Confederate Railroad Bottlenecks

[USS ALASKA]

When discussing the issues the Confederate Railroads had - one of the often mentioned items is the difficulty of transshipment of people and cargo between the individual lines because of the lack of direct connections.

The above map is from the LOC - https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884r.pm009611/

The overlay is from http://www.virginiaplaces.org/rail/ - "Railroad freight stations in Richmond - the Virginia Central (1), RF&P (2), Richmond and Petersburg (3), Richmond and Danville (4), and Richmond and York River (5)"

This is a visual of the problem. Any cargo / people / luggage that were not ending their journey in Richmond had to be hauled through the streets to the other lines and then re-loaded. Quite the money maker for the local population but extremely inefficient for the war effort.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Carronade]

That's the problem.....in the early days, each railroad was built by a group who just wanted to link point A with point B. The most convenient location for a station was on the edge of town nearest where you wanted to go. That was fine for the locals, not so good for long-distance travel, commercial or military.

In time the railroads consolidated, often connecting their tracks at a "Union Station".

 

[DaveBrt]

The other side of the issue is that a great deal of what came into Richmond was not intended to be immediately moved out on another road. Supplies that came in were processed, stored or issued there and were not fit for transport out until this work had been done. Yes, there were times when the gaps mattered, but not as badly in Richmond as you would think at first blush.

 

[USS ALASKA]

@DaveBrt

Understood sir - I just couldn't find a map like that demonstrating the differences in stations for any other location.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[DaveBrt]

@DaveBrt

Understood sir - I just couldn't find a map like that demonstrating the differences in stations for any other location.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

Few other cities were destinations for manufacturing (Tredegar, Crenshaw mills, etc) and few were supporting the national government and a major army nearby. Charleston and Atlanta were the only two that could come close and neither had serious rail gaps -- so no, you will not find another good example.

Many cities had small gaps and they were bridged in '61 or '62. Petersburg is the best example, but there are many.

 

[WJC]

View attachment 176246

When discussing the issues the Confederate Railroads had - one of the often mentioned items is the difficulty of transshipment of people and cargo between the individual lines because of the lack of direct connections.

The above map is from the LOC - https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3884r.pm009611/

The overlay is from http://www.virginiaplaces.org/rail/ - "Railroad freight stations in Richmond - the Virginia Central (1), RF&P (2), Richmond and Petersburg (3), Richmond and Danville (4), and Richmond and York River (5)"

This is a visual of the problem. Any cargo / people / luggage that were not ending their journey in Richmond had to be hauled through the streets to the other lines and then re-loaded. Quite the money maker for the local population but extremely inefficient for the war effort.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

But not unlike other cities of the time. Thanks for sharing this illustration!

 

[dlavin]

Reminds me of Lincoln's trip through Baltimore to DC. Come in on one train line, transport across town to the other line to catch a train to DC.

 

[kevikens]

Something else to keep in mind was the difference in gauges and what that meant for long distance rail operations. Before the war Northern railroads were adopting the universal four feet eight and a half inch guage which meant that rails cars could be interchanged in long distance travel. A western railroad could load cars in Chicago and they could be shipped directly east to Philadelphia with only a change in locomotives as the cars entered the lines of different railroads. There were exceptions to this. Anything that interchanged with the Erie had to have cargoes reloaded as they used a wider five foot gauge. In the South different gauges were the norm. A train travelling from Jackson Mississippi to Charleston would have to have its freight unloaded and reloaded, more than once, as it passed from one railroad to another. The bottom line was that Northern freight, troops and passengers could travel much more quickly than they could in the South.

Another factor was that almost all of the locomotives and rolling stock came from Northern factories which meant the North could readily build and repair its locomotives and rolling stock. The South could not. Lastly the rolling mills were again mostly located in the North (with the notable exception of Richmond's Tredegar) which meant new trackage could be laid and rails repaired in regions controlled by the North while the South was often compelled to cannibalize existing equipment and rail lines to keep anything moving. Among the reasons for the North having won the war, was that her railroads could support major transportation feats that South was unable to match.

