Citizen Soldiers

[atlantis]

The US did not have a tradition of a large standing peacetime regular army. What was the biggest weak point in the provisional army for both sides. Was it the election of officers commissioned and non commissioned as the weakest link or the lack of uniformity in weapons. Or something else.

 

[Lubliner]

The US did not have a tradition of a large standing peacetime regular army. What was the biggest weak point in the provisional army for both sides. Was it the election of officers commissioned and non commissioned as the weakest link or the lack of uniformity in weapons. Or something else.

I am assuming you are talking about Militia companies that met before the war. These may have had meetings once or twice a week, and it was a social group activity. Community support helped the financial obligations, throwing raffle parties and prizes, and other benefits. They were formed to help guide and nurture the youth and give a good bearing for them to pursue, instead of straying into delinquency. Because they were not mandatory gatherings, but strictly volunteer, they could be skipped up to a certain number of times without losing 'rank and privilege'. Without a pressing need, people could lose interest. That is my take on it.
Lubliner.

 

[atlantis]

I am assuming you are talking about Militia companies that met before the war. These may have had meetings once or twice a week, and it was a social group activity. Community support helped the financial obligations, throwing raffle parties and prizes, and other benefits. They were formed to help guide and nurture the youth and give a good bearing for them to pursue, instead of straying into delinquency. Because they were not mandatory gatherings, but strictly volunteer, they could be skipped up to a certain number of times without losing 'rank and privilege'. Without a pressing need, people could lose interest. That is my take on it.
Lubliner.

I am talking about the units of the provisional confederate army and the US volunteers.

 

[Kyle Kalasnik]

The US did not have a tradition of a large standing peacetime regular army. What was the biggest weak point in the provisional army for both sides. Was it the election of officers commissioned and non commissioned as the weakest link or the lack of uniformity in weapons. Or something else.

Interesting questions. I would say the election of officers and NCOs. It would take a while for the bad and weak ones to be weeded out, allowing the armies to function as such instead of armed and undisciplined mobs (First Bull Run).

But wasn't that how the US Volunteers always was, even going back to the colonial miltia?

Like you said there was of bit fear of a large standing army.

 

[Don Dixon]

Just a few of the weaknesses:

By 1860 the militia system, except for a few uniformed social clubs masquerading as militia, had largely fallen apart. Consequently there were few officers and NCOs who had any significant degree of military experience, assuming that one considered militia service as real military experience. The Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795, which required every man subject to militia service - which was every physically and mentally fit white male between 18 and 45 - to purchase a musket or rifle suitable for military service, had been ignored by both the national and state governments for years.

Just because a man was a social leader in his community, resulting in his election as an officer, didn't mean he had the skill set to lead men in combat. And, the governors used officer appointments as political patronage, which was a truly ineffective way of selecting competent officers. In this respect the U.S. Colored Troops were generally better officered than white units. Their officers generally had to have been experienced NCOs, had to pass an examination on military subjects, and had to pass a selection board composed of serving officers.

The national war reserve stocks of military shoulder arms - those still held by the Federals and those seized by the Confederates - at the beginning of the war were largely transformed smoothbore percussion or flintlock weapons. The weapons issued the states under the Militia Act of 1808 had largely been wasted through the incompetence of state officials and the few remaining weapons in state hands were in poor repair.

The new "soldiers" didn't know how to shoot military weapons at militarily useful distances and there was almost no one available who knew enough to teach them.

The Federal logistical system was incapable of supplying adequate quantities of almost everything military until late-1862, and the Confederate logistical system never was.

Helmuth von Moltke's purported observation that the American combatants were nothing but two armed-mobs from which very little of military utility could be learned was essentially correct.

Regards,
Don Dixon

 

[Kyle Kalasnik]

Just a few of the weaknesses:

By 1860 the militia system, except for a few uniformed social clubs masquerading as militia, had largely fallen apart. Consequently there were few officers and NCOs who had any significant degree of military experience, assuming that one considered militia service as real military experience. The Militia Acts of 1792 and 1795, which required every man subject to militia service - which was every physically and mentally fit white male between 18 and 45 - to purchase a musket or rifle suitable for military service, had been ignored by both the national and state governments for years.

Just because a man was a social leader in his community, resulting in his election as an officer, didn't mean he had the skill set to lead men in combat. And, the governors used officer appointments as political patronage, which was a truly ineffective way of selecting competent officers. In this respect the U.S. Colored Troops were generally better officered than white units. Their officers generally had to have been experienced NCOs, had to pass an examination on military subjects, and had to pass a selection board composed of serving officers.

The national war reserve stocks of military shoulder arms - those still held by the Federals and those seized by the Confederates - at the beginning of the war were largely transformed smoothbore percussion or flintlock weapons. The weapons issued the states under the Militia Act of 1808 had largely been wasted through the incompetence of state officials and the few remaining weapons in state hands were in poor repair.

The new "soldiers" didn't know how to shoot military weapons at militarily useful distances and there was almost no one available who knew enough to teach them.

The Federal logistical system was incapable of supplying adequate quantities of almost everything military until late-1862, and the Confederate logistical system never was.

Helmuth von Moltke's purported observation that the American combatants were nothing but two armed-mobs from which very little of military utility could be learned was essentially correct.

Regards,
Don Dixon

Very well said!

 

[jackt62]

General Sherman did not hid his strong dislike of volunteer (citizen) soldiers, particularly because of their lack of military discipline.

 

[major bill]

I would go with a lack of training and a lack of funding for the militia. Only a few states at the start of the Civil War had any training for their militia units and few states provided any funding to their militia units. Many militia units almost never fired their arms and were often more of a social club. The U.S. did not have any real plans of how to turn militia units in to useable military units. Some pre war militia units had reasonably good officers and NCOs while others did not. some officers and NCOs had seen active duty during the Mexican American War.

These problem existed from the start of the American Revolution and lasted well in to the 20th Century.