Confederate Strategy: "Serious defensive strategy"

[Elennsar]

What would have happened if the Confederacy had spent the entire(even early) war fighting a serious defensive strategy?
Only getting aggressive in very, very, very limited circumstances?
Wouldn't that have upped the chance of "winning by not losing"?

This is inspired by Pete's comment, but I'm asking it for anyone who thinks the Confederacy's post-Fort Sumter strategy was overly costly:

What circumstances would you consider the Confederacy to have engaged in aggressive operations when it was unnecessary to do so between the aftermath of firing on Fort Sumter and the movements of Bragg into Kentucky and Lee into Maryland?

It's all well and good to say that Lee (Hood being a late war example) was "wasting lives that the South could not afford to lose", and so far as his record involves a lot of his men dying, that appears to make sense.

But what would one propose be done differently, keeping in mind the need to protect as much of the territory (such as Richmond) valuable to the Confederate war effort as possible?

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

For what it's worth, the last time I played Victory Games' "The Civil War," I based my Confederate strategy on holding Corinth, Chattanooga, and Richmond, and not making any offensive moves other than local counteroffensives and keeping cavalry cutting Union rail lines. It slowed things down sufficiently to throw the 1864 presidential election to the Democrats.

 

[Elennsar]

For what it's worth, the last time I played Victory Games' "The Civil War," I based my Confederate strategy on holding Corinth, Chattanooga, and Richmond, and not making any offensive moves other than local counteroffensives and keeping cavalry cutting Union rail lines. It slowed things down sufficiently to throw the 1864 presidential election to the Democrats.

Remind me not to let you play the Confederates if I ever challenge you to a game of that, then!

Something I want to pick your brains about as relates to better strategy though: It seems like for all the fact on an individual (captain or ship) level the Confederacy wasn't necessarily doing that badly that the Confederacy was able to make only a limited impact on the ability of the Union to effectively employ its naval assets.

I mean, "if completed" the ships at New Orleans might have been a nightmare, but they most certainly weren't completed, and well, they weren't nightmarish as they were.

But I don't want to say the Confederacy should have just never built any ironclads or something, at least not without running it past one of our naval war gurus.

 

[ole]

One thing bad about staying in one place -- offensive or defensive -- is that it becomes increasingly difficult to feed yourself, especially in group of thousands.

 

[peteanddelmar]

One thing bad about staying in one place -- offensive or defensive -- is that it becomes increasingly difficult to feed yourself, especially in group of thousands.

I also realize that forage would be difficult.
BUT, with less offense, less forage would be needed. Not near as much transportation.

 

[Shadow9216]

I'm not certain they could sit back and play defense- it's tempting to think so, but the logistics are difficult:
1) The defenders are restricted in supply. They could quickly exhaust the resources of an area, requiring ever-longer supply lines, assuming the enemy doesn't leave them unmolested.

2) They're restricted in maneuver. They can't effectively utilize the strengths available to a mobile attacker when fighting from the fixed positions necessary for a strong defense (think Petersburg). Or are we assuming the Southern armies are strategically defensive but tactically/operationally mobile? Even then- which is kinda/sorta what happened- the lack of maneuver leaves them vulnerable to superior numbers, resulting in siege/near-siege conditions.

3) They yield the initiative, which is critical when faced with a decisive opponent. When Lee was forced to react to Grant, the outcomes were usually different than when he held the initiative. Facing a numerically superior enemy with greater manufacturing and transportation infrastructure, this would be critical.

 

[Elennsar]

Presumably the idea there is that we see Confederate generals try to avoid going on the tactical offense as much, and focusing on maneuver over battle - although what that means as compared to OTL, I am not sure.

It's not as if Lee was attacking McClellan in the Seven Days just because he was bored and wanted some blood, or Sidney Johnston attacking Grant on the basis of a coin flip.

 

[Shadow9216]

Pretty much that leaves no invasion of KY, MD, and PA...which keeps KY out of the war, or gradually joining the South, precludes issuance of the EP- no "victory" to give it a nudge- and maybe Euro-vention, and no destruction of the field-officer corps at Gettysburg.

That doesn't mean the CSA "wins" though- it just sets up an alternate timeline where they face a more gradual destruction of their resources through longer attrition. Maybe the North gets tired and gives up, maybe there aren't as many bloody battles and it becomes almost an afterthought to the North.

 

[Allie]

Any serious defensive strategy should involve moving the capital from Richmond.

 

[Elennsar]

Any serious defensive strategy should involve moving the capital from Richmond.

Given that Richmond is a city the Confederacy has quite a lot of reason to defend heavily and the defensive advantages the Confederacy has in Virginia, why is it bad to let the troops who have to worry about that because of Richmond's value as an industrial and railroad hub be able to protect the capital at the same time?

 

[Allie]

Given that Richmond is a city the Confederacy has quite a lot of reason to defend heavily and the defensive advantages the Confederacy has in Virginia, why is it bad to let the troops who have to worry about that because of Richmond's value as an industrial and railroad hub be able to protect the capital at the same time?

Fair enough... But it does seem to have made it a larger target than it otherwise would have been. Having to head down to Montgomery to take out the capital would stretch them further.

 

[Elennsar]

Fair enough... But it does seem to have made it a larger target than it otherwise would have been. Having to head down to Montgomery to take out the capital would stretch them further.

