Cold Harbor: Meade's Uncharacteristic Mistake?

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Apr 30, 2012
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Meade was apparently in tactical command at Cold Harbor, particularly for the infamous assault. Given how that it turned out, it seems surprising to me compared to Meade's record up to that point. Meade who was cautious at Gettysburg, held off attacking imposing works at Williamsport, and was willing to cancel an attack against the Mine Run works. Meade seemingly had a history of not making the kind of brute force frontal assault that Cold Harbor saw. So why did he?

Didn't have a choice because Grant ordered him to do it?

Overconfident, like Grant, that Lee's army was on the ropes and vulnerable?

Careless because he was chafing under Grant?

Delegated too much responsibility to his corps commanders?
 
I think it was a combination of all your points. Like most things in war planning is one thing and the real battle something all together different. If the Federals broke Lee's line they would have been between his army and Richmond. The problem was that Lee's army was mostly veterans who knew how to take up a defensive position that gave them the best chance to kill their enemy. The war had reached a point where the Union had to win by attrition, and it took the slaughter at Cold Harbor to convince Meade, Grant and everyone else that there were going to be no more quick victories.
 
Meade was apparently in tactical command at Cold Harbor, particularly for the infamous assault. Given how that it turned out, it seems surprising to me compared to Meade's record up to that point. Meade who was cautious at Gettysburg, held off attacking imposing works at Williamsport, and was willing to cancel an attack against the Mine Run works. Meade seemingly had a history of not making the kind of brute force frontal assault that Cold Harbor saw. So why did he?

Didn't have a choice because Grant ordered him to do it?

Overconfident, like Grant, that Lee's army was on the ropes and vulnerable?

Careless because he was chafing under Grant?

Delegated too much responsibility to his corps commanders?

Grant ordered the attack, but Meade and his corps commanders had poor execution. They neglected to perform their most basic responsibilities in planning an attack. It was tough enough to start with, but the neglect of duty of the command structure of the Army of the Potomac guaranteed it would fail.
 
It was all Meade's fault, the entire Overland Campaign's casualties. That's been pretty well established around here.

Appomattox Courthouse belongs solely to Grant, you see, because as General in Chief he had nothing to do with what it cost his Army.

I'm sorry to be a wise-acre, there's just been a lot of Forum activity on this issue lately. Rah, Rah, General Grant!
 
It was all Meade's fault, the entire Overland Campaign's casualties. That's been pretty well established around here.

Appomattox Courthouse belongs solely to Grant, you see, because as General in Chief he had nothing to do with what it cost his Army.

I'm sorry to be a wise-acre, there's just been a lot of Forum activity on this issue lately. Rah, Rah, General Grant!

I guess I should be paying closer attention because I hadn't really noticed that Meade was being made a scapegoat for Grant's failures as a tactician. I did notice that the appalling Union casualties of the Overland Campaign tend to get glossed over as part of the acceptable cost of the ultimate victory. I think none of us like to think that our favorite generals (or politicians) were careless with the lives of their men. Fact is, a lot of the generals and politicians in the war, on both sides, were cold-hearted brutes when it came to the lives of the common soldiers.
 
It was all Meade's fault, the entire Overland Campaign's casualties. That's been pretty well established around here.

Appomattox Courthouse belongs solely to Grant, you see, because as General in Chief he had nothing to do with what it cost his Army.

I'm sorry to be a wise-acre, there's just been a lot of Forum activity on this issue lately. Rah, Rah, General Grant!

Meade certainly said Cold Harbor was his fault. If we can't believe Meade himself on that, who can we believe?
 
It was all Meade's fault, the entire Overland Campaign's casualties. That's been pretty well established around here.

Appomattox Courthouse belongs solely to Grant, you see, because as General in Chief he had nothing to do with what it cost his Army.

I'm sorry to be a wise-acre, there's just been a lot of Forum activity on this issue lately. Rah, Rah, General Grant!
If you have evidence that contradicts the assertion made that Meade held command of the field and he and his corps commanders performed poorly in both the planning and execution of the assault of June 3rd, submit it. Moderating is done by moderators. Inflammatory content edited out by moderator JerseyBart.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
If we're going to talk about any tactical failures of Grant, I think it's only fair to identify where he determined the tactics to be used.

My comment was in response to Drew's remark about the whole Overland Campaign, so, just for an example, let's take the massive assault on the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. It was a very, very bloody affair. Don't you think it's fair to say that Grant sacrificed a lot of lives for very modest gains?
 
My comment was in response to Drew's remark about the whole Overland Campaign, so, just for an example, let's take the massive assault on the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania. It was a very, very bloody affair. Don't you think it's fair to say that Grant sacrificed a lot of lives for very modest gains?

Did Grant determine which tactics would be used there?

Was the objective to make only modest gains?
 
Unless you're comparing Meade's decisions at the Mule Shoe to those he made at Cold Harbor what does Grant at Spotsylvania have to do with the OP question?

I'm sorry to be a wise-acre, there's just been a lot of Forum activity on this issue lately. Rah, Rah, General Grant!

Thanks for contributing nothing and steering the thread of topic.
 
Did Grant determine which tactics would be used there?

Was the objective to make only modest gains?

It may be that I am misusing the word 'tactics'.

What I mean in this context is the tactic of throwing a huge number of men at an objective, with little regard for losses. The underlying assumption being that the Army of the Potomac could afford enormous losses, but the Army of Northern Virginia could not.
 
It may be that I am misusing the word 'tactics'.

What I mean in this context is the tactic of throwing a huge number of men at an objective, with little regard for losses. The underlying assumption being that the Army of the Potomac could afford enormous losses, but the Army of Northern Virginia could not.

Let's ask ourselves what Grant was trying to achieve and if that was worth an attack along the line.

Is breaking the ANV worth a general assault? I think it was. That may not have happened for a variety of reasons but it's what he was trying to do.

Tactics is how you fight a battle. It includes where and when each part of your force strikes, what formation they use, whether there are simultaneous assaults, etc.

Grant was responsible for strategy, which includes where the army went, where it fought, what its objectives were, etc.

Grant directed large attacks and small attacks depending on the objective. For some he had only limited objectives so he used a smaller force.
 
An attack on a well manned, multi level trench system.
meade wasnt in command and couldnt call it off. I guess grant is drawing atraction here so he can slip Calvary off the right, and cross a river to his left.
in a 19 day campaign grant lost 19 thousand men (approx) a thousand men a day, that it isn't bad for an army (modifiers agreed upon) in the field. if he lost nine grand at cold harbor then he was only bleeding five hundred a day..
 
I would have to say the blame for Cold Harbor belongs to the entire Union command structure above the rank of colonel. Did any of the generals do any recon before the attack? If they had, they might have noticed the infantrymen putting slips of paper on their coats so their bodies could be identified after the attack failed. The poor guys who would make the attack the next day already knew it was doomed to failure, and they were going to be the ones to pay the price. None of the division or corps commanders went to Meade or Grant, as far as I know, to argue against the attack. While I'm sure that they would have been told to follow their orders, at least an attempt would have been made.
 

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