 

[winchester]

Another problem for the south during the war was the continued destruction of its track. To replace the track destroyed, they were going into the Florida Panhandle and taking up that track. There was a pretty good book called "Railroad of the Confederacy" by Robert C. Black III which included a very good map of the entire southern railroads.

 

[DaveBrt]

In the South different gauges were the norm. A train travelling from Jackson Mississippi to Charleston would have to have its freight unloaded and reloaded, more than once, as it passed from one railroad to another. The bottom line was that Northern freight, troops and passengers could travel much more quickly than they could in the South.

Another factor was that almost all of the locomotives and rolling stock came from Northern factories which meant the North could readily build and repair its locomotives and rolling stock. The South could not. Lastly the rolling mills were again mostly located in the North (with the notable exception of Richmond's Tredegar) which meant new trackage could be laid and rails repaired in regions controlled by the North while the South was often compelled to cannibalize existing equipment and rail lines to keep anything moving.

Where to begin?
East of the Mississippi River, the South had only 2 gauges- 1 for Virginia and North Carolina and 1 for the rest of the eastern Confederacy. The only exception was 1 line in Alabama, the Montgomery & West Point RR.
The North could build and repair its locomotives and rolling stock mostly because the South was short of manpower -- not just railroad mechanics, but miners and foundrymen for the various iron mills and a host of other RR related jobs.
Northern passengers and freight moved more quickly than Southern because the North had more rolling stock, so waiting for transportation was much less likely in the North. Also, in the summer of 1861, the Southern RRs consciously slowed their speed in order to not wear out the rails so quickly. Wear was governed by weight carried and speed, so slow down the speed and save the rails -- required by the shortage of manpower.

 

[DaveBrt]

Another problem for the south during the war was the continued destruction of its track. To replace the track destroyed, they were going into the Florida Panhandle and taking up that track. There was a pretty good book called "Railroad of the Confederacy" by Robert C. Black III which included a very good map of the entire southern railroads.

I'm not aware of any rails taken from Florida for use outside of that state except for the construction of the line connecting Lawton and Live Oak, one station in Florida and the other in Georgia, 50 miles away.

If you are interested in the South's railroad story, please check my web site, www.csa-railroads.com. It is based on Black's work, but takes advantage of the advances in availability of original documents in the almost 70 years since Black wrote his book in the late 1940's.

 

[John S. Carter]

The other side of the issue is that a great deal of what came into Richmond was not intended to be immediately moved out on another road. Supplies that came in were processed, stored or issued there and were not fit for transport out until this work had been done. Yes, there were times when the gaps mattered, but not as badly in Richmond as you would think at first blush.

Is it true that the last train of supplies to reach Lee's army was weapons and not the food that he was expecting from Richmond.Was this typical of CSA ordnance department or was this meant as a message that they expected Lee to continue to fight even as the army starved.That was possible the biggest advantage that the Union had over the CSA was their ordnance,able to supply the forces with what they needed ,where and when and then distribute it in an orderly faction.Having been in the supply part of the military we were the ones that in truth could determine the outcome of a military practice ,if you did not git it you ain't going.One department ,supply,was always the one who all others really depended upon,It always has been that way,ordnance department ,with transport,has been the back of the military or even civilian enterprise.

 

[USS ALASKA]

The South wasn't the only place that had this problem.

The Erie Gauge War

The Erie Gauge War (sometimes called the Erie Railroad War) was a conflict between the citizens of Erie, Pennsylvania, and two railroad companies over the standardization of the track gauge between Erie and the New York border. It started on December 7, 1853, and ended on February 1, 1854.

Background

In 1849, the Erie and North East Railroad started laying track east from Erie to the New York–Pennsylvania border at a gauge of 6 feet. At the same time, the Franklin Canal Company was laying track west from Erie to the Ohio–Pennsylvania border and the Buffalo and State Line Railroad was laying track from Buffalo to the New York border, both were at a gauge of 4 ft 10 in (1,473 mm) (Ohio gauge). On November 23, 1852, the first train left Erie heading to Ashtabula, Ohio, and on January 19, 1852, the first train from New York state arrived in Erie. A passenger traveling from Buffalo to Cleveland would be forced to change trains at the Pennsylvania border because of the different gauges. Only 20 miles (32 km) down the road in Erie, the passenger would again have to change trains. The process of having to change trains repeatedly would result in lengthy delays, often causing passengers to miss connecting trains and then to be forced to stay in Erie.

