Canby takes Mobile August 1864

[33RDNCK]

Looking at Canby's 1865 force, 74 of the 85 Infantry regiments used in the 1865 campaign were east of the Mississippi or otherwise available in August 1864, along with 11 of 12 cavalry regiments. The artillery, engineer, and other support troops were available. In my mind, this still gives Canby ample force to take Mobile, especially with the Army of Tennessee deadlocked with Sherman at Atlanta. You could argue that the use of A.J. Smith's troops leaves an opportunity for Forrest to raid TN, but I think Forrest's forces would have been been compelled to defend Mobile, along with anything else Taylor could have thrown together. Note: Of Cnaby's 1865 OOB, I've left out any regiments in Arkansas in July/Aug 1864 (8 regiments), and those 4 regiments not yet organized in that July/Aug 1864 period.

All things considered, it looks like the Union was reluctant to use it's greatly superior manpower in MS, LA, AL.

 

[RedRover]

On August 10, 1864, General Sherman, commanding the Military Division of the Mississippi, observed that he desired merely to threaten Mobile, etc., so to guarantee the Confederates would retain troops there in some number... writing to Grant...

As Atlanta fell in September, Gen. Sherman preferred Gen. Canby use his forces in some other manner than directly against Mobile...

Canby had responded to Sherman that he was game if reinforced...

At the same time, President Lincoln expressed his appreciation for the operations in which Canby's force closed the Confederate port of Mobile...

Sherman evidently felt any continuing Confederate defense of Mobile was a boon for the short term... the defenders not actively engaged in any strategic manner that could aid in the life of the Confederacy...

Sherman was shortly engaged with General Hood's continued maneuvering, and his own March to the sea, etc.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Looking at Canby's 1865 force, 74 of the 85 Infantry regiments used in the 1865 campaign were east of the Mississippi or otherwise available in August 1864, along with 11 of 12 cavalry regiments. The artillery, engineer, and other support troops were available. In my mind, this still gives Canby ample force to take Mobile, especially with the Army of Tennessee deadlocked with Sherman at Atlanta. You could argue that the use of A.J. Smith's troops leaves an opportunity for Forrest to raid TN, but I think Forrest's forces would have been been compelled to defend Mobile, along with anything else Taylor could have thrown together.

How is Forrest's cavalry going to defend Mobile? That seems a waste of his troops. Especially if the Union goes up the east side of the bay as they did historically, instead of the west side.

Sherman also needed a force the size he had to conduct the operations that he did. When he wasn't conducting active operations the problem was usually weather.

The problem with Mobile Bay is that the Union had to take Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines before the CSS Tennessee was active. After that point Farragut required monitors to offset that Confederate advantage. Jack Friend's West Wind, Flood Tide addresses this issue quite well.

The mistake was conducting the Red River Campaign instead of the Mobile Campaign. Probably also the expedition to the Texas coast before that. Political concerns with the situation in Mexico undercut operations against Mobile. Emory's corps being sent to Virginia in 1864 was another setback, especially in terms of operations any farther than Morgan and Gaines.

Taking the forts mostly closes the port. Actually taking the city of Mobile is a lot more difficult from a geographic perspective than it looks at a glance. Paul Brueske's books about the 1865 Mobile campaign address this quite well. Canby was perhaps overcautious in his operations, but he wasn't taking many chances with the Confederate fortifications. He maximized overwhelming force to minimize loses.

 

[33RDNCK]

Oh boy, where do I begin...

Read my original post. Not talking about taking any regiments from Sherman, we're talking about the actual force that Canby took to Mobile in 1865, which contained zero regiments from Sherman's Atlanta force. The Red River campaign had already come and gone by the summer of 1864, so it is water under the bridge. We are mostly talking about Canby having a lot of relatively idle troops, even after the transfer of the 19th Corps to Virginia.

As far as Forrest, he would defend Mobile by dismounting his cavalry. Alternatively, he might raid Tennessee, but I think Stephen D. Lee or Richard Taylor (depending on when the attack occurred) would have tried to defend Mobile with all available resources, which includes dismounting cavalry, in a department that had almost no infantry. There is very little point to his raiding in Tennessee, if Alabama and Mississippi get taken from a new Union base of operations in Mobile.

It goes without saying that the Union navy proved more than equal to the task of defeating the CSS Tennessee, capturing the forts at the mouth of the bay, and closing off blockade running into Mobile. This obviously ended Mobile's useful life as a Confederate port. If the Union had captured Mobile, however, it would have become tremendously important as a jumping off point for campaigns up the Alabama river, as one example. If the Union takes Mobile in August 1864, and follows up with a campaign aimed at Selma and Montgomery, I'd argue that the Confederacy would be forced to abandon Miss, AL, and East LA altogether.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Wasn't AJ Smith's corps sent to Missouri during Price's Raid? That raid began at the end of August. So even if Smith had been sent to the Gulf intending to began a land campaign against Mobile in Sep 1864, after Fort Morgan surrendered, he would have been yanked away before it could get going.

