Biggest union error?

[atlantis]

Was the Emancipation Proclamation the biggest union error of the conflict. It told slave owning southern unionists their property rights meant nothing to Washington and confirmed the fears of non-slave owning southern whites that the union would force them to compete with freed slaves for jobs.
The EP gave confederates whose morale was flagging reason to continue the fight thus prolonging the war.

Your Thoughts

 

[Saphroneth]

If McDowell thought it hopeless, why was he planning to advance to the Rappahannock. You can supply the army via the Rappahannock. The Rappahannock is halfway to Richmond, from Fredericksburg to Richmond you have a railroad for supply.

What I said is that the army is fundamentally not capable of offensive action, and that McDowell knew this. He was then overridden and told to launch an offensive anyway - remember "You are all green alike"? So he obeyed the lawful orders of his superiors and put together an offensive plan.

McDowell's plan is a good plan which falls apart because the volunteers cannot move like properly drilled infantry.


As for supplying the army via the Rappahannock - okay, so firstly, how do you get the army from Bull Run to the Rappahannock? By what route? Where do they resupply on the journey?

Do you plan to cross the Rappahannock along the Orange and Alexandria, via Germanna Fords, or at Fredericksburg? Three different crossing places which are multiple days' march apart.

And then you're supplying the army via rail down from Fredericksburg to Richmond, which means you need to defend the entire rail line against Confederates coming in on (say) the Virginia Central from Gordonsville to cut the line from the west, or against the loss of one of a dozen or so bridges.

This is not a simple matter.

The rebel army was weaker than the union army.

I'd be interested to know what metrics you're using - about a third of McDowell's army were three-months men, as were two thirds of Patterson's. Are you assuming that all of them stay? Who gets left to defend Washington?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Was the Emancipation Proclamation the biggest union error of the conflict. It told slave owning southern unionists their property rights meant nothing to Washington and confirmed the fears of non-slave owning southern whites that the union would force them to compete with freed slaves for jobs.
The EP gave confederates whose morale was flagging reason to continue the fight thus prolonging the war.

Your Thoughts

At the time of the EP, the war for the Union was seen to be going badly. Battles were increasing in size and casualties and recruitment was going down, the threat of foreign involvement was peaking and Union morale was falling.

Lincoln seemed to believe that before an EP was presented, the general public and Congress had to be prepared and issuing it prematurely would be counter productive, but events forced his hand.

In the first year of the War most Unionists, including Lincoln believed the war was about fighting for the Union and Constitution that existed before the war had started, in other words a limited war for a limited goal, Reunion. That war was failing and Lincoln was forced to expand the War, it was no longer only a war for Reunion but, also Freedom, from now on it was a war for Reunion and Emancipation, the two were now inextricably intertwined and under Lincoln there could not be the one without the other.

A war that started out as a conservative act to restore the Union that existed before the war had now, become a revolutionary war for Freedom and the rights of man.

One immediate outcome of issuing the EP, was that it stopped any real movement for foreign intervention in its tracks. The EP guaranteed the ACW remained an internal national struggle.

 

[benmax]

In fact, we know the EP was perhaps Lincoln's smartest move. It effectively put an end to any consideration by Great Britain or France to recognize the CSA and it ultimately put the war on a higher moral plane

The EP did several things.....yes, as someone stated that it galvanized the Confederacy. But it also galvanized the Union, which was ultimately the logistical juggernaut of the two....lincoln was a clever man. Plus what you have mentioned in your quote I have selected above. I also believe that it gave a secure, official and credible voice to the anti-slavery cohort of the War era who may have been seen as radicals with their rhetoric prior to the EP.

I therefore agree that the EP was an incredibly productive manoeuver and not an error.

In terms of the biggest Union error....... what about underestimating War Fatigue?

 

[JerryD]

The EP did several things.....yes, as someone stated that it galvanized the Confederacy. But it also galvanized the Union, which was ultimately the logistical juggernaut of the two....lincoln was a clever man. Plus what you have mentioned in your quote I have selected above. I also believe that it gave a secure, official and credible voice to the anti-slavery cohort of the War era who may have been seen as radicals with their rhetoric prior to the EP.

I therefore agree that the EP was an incredibly productive manoeuver and not an error.

