I did not find any previous discussion on this topic on any thread here. I recently read Gen. David Stanley's memoirs, which are quite readable and enjoyable BTW. Stanley was very indignant over Jacob Cox claiming greater accolades for the battle that he believed properly belonged to him. Schofield gave Cox responsibility for the defensive preparations because Stanley was still on the retreat route with the rear guard. At the climax of the battle, Stanley was at the forefront with Opdyke leading the charge into the breach at the Carter House when he was severely wounded in the neck. Per Stanley, his long convalescence allowed Cox free reign to write his version of the battle without any contemporaneous counter by Stanley. Cox claims he was effectively in command of the field by virtue of Schofield's previous order to prepare the defensive positions. Stanley says that Schofield disputed this claim and affirmed that when Stanley arrived on the scene he of resumed command of his division.
I was unaware of this dispute. I have not gone back to Cox's book on the battle and it has been a long time since I read it. But since this work was long regarded as a definitive resource, I am guessing Cox burnished his role in the battle to the diminishment of Stanley's. In fact, my first impressions of the Battle of Franklin are from Cox, and this may well be why I was unaware of Stanley's dispute. Or role for that matter. And I suppose this quarrel was overshadowed by Schofield's efforts to claim responsibility for the outcome of Franklin AND Nashville, to the detriment of Thomas.
I am wondering how visible and public this dispute between Cox and Stanley really was. And whether Stanley is correct,
Cox's 266-page 1897 monograph on the battle, to my mind, destroys Stanley's rather embarrassing pretensions (no matter how much I admire Stanley's 1862-63 work in command of the AoC cavalry). Stanley was present only for a few minutes on the battle line, received the flesh wound across his neck and shoulder, rode back to the field hospital across the river from the battle to have the wound dressed and to change clothes, and then spent the rest of the battle at Schofield's headquarters at the Truett house on the opposite side of the Harpeth from the battle.
Schofield had put Cox in charge of the battle line, detached 4th Corps batteries to Cox as they came up (and the report of the 4th Corps artillery chief confirms they acted under Cox's orders during the battle and does not even mention Stanley), detached Kimball's 4th Corps division to Cox as it came up and Kimball followed Cox's orders during the battle, and Opdyke's brigade of the other 4th Corps division (Wagner's) to participate, came under Cox's command when it came within the works and was posted as his reserve (Opdyke also consistently writes that he acted under Cox's orders during the battle).
Stanley's brief arrival on the battle line did not change Schofield's orders that Cox was in command there. As Cox notes on pages 226-227: "[O]rders under which troops are detached continue in force until they are revoked by the authority which issued them, or the duty is completely performed. 'On the return of a detachment the commander reports to the headquarters from which he received his orders,' and no officer can put himself on duty without orders from competent authority." (citing Army Regulations of 1861, sect. 8, 655)
Then there is the matter of Stanley's 1881 correspondence with Cox, when Cox was preparing to write his 1882 volume on the March to the Sea, Franklin and Nashville. Stanley wrote offering to help by the loan of papers, etc. In his August 24, 1881 reply, Cox set forth nine numbered paragraphs stating his recollections and asked Stanley "to compare it with yours" and asked "for any illustration, correction or addition which may occur to you." Here are pertinent portions from the nine paragraphs:
"2. Schofield...had arranged that ... your chief of artillery should detail some batteries as your troops came in, and they reported to me."
"3. After putting my own command in position, I reported to General Schofield that my troops were not sufficient to reach the river on the right, and that the flank was consequently exposed. Kimball's division reported to me and was assigned that place."
"4. I received a written dispatch from General Schofield saying that two brigades of Wagner's were out as rear guard, and one (Opdycke's) would report within the lines to act as my reserve; that Wagner was ordered to bring the other two brigades in whenever Hood showed a purpose of serious attack. I showed this note to Wagner, and found he had such orders."
"5. When Hood formed and advanced, Wagner did not order in the two brigades, but ordered them to fight...."
"6. Being at the left of the line on the parapet, watching the enemy's advance, I was amazed to see Wagner's two brigades open fire. They were quickly run over by the enemy, and came back in confusion."
"7. I immediately sent an aid to Opdycke to warn him to be ready to advance in case of a break at the centre...."
"9. Opdycke and the artillery continued to act under my orders till we left the lines at midnight....
General Stanley replied on October 17, 1881:
"
The nine points submitted in your letter are, to the best of my memory, exactly correct...." (from pp. 201-03 of Cox,
The Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, November 30, 1864: A Monograph, (Scribner's 1887, 2019 reprint by The Battle of Franklin Trust)
Bringing the