Confederate Mismanagement

whitworth

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Jun 18, 2005
I found this little nugget from J.B. Jones, a clerk in the Confederate War Department in Richmond. The Confederate supply system was falling apart from the inside. And the historians are primarily still interested in the battles.


On November 13, 1863, the ardent secessionist J.B. Jones, a war clerk, would write in his diary...Lee to President. "For the last five days we have only received three pounds of corn per horse, from Richmond, per day. At this rate the horses will die and cannot do hard work."

Perhaps this may rouse the department. Horses starving in the midst of corn fields ready for gathering! Alas, what mismanagement.
 
Dear Whitworth,

It isn't lost on me sir.

Behind the scenes are just as important as the general on the battlefield.

What happens, is there is no excitement in forms and tables, math and percentages.

Although better than nothing--corn is a heat grain. Oats would be a great addition to the corn.

For an average horse about 1,200 lbs. Measure of 3 pounds per horse; gives the horse 1 pound per meal. If correctly fed--three times a day as their stomach is set up for grazing not three squares a day. Hay is also a filler when grass isn't available. Since horses were moving all the time; they didn't have a chance to eat 'dr. grass.' Three pounds would be a tea cup of cornflakes for us humans to last us the entire day.

And, that doesn't take into account if the grain/corn is rotten with moldy portions, which upsets the stomach of the horse --colic.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
I found this little nugget from J.B. Jones, a clerk in the Confederate War Department in Richmond. The Confederate supply system was falling apart from the inside. And the historians are primarily still interested in the battles.


On November 13, 1863, the ardent secessionist J.B. Jones, a war clerk, would write in his diary...Lee to President. "For the last five days we have only received three pounds of corn per horse, from Richmond, per day. At this rate the horses will die and cannot do hard work."

Perhaps this may rouse the department. Horses starving in the midst of corn fields ready for gathering! Alas, what mismanagement.

What chapter did you find that in?
 
And when something the size of a horse gets gas ......!!!! Let 'er rip.

Didn't we go through this on another thread? The Trivia Game. 26 pounds total. Was it 12 pounds grain and 14 pounds fodder? Or was it the other way around. A working horse cannot survive on 3 pounds of corn per day. And oats is better. (But, given the meaning of corn, Lee might have been talking about oats anyway.)

The horse with nothing to do all day but graze can live on grass, but not when it's working. And walking 20 miles is working; nevermind dragging a wagon, a cannon and limber, or a caisson. At three pounds per day, that horse is going to die or be turned out for some local farmer to save.

But let's look at the date. November 13, 1863. Kind of an idle time. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania is history. If it worked, the Virginia farmer got his cereal grains harvested. (Oats, wheat, barley and, by November, corn.) The first thing that farmer is going to do is get it milled into flour for his family to get them to the next harvest. What he has left when his family if covered is for sale. He might trade a barrel of flour for a plow or a mule, but it is, in the end, his income.

Now we need to figure out if that was all there was, or was the Confederate Government unable to buy it? Or did the farmers leave the state or just planted smaller fields so the armies didn't march all over it? I'm not a Virginian, so I'm guessing when I figure the fields were planted in April. Maybe much of the crops had already been trampled?

What I'm looking for is a reason that Richmond could cough up only three pounds of "corn" per horse per day. Was this a temporary situation and on the sixth day Lee got full rations for his horses?

Ole
 
Dear Ole;