I think it would be harder to defend at the same time. The Confederacy's bumbling in the West is the part that worries me most about that, in that regard - the Army of Tennessee (sticking with that name for consistency) seems like it would have lost the capital in 1863 at the latest, unless some part of not having the capital in Richmond means having someone other than the men who OTL were in its high command (not simply its commanding generals) in those roles.

 

[TerryB]

I think once you fire on Fort Sumter, the options begin to be very limited indeed. There were CS politicians who understood this and expressed opposition to starting a war. They were, in effect, shouted down. Without foreign intervention, you have one of two options. 1) Make the war a long, costly affair with lots of hit-and-run, hoping to wear down Northern will to fight to the bitter end. 2) You adopt a point defense, in which you concentrate your armies around strategic points, allowing them the ability to go on the offensive if opportunity presents itself.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

While I think that, provided the Union stayed committed to reunion (important caveat) Confederate independence was a very long shot, I think there are several things, singly or in conjunction, that the Confederacy could have done to improve their odds.

• Recognize that "King Cotton" was a fallacy. It was a competitive advantage and no more than that. Cotton should have been shipped out of the Confederacy as rapidly as transport would permit and stockpiled offshore to provide a source of revenue abroad.
• Regulate blockade-running more closely from the outset, as well as signaling and piloting arrangements for it. When this was done at Wilmington, it was a success, but that was too little and too late.
• Assign people with better diplomatic skills to diplomatic posts, particularly to Britain.
• Don't give important military assignments to Gideon Pillow and Leonidas Polk; and if you do, at least put them under close supervision. And by all means, don't put them together.
• Nationalize the railroad system and expend every effort to support and expand it.
• Don't fire on Fort Sumter when you already know the garrison is about out of supplies anyway.
• Put more money into torpedo/mine development and deployment.

Ultimately, many of these things didn't happen for political reasons, which gives a bit of support to the oft-quoted 'died of a Theory'... to be frank, if the would-be Confederate states would have agreed at the outset not to expand slavery beyond its existing boundaries, had backed off on the Fugitive Slave Law, and hadn't seized any federal property (perhaps negotiating for it instead), any significant Northern support for military action would have well-nigh impossible to generate and sustain.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... precludes issuance of the EP- no "victory" to give it a nudge- ....

Why no "victory"?

 

[Carronade]

But I don't want to say the Confederacy should have just never built any ironclads or something, at least not without running it past one of our naval war gurus.

I'll say it although I'll put it in the form of a question - what would the Confederacy have lost if they had not built ironclads?

To be fair, I'll note that Albemarle facilitated the temporary reconquest of a small piece of tidewater North Carolina. I've also posed the question of how the opening of McClellan's Peninsula campaign was impacted by Virginia denying him use of the James River, but no one has yet suggested it was significant.

The US Navy would have two more sailing ships and one more converted ferryboat - and three fewer ironclads without Eastport, Atlanta, and Tennessee. Actually they'd have a lot fewer ironclads if they didn't have to counter the Confederates', although I expect river craft like the Pook Turtles would still be built.

The Confederates got a lot more bang for the buck from improvised rams and gunboats, torpedos and torpedo craft than from their investment in some thirty ironclads.

 

[Carronade]

I think it would be harder to defend at the same time. The Confederacy's bumbling in the West is the part that worries me most about that, in that regard - the Army of Tennessee (sticking with that name for consistency) seems like it would have lost the capital in 1863 at the latest, unless some part of not having the capital in Richmond means having someone other than the men who OTL were in its high command (not simply its commanding generals) in those roles.

I think that's exactly what it means. The point about having the capital in a more central location is that it might have led to a more balanced allocation of leaders, troops, and resources and to greater willingness to shift them as needed, using their key advantage of interior lines. For that matter they could have done that with the capital at Richmond, but they were generally reluctant to.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

The Confederates got a lot more bang for the buck from improvised rams and gunboats, torpedos and torpedo craft than from their investment in some thirty ironclads.

I agree. While I would still have built a few ironclads at important points, there were too many projects competing with each other for scarce resources.

The "magic formula" appears to have been the intelligent combination of earthwork fortifications with heavy seacoast-class armament with obstruction of the river (including mines), backed up by an ironclad or two and supporting naval craft. While this combination was not impossible to overcome, it was much more of a challenge than any of those elements deployed separately or in an uncoordinated way.

 

[Mark F. Jenkins]

I think that's exactly what it means. The point about having the capital in a more central location is that it might have led to a more balanced allocation of leaders, troops, and resources and to greater willingness to shift them as needed, using their key advantage of interior lines. For that matter they could have done that with the capital at Richmond, but they were generally reluctant to.

I'm of two minds about this. Richmond would have been an important point to hang onto anyway, if only for Tredegar and the fact that it was the capital of an important (if not vital) Confederate state, so adding the national capital to the reasons for defense isn't asking a whole lot in addition... at the same time, it's an obvious magnet for Union offensives, so it's an expensive place to maintain and defend.

 

[NedBaldwin]

• Don't fire on Fort Sumter when you already know the garrison is about out of supplies anyway.

With the imminent arrival of the relieve expedition, they were going to have to fire on someone -- either the fort or the ships -- if they wanted to maintain their goal.