Cotton captured by the US Navy

[tony_gunter]

What was the official policy of the navy with regard to captured cotton? Was it treated like any other naval prize (sold and the proceeds split by the crew)? Several army commanders found themselves accused of cotton speculation, some lost their jobs as a result. Did the navy ever come under scrutiny for the same?

 

[tony_gunter]

What was the official policy of the navy with regard to captured cotton? Was it treated like any other naval prize (sold and the proceeds split by the crew)? Several army commanders found themselves accused of cotton speculation, some lost their jobs as a result. Did the navy ever come under scrutiny for the same?

I found a previous thread that suggests the navy was heavily involved in cotton speculation, sending crews several miles inland to round up cotton, which they would later claim as a naval prize. This wasn't because it was official policy, right? The prize court simply gave it a veneer of legality?

Members of the army suffered charges of cotton speculation so often, why did the navy escape scrutiny?

 

[observator]

see following article..the cotton would handed over to the Quartermaster Corps

An Official Journal Of The NRA | General Grant’s Magnificent Set of Lost Remingtons

A recent discovery brings to light a pair of Remington New Model Army revolvers that had been presented to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. With engraving and carved ivory stocks by L.D. Nimschke, the remarkable guns were a “thank you” for a wartime cotton-smuggling scheme.

www.americanrifleman.org

 

[GwilymT]

Great question

 

[GwilymT]

see following article..the cotton would handed over to the Quartermaster Corps

An Official Journal Of The NRA | General Grant’s Magnificent Set of Lost Remingtons

A recent discovery brings to light a pair of Remington New Model Army revolvers that had been presented to Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. With engraving and carved ivory stocks by L.D. Nimschke, the remarkable guns were a “thank you” for a wartime cotton-smuggling scheme.

www.americanrifleman.org

Please forgive me, but I don't think this NRA article really answers the question outside of some antidotal tales.

 

[Pollaco]

Please forgive me, but I don't think this NRA article really answers the question outside of some antidotal tales.

I have read that article and it does concern the Cotton trade (even Grant had his fingers in it). However not cotton captured in the blockade or by the navy.

 

[Philip Leigh]

What was the official policy of the navy with regard to captured cotton? Was it treated like any other naval prize (sold and the proceeds split by the crew)? Several army commanders found themselves accused of cotton speculation, some lost their jobs as a result. Did the navy ever come under scrutiny for the same?

The article below may interest you.

Trading With the Enemy

Provided below is my speech to the Sarasota, Florida Civil War Roundtable on December 2, 2014 about Trading With the Enemy, which is my book about intersectional trade during the Civil War. *** On …

civilwarchat.wordpress.com

 

[Philip Leigh]

I found a previous thread that suggests the navy was heavily involved in cotton speculation, sending crews several miles inland to round up cotton, which they would later claim as a naval prize. This wasn't because it was official policy, right? The prize court simply gave it a veneer of legality?

Members of the army suffered charges of cotton speculation so often, why did the navy escape scrutiny?

The New York Times article below, may interest you.

Trading With the Enemy

Despite a blockade and an embargo, the North-South cotton trade thrived during the Civil War.

archive.nytimes.com

 

[Lubliner]

I have a small bit of information that as a sidenote for cotton not captured could be interesting to some.

Evening Star, April 1, 1865,
From an official statement of the results of blockade-running at Wilmington, published in the Manchester (Eng.) Guardian, we learn that the total ventures made by English speculators amount to more than $36,000,000. The quantity of cotton exported from Wilmington in 22 months was 137,937 bales, and the total number of vessels which ran the blockade in 15 months, 396.

Lubliner.

 

[GwilymT]

@Philip Leigh , thanks for sharing those articles. Hopefully they address the op regarding US Navy policy, if any, regarding cotton. Didn't you write a southern (neo-CSA) perspective book regarding the cotton trade? Any ideas on US Navy policy?

 

[USS ALASKA]

College of William and Mary
W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects
1980

Trading with the enemy: Legal theory and the Civil War
Carole Johnson Breitenbach
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is first to introduce the concept of trading with the enemy, as defined and governed by international law. The thesis then applies this definition, and the stipulations it embodies, to the statutory laws passed and the Supreme Court decisions rendered concerning interbelligerent trade during the Civil War. The study traces the efforts of Union lawmakers to control trade between the North and the South, and the extent to which those efforts reflected international legal theory. Discussion then turns to the Supreme Court cases dealing with the wartime trade, and the degree to which the Court's decisions upheld the tenets of international law. Finally, the study briefly examines the application of international law to twentieth-century warfare.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4160&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

College of William and Mary
W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects
1965

The Evolution of Confederate Policy Regarding Interbelligerent Commerce in the Civil War
Judith Baker Rutherford
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected].

