Bragg versus McClellan

[TinCan]

67th,
If that was the case why so many messages between McClellan, Lincoln, and Halleck urging McClellan to do something even if he did it wrong. From my reading it was Lincoln and Halleck urging McClellan to move forward against Lee and Richmond that was met by constant telegrams from McClellan complaining of being vastly outnumbered, needing reenforcements, etc.

 

[67th Tigers]

67th,
If that was the case why so many messages between McClellan, Lincoln, and Halleck urging McClellan to do something even if he did it wrong. From my reading it was Lincoln and Halleck urging McClellan to move forward against Lee and Richmond that was met by constant telegrams from McClellan complaining of being vastly outnumbered, needing reenforcements, etc.

How many telegrams are there then?

Yes, there is the odd fantastical missive from Lincoln to McClellan telling him simply to "break the enemies line", despite it being heavily entrenched, behind a flooded river and with a cleared mile wide field of fire beaten by hundreds of artillery pieces, or to cross the Potomac and not to worry about supplies because you don't need transport, food or bullets. Typically McClellan patiently explained to Lincoln why he was wrong.

It's telling that what finally worked against Lee was an implementation of McClellan's plans with the force ratios McClellan said were needed to make it work, by another commander, and with Halleck still protesting it as a mistake.

 

[TinCan]

I see, when ordered to "break the enemies line", McClellan complains why it can't be done and Grant just goes and does it. One general used his army and the other didn't, I'll let the facts bear me out.

 

[67th Tigers]

I see, when ordered to "break the enemies line", McClellan complains why it can't be done and Grant just goes and does it. One general used his army and the other didn't, I'll let the facts bear me out.

Does Grant ever just "break the enemies line" at short notice based off a missive?

I see this is going to take the standard turn of argument.

Grant's career is very checkered. He was usually slow to attack, and it was usually not terribly effective. Say Grant's Vicksburg campaign, which actually parallels Yorktown quite well, Grant takes seven months to get across a river line. If this were McClellan I'd suspect you'd be saying he was slow, but it was Grant. It even features Grant's supply base getting blow away (a la Seven Days) and him withdrawing to safety.

Or Chattanooga, where Grant waits two months before attacking.

Or once before Petersburg the six months without any attack and eight months with no significant attack.

By the standard Lincoln used to judge McClellan, Grant was a dead failure. Fact. That Grant was allowed to go fallow for long periods of time is great, but why not extend the same patience to McClellan who in parallel situations (West Va vs Ft Donelson, Peninsula vs Vicksburg and Overland/ Petersburg, Antietam vs Chatanooga) is actually much faster and more aggressive?

 

[TinCan]

This isn't going anywhere so lets just agree to disagree shall we. You believe what you want about Little Mac and I'll do the same. Enough said.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Both times were because McClellan was too aggressive.

The first time McClellan is essentially relieved for planning to cross the James and attack Petersburg, which Lincoln hates because it isn't defending Washington.

The second time McClellan is relieved for moving aggressively against Lee in the Loudon Valley and hence "uncovering Washington".

McClellan, far too aggressive (operationally) for Lincoln's sentiments.

Is this in some alternate universe where everything is the opposite of this universe?

I've been reading Jacob Cox lately, and with his first-hand observations, he backs up the commonly held opinion that McClellan was nowhere near aggressive enough for Lincoln.

 

[67th Tigers]

This isn't going anywhere so lets just agree to disagree shall we. You believe what you want about Little Mac and I'll do the same. Enough said.

Well that's the rub isn't it - belief.

This wasn't about the facts of the matter which reveal a complex struggle between the aggressive McClellan and the conservative Lincoln. It was about fitting everything into a neat story.

But okay, lets stop before the typical third act plays out.

 

[67th Tigers]

I've been reading Jacob Cox lately, and with his first-hand observations, he backs up the commonly held opinion that McClellan was nowhere near aggressive enough for Lincoln.

Ah Cox. So imcompetent, and so consistent in blaming his mistakes on others.

"It wasn't me that ran away and ordered a general retreat at Antietam, honest gov."

 

[Will Carry]

That is a great question. Thanks for posting it. When McClellan rode it front of his troops, they cheered him. That has to account for something. Bragg did not have men cheering for him. Bragg showed moments of tactical brilliance both at Stone's River and Chickamauga but his lieutenants failed to follow his orders. So it seems to me:

McClellan loved his men so much, he did want to get them hurt.

Bragg was unable to instill the level of devotion from his lieutenants needed to win battles.

I personally thinks history has been hard on Bragg and Little Mac.

 

[Horace Porter]

I can't really see Bragg defeating anyone.

