Corps Commander Alternatives For The AOTP?

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In the fall of 1863 and early 1864, the Army of the Potomac had a serious upper leadership problem (corps and division). Deaths, injuries, ineffectiveness, arguably some outright incompetence, and some people Meade simply didn't like. Five corps were reorganized into three: because of losses at Gettysburg, to make the army easier to manage, to squeeze some generals out, and because of a perceived shortage of good corps commanders.

After reorganization, the corps commanders were Sedgwick, Hancock, and Warren.

Hancock never really recovered from his Gettysburg wound and had to resign as corps commander after the Overland Campaign. Meade wanted and needed a healthy Hancock at corps commander.

I don't think Meade was inclined to replace Sedgwick. He was popular, had seniority, and was competent. However, by early 1864 it should have been obvious he was slow and cautious, to a fault.

Warren proved in the long term not to be cut out for corps command, although that wasn't apparent before the Overland Campaign.

Besides those already in the AOTP who did later become corps commanders (Humphreys, Wright, and Gibbon) what realistic options were there outside the AOTP?

Three obvious answers to me are Baldy Smith, Franklin, and Couch. I don't think Meade would have wanted any of them back in the AOTP and I don't think they would have been improvements anyways.

Henry Slocum or Alpheus Williams seem like logical options, if Sherman would spare them. Meade was familiar with them, but I'm not sure what he thought of them. I doubt Sherman would have been willing to spare any of his other top guys. (Howard was definitely not coming back.)

Edward Ord is someone Grant liked a lot and he was Sherman's West Point roommate, but I don't know what Meade thought of him (I can imagine Meade would have come to hate him though). Dave Powell's book about New Market illustrates Ord weaseled his way into a WV command for the 1864 campaigns then quickly weaseled his way back out when he saw how messy the situation was, doing Sigel no favors in the process. His war record seems surprisingly peripheral so it seems difficult to evaluate his quality as a commander.

Given Grant's dislike of Rosecrans I don't see him getting a second chance as a corps commander in Virginia. I don't suppose Meade knew him.

Sheridan probably would have been much better for the AOTP as an infantry corps commander rather than as the cavalry corps commander. (I think our esteemed cavalry guru Eric Wittenberg has previously given the learned opinion that, with Buford dead, Wesley Merritt should have gotten the position.)

Are there any other realistic options I'm overlooking? Some Major General on the sidelines in the winter of 1863-1864 that might have been better than Sedgwick, Warren, or a weakened Hancock and also acceptable to Meade, Grant, and Lincoln? (So definitely not McClellan or Buell.)
 
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I would have had John Gibbon take 2nd Corps if Hancock's health was starting to fail. I would kept Segdwick becuase there are no good replacements for him and I would kept Warren but have General George Webb Morell ready to get the job. Williams would be a good chose if 11th and 12th corps returned to the army. Parke should get 9th corps and Sheridan could get 6th corps. The Cavalry would go to David M. Gregg.
 
I'd like to take rank out of the equation and talk about officers who didn't make it past Brigadier General that I find compelling.

1) Charles Griffin - a dependable division commander who Warren always seemed to put in the lead when there was a new expedition around Petersburg. Led the V Corps after Warren was relieved - unsure of his brilliance, but he certainly seemed reliable.
2) Frank Barlow - aggressive, experienced, well-regarded. He seems to have escaped the stench of Gettysburg and the XI Corps, although illness and wounds took him in and out of the II Corps command structure.
3) John Hartranft - Had one heck of a day at Fort Stedman - energetic / resourceful / determined. Would that have carried over to a higher command?
 
I know you said outside the AotP, however, if I were Meade Humphreys would be on top of my list. Than Gibbon. Not a big fan of Sedgwick or Slocum my self and Barlow I would never have gone for. I certainly would have considered Alexander Hays before he died. I don't really know enough about guys outside the AotP to have any opinions on them.

John
 
Charles Griffin - a dependable division commander who Warren always seemed to put in the lead when there was a new expedition around Petersburg. Led the V Corps after Warren was relieved - unsure of his brilliance, but he certainly seemed reliable.

Griffin was career Army. West Point 1847. He was an artillery specialist, to the point he was teaching it at the academy when the war started. I think that might have st slowed his wartime ascent.
 
I know you said outside the AotP, however, if I were Meade Humphreys would be on top of my list. Than Gibbon. Not a big fan of Sedgwick or Slocum my self and Barlow I would never have gone for. I certainly would have considered Alexander Hays before he died. I don't really know enough about guys outside the AotP to have any opinions on them.

