Could General Beauregard Been Used More Effectively?

[jackt62]

P.G.T. Beauregard was one of only 5 officers to be originally appointed by Jeff Davis to the most senior rank of full Confederate general. During the first months of the CW, Beauregard held commanding positions overseeing southern victories at Ft. Sumter and 1st Manassas. Subsequently transferred to the western theater to serve under General A.S. Johnston, Beauregard helped plan and execute the Confederate attack at Shiloh. After Johnston's mortal wounding, Beauregard withdrew the Army of Mississippi to Corinth, from which the army was evacuated before Halleck's forces could besiege the town. But a simmering hostility with Beauregard finally led Davis to relieve Beauregard after which he was consigned to secondary fronts for much of the war's remainder. Beauregard performed creditably in defending Charleston from federal naval and land assaults in 1863 and did similar good service in putting the kabosh on Butler's move at Bermuda Hundred and the subsequent defense of Petersburg. But despite befitting his rank and status, Beauregard never held high ranking command of a major Confederate field army after his relief by Davis in 1862. So did Davis' animosity towards Beauregard harm the Confederate military situation or was his relegation to other lesser postings appropriate? Could Beauregard have been used more effectively in command of say, the AoT or even in the lower capacity of a corps commander in any of the major armies?

 

[nc native]

I think Beauregard was underutilized by the Confederacy. I think he could been useful in the Trans-Mississippi theater in command in that region earlier in the war being from that area and as mentioned before in command of the Army of the Tennessee he would have probably done a better job than Bragg, Hood and maybe Johnston. He did perform well in the commands he was given after 1862. He had the pedigree and experience to handle larger assignments than the ones he was given. One of Jefferson Davis's flaws as leader was letting personal relationships interfere with his decisions in choosing men to perform important tasks for his government and his military and snubbing an officer with the experience and talent that Beauregard had is one example of that.

 

[RedRover]

Beauregard was a full General of the Confederate Regular army. In the Confederate army, a corps command was that of a lieutenant-general. To have assumed command of a corps would have been a demotion.


After Shiloh/Corinth, in June, 1862, Beauregard sent the following notice to Richmond:

Given the desperate situation, and the fact that Beauregard subsequently left on sick furlough, Davis immediately relieved him of command, and gave it to Bragg. Beauregard was clearly rankled by the haste and discourtesy implied, but Davis claimed to others in the Confederate government he acted without malice...

....

After Beauregard reporting himself fit for field service in August, a large group of Confederate congressmen petitioned Davis to restore him to the general command in the west. This Davis declined emphatically, though assigning Beauregard command at Charleston:

Interestingly, going back to June, 1862, when he was relieved of command of the western army, Beauregard and others noted his preliminary official report on Shiloh was never followed up by a more detailed one. His corps commanders, etc. sent their own reports to Richmond, rather than submitting to him, for possible revision/correction, or to inform him in aid of completing his own full report.

General Beauregard in late 1864, after the fall of Atlanta, was finally given command again in the west... but with some significant limitations...

Though Beauregard noted it was not an optimal situation, as he was aware the armies of Hood and Taylor were practically independent of his authority. For example, noting Davis' advice to both army commanders...

Beauregard's command was shortly expanded to include SC, GA, and Florida and oppose Sherman. He developed a plan to abandon the defense of the cities and concentrate an army against Sherman, and this was declined by Richmond. On February 22 he was superseded in command by Joe Johnston, with whom he continued to serve to the conclusion.

Beauregard's aide Col. Roman noted later,

 

[Pollaco]

This is kind of or almost like a "what if" thread. So how would things be different had Beauregard been given the TransMiss Dept. instead of having Kirby Smith in command?

 

[RedRover]

Speaking of what ifs, Col. Roman, in his history of Beauregard's operations (Vol. 2), which was approved by the general, gives an example. When Beauregard commanded generally in the west in late 1864, he wanted a rapid transfer of some of Kirby Smith's Trans-Mississippi troops toward Tennessee to reinforce Hood. Richmond approved, but Beauregard was torqued that Smith would not send the troops across the river, for various reasons. Beauregard lamented that Forrest was not in command in the Trans-Mississippi, insinuating he would have seen the necessity and obeyed the orders promptly... and perhaps with dramatic results...

