Casualties to break a unit

67th Tigers

Major
Joined
Nov 10, 2006
I'm currently researching when units become unreliable on the basis of casualties. There are two major breakpoints:

I: the unit ceases to be able to attack, but is still capable of defence
II: the unit ceases to be able to defend itself

Point I seems to be around 20-25% casualties for experienced units, which is where a lot of "hard fought" units often end up in battle. That makes sense because they'll attack to their breakpoint, and then cease to be able to attack. At around 40% casualties units are incapable even of defending themselves. This is visible in official effectiveness charts, thus:

1596365187346.png


I then realised that the probability of a unit break I was the same as the observed probability of attacks "stalemating" due to casualties, thus:

1587310445659-png.355633


We know that units slowly recover morale when rested, and that it takes about 3 months for a broken unit to fully regain combat effectiveness.

My interest was due to a recent argument over the effectiveness of the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 12th Corps on 18th Septemebr 1862. I found that all of the divisions had likely reached breakpoint I (using South Mountain and Antietam casualties, as the recovery wouldn't have happened), and some had likely reached breakpoint II. Estimating combat value from the remaining troops and a linear model of effectiveness loss (value in attack declining to 0 in first 20% and then in defence linearly in the second 20%) and Carman's troop strengths


StrengthCasualtiesValue
CorpsDivision(Carman)(SM+A)% LossCategoryAttackDefence
1st CorpsDoubleday2,975
1361​
46%​
II--
Ricketts3,037
1222​
40%​
II--
Meade2,607
968​
37%​
close to II-246
2nd CorpsRichardson4,029
1136​
28%​
I-1,736
Sedgwick5,437
2255​
41%​
II--
French5,740
1818​
32%​
I-1,569
9th CorpsWillcox3,002
687​
23%​
I-1,968
Sturgis3,013
827​
27%​
I-1,421
Rodman2,791
1083​
39%​
close to II-85
Kanawha2,908
553​
19%​
close to I1182,355
12th CorpsWilliams4,725
1076​
23%​
I-3,102
Greene2,504
650​
26%​
I-1,298
Total42,76813,636
32%​
11813,779

Using the 22nd September return for the rebels, it looks like Lee's army had completely pass breakpoint I, and hence would be incapable of offensive actions, but could effectively defend itself:

DivisionStr 22ndCasTot%CategoryAttackDefend
McLaws3,9282,0816,009
35%​
I-520
Jones3,8101,4355,245
27%​
I-2,477
Anderson5,3241,4656,789
22%​
I-4,792
Walker3,4281,1034,531
24%​
I-2,742
Evans556290846
34%​
I-167
Hood2,8471,0163,863
26%​
I-1,993
DH Hill5,0713,2418,312
39%​
close to II-254
AP Hill4,7777025,479
13%​
0​
1,6724,777
Ewell3,4421,3444,786
28%​
I-2,065
Jackson2,5537003,253
22%​
I-2,298
Sum35,73613,37749,113
27%​
1,67222,084
 
My cousin and I went to Malvrin Hill this year back in February we figured that from every 100 miles they marched from the beginning of the campaign that they had to had several 100 casualties just in that battle alone they had 3,000 for the Confederates but for wounded I am sure they had like 10,000.
 
So the implication of the model above is that essentially 100% of the fighting for the Union in the event of a resumed assault would have to fall upon 6th Corps (which had suffered casualties in Irwin's bde) and 5th Corps (which had suffered casualties in Sykes' division).
 
So the implication of the model above is that essentially 100% of the fighting for the Union in the event of a resumed assault would have to fall upon 6th Corps (which had suffered casualties in Irwin's bde) and 5th Corps (which had suffered casualties in Sykes' division).

Indeed. That was my contention, and it was Harsh's contention.

Then I started looking at the casualty history of 5th and 6th Corps. Both 5th Corps divisions had passed breakpoint I less than 3 weeks earlier at 2nd Bull Run, and it's likely that Morell at least was a bit shaky. Morell had 3,630 infantry PFD on 1st September, and Sykes 3,202 (of whom 523 are Warren), making them 25% and 22% casualties.

6th Corps went into the campaign in good shape. Taylor's brigade (Slocum) likely hit breakpoint I at Bull Run bridge 3 weeks earlier. Slocum's division took 513 at Crampton's Gap and another 65 on the 17th. Smith's division took 20 at CG and 373 on the 17th (mostly Irwin).
 