John
Hays got bumped down to brigade command after a sketchy performance at Morton's Ford. Not sure he would have been cut out for Corps command.
 
In late March - early April 1864, the Army of the Potomac was reorganized this way :

- 2nd Corps : MG Winfield Scott Hancock
- - - 1st Div. : BG Francis C. Barlow
- - - 2nd Div. : BG John Gibbon
- - - 3rd Div. : MG David B. Birney
- - - 4th Div. : BG Joseph B. Carr

- 5th Corps : MG Gouverneur K. Warren
- - - 1st Div. : BG Charles Griffin
- - - 2nd Div. : BG Henry Baxter
- - - 3rd Div. : Col. William McCandless
- - - 4th Div. : BG James Wadsworth

- 6th Corps : MG John Sedgwick
- - - 1st Div. : MG Horation G. Wright
- - - 2nd Div. : BG George W. Getty
- - - 3rd Div. : BG James B. Ricketts

- Cavalry Corps : MG Philip H. Sheridan
- - - 1st Div. : BG A.T.A. Torbert
- - - 2nd Div. : BG David M. Gregg
- - - 3rd Div. : BG James H. Wilson

With the dissolution of the 1st and 3rd Corps, MG John Newton and MG William H. French were left without a command. MG George Sykes, commander of the 5th Corps, was replaced by MG Gouverneur K. Warren, who performed well during Bristoe and Mine Run Campaigns. Due to his seniority, MG John Sedgwick retained the command of the 6th Corps. This grand consolidation may had negative effects on the military quality of Union troops, by breaking an "esprit de corps". I believe that, without ruining such cohesion, all of the five Corps could have been consolidated :
- the 1st Corps was composed of three understrength divisions, the 3rd one is dissolved in order to reinforce the 1st and 2nd ones.
- the 2nd Corps was composed of three average divisions, it retains its organization.
- the 3rd Corps was composed of three average divisions, it retains its organization.
- the 5th Corps was composed of three understrength divisions, the 3rd one is dissolved in order to reinforce the 1st and 2nd ones.
- the 6th Corps was composed of two average divisions, it retains its organization.

The Army of the Potomac can be boosted by the transfer of already existing troops from the 8th Corps, the 22nd Corps and the Department of the Susquehanna. Sedgwick, being a senior general, can be placed in command of the Department of West Virginia while the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Corps are still directly under Meade's control, receiving extra troops and consolidating his command.

*Army of the Potomac : MG Meade
- 1st Corps : MG Newton / MG Humpheys - BG Wadsworth
- - - 1st Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 3 Bdes
- 2nd Corps : MG Warren / MG Hancock - BG John Gibbon
- - - 1st Div. = 4 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 3rd Div. = 3 Bdes
- 3rd Corps : MG French / MG Birney - BG Ricketts
- - - 1st Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 3rd Div. = 3 Bdes
- 5th Corps : MG Sykes / MG Warren - BG Griffin
- - - 1st Div. = 4 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 4 Bdes
- 6th Corps : MG Sedgwick / MG Sheridan - MG Wright
- - - 1st Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 3 Bdes
- Cavalry Corps : MG Alfred Pleasonton / BG Gregg - BG Torbert
- - - 1st Div. = 3 Bdes
- - - 2nd Div. = 2 Bdes
- - - 3rd Div. = 2 Bdes

When necessary, one of the three smallest Corps can be dissolved (either the 1st, the 5th or the 6th) in order to consolidate the two others in order to create a four-infantry-corps army, with each corps composed of three average divisions.
 
In the fall of 1863 and early 1864, the Army of the Potomac had a serious upper leadership problem (corps and division). Deaths, injuries, ineffectiveness, arguably some outright incompetence, and some people Meade simply didn't like. Five corps were reorganized into three: because of losses at Gettysburg, to make the army easier to manage, to squeeze some generals out, and because of a perceived shortage of good corps commanders.

After reorganization, the corps commanders were Sedgwick, Hancock, and Warren.

Hancock never really recovered from his Gettysburg wound and had to resign as corps commander after the Overland Campaign. Meade wanted and needed a healthy Hancock at corps commander.

I don't think Meade was inclined to replace Sedgwick. He was popular, had seniority, and was competent. However, by early 1864 it should have been obvious he was slow and cautious, to a fault.

Warren proved in the long term not to be cut out for corps command, although that wasn't apparent before the Overland Campaign.

Besides those already in the AOTP who did later become corps commanders (Humphreys, Wright, and Gibbon) what realistic options were there outside the AOTP?