In any case, September is a bad time to start a land campaign on the Gulf Coast, in terms of the weather.

It's also worth noting Atlanta surrendered a week after Fort Morgan. As soon as Hood moved into Alabama, Smith wasn't leaving Tennessee until Hood's campaign was over. If he's already on the Gulf, maybe it's too late to recall him, but his absence might have been felt at Nashville where his three divisions were roughly a third of Thomas' army.

 

[33RDNCK]

Wasn't AJ Smith's corps sent to Missouri during Price's Raid? That raid began at the end of August. So even if Smith had been sent to the Gulf intending to began a land campaign against Mobile in Sep 1864, after Fort Morgan surrendered, he would have been yanked away before it could get going.

In any case, September is a bad time to start a land campaign on the Gulf Coast, in terms of the weather.

It's also worth noting Atlanta surrendered a week after Fort Morgan. As soon as Hood moved into Alabama, Smith wasn't leaving Tennessee until Hood's campaign was over. If he's already on the Gulf, maybe it's too late to recall him, but his absence might have been felt at Nashville where his three divisions were roughly a third of Thomas' army.

If the Mobile Campaign had been in motion, I doubt that Smith would have been yanked to defeat Price (Smith's troops never actually fought Price). If Canby occupied Mobile in August / September 1864, I doubt Hood's offensive into TN would have ever occurred. The whole end game changes.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

If Canby occupied Mobile in August / September 1864

Fort Morgan surrendered Aug 23. The land campaign against Mobile would not begin until after that. Mobile isn't going to be occupied within a month, even with the additional troops ready to go.

 

[Stryker65]

Looking at Canby's 1865 force, 74 of the 85 Infantry regiments used in the 1865 campaign were east of the Mississippi or otherwise available in August 1864, along with 11 of 12 cavalry regiments. The artillery, engineer, and other support troops were available. In my mind, this still gives Canby ample force to take Mobile, especially with the Army of Tennessee deadlocked with Sherman at Atlanta. You could argue that the use of A.J. Smith's troops leaves an opportunity for Forrest to raid TN, but I think Forrest's forces would have been been compelled to defend Mobile, along with anything else Taylor could have thrown together. Note: Of Cnaby's 1865 OOB, I've left out any regiments in Arkansas in July/Aug 1864 (8 regiments), and those 4 regiments not yet organized in that July/Aug 1864 period.

All things considered, it looks like the Union was reluctant to use it's greatly superior manpower in MS, LA, AL.

I think the Union was still worried about resurgent Confederate activity in Louisiana -- as you may have noticed, the removal of the 19th Corps to Virginia and the 13th Corps to Mobile left New Orleans and much of eastern Louisiana a tad light on defenders. The campaign on Mobile required that the former command of Richard Taylor be moved to Texas for winter quarters, and when this was done the Mobile campaign began. The small garrisons in eastern Louisiana were hardly threatened by the presence of just seven small Confederate cavalry regiments in the area.

 

[Stryker65]

Fort Morgan surrendered Aug 23. The land campaign against Mobile would not begin until after that. Mobile isn't going to be occupied within a month, even with the additional troops ready to go.

Perhaps not immediately within a month, but it could certainly happen. The Confederate defenses of Mobile at this time had roughly 66% less infantry and 75% less artillery than in April, especially following the capture of the harbor forts.

 

[33RDNCK]

I think the Union was still worried about resurgent Confederate activity in Louisiana -- as you may have noticed, the removal of the 19th Corps to Virginia and the 13th Corps to Mobile left New Orleans and much of eastern Louisiana a tad light on defenders. The campaign on Mobile required that the former command of Richard Taylor be moved to Texas for winter quarters, and when this was done the Mobile campaign began. The small garrisons in eastern Louisiana were hardly threatened by the presence of just seven small Confederate cavalry regiments in the area.

I think you're right on the Union fears of the CS Trans-Miss, but it was an unreasoning fear. The Confederates thought that the Union gunboats would tear them apart if they tried to cross the Mississippi. The Union could have most likely concentrated a larger force, taken Mobile, and then launched a follow-on campaign toward Selma. Seizing Selma takes most of AL, MS, and east LA out of the war for the CSA.

 

[Stryker65]

I think you're right on the Union fears of the CS Trans-Miss, but it was an unreasoning fear. The Confederates thought that the Union gunboats would tear them apart if they tried to cross the Mississippi. The Union could have most likely concentrated a larger force, taken Mobile, and then launched a follow-on campaign toward Selma. Seizing Selma takes most of AL, MS, and east LA out of the war for the CSA.

I meant more on an assault on Louisiana near the mouth of the Mississippi, i.e. on Morganza / La Fourche / Baton Rouge, as had happened a year before with Taylor's and Tom Green's campaigns. You're definitely right about the gunboats, though, and morale also had a large part in it -- most T-MS troops outright refused to cross the river.