General Robert E. Lee is in the vicinity of Catlett, Virginia --

Here is what I found in a quick search using November 1863.:
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIX/1 [S# 48]
OCTOBER 31, 1863.--Affair near Weaverville, Va.
Report of Private William A. Bolick, First South Carolina Cavalry, with commendation of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army.
[excerpt]
GUERRILLAS IN OUR REAR.
The guerrillas continue bold and active in the rear of our army. They appear to have organized into small squads for the business of attacking solitary travelers and small parties of our men at a disadvantage. On Wednesday, Lieutenant Sage, of the Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, quartermaster of General Merritt's cavalry brigade, was shot dead by them while on his way from Morrisville to Warrenton Junction to get forage. An orderly with him escaped unhurt. The same day General Merritt was fired at several times by guerrillas, who seemed persistently seeking his life. He escaped unhurt.
These rebel marauders are numerous along the Warrenton pike and between that and the railroad, and daily shoot and capture men almost in sight of headquarters. A day or two ago 5 men, belonging to Buford's division, while guarding cattle within a mile or two of the army headquarters, were captured by them. Lieutenant Hedges, of the Second New York Cavalry, acting commissary of General Kilpatrick's division, was also fired at, near Catlett's Station, and badly wounded.
[Indorsements.]
NOVEMBER 13, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded.
The 5 prisoners alluded to were delivered to me while on picket, and confessed that they were captured by Bolick and Curtis within rifle shot of General Meade's headquarters. The inclosed extract from Northern paper confirms the same.
J. L. BLACK,
HDQRS. CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 17, 1863.
Respectfully forwarded; and attention called to this act of gallantry, which is only one of many which are almost daily performed by our daring scouts, as is shown in part by the inclosed extract from newspaper.
J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.
-----
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
November 20, 1863.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry Corps:
GENERAL: The report of the capture of 6 Federal soldiers, with their horses and arms, at Weaverville, near General Meade's headquarters, on October 31, by Privates William A. Bolick, of the First South Carolina Cavalry, and Isaac Curtis, of the Ninth Virginia Cavalry, has been received. They deserve great credit for the daring and skill with which the capture was effected. The report will be forwarded to the Department as an evidence of their merit.
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XXIX/2 [S# 49]
Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating Specially To Operations In North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, And Pennsylvania, From August 4 To December 31, 1863.
UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.--#18
NOVEMBER 13, 1863--11 a.m.
(Received 11.45 a.m.)
Major-General HALLECK:
The enemy occupy in force the line of the Rapidan. My cavalry picket to the river in front. The army is in position from Welford's Ford, on the Hazel River, to Stevensburg, The enemy occasionally fire from their batteries on the Rapidan at the cavalry pickets. If you have no objection. I should like to visit Washington to-morrow to confer with yourself and the Secretary of War. The work on the railroad is progressing; it was to be finished to Bealeton yesterday, and work has been commenced on the Rappahannock Bridge.
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General, Commanding.
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
November 13, 1863--1.20 p.m.
Major-General MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
There is no objection to the proposed visit, and the consultation is desirable.
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
-----
General Longstreet is in Tennessee on that day.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

---------------------------------------------------------
 
And when something the size of a horse gets gas ......!!!! Let 'er rip.

Didn't we go through this on another thread? The Trivia Game. 26 pounds total. Was it 12 pounds grain and 14 pounds fodder? Or was it the other way around. A working horse cannot survive on 3 pounds of corn per day. And oats is better. (But, given the meaning of corn, Lee might have been talking about oats anyway.)

The horse with nothing to do all day but graze can live on grass, but not when it's working. And walking 20 miles is working; nevermind dragging a wagon, a cannon and limber, or a caisson. At three pounds per day, that horse is going to die or be turned out for some local farmer to save.

But let's look at the date. November 13, 1863. Kind of an idle time. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania is history. If it worked, the Virginia farmer got his cereal grains harvested. (Oats, wheat, barley and, by November, corn.) The first thing that farmer is going to do is get it milled into flour for his family to get them to the next harvest. What he has left when his family if covered is for sale. He might trade a barrel of flour for a plow or a mule, but it is, in the end, his income.

Now we need to figure out if that was all there was, or was the Confederate Government unable to buy it? Or did the farmers leave the state or just planted smaller fields so the armies didn't march all over it? I'm not a Virginian, so I'm guessing when I figure the fields were planted in April. Maybe much of the crops had already been trampled?

What I'm looking for is a reason that Richmond could cough up only three pounds of "corn" per horse per day. Was this a temporary situation and on the sixth day Lee got full rations for his horses?

In passing -- this was the real reason Stuart kept draging those 125 wagons around with him in the Gettysburg Campaign. Sure, the animals and wagons were valuable in and of themselves -- but when captured they had largely been hauling grain to feed horses in the AoP. While the wagons slowed his hourly rate of march, the feed meant he didn't have to spend many hours a day foraging for the horses or stopping to let them graze -- so he could travel more hours/day. By the time he got to Lee, most of the feed was gone.

Tim
 
Of course, mismanagement is a part of war and does not "favor" either side... just ask Burnside... had his pontoons showed up when needed, Fredricksburg could have been a completely different story...

Not to argue that the failuer to supply the pontoons was not a grevious error, but the Confederacy's mismanagement seems to have been more decisive.

It had less of a margin for error, certainly. Whether worse bungling occured is a mystery.

Though I must ask - and this on the rations for men as much horses.

It is barely concievable that Lee's men would have been on quarter rations and fighting well enough to do what they did at Chancellorsville.