 

[7thWisconsin]

Beauregard´s career was not just limited to the eaarly War - his defense of Petersburg from June 15-18 1864 was as good a piece of generalship as you will find in the entire War. Outnumbered badly, he traded space for time very competently. I think one of Beauregard´s biggest problems was Beauregard himself. He was pretty vain and thought himself to be the best general in the room. I don´t think you worked ¨with¨ him; you worked for ¨him.¨ He didn´t like not being lead sled dog.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Thought Beauregard displayed command versatility in exercising various command roles across multiple theaters through the war.

His experience in active field leadership was restricted to First Bull Run, Shiloh and the siege of Corinth. With this limited experience, thought he was largely untested and unproven as a high commander in combat.

But Beauregard was more effective as an engineering officer in charge of constructed defenses, like at Charleston (in '61 and '62) and Petersburg (in '64)).

Also, Beauregard was not really suited (he admitted this) to administrative, logistical or advisory roles either.

Among his positive personal attributes, thought his self-confidence and charisma were inspiring to those around him. But it was his inability to get along with Davis and Richmond that would hamper his elevation to perform more active field command roles through the war. His quarrels and poor relationship with Davis probably prevented him from gaining operational command of the AOT, both after Bragg's resignation from army command and after the fall of Atlanta when Davis considered replacing Hood.

Given Beauregard's capabilities as an engineering officer preparing and commanding fortified defenses, thought he could have been most effectively utilized in remaining to organize and handle the defenses around New Orleans – the South's biggest and most important city. As a native Louisianian, whose hometown was New Orleans, he was very familiar with the defenses around the city. Prewar, he spent several years in charge of building waterway defenses in Louisiana, including improving the defenses of Forts St. Philip and Jackson on the Mississippi River below New Orleans.

Immediately prior to Fort Sumter, Beauregard was planning to further strengthen both of these forts, which guarded the Mississippi River approaches to New Orleans, when he was transferred by Davis to take over command of the Charleston defenses.

As it turned out, New Orleans became a prime target of Union forces early in the war. Instead of Beauregard running the city's defenses, command was given firstly (for a short time) to the elderly and sick David Twiggs, who was then succeeded by a native Northerner, Mansfield Lovell, who actually abandoned the city (resulting in its surrender on April 28, '62). Although Mansfield was never given enough men or supplies to conduct a proper defense, thought Beauregard might have managed a much better defensive effort because of his defensive engineering skills, local knowledge and connections/committment to the region.

 

[jackt62]

This is kind of or almost like a "what if" thread. So how would things be different had Beauregard been given the TransMiss Dept. instead of having Kirby Smith in command?

Probably not much different. Aside from the fact that the trans-Mississippi was diminished in importance after the initial Confederate routs at Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove, there were not a lot of options for whomever commanded, whether it was Beauregard or Kirby. Overall, Beauregard probably was best suited for his defensive roles at Charleston and Petersburg.

 

[jackt62]

I think one of Beauregard´s biggest problems was Beauregard himself. He was pretty vain and thought himself to be the best general in the room. I don´t think you worked ¨with¨ him; you worked for ¨him.¨ He didn´t like not being lead sled dog.

I agree. His biggest problem was his inflated ego, and his tendency to express displeasure with superior officials (mainly Davis). He also showed his independent streak when partially fending off Lee's requests for a portion of Beauregard's troops in 1864.

 

[jackt62]

Although Mansfield was never given enough men or supplies to conduct a proper defense, thought Beauregard might have managed a much better defensive effort because of his defensive engineering skills, local knowledge and connections to the region.

Beauregard was probably one of the Confederacy's most able engineering officers. It remains to be seen whether he could have organized a better defense of New Orleans than did Lovell who was basically unprepared for a federal river-borne movement. But on the other hand, Beauregard's experience with organizing the batteries around Ft. Sumter may have given him some greater insight into protecting New Orleans from Farragut's fleet.

 

[Saphroneth]

One thing to note is that at Shiloh there's an extent to which Beauregard's involvement in the Shiloh plan was detrimental. This is related to the kinematics of deploying the force.

