67th Tigers
Major
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
I'm currently researching when units become unreliable on the basis of casualties. There are two major breakpoints:
I: the unit ceases to be able to attack, but is still capable of defence
II: the unit ceases to be able to defend itself
Point I seems to be around 20-25% casualties for experienced units, which is where a lot of "hard fought" units often end up in battle. That makes sense because they'll attack to their breakpoint, and then cease to be able to attack. At around 40% casualties units are incapable even of defending themselves. This is visible in official effectiveness charts, thus:
I then realised that the probability of a unit break I was the same as the observed probability of attacks "stalemating" due to casualties, thus:
We know that units slowly recover morale when rested, and that it takes about 3 months for a broken unit to fully regain combat effectiveness.
My interest was due to a recent argument over the effectiveness of the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 12th Corps on 18th Septemebr 1862. I found that all of the divisions had likely reached breakpoint I (using South Mountain and Antietam casualties, as the recovery wouldn't have happened), and some had likely reached breakpoint II. Estimating combat value from the remaining troops and a linear model of effectiveness loss (value in attack declining to 0 in first 20% and then in defence linearly in the second 20%) and Carman's troop strengths
Using the 22nd September return for the rebels, it looks like Lee's army had completely pass breakpoint I, and hence would be incapable of offensive actions, but could effectively defend itself:
I: the unit ceases to be able to attack, but is still capable of defence
II: the unit ceases to be able to defend itself
Point I seems to be around 20-25% casualties for experienced units, which is where a lot of "hard fought" units often end up in battle. That makes sense because they'll attack to their breakpoint, and then cease to be able to attack. At around 40% casualties units are incapable even of defending themselves. This is visible in official effectiveness charts, thus:
I then realised that the probability of a unit break I was the same as the observed probability of attacks "stalemating" due to casualties, thus:
We know that units slowly recover morale when rested, and that it takes about 3 months for a broken unit to fully regain combat effectiveness.
My interest was due to a recent argument over the effectiveness of the 1st, 2nd, 9th and 12th Corps on 18th Septemebr 1862. I found that all of the divisions had likely reached breakpoint I (using South Mountain and Antietam casualties, as the recovery wouldn't have happened), and some had likely reached breakpoint II. Estimating combat value from the remaining troops and a linear model of effectiveness loss (value in attack declining to 0 in first 20% and then in defence linearly in the second 20%) and Carman's troop strengths
| Strength | Casualties | Value | |||||
| Corps | Division | (Carman) | (SM+A) | % Loss | Category | Attack | Defence |
| 1st Corps | Doubleday | 2,975 | 1361 | 46% | II | - | - |
| Ricketts | 3,037 | 1222 | 40% | II | - | - | |
| Meade | 2,607 | 968 | 37% | close to II | - | 246 | |
| 2nd Corps | Richardson | 4,029 | 1136 | 28% | I | - | 1,736 |
| Sedgwick | 5,437 | 2255 | 41% | II | - | - | |
| French | 5,740 | 1818 | 32% | I | - | 1,569 | |
| 9th Corps | Willcox | 3,002 | 687 | 23% | I | - | 1,968 |
| Sturgis | 3,013 | 827 | 27% | I | - | 1,421 | |
| Rodman | 2,791 | 1083 | 39% | close to II | - | 85 | |
| Kanawha | 2,908 | 553 | 19% | close to I | 118 | 2,355 | |
| 12th Corps | Williams | 4,725 | 1076 | 23% | I | - | 3,102 |
| Greene | 2,504 | 650 | 26% | I | - | 1,298 | |
| Total | 42,768 | 13,636 | 32% | 118 | 13,779 |
Using the 22nd September return for the rebels, it looks like Lee's army had completely pass breakpoint I, and hence would be incapable of offensive actions, but could effectively defend itself:
| Division | Str 22nd | Cas | Tot | % | Category | Attack | Defend |
| McLaws | 3,928 | 2,081 | 6,009 | 35% | I | - | 520 |
| Jones | 3,810 | 1,435 | 5,245 | 27% | I | - | 2,477 |
| Anderson | 5,324 | 1,465 | 6,789 | 22% | I | - | 4,792 |
| Walker | 3,428 | 1,103 | 4,531 | 24% | I | - | 2,742 |
| Evans | 556 | 290 | 846 | 34% | I | - | 167 |
| Hood | 2,847 | 1,016 | 3,863 | 26% | I | - | 1,993 |
| DH Hill | 5,071 | 3,241 | 8,312 | 39% | close to II | - | 254 |
| AP Hill | 4,777 | 702 | 5,479 | 13% | 0 | 1,672 | 4,777 |
| Ewell | 3,442 | 1,344 | 4,786 | 28% | I | - | 2,065 |
| Jackson | 2,553 | 700 | 3,253 | 22% | I | - | 2,298 |
| Sum | 35,736 | 13,377 | 49,113 | 27% | 1,672 | 22,084 |