Three obvious answers to me are Baldy Smith, Franklin, and Couch. I don't think Meade would have wanted any of them back in the AOTP and I don't think they would have been improvements anyways.

Henry Slocum or Alpheus Williams seem like logical options, if Sherman would spare them. Meade was familiar with them, but I'm not sure what he thought of them. I doubt Sherman would have been willing to spare any of his other top guys. (Howard was definitely not coming back.)

Edward Ord is someone Grant liked a lot and he was Sherman's West Point roommate, but I don't know what Meade thought of him (I can imagine Meade would have come to hate him though). Dave Powell's book about New Market illustrates Ord weaseled his way into a WV command for the 1864 campaigns then quickly weaseled his way back out when he saw how messy the situation was, doing Sigel no favors in the process. His war record seems surprisingly peripheral so it seems difficult to evaluate his quality as a commander.

Given Grant's dislike of Rosecrans I don't see him getting a second chance as a corps commander in Virginia. I don't suppose Meade knew him.

Sheridan probably would have been much better for the AOTP as an infantry corps commander rather than as the cavalry corps commander. (I think our esteemed cavalry guru Eric Wittenberg has stated, with Buford dead, Wesley Merritt should have gotten the position.)

Are there any other realistic options I'm overlooking? Some Major General on the sidelines in the winter of 1863-1864 that might have been better than Sedgwick, Warren, or a weakened Hancock and also acceptable to Meade, Grant, and Lincoln? (So definitely not McClellan or Buell.)
Of the three you mention - Baldy Smith, Franklin, and Couch - only the latter strikes me as plausible on the first part of the test, "improvements" (the second part - "acceptability" - probably injects even more subjective speculation into the analysis). Couch had health issues.
Griffin was career Army. West Point 1847. He was an artillery specialist, to the point he was teaching it at the academy when the war started. I think that might have st slowed his wartime ascent.
You are correct regarding Griffin. Like many officers who were stuck in the snail-pace promotional process in the artillery, he, Gibbon, Ricketts, Upton, and others jumped to infantry commands. The bungled tactical decisions at First Bull Run that put his battery in an untenable position may have "helped" him decide.
 
I'd really like to see a "position description" for a Civil War corps commander...particularly how the role differed from that of a division or brigade commander. It's really hard to evaluate people in the role or aspiring to the role without knowing what was expected of them.
 
In a field as prone to nit-picking as history I'm puzzled the anachronistic use of Roman numerals to describe Federal army corps isn't often criticized. And I wonder why people even refer to them so, certainly they know better.
 
I'd really like to see a "position description" for a Civil War corps commander...particularly how the role differed from that of a division or brigade commander. It's really hard to evaluate people in the role or aspiring to the role without knowing what was expected of them.
It's probably not susceptible to a standard job description. I think the concept would be that units of 10,000 or larger, with the increased number of sub-units, placed a greater premium on the "CEO" role as opposed to hands-on involvement in tactics, etc. It also required more efficient and delegated staff work and a "bigger picture" perspective in combat. I use Kearney as an example because he was a "lead from the front" guy who even in division command acted much like a field officer as we understand that role. We know how he was killed at Chantilly. The thing to also keep in mind is that until 1861 the US had never fielded an army close to the size of Civil War armies. Washington's maximum at any time was c. 20,000 and there was nothing even that size during the War of 1812 or the War with Mexico. (Compare Napoleon's massive armies, leading him to establish the corps d'armee). The institution of the corps level was adopted during 1862 to accommodate the size of the armies with an increasing and unmanageable number of divisions. This got political initially in Spring 1862 with McClellan but eventually both sides recognized the management need.
 
@Irishtom29 I can't claim to know the whys or wherfores of the conventional diagrams on military maps but I first saw the use of Roman numerals designating corps in Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon in 1966. It seemed to be a convention pretty universally followed in English language books on military history. In my first exposure to French language books on military history I noticed that they didn't seem to follow that convention.

I don't have them it in front of me but, if I remember correctly the West Point atlas of the Napoleonic Wars did the same.

John
 
@Irishtom29 I can't claim to know the whys or wherfores of the conventional diagrams on military maps but I first saw the use of Roman numerals designating corps in Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon in 1966. It seemed to be a convention pretty universally followed in English language books on military history. In my first exposure to French language books on military history I noticed that they didn't seem to follow that convention.

I don't have them it in front of me but, if I remember correctly the West Point atlas of the Napoleonic Wars did the same.

John
Roman numerals weren't used in the US Army for its corps until WWI, IIRC. During the Civil War, Arabic numerals were used on corps flags.

Ryan
 

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