The citizens of Erie enjoyed being an "enforced stopping place," as they made big profits from the transferring of freight from one train to another and from passengers having to buy food at Erie's restaurants or street vendors (leading the conflict to sometimes be referred to as the "Peanut War," as Erie's peanut sellers would be the hardest hit by the lack of passengers). The owners of the Buffalo and State Line Railroad were able to acquire two thirds of the Erie and North East's stock, and on November 16, 1853, they made the decision to re-lay the 6 ft (1,829 mm) track between Erie and the New York border as Ohio gauge, but four months earlier, to try to prevent the change, Erie's city council had enacted ordinances barring the railroads from crossing the city's streets. On November 26, 1853, the council was reconvened when railroad ties were found being laid in the preparation for the gauge change. The council passed an ordinance to allow the mayor to call out the city's police to take down any of the railroad bridges that crossed the city's streets "in order to preserve the present railroad gauge."

Conflict

On December 7, 1853, after swearing in 150 "special police constables", Mayor Alfred King led the police to the railroad bridge crossing State and French streets and, where engineers had marked the edges of the streets on the bridges, had sections of the bridges cut out. That evening, 7 miles (11 km) away in town of Harborcreek, its citizens decided to pass its own ordinances and then proceeded to tear up tracks along the highway. Three days later, tracks of the new gauge were completed up to the city limits and that night the people of Harbor Creek tore out the tracks again, knocked down a bridge, and even ploughed up a level crossing. An injunction was obtained by the railroad from the United States Circuit Court in Pittsburgh and a United States Marshal was dispatched to Harborcreek. Upon arriving in Harborcreek, the marshal served it to one of the officials of Harborcreek and pointed out the seal of the United States. The official promptly threw it on the ground and stomped it with his heel and declaring the heelmark "the seal of Harborcreek."

The most serious incident occurred on December 27, 1853, when a train of railroad officials and workers was stopped outside of Harborcreek by a crowd of people ripping up the tracks. An official shot at one the men in the crowd and knocked him unconscious. The crowd, who believed the man to be dead, chased the official back on to his train. After two or three members of the crowd forced their way on to the train, the train reversed and "headed at full speed for the state line". Once across the border, the train stopped, and stowaways from Harborcreek were sent back over border into Pennsylvania.

Finally, on February 1, 1854, the railroad ran a train through Erie without change. But civil disturbances continued for years. Townspeople were assaulted, the local newspaper was torn down and the ruins burnt, and the Presbyterian church split in two. The matter caused such hard feelings that people avoided discussing it for years afterwards in order to avoid starting arguments.

Reactions

Pennsylvania Governor William Bigler sympathized with Erie saying:

Pennsylvania holds the key to this important link of connexion between the East and the West, and I most unhesitatingly say, that where no principle of amity or commerce is to be violated, it is the right and the duty of the State to turn her natural advantages to the promotion of the views and welfare of her own people.


Although the governor and state of Pennsylvania agreed with Erie's objectives, people in other states criticized Pennsylvania for its "selfishness". The United States Representative from Ohio, Edward Wade, suggested that Pennsylvania's nickname be changed to the "Shylock State" because it "demanded a 'pound of flesh' from all who passed its borders".

On December 26, 1853, Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, had to travel through Erie on his way to Chicago and had to travel from Harborcreek to Erie in an open sleigh "through a cutting storm of wind, snow, and sleet". Greeley had hoped to be able to give a lecture in Adrian, Michigan, that same day "but that could not now be, for the Kingdom of Erie forbade it".

" Let Erie be avoided by all travelers until grass shall grow in her streets, and till her pie-men in despair shall move away to some other city. "
— Horace Greeley, New York Tribune

Resolution

In January 1854, with the repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas–Nebraska Act, the Erie Gauge War stopped attracting attention.