Interesting. My tactical game project uses 10, 25, and 40% thresholds for die roll modifiers affecting unit "stance" (charge, attack, defend, retreat, or rout). I rather stumbled into this with bits and pieces of information over the years; it is nice to see it here laid out formally. Is the Army document you cited available online?

(Ultimate General can be fun but needing upwards of 75% casualties to cause a unit to quit never sits right.)
 
Interesting. My tactical game project uses 10, 25, and 40% thresholds for die roll modifiers affecting unit "stance" (charge, attack, defend, retreat, or rout). I rather stumbled into this with bits and pieces of information over the years; it is nice to see it here laid out formally. Is the Army document you cited available online?

(Ultimate General can be fun but needing upwards of 75% casualties to cause a unit to quit never sits right.)

I took the table from a thesis.

My reading for wargaming is that there should really be the following thresholds:

0-5% cas: no effects
5-20/25%: decreasing ability to attack linear to casualties, once the threshold is reached a unit can't attack
-40%: unit can defend but gets shakier with casualties
>40%: unit is completely ineffective, depending on the game you might remove them.
 
(Ultimate General can be fun but needing upwards of 75% casualties to cause a unit to quit never sits right.)
I think for your sanity it's best to treat the depleting strength of a unit as remaining men in the line, and that damage incurred results from both casualties and "battle shock". So a unit that was 1000 strong and is down to 300 has actually only suffered say 200-300 men KIA/WIA (and is thus about to disintegrate per the numbers 67th has been discussing) but has had the rest run off.


My reading for wargaming is that there should really be the following thresholds:
It's interesting to think about that in terms of the GCACW series, because they have a "disorganized" state which instantly drops a unit to about 2/3 total combat strength but there's no point at which a unit becomes completely combat ineffective. A 10,000 man division (20 manpower) can suffer 2,500 casualties in one badly lost defensive battle and end up Disorganized (10 combat strength instead of 15) and Demoralize-2 (which is to say, completely incapable of attack) but it still defends almost as well as a fresh unit of 5,000 men (10 combat strength).

In fact, in GCACW terms, Morell's division (13 combat strength) advancing in broken terrain against an initially-10,000-man division after just about the worst lost battle the game can permit (Disorg, Demoralize-2, lost 7 strength points) is at +1 for the enemy being demoralize-2.
Morell's division advancing against a fresh unit of the same strength AP Hill is then (6,500 men, 13 strength points) in broken terrain is at +0. So... almost no difference.
 
I took the table from a thesis.

My reading for wargaming is that there should really be the following thresholds:

0-5% cas: no effects
5-20/25%: decreasing ability to attack linear to casualties, once the threshold is reached a unit can't attack
-40%: unit can defend but gets shakier with casualties
>40%: unit is completely ineffective, depending on the game you might remove them.

Thank you for the link.

That sounds close to what I ended up with, each threshold reached shifts the possibilities of the unit stance until finally a high roll merely keeps a unit together while it rests away from any combat.

I think for your sanity it's best to treat the depleting strength of a unit as remaining men in the line, and that damage incurred results from both casualties and "battle shock". So a unit that was 1000 strong and is down to 300 has actually only suffered say 200-300 men KIA/WIA (and is thus about to disintegrate per the numbers 67th has been discussing) but has had the rest run off.

That's always an important point to remember: "casualties" or "losses" usually exceed the number of men actually "hit".
I found adding the 10% threshold tended to give me consistently historical results with many attacks, especially against prepared enemy positions, falling apart on morale rather than hits. Instead of (game) hours of continuous slugging, I started to see a lot more combat pulses - firing, wavering, falling back to rally, etc. - and the majority of units reaching critical stages much later in the day.
 
That's always an important point to remember: "casualties" or "losses" usually exceed the number of men actually "hit".
The best example of this IMO is that one of the 1st Corps divisions at Antietam (3rd division) was estimated as down to 300 men in line on the afternoon of the 17th. This wasn't even the corps or division-within-that-corps that got worst hit, so functionally speaking a lot of the divisions mentioned above were probably completely combat incapable - as in could be outfought by a fresh regiment, let alone a fresh brigade.
 

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