In terms of the biggest Union error....... what about underestimating War Fatigue?

I think both sides made the same biggest error. Thinking the war would only last a few days and being over in a matter of weeks.

 

[Jamieva]

Not coordinating movement of their forces to work in concert. They didn't really understand that until Grant took overall command and they all moved at the same time to start the 64 campaign.

 

[damYankee]

Both sides had significant numbers of citizens who did not want to join the fight. How then do you raise the troops absent conscription.
Did the EP not trigger the need for the draft by suppressing white enlistment. The EP turned the war into a rich man's war and a poor man's fight for union soldiers.

So the exemption for any southern citizen who owned 20 or more slaves didn't make it a "rich man's war"?
That is an interesting take, I'm thinking of two of my ancestors who died serving in the CSA, neither of whom owned slaves, while men who owned slaves stayed home and were waited on by their servants.

 

[rvbgrif]

Was the Emancipation Proclamation the biggest union error of the conflict.
Your Thoughts

Biggest Union Error was Fort Sumter. Lincoln played into Davis's hand and let the Confederacy start the war with Virginia.

Had he handled Fort Sumter differently, he could have kept Virginia and started the war in a better position.

Emancipation Proclamation was a great move as it put the Union in a better position, domestically but especially internationally, while not costing him anything by that point in the war. He didn't lose Maryland, Missouri, or Kentucky from it.

 

[Saphroneth]

Not coordinating movement of their forces to work in concert. They didn't really understand that until Grant took overall command and they all moved at the same time to start the 64 campaign.

I don't really know if this is a "didn't understand" thing so much as a "didn't manage" thing - they're different.

Of course, as it happened the Corinth and Peninsula campaigns did pretty much start at the same time.

 

[damYankee]

Biggest Union Error was Fort Sumter. Lincoln played into Davis's hand and let the Confederacy start the war with Virginia.

Had he handled Fort Sumter differently, he could have kept Virginia and started the war in a better position.

Emancipation Proclamation was a great move as it put the Union in a better position, domestically but especially internationally, while not costing him anything by that point in the war. He didn't lose Maryland, Missouri, or Kentucky from it.

The other side of the coin is, if Buchanan taken action when So. Carolina proposed a vote on secession we may not be having this discussion.
Buchanan was a poor excuse for a president and seldom gets the blame he deserves as a result of his lack of action to stop what started as a local uprising.
I often wonder, what would George Washington's reaction have been to a up rising?

 

[Saphroneth]

I often wonder, what would George Washington's reaction have been to a up rising?

George Washington faced with an uprising in favour of independence from a government perceived as interfering with tariff problems, where the rebellion is actually led by Southern planters?

...lead it?

 

[Library Lady]

I often wonder, what would George Washington's reaction have been to a up rising?

We don't have to wonder. We can read about the Whiskey Rebellion.

Whiskey Rebellion

In January 1791, President George Washington's Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton proposed?

www.mountvernon.org

 

[damYankee]

George Washington faced with an uprising in favour of independence from a government perceived as interfering with tariff problems, where the rebellion is actually led by Southern planters?

...lead it?

You do know that Washington supported keeping slavery out of the Northwest Territories?

I never mean (unless some particular circumstance should compel me to it) to possess another slave by purchase: it being among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by the legislature by which slavery in the Country may be abolished by slow, sure, & imperceptible degrees. George Washington, 1786

 

[Saphroneth]

You do know that Washington supported keeping slavery out of the Northwest Territories?

Are we taking Washington as of 1860 or Washington as of that time he did, in fact, lead a major rebellion?

 

[Library Lady]

Are we taking Washington as of 1860 or Washington as of that time he did, in fact, lead a major rebellion?

I would say we're talking about the Washington who was president of the country that came out of the rebellion he led. I have a hard time seeing him approving of the 1% (planter elite) of South Carolina trying to wreck that country when he didn't approve of grubby farmers out West trying to wreck it, especially when the proffered reason for doing so wasn't all that different in the two cases.

 

[Saphroneth]

I would say we're talking about the Washington who was president of the country that came out of the rebellion he led. I have a hard time seeing him approving of the 1% (planter elite) of South Carolina trying to wreck that country when he didn't approve of grubby farmers out West trying to wreck it, especially when the proffered reason for doing so wasn't all that different in the two cases.