Stranger things have happened, but to argue that they were starving scarecrows but still fighting in a way to be among the best armies until their time (I do not have the knowledge to even try and compare them to anything after) seems far fetched.

Still, the weaknesses of the Confederate supply system are brutal.

Even if closer to half-three quarters rather than full (instead of one quarter), that's only just enough at best.
 
Dear Bama46,

I agree that not only General Burnside's pontoon boats were totally mismanaged; it was also General Halleck's job to see the order was carried through. Halleck didn't do that, sir.

It would be like if you ordered me to send you the pontoon boats. I ordered Colonel A, B and C. to get those pontoon boats; Colonel A would have his boys build/find boats, same with B and C. Some were already built but, you got three Colonels operating independently; Quarter-Master, Engineer, Transportation. They have to coordinate and if there was a bit of a issue between the three, such as timing, supplies, routes...this needs me to check in with the three and either; pat 'em on the back, kick 'em in the caboose or give 'em more help to get it done. All three have to meet to get the job done and deliver for you, sir.

Personally speaking sir, if you had given me an order/request as a field commander, I might be your superior in rank, e.g. like Halleck but, its the fulfillment of the mission that is more important sir.

But, I also have read the reports and they are too rigid on Burnside's side of the mission. He has not had mentoring to be a Commander in Chief. He wrote a script but, he didn't write contingency plans or--respect General Winfield Scott Hancock's recon of the area and discovery of a easy place to forge across the river.

But, I agree 100% that this incident with Burnside was totally mismanaged.

If Burnside didn't 'dilly dally' around, Lee would have still been responding to Fredericksburg, while Burnside crossed and follow up on his boast 'On to Richmond.'

It is good though that he is immortalized by his whiskers--to which all men refer to the area as 'sideburns;' as he escaped worse by 'whiskers.' ;)

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
Dear Elennsar;

I do agree 100% about the underpinning of the army, by it's ability to supply and deliver all things from weapons, ordnance, clothing, shoes, feed for horses and mules, food for the men, etc.; was certainly lacking.

When I read General Lee's letter, a brief month after the Battle of First Manassas/Bull Run; I know that if things don't improve--Lee's Army a mere symptom would be the death of the CSA.

[Reference]:
Robert E. Lee
Chapter II—The Confederate General
In a letter to his two daughters who were in Richmond, he writes:
"VALLEY MOUNTAIN, August 29, 1861.
"My Precious Daughters: I have just received your letters of the 24th and am rejoiced to hear that you are well and enjoying the company of your friends. . . . It rains here all the time, literally. There has not been sunshine enough since my arrival to dry my clothes. Perryis my washerman, and socks and towels suffer. But the worst of the rain is that the ground has become so saturated with water that the constant travel on the roads has made them almost impassable, so that I cannot get up sufficient supplies for the troops to move. It is raining now. Has been all day, last night, day before, and day before that, etc., etc. But we must be patient. It is quite cool, too. I have on all my winter clothes and am writing in my overcoat. All the clouds seem to concentrate over this ridge of mountains, and by whatever wind they are driven, give us rain. The mountains are magnificent. The sugar-maples are beginning to turn already, and the grass is luxuriant.
"'Richmond'(*) has not been accustomed to such fare or such treatment. But he gets along tolerably, complains some, and has not much superfluous flesh. There has been much sickness among the men—measles, etc.—and the weather has been unfavourable. I hope their attacks are nearly over, and that they will come out with the sun. Our party has kept well. . . . Although we may be too weak to break through the lines, I feel well satisfied that the enemy cannot at present reach Richmond by either of these routes, leading to Staunton, Milborough or Covington. He must find some other way. . . . God bless you, my children, and preserve you from all harm is the constant prayer of
"Your devoted father,
"R. E. LEE."

Horses, mules and ox can graze on grass, humans cannot. But, not only are the problems in creating a supply line--weather and road conditions available are sometimes the monkey wrench in any army's efficiency; especially depending upon them. The railroads had various guages of steel so they could not easily swap cars and or engines to move on many tracks and the like. Once a 'standard' guage was in place; railroads were only as good as the tracks they were on.