On January 28, the Pennsylvania General Assembly passed legislation maintaining "the break at Erie" and repealing the charter for the Franklin Canal Company. Governor Bigler appointed future governor William F. Packer to state superintendent and personally took control of the Franklin Canal Company. All Erie & North East bridges and track were rebuilt by February 1, and E&NE trains were running normally again.

Although the Gauge War largely ended in February 1854, disruptions continued irregularly into 1856. In mid-January 1855, a mob in Harborcreek tore up Erie & North East track, and destroyed two bridges. The state sent in law enforcement, and the property damage ended immediately. The bridges were swiftly rebuilt days later, and the track relaid.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erie_Gauge_War

Cheers,
USS AlASKA

 

[John S. Carter]

Where to begin?
East of the Mississippi River, the South had only 2 gauges- 1 for Virginia and North Carolina and 1 for the rest of the eastern Confederacy. The only exception was 1 line in Alabama, the Montgomery & West Point RR.
The North could build and repair its locomotives and rolling stock mostly because the South was short of manpower -- not just railroad mechanics, but miners and foundrymen for the various iron mills and a host of other RR related jobs.
Northern passengers and freight moved more quickly than Southern because the North had more rolling stock, so waiting for transportation was much less likely in the North. Also, in the summer of 1861, the Southern RRs consciously slowed their speed in order to not wear out the rails so quickly. Wear was governed by weight carried and speed, so slow down the speed and save the rails -- required by the shortage of manpower.

I do believe that the above is correct but their was also a political and social cause for this on the South's failure.The South was since the 18th century had been just agriculture.Not wanting any federal support/fear of control preferring to have the states control the laying and operation of this system as with roads though out the states.?Why did they not cooperate with other states to run lines between the states ?Was it that the Southern governments so into the states control that they did not want to permit another state to cross into their state.?There was some who were able to do this but not on the scale of the rest of the country.Did the northern rails receive any finance or right of way from the federal gov. as they did with Central-Pacific ? The South lacked the men with the foresight as key men in the North and est. the East who were willing to take the risk of expanding their rail system.

 

[DaveBrt]

I do believe that the above is correct but their was also a political and social cause for this on the South's failure.The South was since the 18th century had been just agriculture.Not wanting any federal support/fear of control preferring to have the states control the laying and operation of this system as with roads though out the states.?Why did they not cooperate with other states to run lines between the states ?Was it that the Southern governments so into the states control that they did not want to permit another state to cross into their state.?There was some who were able to do this but not on the scale of the rest of the country.Did the northern rails receive any finance or right of way from the federal gov. as they did with Central-Pacific ? The South lacked the men with the foresight as key men in the North and est. the East who were willing to take the risk of expanding their rail system.

"Why did they not cooperate with other states to run lines between the states?" They DID. Every time 2 roads met at a state line, there had been cooperation between the two states.

"Did the northern rails receive any finance or right of way from the federal gov. as they did with Central-Pacific?" No, the national government did not own any land in the northern states, but they did own the great majority of the land west of the Mississippi. The government could not give away what it did not own.

"The South lacked the men with the foresight as key men in the North and est. the East who were willing to take the risk of expanding their rail system." Not true. The South was building very rapidly, slowed mostly by the need to find additional capital for new projects.

 

[John S. Carter]

"Why did they not cooperate with other states to run lines between the states?" They DID. Every time 2 roads met at a state line, there had been cooperation between the two states.

"Did the northern rails receive any finance or right of way from the federal gov. as they did with Central-Pacific?" No, the national government did not own any land in the northern states, but they did own the great majority of the land west of the Mississippi. The government could not give away what it did not own.

"The South lacked the men with the foresight as key men in the North and est. the East who were willing to take the risk of expanding their rail system." Not true. The South was building very rapidly, slowed mostly by the need to find additional capital for new projects.

Thank you for this infomation.

 

[USS ALASKA]

The first government land grant to a railroad was signed into law in 1850 for the Illinois Central Railroad.

https://books.google.com/books?id=C...epage&q="Illinois Central" land grant&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=8...6AEINzAD#v=onepage&q=first land grant&f=false

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

Before the war Northern railroads were adopting the universal four feet eight and a half inch guage...