What should have been done is to deploy the force from marching to fighting order in a "line of columns". This means that the three primary corps of the army each have a sector of the front line which is "theirs" and which they manage, abreast:

I I I
I I I
I I I

And the army commander coordinates, while assigning troops from the reserve.


Instead, what happened is that - due substantially to Beauregard's decisions - the army deploys in "column of lines". That means that all three primary corps were spread across the entire fighting front, and they kept interfering with one another:

___
___
___



My understanding is that this materially contributed to the fact that the battle could not be conducted in the manner which AS Johnston desired (a wheel to push the Union forces against the swamps) - the total desired advance was only about three miles, which should have been possible against the fundamentally disorganized Union troops, or at least the disorganization of the Confederate troops interfered with making this possible owing to the mixed-up corps. A line-of-columns deployment means each corps has a clear mission and makes the situation much more controllable.

 

[Bryce]

P.G.T. Beauregard was one of only 5 officers to be originally appointed by Jeff Davis to the most senior rank of full Confederate general. During the first months of the CW, Beauregard held commanding positions overseeing southern victories at Ft. Sumter and 1st Manassas. Subsequently transferred to the western theater to serve under General A.S. Johnston, Beauregard helped plan and execute the Confederate attack at Shiloh. After Johnston's mortal wounding, Beauregard withdrew the Army of Mississippi to Corinth, from which the army was evacuated before Halleck's forces could besiege the town. But a simmering hostility with Beauregard finally led Davis to relieve Beauregard after which he was consigned to secondary fronts for much of the war's remainder. Beauregard performed creditably in defending Charleston from federal naval and land assaults in 1863 and did similar good service in putting the kabosh on Butler's move at Bermuda Hundred and the subsequent defense of Petersburg. But despite befitting his rank and status, Beauregard never held high ranking command of a major Confederate field army after his relief by Davis in 1862. So did Davis' animosity towards Beauregard harm the Confederate military situation or was his relegation to other lesser postings appropriate? Could Beauregard have been used more effectively in command of say, the AoT or even in the lower capacity of a corps commander in any of the major armies?

I could write a book on how great a general Beauregard really was. The biggest problem was that Bragg and Davis hated him. He saved Petersburg and Richmond three times. In May 1864 he defeated the army of the James and saved Richmond. On June 9, 1864 he stopped the army of the james from capturing Petersburg. On June 15-18, 1864 he defended Petersburg against the combined forces of two union armies.

Some of you may have heard about how inventive Beauregard was during the siege of Charleston. He used a submarine torpedo boats against the union fleet. I wrote an article called the unknown war north of the james. It tells the story of how Lee ordered Ewell to blockade the James River. He did not succeed. Sometimes I think about how Beauregard would've handled the problem, but there was no way Bragg or Davis would have allowed him to command the department of Richmond.

 

[Harms88]

Beauregard was a general who was competent on the field and was given at times to wild fantastical strategies, many times these strategies exceeded the capabilities of the South. If I recall, in 1864 he's supposed to have sent a plan for a strategy to Davis on how they would win the war and Davis had to laugh to himself at how wild it was compared to what the reality at the time was.

 

[Piedone]

i was always much impressed by his defense of Petersburg in 1864 - he showed so much energy, ingenuity, initiative and fighting spirit. I do not know if he always could put up such a show - but if he could he would have been just perfect to command the AoT during the Atlanta campaign.

JEJohnston always seemed a bit too cautious and defensive to me -
I guess (regardless of his later comments stating the contrary) Sherman never was really afraid of the AoT doing something really unexpected, it was always just putting up a defensive line, getting flanked, retreating, putting up another defensive line.

I could imagine Beauregard to come up with some more daring plans and surprising actions
(but of course….these might also have backfired…) which could have given Sherman a bit more of a headache.

And if he could get along with the corps and division commanders for any longer timespan (which could not be taken for granted in the AoT) he probably could have been much of an inspiration and improved the offensive capabilities of the army (which in my eyes were not that big….).

So yes….I'd conclude his talents were definitely wasted up to certain degree by president Davis - who (and whose never wavering support for Bragg) seems to have been pretty responsible for this.