Except William S. Rosecrans.

 

[David Moore]

Is this in some alternate universe where everything is the opposite of this universe?

I've been reading Jacob Cox lately, and with his first-hand observations, he backs up the commonly held opinion that McClellan was nowhere near aggressive enough for Lincoln.

Cox's Reminiscences were written in 1900. He was a Republican governor of Ohio and McClellan of course was a Democrat.
Based on when his books were published and that he was a political figure his opinions should be looked at with some skepticism.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Cox's Reminiscences were written in 1900. He was a Republican governor of Ohio and McClellan of course was a Democrat.
Based on when his books were published and that he was a political figure his opinions should be looked at with some skepticism.

You seem very quick to dismiss sources who had first-hand experience with Rosecrans and were critical of him. His evaluations of Rosecrans, and McClellan, and other generals, seem very thoughtful and balanced to me. He praised their good points, and he criticized their bad points.

 

[David Moore]

You seem very quick to dismiss sources who had first-hand experience with Rosecrans and were critical of him. His evaluations of Rosecrans, and McClellan, and other generals, seem very thoughtful and balanced to me. He praised their good points, and he criticized their bad points.

I prefer eyewitness accounts written close in time to the events written about. I have no real feelings either way about Cox in regards to Rosecrans. He was only with him in West Virginia in 1861. He is a source of info via what he says Garfield told him but it was written after Garfield and Rosecrans were both dead. Secondary source at best. Btw I'm still looking for first hand sources critical of Rosecrans. Dana is the main one. Milo Hascall is another. Perhaps Hazen. Any others you know of?

 

[DanSBHawk]

I prefer eyewitness accounts written close in time to the events written about. I have no real feelings either way about Cox in regards to Rosecrans. He was only with him in West Virginia in 1861. He is a source of info via what he says Garfield told him but it was written after Garfield and Rosecrans were both dead. Secondary source at best. Btw I'm still looking for first hand sources critical of Rosecrans. Dana is the main one. Milo Hascall is another. Perhaps Hazen. Any others you know of?

"Secondary source at best?" Good grief, he served with Rosecrans!

 

[David Moore]

"Secondary source at best?" Good grief, he served with Rosecrans!

Only in WV. His Military Reminiscences book was written in 1900. Primary sources would be letters or diaries written during the events described or shortly afterwards. More problematic are his conversations with Garfield which can't be corroborated otherwise. But those conversations reflect more on Garfield and his possible duplicity than on Rosecrans.
They are often cited without the warning that they were written years after the events and most principals being dead.

 

[67th Tigers]

You seem very quick to dismiss sources who had first-hand experience with Rosecrans and were critical of him. His evaluations of Rosecrans, and McClellan, and other generals, seem very thoughtful and balanced to me. He praised their good points, and he criticized their bad points.

Being quick to dismiss Cox is no bad thing. He was a shameless self-promoter who glossed over and tried to conceal his own mistakes - such as ordering a general retreat of 9th Corps at Antietam over the objections of all his division commanders, and refusing to obey McClellan's order to counterattack.

"Such imbecility and incompetence was simply criminal, a great deal of which last until the close of the war. It was galling to serve under such people [Cox et al.]. But many of them, by maneuvering in politics and elsewhere, are looked upon by certain people throughout the land as some of our military luminaries."
- George Crooks

 

[David Moore]

Being quick to dismiss Cox is no bad thing. He was a shameless self-promoter who glossed over and tried to conceal his own mistakes - such as ordering a general retreat of 9th Corps at Antietam over the objections of all his division commanders, and refusing to obey McClellan's order to counterattack.

"Such imbecility and incompetence was simply criminal, a great deal of which last until the close of the war. It was galling to serve under such people [Cox et al.]. But many of them, by maneuvering in politics and elsewhere, are looked upon by certain people throughout the land as some of our military luminaries."
- George Crooks

Any CW history written 35 years after the facts and after most of the principal personages were dead and unable to respond has to be used cautiously at best.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Being quick to dismiss Cox is no bad thing. He was a shameless self-promoter who glossed over and tried to conceal his own mistakes - such as ordering a general retreat of 9th Corps at Antietam over the objections of all his division commanders, and refusing to obey McClellan's order to counterattack.

"Such imbecility and incompetence was simply criminal, a great deal of which last until the close of the war. It was galling to serve under such people [Cox et al.]. But many of them, by maneuvering in politics and elsewhere, are looked upon by certain people throughout the land as some of our military luminaries."
- George Crooks

Antietam definitely suffered from poor union generalship. But it wasn't Cox.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Only in WV. His Military Reminiscences book was written in 1900. Primary sources would be letters or diaries written during the events described or shortly afterwards. More problematic are his conversations with Garfield which can't be corroborated otherwise. But those conversations reflect more on Garfield and his possible duplicity than on Rosecrans.
They are often cited without the warning that they were written years after the events and most principals being dead.