"VALLEY MOUNTAIN, September 1, 1861.
"I have received, dearest Mary, your letter of August 18th from Audley, and am very glad to get news of your whereabouts. . . . I am very glad you are enabled to see so many of your friends. I hope you have found all well in your tour, and am very glad that our cousin Esther bears the separation from all her sons so bravely. I have no doubt they will do good service in our Southern cause, and wish they could be placed according to their fancies. . . . I fear you have postponed your visit to the Hot too late. It must be quite cold there now, judging from the temperature here, and it has been raining in these mountains since July 24th. . . . I see Fitzhugh quite often, though he is encamped four miles from me. He is very well and not at all harmed by the campaign.
"We have a great deal of sickness among the soldiers, and now those on the sick-list would form an army. The measles is still among them, though I hope it is dying out. But it is a disease which though light in childhood is severe in manhood, and prepares the system for other attacks. The constant cold rains, with no shelter but tents, have aggravated it. All these drawbacks, with impassable roads, have paralysed our efforts. Still I think you will be safe at the Hot, for the present. We are right up to the enemy on the three lines, and in the Kanawha he has been pushed beyond the Gauley. . . . My poor little Rob I never hear from scarcely. He is busy, I suppose, and knows not where to direct. . . .
"With much affection,
"R. E. LEE."

So, from the rain that started at the conclusion of the Battle of First Manassas/Bull Run continued on and off through July and into August. Not enough medical supplies to get the men through the measles.

Recollections And Letters Of General Robert E. Lee
Chapter III—Letters To Wife And Daughters
CAMP ON SEWELL'S MOUNTAIN,
"September 26, 1861.
"I have just received, dear Mary, your letters of the 17th and 19th instants, with one from Robert. I have but little time for writing to-night, and will, therefore, write to you. . . . Having now disposed of business matters, I will say how glad I am to hear from you, and to learn that you have reached the Hot in safety, with daughter and Rob. I pray that its healing waters may benefit you all. I am glad to hear of Charlotte and the girls, and hope all will go well with them. I infer you received my letter written before leaving Valley Mountain, though you did not direct your letter 'via Lewisburg, Greenbrier County,' and hence its delay. I told you of the death of Colonel Washington. I grieve for his loss, though trust him to the mercy of our Heavenly Father. May He have mercy on us all.

"It is raining heavily. The men are all exposed on the mountain, with the enemy opposite to us. We are without tents, and for two nights I have lain buttoned up in my overcoat. To-day my tent came up and I am in it. Yet I fear I shall not sleep for thinking of the poor men. I wrote about socks for myself. I have no doubt the yarn ones you mention will be very acceptable to the men here or elsewhere. If you can send them here, I will distribute them to the most needy. Tell Rob I could not write to him for want of time. My heart is always with you and my children. May God guard and bless you all is the constant prayer of
"Your devoted husband,
"R. E. LEE."

----------
"SEWELL'S MOUNTAIN, October 7, 1861.
"I received, dear Mary, your letter by Doctor Quin-tard, with the cotton socks. Both were very acceptable, though the latter I have not yet tried. At the time of their reception the enemy was threatening an attack, which was continued till Saturday night, when under cover of darkness he suddenly withdrew. Your letter of the 2d, with the yarn socks, four pairs, was handed to me when I was preparing to follow, and I could not at the time attend to either. But I have since, and as I found Perry in desperate need, I bestowed a couple of pairs on him, as a present from you. The others I have put in my trunk and suppose they will fall to the lot of Meredith,(*) into the state of whose hose I have not yet inquired. Should any sick man require them first, he shall have them, but Meredith will have no one near to supply him but me, and will naturally expect that attention. [excerpt..goes into Mary's lodgings]
am ignorant where I shall be. In the field somewhere, I suspect, so I have little hope of being with you, though I hope to be able to see you. . . . I heard from Fitzhugh the other day. He is well, though his command is greatly reduced by sickness. I wished much to bring him with me;but there is too much cavalry on this line now, and I am dismounting them. I could not, therefore, order more. The weather is almost as bad here as in the mountains I left. There was a drenching rain yesterday, and as I had left my overcoat in camp I was thoroughly wet from head to foot. It has been raining ever since and is now coming down with a will. But I have my clothes out on the bushes and they will be well washed.
"The force of the enemy, by a few prisoners captured yesterday and civilians on the road, is put down from 7,000 to 20,000. Some went as high as 22,000. General Floyd thinks 18,000. I do not think it exceeds 9,000 or 10,000, though it exceeds ours. I wish he had attacked us, as I believe he would have been repulsed with great loss. His plan was to attack us at all points at the same time. The rumbling of his wheels, etc., was heard by our pickets, but as that was customary at night in the moving and placing of his cannon, the officer of the day to whom it was reported paid no particular attention to it, supposing it to be a preparation for attack in the morning. When day appeared, the bird had flown, and the misfortune was that the reduced condition of our horses for want of provender, exposure to cold rains in these mountains, and want of provisions for the men prevented the vigorous pursuit and following up that was proper. We can only get up provisions from day to day—which paralyses our operations.
"I am sorry, as you say, that the movements of the armies cannot keep pace with the expectations of the editors of papers. I know they can regulate matters satisfactorily to themselves on paper. I wish they could do so in the field. No one wishes them more success than I do and would be happy to see them have full swing. I hope something will be done to please them. Give much love to the children and everybody, and believe me
"Always yours,
"R. E. LEE."
----------------------------------------------------------
So early into the Civil War--I would have been very concerned and seen this as 'things to come.'