 

[Saphroneth]

One thing I'll point out with respect to Beauregard's defence of Richmond (before Grant arrived) is that there's an interesting question of force ratio. I once worked out that Burnside was facing tougher odds around Richmond in purely numerical terms than Grant was up north.

 

[Piedone]

One thing I'll point out with respect to Beauregard's defence of Richmond (before Grant arrived) is that there's an interesting question of force ratio. I once worked out that Burnside was facing tougher odds around Richmond in purely numerical terms than Grant was up north.

Could you please specify that a a bit more? This could be interesting!

 

[Saphroneth]

Could you please specify that a a bit more? This could be interesting!

Well, firstly I must admit to confusion and say I meant Butler! Sorry about that.



Infantry brigades already in the Richmond/Petersburg defences on 5th May: Hunton's, Gracie's, Barton's, Clingman's and Bushrod Johnson's, plus a few random regiments. All bar Hunton's were shuffled to face Butler immediately and were available on the 6th.
Arriving 6th: Hagood's
7th: Wise's
9th: Hoke's, Kemper's
10th: Ransom's
11th: Colquitt's
12th: Corse's
14th: Martin's
17th: Evans'

So a substantial chunk of reinforcements arrives in Virginia during May, but most of them go to face Butler not Grant.

At this time, Lee's army is 35 infantry brigades plus cavalry and artillery, meaning that around Spotsylvania (which is the point before Lee gets any reinforcements) Butler is facing about 30% of the total infantry units available in Virginia. (Most of Lee's cavalry is at that time off fighting a cavalry campaign against Grant's cav).
Butler has about 20% of Grant's total strength at the same time. These numbers are somewhat rough but Butler simply doesn't have the strength needed to represent a higher % of the total Union force than Beauregard has of the total Confederate force.

Then of course Grant pulls out four of Butler's six divisions for Cold Harbor, and Butler can't mount further offensive operations for obvious reasons. This lapse in pressure is actually what releases most of the reinforcements Lee enjoys for Cold Harbor.

 

[Caddo Militia]

Why not assign Beauregard to command at Vicksburg instead of Pemberton?

 

[Saphroneth]

Why not assign Beauregard to command at Vicksburg instead of Pemberton?

Honestly Pemberton didn't screw up as much as is commonly painted either - he actually did notice Grant moving south for the crossing below Grand Gulf and ordered his reserve division (Stevenson) south to counter this movement, but Stevenson just outright ignored orders. Then the local commander down there (I believe Bowen?) blew the fortifications of Grand Gulf and retreated from Bayou Pierre, allowing Grant to bridge this river obstacle which could otherwise have held him long-term.


Consequently it's hard to point to a move by Pemberton that comprehensively buggered the campaign. The best you can do once Grant's over the Mississippi and has crossed Bayou Pierre - given his greater numbers - is to evacuate Vicksburg before you get penned in place, and given the duration of the siege (and the post-siege pause for Grant's troops) the real question is whether the expenditure of all that parole credit is worth delaying Grant's army another several months - Vicksburg is being lost anyway as it's now possible to cut it off from supply.

 

[Caddo Militia]

Honestly Pemberton didn't screw up as much as is commonly painted either - he actually did notice Grant moving south for the crossing below Grand Gulf and ordered his reserve division (Stevenson) south to counter this movement, but Stevenson just outright ignored orders. Then the local commander down there (I believe Bowen?) blew the fortifications of Grand Gulf and retreated from Bayou Pierre, allowing Grant to bridge this river obstacle which could otherwise have held him long-term.


Consequently it's hard to point to a move by Pemberton that comprehensively buggered the campaign. The best you can do once Grant's over the Mississippi and has crossed Bayou Pierre - given his greater numbers - is to evacuate Vicksburg before you get penned in place, and given the duration of the siege (and the post-siege pause for Grant's troops) the real question is whether the expenditure of all that parole credit is worth delaying Grant's army another several months - Vicksburg is being lost anyway as it's now possible to cut it off from supply.

Perhaps Beauregard or another commander bolder than Pemberton could have left Vicksburg and joined up with Johnston. They would then have outnumbered Grant who was deep in enemy territory and with a long supply line. And why leave Taylor in Louisiana, send him to join the others.