What I'm getting at here is that this idea of Washington as anti-rebellion is pretty discordant with the thing he did where he led a rebellion. Yes, if you assume that he would be thoroughly invested in the United States as of 1860 then he'd be against it, because people who are invested in power structures tend to be against rebellions intended to disrupt those power structures, but I don't think you can automatically presume that Washington wouldn't sympathize with the political goals of this particular rebellion. The man owned slaves and any anti-slavery views he had amounted to "I won't buy any more" - but he didn't free any of his.

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't really know if this is a "didn't understand" thing so much as a "didn't manage" thing - they're different.

Of course, as it happened the Corinth and Peninsula campaigns did pretty much start at the same time.

Lincoln pushed Port Hudson, Stones River, Chickasaw Bayou, and Fredericksburg simultaneously to be timed with the release of the Emancipation Proclamation. Which resulted in two bloody defeats, a bloody stalemate, and Banks getting derailed by having political objectives foisted upon him.

Later the same year, we get Vicksburg, Port Hudson, Lincoln urging a resistant Rosecrans forward, and Chancellorsville, with only Grant achieving significant victories until Rosecrans finally surges forward.

The problem wasn't just timing, it was the armies operating towards supporting strategic goals. Lincoln was clueless in this regard and thought that the armies going head to head everywhere at once with no particular strategic goal in mind was sufficient.

 

[atlantis]

The other side of the coin is, if Buchanan taken action when So. Carolina proposed a vote on secession we may not be having this discussion.
Buchanan was a poor excuse for a president and seldom gets the blame he deserves as a result of his lack of action to stop what started as a local uprising.
I often wonder, what would George Washington's reaction have been to a up rising?

He would have buried them in their own manure.

 

[Saphroneth]

Lincoln pushed Port Hudson, Stones River, Chickasaw Bayou, and Fredericksburg simultaneously to be timed with the release of the Emancipation Proclamation. Which resulted in two bloody defeats, a bloody stalemate, and Banks getting derailed by having political objectives foisted upon him.

Right, but what I mean is that the Union did understand the idea of coordinating offensives in time - they just had trouble doing it. You missed the Washington's Birthday offensive of early 1862, pushed by Lincoln but which nobody actually did...

 

[damYankee]

Biggest Union Error was Fort Sumter. Lincoln played into Davis's hand and let the Confederacy start the war with Virginia.

Had he handled Fort Sumter differently, he could have kept Virginia and started the war in a better position.

Emancipation Proclamation was a great move as it put the Union in a better position, domestically but especially internationally, while not costing him anything by that point in the war. He didn't lose Maryland, Missouri, or Kentucky from it.

How should have have handled Confederate aggression?

 

[rvbgrif]

How should have have handled Confederate aggression?

It is easy to criticize Lincoln in hindsight, because it is 160 years later, and the Lincoln Presidency was months old.

However, the way Fort Sumter was handled by both the Buchanan administration and Lincoln administration was the worst way it could possibly be handled.

The Buchanan administration allowed Secessionists/Confederates to seize weapons and forts. Buchanan made an agreement with South Carolina Governor Higgins to not reinforce Fort Sumter in return for the Confederates leaving it alone. And he attempted to reinforce it multiple times, his only action to prevent secession.

What Lincoln should have done... Is not follow in Buchanan's footsteps.

Virginia had a vote on secession, and secession lost but it was a close vote. Lincolns primary objective should have been to secure Virginia. Lincoln indicated this when he gave a public statement that he would "trade Fort Sumter for Virginia not seceding".

Likewise, Davis was trying to provoke a reaction at Fort Sumter to dog Virginia into seceding.

Instead, Lincoln decided to send a flotilla filled with weapons and soldiers to resupply and reinforce Fort Sumter and fire back at Confederate batteries. This provoked Davis into giving the order to fire on Fort Sumter, but it also provoked Virginia into seceding. In hindsight, a bad more.

Fort Sumter was both David and Lincoln provoking one another into war so they can go back to their base and justify a war. And it worked out better for Davis because he got extra and significant states.

Lincoln had an endless number of ways on where and how he wished to deal with the Confederates. Davis was limited as he was riding on public outcry to provoke secession and win states. The way Lincoln chose cost him key states which prolonged the war for years...