CSA's benefit though--was that she was on home turf....not in enemy territory.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
A grevious problem indeed. Exagerated? Maybe. Very real and capable of hindering? Definately.

I'm not sure if better fed horses and men would have made the difference by making for victory, but ill fed horses and men were a constant drain on the Confederacy's armies.

Sickness as well.

By 1863, the Confederacy has started to push things further than can be realistically expected.

By 1864, the fat lady is warming up, if the metaphor makes sense.
 
Dear Elennsar,

Agreed in some of the observations sir.

But, the CSA Army was not well supplied 'in total' throughout the War. The CSA was supplied mainly by the Union abandoning their 'goodies' and stripping of prisoners of their equipment, horses, camp supplies, etc.

If the Union wasn't so soft in this area--it may have crippled the CSA more.

In addition, every available man was pressed into service for the CSA. Union still had recruiting abilities and not all 'men' were pressed into service.

Selby Foote the historian mentioned that the Union fought the Civil War with one hand behind their back. Resources for men or supplies were not exhausted. And looking at the ratio of Union States vs. Confederate States. ....well...no need to say more.

Now, having had bought rescued horses, hide on bones and starving as these horses were in the Civil War; they have such big hearts and try so very hard to please; that they often drop dead having used the last bit of will and energy they have. They are very unstable, their muscles a shadow of their strength, sores come easily as well. Rasping of their teeth wasn't done in those days (it is called floating), and often they would drop precious bits of feed. They would suck air to fill themselves (equestrians call it cribbing). You will see bark on trees stripped bare because horses are starving. Horses also get worms and that eats them inside out too. Without the strength to wave their tails, or to kick flies away from their belly; flies bite and leave eggs. Leaving sores there too. Starving to death horses will start stumbling and drop to their knees. Because of the Cavalry manual protocol on marches, horses were to walk more than trot. Gallops were saved for charges. But, having seen horses dying--it is not a pretty site in modern times and would tear my gut more if I had to see it in the Civil War. But, a human on a dying horse often gets warning before they drop for good. Sudden death of a horse is a no warning deal, and why riders were killed from the fall.

I can tell you that those horses I personally rescued were grateful. Horses can tell. From the death march to the slaughter pens...several horses pulled and saved; had turned out to be faithful servants that appreciated a second chance.



Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
There is something more tragic about the starving horses than the starving men.

I guess its that the horse - while he can show that he's unhappy - can't do anything about it.

Poor animals. They deserved better.

:(

Glad to hear that you have given some a second chance in your experiences. That's comforting in a way that words do not do justice to.
 
I believe I am closely paraphrasing Patton with the statement- While an Armys commanders may be given the credit it is logistics that wins wars.
 
A grevious problem indeed. Exagerated? Maybe. Very real and capable of hindering? Definately.

I'm not sure if better fed horses and men would have made the difference by making for victory, but ill fed horses and men were a constant drain on the Confederacy's armies.

Sometimes a better recognition of the situation might have helped.

On Sept 3, 1862, Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis: "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of the
enem's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes."

And yet Lee opted to march into Maryland.

"Still," he wrote, "we cannot afford to be idle."
 
I can understand Lee's reasoning to some extent - remaining "idle" might well have been little if any better in regards to the condition of the men and animals - but it is still an extraordinary statement that "We're in rags, but we're going on the offensive."

The only possible justification is that "going on the offensive" would have been better than the consequences of not.

How that would be, this is not the thread to debate - but I do think he has a point, I will say that.

REnglish said:
I believe I am closely paraphrasing Patton with the statement- While an Armys commanders may be given the credit it is logistics that wins wars.

I can't recall any specific Patton quote, but the old saying "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics." came to mind when you mentioned that.
 
Remaining idle to build strength is a double-edged sword. The opposition gains strength as well. Given that the Union forces could use the idle time to greater advanage, Lee had no choice but to act.
 

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