At the beginning of the ACW, Union RRs had more different gauges than the Confederacy. To sort of counter-balance that, the Union had 2/3ds more track mileage to spread those changes across.

https://www.amazon.com/1795-1895-hu...+Hundred+Years+of+American+Commerce+1795-1895

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Southern Boy]

I find the drawing of Richmond posted by USS Alaska on Feb. 7, 2018 to be fascinating and the tread started to be excellent. I would like to add my research to the thread.

I found this site: http://www.richmondrailroadmuseum.org/railroad_history.htm

Summarized from the site:

"Richmond has been served by multiple railroads since the 1830's The five lines fanning out from the city in 1861 were a major reason for choosing Richmond as the capital of the Confederacy."

Richmond Railroads 1830's-1860's


*The Lousia Railroad was chartered in 1836 to run from Frederick Hall to a junction with the RF&P at what is now Doswell. The line was extended westward to Lousia and Gordensvillle and extended eastward to Richmond. The name was changed to the Virginia Central in 1847. It entered Richmond along Shockoe Creek and terminated at 16th Street and Broad Street.

*The Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad was chartered in 1834 to build northward from Richmond through Fredericksburg to Acquia Creek, an arm of the Potomac River, where it could meet coastal shipping to Washington and the upper Chesapeake Bay. The Richmond station was located on the north side of Broad Street between 7th and 8th Streets. The mainline ran along the middle of Broad Street to a point one block west of Harrison Street where it then turned northward.

*The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad was chartered in 1836 to run north-south between the two cities. Work began in 1838. The line crossed the James River and built its terminal, Byrd Street Station, on the north bank of the River at 8th and Byrd Streets (where the Federal Reserve Bank now stands). This station was replaced with a new one at 7th and Byrd Streets in 1887.

*The Richmond Stations of the RF&P and the R&P were about 6 blocks apart as the crow flies but were at considerably different elevations. Likewise, the RF&P and the Virginia Central (VC) were about 10 blocks apart but they too were at considerably different elevations. Interchange of goods and passengers between these railroads had to be made by unloading one train on to wagons or carriages and pulling them along the city streets to the reload on the other train.

*The Richmond and York River Railroad was chartered in 1853 to connect Richmond with steamboat traffic at West Point. It was completed in1859 and suffered considerable damage during the Civil War.

*The Richmond and Danville Railroad was chartered in 1848, began construction form Manchester in 1850, and was completed to Danville in 1856. The Confederate Government used this railroad to flee Richmond in 1865. This RR served coal mines in Midlothian hauling coal to Tredegar Iron Works, for heating city homes, and for shipping to cities along the Chesapeake Bay.

 

[USS ALASKA]

@John S. Carter

Sir, a state centric viewpoint was not unique to the South. One of the most egregious Northern examples I can think of is Pennsylvania. With the race to be the most dominant commercial center shaking out to be between NYC, Philly, and Bal'mer, business and political leaders in Philly were desperate to make sure the bounty of Penn, or west of there, didn't end up in NYC or Balto. While Philly received a great influx from the rivers that headed her way - especially the Delaware, Lehigh, Schuylkill and their tributaries - the big natural mover east of the mountains was the Susquehanna. This was a no-no (unless you were crossing it - not traveling along with it ) for investments / grants / licenses / charters / et al because the logical terminus for that north-south movement would have been Baltimore. Legislature and their economic 'patrons' wanted flow going only east-west regardless of how expensive or counter-intuitional to nature. Canals and later RRs had a MUCH easier time getting approval and financing by following that edict. Once canals and other infrastructure projects were begrudgingly approved for the Susquehanna and her tribs, the hope was that Harrisburg, Middletown, and Columbia would siphon off the traffic and ship it east to Philly. While completion of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal began to break down these barriers, greater wealth accumulation in the central and south-central parts of the state allowed these regions to have more political sway by allowing them to become their own 'benefactors'. Cooler economic heads eventually prevailed, realizing that trade / commerce / production were of value to the entire state, not just to benefit Philly.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA