminary ridge when Pender attacks he can attack 3 brigsde front with 2 in reserve and the sixth (let's say Thomas like in real life) held back in case of ddisaster. Historically only 2 of perrins regiments attacked into the town as Scaleswas beaten up and Lane was worried about bufords cavalry. Now you would have dome combination of more fresh troops to pursue and to move against Cemetery ridge. Which they didn't have in real life.



Day 2- Pender having 2 more brigades on hand would extend his line farther south. Either allowing Anderson to create more depth OR Longstreets assault begins farther south possibly being more able to overlap the flank of LRT. On top of that if Anderson has depth his units have a better chance of holding their gains on Cemetery ridge.

 

[Bruce Vail]

You think that if Lee had 5k more troops on day 1 it woukdnt of made a difference. If Lee just gets the 4 extra brigades he wants that's 9k more troops altogether.


Day 1 - Lee originally envisioned Heths division as Ransom 3.5k/Cooke 2.6k/Pettigrew 2.8k/Davis 2.4k. That means when Heth initially confront Buford and then the iron brigade its not Archer's depleted brigade but most likely Cooke or Ransom both large verteran units. On top of that the iron brigade wouldn't of been able to overlap any of those units in the way they did TN brigade. It's not hard to envision them pushing buford first Corp back to seminary ridge much sooner. Then when he strikes with his other two brigades it's Pettigrew and Cooke or Ransom striking that's going to be much more force. Behind that when Pender assaults he would have 6 brigades instead of 4 as the light division would of been kept together.


If the 1st Corps is still on seminary ridge when Pender attacks he can attack 3 brigsde front with 2 in reserve and the sixth (let's say Thomas like in real life) held back in case of ddisaster. Historically only 2 of perrins regiments attacked into the town as Scaleswas beaten up and Lane was worried about bufords cavalry. Now you would have dome combination of more fresh troops to pursue and to move against Cemetery ridge. Which they didn't have in real life.



Day 2- Pender having 2 more brigades on hand would extend his line farther south. Either allowing Anderson to create more depth OR Longstreets assault begins farther south possibly being more able to overlap the flank of LRT. On top of that if Anderson has depth his units have a better chance of holding their gains on Cemetery ridge.

I'm okay with the general proposition that Lee would have done better at Gettysburg if he had had a larger fighting force at his disposal at a few of the key moments. But there has been a lot of discussion on this forum over the years on what the overall Pennsylvania Campaign would have looked like had Lee been more successful at Gettysburg, and I agree with the majority who have opined the overall campaign would have failed anyway and the final outcome of the war unaffected.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

I'm okay with the general proposition that Lee would have done better at Gettysburg if he had had a larger fighting force at his disposal at a few of the key moments. But there has been a lot of discussion on this forum over the years on what the overall Pennsylvania Campaign would have looked like had Lee been more successful at Gettysburg and I agree with the majority who have opined tthe campaign would have failed anyway and the final outcome of the war unafecteed.

Depends on what type of victory we get. After day 2, Lee had about 11K casualties to about 19-20k casualties for the North. If Lee on either day is either to drive the North from the field and hold the ground, that would be a major victory. Having said that, I don't think you can really destroy an army in this time period. Meade most likely falls back to Pipe Creek, and then it's up in the air what Lee would do. IMO. For Lee the best news would be the North recalling troops back to face him and him having more time to collect more supplies. He does this without shattering Pickett's division, then maybe all 3 1st corps troops can head west in the fall.

 

[Jamieva]

I didn't even realize this was a thing! That an inferior officer could deny a superior officer reinforcements!

That was the downside to the confederate departmental system. Same thing happened out west as well

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

That was the downside to the confederate departmental system. Same thing happened out west as well

IF Lee just gets the four other brigades he requested, which are, Ransom (3,000 men), Cooke (2,300 men), Jenkins (2,600 men), and Corse (1,100 men) thats 9,000 extra soldiers, that's the equivalent of a Union Corps. On top of that Pettigrew is missing a reigment during the battle, he should of had 3,500 men in the battle. That is now nearly 10,000 men, you also had 2 regiments from Smith and a regiment from Avery escorting prisoners that could of been the job of one of the Cavalry regiments that were sitting on their butts near the Potomac because Beverly Robertson was incompetent.

 

[Piedone]

I didn't even realize this was a thing! That an inferior officer could deny a superior officer reinforcements!

This might be illustrative on how matters were handled in the South then
- and how much the members of the gentleman's/planter's (?) class believed to be their equals…

It comes to ones mind how they shaped their constitution, treated their government, behaved in the staff tents of the AoT…..I deem all of that most remarkably

but - if I am not mistaken - this reminds me on

- how british officers of the landed gentry and aristocracy worked together (even as late as WWI)
- how all officers of the austrian-hungarian monarchy were entitled to adress each other very informally with their first names (regardless of position or seniority).

Maybe it is another telling example how aristocrats in a feudal society are on intimate terms with each other (since the middle ages?).

 

[Pat Answer]

Does the term 'blowhard" come to mind?

LOL.

Then again, wasn't what we would consider over the top language like this at or close to par at that time?

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

@lelliott19 this one is for you! Here is your boy! No mincing words here!

D. H. Hill Takes a New Command - Emerging Civil War

On this date in 1863, Daniel Harvey Hill took command of the district of North Carolina (an assignment that would stretch up to the south bank of the James River in Virginia). Hill had earned a well-deserved reputation as a fighter, but, being a prickly fellow, he also earned a well-deserved...

emergingcivilwar.com

D. H. Hill Takes a New Command

War

View attachment 499628 Chris Mackowski February 25 " data-medium-file="http://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg?w=220" data-large-file="http://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg?w=257" loading="lazy" class="size-full wp-image-151883" src="https://emergingcivilwar.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/daniel_harvey_hill.jpg" alt="" width="257" height="350" style="border: medium; max-width: 100%; margin-bottom: 24px;">Daniel Harvey "D. H." Hill On this date in 1863, Daniel Harvey Hill took command of the district of North Carolina (an assignment that would stretch up to the south bank of the James River in Virginia). Hill had earned a well-deserved reputation as a fighter, but, being a prickly fellow, he also earned a well-deserved reputation as a difficult subordinate. Following the battle of Fredericksburg, Robert E. Lee had looked for a convenient way to shuffle Hill aside; even Hill's immediate superior, his own brother-in-law, Stonewall Jackson, assented to Hill's reassignment. (Hill would soon get his irascible revenge by denying Lee reinforcements in advance of the Gettysburg campaign.) To get some great insight into Hill's personality, look at the general order he issued to his new command on the day he took charge. This has to be some of the most colorful language used by a general officer in an official communication! This comes from O.R. XVIII, pp. 894–5. I have added a few paragraph breaks to make reading easier. ------------ Headquarters, Goldsborough, V. O., February 25, 1863. The undersigned has been placed in charge of the troops in North Carolina. In assuming command he would address a few words of exhortation to his forces: Soldiers! Your brutal and malignant enemy is putting forth efforts unexampled in the history of the world. Having failed to subjugate you, he is maddened with the thirst for vengeance, and is pushing forward his foreign mercenaries to plunder your property and lay waste your homes. But his marauding hosts have been so often beaten and baffled that they are now discouraged and demoralized. Should you be able to check them everywhere for the next sixty days the 300,000 whose time expires in May will not re-enlist, and the war will end before July. Should the scoundrels, however, gain a single substantial success at any one point the war will be prolonged during the entire administration of Lincoln. It becomes a solemn duty then to labor and fight during the next two months as we have never done before. We must make the war unpopular with the mercenary vandals of the North by harassing and annoying them. We must cut down to 6 feet by 2 the dimensions of the farms which these plunderers propose to appropriate. You will have to endure more hardships and to fight more desperate battles than you would have done were your ranks properly filled. Our cities, towns, and villages are full of young and able-bodied skulkers, wearing the semblance of men, who have dodged from the battle-field under the provisions of the exemption bill. The scorn of the fair sex and the contempt of all honorable men have not been able to drive these cowardly miscreants into the ranks, so long as they can fatten upon the miseries of the country and shelter their worthless carcasses from Yankee bullets, but they are insensible to shame. But a day of retribution awaits these abortions of humanity. Their own descendants will execrate their memory when the finger of scorn is pointed and the taunt is uttered, "He is the son, or grandson, or great-grandson of an exempt and extortioner." Do your full duty, soldiers, and leave these poltroons and villains to the execration of posterity. All commanding officers are hereby enjoined to furnish the names of officers and men who distinguish themselves in pitched battles and skirmishes. Those so distinguishing themselves will be recommended for promotion and their names published in the principal papers of their respective States. The infantry have to bear the brunt of every battle and to endure special hardships in every campaign. The post of danger and of suffering is the post of honor. If our liberty be ever won it will be due mainly to the indomitable pluck and sturdy endurance of our heroic infantry. The Confederate artillery has behaved most nobly, and the wonder is that with inferior guns and ammunition it has been able to cope successfully with the splendid armament of the enemy. It has been a mistake, however, to contend with the Yankee artillery. Reserve your fire, as at Fredericksburg, for the masses of infantry, and do not withdraw your guns just when they are becoming effective. It is glorious to lose guns by fighting them to the last; it is disgraceful to save them by retiring early from the fight. The cavalry constitute the eyes and ears of the army. The safety of the entire command depends upon their vigilance and the faithfulness of their reports. The officers and men who permit themselves to be surprised deserve to die, and the commanding general will spare no efforts to secure them their deserts. Almost equally criminal are the scouts who, through fright, bring in wild and sensational reports. They will be court-martialed for cowardice. Many opportunities will be afforded to the cavalry to harass the enemy, cut off his supplies, drive in his pickets, &c. Those who have never been in battle will thus be enabled to enjoy the novel sensation of listening to the sound of hostile shot and shell, and those who have listened a great way off will be allowed to come some miles nearer, and compare the sensation caused by the distant cannonade with that produced by the rattle of musketry. D. H. HILL, Major- General.

Good post. As an aside, I enjoyed Chris Mackowski's book, "A Season of Slaughter...." about the battle at Spotsylvania Courthouse!

 

[rpkennedy]

LOL.

Then again, wasn't what we would consider over the top language like this at or close to par at that time?

Even by the standards of the time, Hill was still pretty over the top. He seems to have set his own bar and tried to go beyond it.

Ryan

 

[NH Civil War Gal]

Even by the standards of the time, Hill was still pretty over the top. He seems to have set his own bar and tried to go beyond it.

Ryan

I also wanted to give a "like" emoji too!

 

[Pat Answer]

Even by the standards of the time, Hill was still pretty over the top. He seems to have set his own bar and tried to go beyond it.

Ryan

From the little I've read, DH Hill does strike me as the 'doesn't know when to quit' type...

 

[rpkennedy]

From the little I've read, DH Hill does strike me as the 'doesn't know when to quit' type...

100%. He is the definition of "can't get out of his own way". He was a talented officer but his abrasive personality and inability to get along with others took a major toll on his career.

Ryan