As a brigade commander under Rosecrans, Cox had first-hand experience with, and observations of, Rosecrans performance as a general. He had far more ability to judge Rosecrans than the average enlisted man under Rosecrans.

 

[67th Tigers]

Antietam definitely suffered from poor union generalship. But it wasn't Cox.

Cox may have been the worst commander in the campaign.

1. He initially commanded the vanguard of the Union advance at South Mountain. He performed very badly. Scammon's brigade was first in the column with the cavalry and, with Pleasonton as senior officer on the field, pitched in driving the rebels pell mell up the hill to the safety of a low stone wall. Cox then arrived ahead of Crook's brigade, which steamed into the defenders, broke them and then Cox ordered everyone back into a defensive position, ending the initial phase.

He likely was influenced by his meeting of Col Moor who'd just been paroled and warned him to "be careful".

This halt was fatal. The division had smashed Garland's brigade and then GB Anderson's and for 4 hours could actually have marched over the hill and opened the gap with no organised resistance. Two of those hours with Willcox's division in place. Instead Cox sat down and waited for the rest of the Corps and Reno to come up.

2. The next day Cox disobeyed McClellan's orders to pursue the enemy from South Mountain. At Midday FJ Porter with Sykes' division found 9th Corps (which Cox was now in command of) sitting down and resting whilst everyone else went maximum speed. Hooker had pushed his force forward vigourously and hence Burnside's wing becomes separated.

3. At Antietam McClellan ordered Burnside to attack around 1100 hrs on the 16th (i.e. the day "before" Antietam). The next morning Cox still hadn't gotten a single division into assault position.

4. At Antietam Cox ordered a panicked general retreat of 9th Corps as his division commanders prepared to counterattack. Either him or Burnside ignored McClellan's order to counterattack AP Hill and regain the lost ground thus (from an old post):

"The attack having already had the effect of a most powerful diversion in favor of the center and right of the army, which by this means had been able to make decided and successful advances, and no supports being at the time available for our exhausted corps, I ordered the troops withdrawn from the exposed ground in front to the cover of the curved hill above the bridge, which had been taken from the enemy earlier in the afternoon. This movement was effected shortly before dark, in perfect order and with admirable coolness and precision on the part of both officers and men"

- Cox, Report of 23rd September 1862

While Cox was ordering the retreat, this surprised his division commanders who were about to counterattack:

"My right was all secure but Rodman & Scammon were pressed & the extreme left, Sturgis was in danger. I told Rodman's brigade commanders that we could hold the ground & would & agreed with them & Scammon to assist the left by a charge bayonet (our ammunition being exhausted) along the whole line, when we were ordered to fall back near the bridge." (letter from Willcox to his wife, 25th September 1862, emphasis in original. From Willcox, Forgotten Valor, 366).

Burnside sent word to McClellan that he needed reinforcement, and that he was preparing to recross the bridge.

"I want troops and guns. If you do not send them, I can not hold my position half and hour."

McClellan replied "I have no infantry... Tell General Burnside this is the battle of the war-he must hold his ground till dark at any cost…Tell him if he cannot hold his ground, then the bridge, to the last man! always the bridge! If the bridge is lost, all is lost!"

McClellan issued two orders:

"General: General McClellan directs me to say that whatever the result of your affair to-night, you must so guard the bridge with infantry and artillery as to make it impossible for the enemy to cross it."

- order from McClellan to Burnside timestamped 6.10 pm

and 5 minutes later, after McClellan asked the signallers what they could see he orders Burnside to counterattack:

"[McClellan] desires you to push the enemy vigorously. Let the General know if the enemy is retreating, and he will push forward with the center."

- from order to Burnside timestamped 6.15 pm

Reflecting afterwards Cox concluded it couldn't be his panicked order to retreat to the bridge that was the problem. It must have been McClellan denying him reinforcements! He then was very vocal in the years after that him ordering his corps to retreat and claiming they couldn't even hold the bridge had to be McClellan's fault. In fact in the heat of the moment he made a decision not to fight, but to retreat. You can argue about whether it was the right decision, and about Cox's decision making, but we can't argue that he made the decision to retreat. Whether Cox was informed of McClellan's order to counterattack I do not know, but we do know that 9th Corps did not put in the counterattack McClellan ordered, and hence the battle ended on the 17th.