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of Confederate policy regarding contraband trade during the Civil War, Trade policy was studied from three aspects: (1) official policy as manifested in Confederate statutes, (2) attitudes of high officials which affected trade policy and practices, and (3) actual trade practices.

Stringent anti-contraband trade laws were in effect in the Confederacy until February 1864, At that time the Confederate Congress passed two liberalizing trade laws, one allowing the President to authorize trade with the enemy and the other permitting the President or the department heads to authorize trading in northern paper currency. Then in February 1865, all restrictions on the exportation of governmental produce were removed, and the Secretary of the Treasury - subject to Presidential approval - was placed in complete command of governmental trade. The following month, the Secretary of the Treasury was empowered to trade tobacco and cotton for coin with which to purchase supplies.

While the Confederate Congress was slow in relaxing restrictions against trade with the Worth, high Confederate officials quickly came to favor trade with the enemy. Jefferson Davis never exerted effective leadership in this important area, instead, beginning with Commissary General Lucius S. Northrop in 1861, the various department heads began recommending reliance on contraband trade as the best source of supplies. These men not only recommended, but actually engaged in, trade with the North.

The volume of trade with the enemy increased as the Southern military effort deteriorated and as the Union blockade became increasingly effective. Seemingly, the Bureau of Subsistence and the War Department conducted the bulk of trade with the North during the first three years of the war. Transactions were usually completed through departmental agents. Then in August 1864 the President placed the responsibility for trading cotton for military supplies in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury. Although the other departments never completely ceased their trade activities, the Treasury Department's control over governmental trade increased after the liberal congressional delegation of authority to it in February 1865.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4636&context=etd

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Traders or Traitors: Northern Cotton Trading During the Civil War
David G. Surdam
Department of Economics Loyola University of Chicago

Conclusions
The tightening Federal naval blockade created potential for spectacular profits for those who could obtain and transport cotton cheaply. A total ban on trade would have only magnified the potential profits and would have likely created a greater impetus for illicit smuggling and its attendant evils. Lincoln wanted to use cotton, and perhaps he believed that even greed could be used to further the national interest. Lincoln, himself, was scrupulous about his personal finances [French, 1989, p. 382; Donald, 1995, p. 313, 325]. Why did a man with such personal integrity eventually countenance a system that became rife with abuse and corruption? Why did he grant favored treatment to so many friends and associates in obtaining permits? In comparison, Jefferson Davis was so strict regarding cotton that he didn't help his older brother, Joseph, in preserving their stocks of cotton from being burned [Hermann, 1990, p. 105]. In an ironic twist, General Grant saw and condemned the corruption inherent in the trade, but later he became renown for an administration characterized by his associates' corruption. Lincoln oversaw a system whereby his associates gained even at the possible cost of prolonging the war, but we revere him as "Honest" Abe. Lincoln was at least sensitive to the potential scandal from the cotton trade. On some instances he refused to issue permits because of the impropriety involved. Still, the cotton trade, with its attendant profitability, probably posed too great a temptation for any set of men to avoid some sinful behavior; Lincoln was not surrounded by saints. Moreover, the attempts to get cotton and the methods for apportioning permits served critical local interests. Massachusetts and New York were critical states for the Republicans in 1864. The Massachusetts cotton textile manufacturers needed cotton to stay in business, and Lincoln was loathe to abandon them. New York was not safely Republican, and Lincoln needed to insure the support of men such as Thufiow Weed (Lincoln won the state by fewer than 7,000 votes). But satisfying local interests was a risky strategy. Grant's military strategy was to pin Lee down and starve him out by cutting the supply lines from the South; by allowing the trading of food supplies for cotton in southern Virginia, Lincoln's cotton policies were undermining Grant's strategy at a time when war-weariness was at its peak. By helping Massachusetts and New York manufacturers and traders, Lincoln was putting the war effort at risk. Fortunately for him, his military leaders won vital victories before the 1864 election, maintaining the Union cause, but the margin for error was slender.

http://www.thebhc.org/sites/default/files/beh/BEHprint/v028n2/p0301-p0312.pdf

Because of copywrite, please see above link

Cheers,
USS ALASKA