Biggest union error?

[atlantis]

Was the Emancipation Proclamation the biggest union error of the conflict. It told slave owning southern unionists their property rights meant nothing to Washington and confirmed the fears of non-slave owning southern whites that the union would force them to compete with freed slaves for jobs.
The EP gave confederates whose morale was flagging reason to continue the fight thus prolonging the war.

Your Thoughts

 

[OpnCoronet]

Was the Emancipation Proclamation the biggest union error of the conflict. It told slave owning southern unionists their property rights meant nothing to Washington and confirmed the fears of non-slave owning southern whites that the union would force them to compete with freed slaves for jobs.
The EP gave confederates whose morale was flagging reason to continue the fight thus prolonging the war.

Your Thoughts

It certainly loomed large in Lincoln's mind. He considered the war as good as lost without it. I myself, am not too sure, but it is hard to argue against Lincoln' political acumen.

 

[tony_gunter]

Only problem with that statement is there is absolutely no evidence to support it. Please list all the slave uprisings under Republican rule.

I'm confused.

Subjectively, southern leaders were convinced that Republican rule was an existential threat to white southerners. There's a ton of primary source documentation proving this. I've posted two of them. An existential threat means that the Confederates began the war on Death Ground, and necessarily negates the original question posed in this thread.

You seem to think I'm saying that the fear was objective and reasonable which is absurd at face value.

 

[JerryD]

I'm confused.

Subjectively, southern leaders were convinced that Republican rule was an existential threat to white southerners. There's a ton of primary source documentation proving this. I've posted two of them. An existential threat means that the Confederates began the war on Death Ground, and necessarily negates the original question posed in this thread.

You seem to think I'm saying that the fear was objective and reasonable which is absurd at face value.

My mistake.

 

[tony_gunter]

My mistake.

No, my mistake for not clarifying. I assumed nobody would mistake me for someone who actually felt this way

 

[Saphroneth]

In my opinion, the biggest Federal error in the war is simply the size of the army they raised at the beginning combined with the decision to close recruitment when the number of soldiers enrolled (on paper) exceeded this value, instead of expanding the planned size of the army.

My reason for this is that resource allocation is the major Federal constraint in 1862 and 1863 alike.


In 1862:

- The number of men that defended Washington, and where they were, was a perennial bugbear.
- Divisions were being taken from the Union army pointed at Richmond and assigned to secondary tasks.
- Assembling an army for a major offensive in the West involved pulling together troops from all over the West, which meant that the Union didn't really have the resources to do much elsewhere.
- Even when everyone agreed that the Army of the Potomac needed reinforcement, nobody could decide where these divisions should come from.
- The shot in the arm of strength from the 300,000 more volunteers raised in July 1862 greatly aided the Union cause (and prevented the risk of a major defeat - imagine the Maryland Campaign without the new recruits)


In 1863:
- The shot in the arm faded nine months later, resulting in major Union resource problems going into the Gettysburg campaign.
- The lack of Union strength in the East allowed Longstreet to be transferred west, winning Chickamauga
- It is then a struggle to pull together a relief army to save Chattanooga


The Union has a total population as of 1860 of about 19 million in free states and 3 million in border states; the Confederacy has 9 million total, of which only 5.5 million are free. It should be within the ability of the Union to raise an army at least double the size of the Confederate army across the continent, or at least to raise the ~650,000 men PFD that it had with the colours in 1864, when resource allocation was generally speaking far less of a problem; the marginal improvement here is significant. An extra four divisions of troops available to the Union in June 1862 can easily result in an extra couple of divisions for the Army of the Potomac in June 1862, which all else being equal means that Lee does not have numerical superiority before Richmond and changes the course of the Seven Days (and thus the war).

To put it another way, if the President feels that the US capital cannot be secure with less than 70,000 men defending it (the historical June 1862 number) then that's fine, but the Union should be able to raise an army big enough that the field army can still outnumber the Confederate one. Doing otherwise is a choice, and it is that choice - for whatever reason it is made - that is the error.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

In my opinion, the biggest Federal error in the war is simply the size of the army they raised at the beginning combined with the decision to close recruitment when the number of soldiers enrolled (on paper) exceeded this value, instead of expanding the planned size of the army.

My reason for this is that resource allocation is the major Federal constraint in 1862 and 1863 alike.


In 1862:

- The number of men that defended Washington, and where they were, was a perennial bugbear.
- Divisions were being taken from the Union army pointed at Richmond and assigned to secondary tasks.
- Assembling an army for a major offensive in the West involved pulling together troops from all over the West, which meant that the Union didn't really have the resources to do much elsewhere.
- Even when everyone agreed that the Army of the Potomac needed reinforcement, nobody could decide where these divisions should come from.
- The shot in the arm of strength from the 300,000 more volunteers raised in July 1862 greatly aided the Union cause (and prevented the risk of a major defeat - imagine the Maryland Campaign without the new recruits)


In 1863:
- The shot in the arm faded nine months later, resulting in major Union resource problems going into the Gettysburg campaign.
- The lack of Union strength in the East allowed Longstreet to be transferred west, winning Chickamauga
- It is then a struggle to pull together a relief army to save Chattanooga


The Union has a total population as of 1860 of about 19 million in free states and 3 million in border states; the Confederacy has 9 million total, of which only 5.5 million are free. It should be within the ability of the Union to raise an army at least double the size of the Confederate army across the continent, or at least to raise the ~650,000 men PFD that it had with the colours in 1864, when resource allocation was generally speaking far less of a problem; the marginal improvement here is significant. An extra four divisions of troops available to the Union in June 1862 can easily result in an extra couple of divisions for the Army of the Potomac in June 1862, which all else being equal means that Lee does not have numerical superiority before Richmond and changes the course of the Seven Days (and thus the war).

To put it another way, if the President feels that the US capital cannot be secure with less than 70,000 men defending it (the historical June 1862 number) then that's fine, but the Union should be able to raise an army big enough that the field army can still outnumber the Confederate one. Doing otherwise is a choice, and it is that choice - for whatever reason it is made - that is the error.

I agree that these were major problems, but I'm not sure I would quite call it a mistake. Reason being that the federal and state governments had a hard enough time equipping the first 75,000, and at least as far as arms, things weren't a whole lot better for the 300,000. One has to wonder what that larger first recruitment would look like, and what they would be able to accomplish.

 

[Saphroneth]

I agree that these were major problems, but I'm not sure I would quite call it a mistake. Reason being that the federal and state governments had a hard enough time equipping the first 75,000, and at least as far as arms, things weren't a whole lot better for the 300,000. One has to wonder what that larger first recruitment would look like, and what they would be able to accomplish.

As of June 30 1862, there were about 335,000 long arms in store of which 94,000 were described by Ripley (as of the start of June) as "good rifled arms". I agree there was a lot of dross, but what I'm envisaging here is that the 500,000 men authorized is - say - taken to mean 500,000 men Present For Duty, and that recruitment is done to keep the strength up to that level.

That amounts to not closing recruitment outright in April 1862 and instead keeping it up as a source of battle casualty/sickness replacements. This would permit the Union's cross-continent PFD in June 30 1862 to be more like 475,000-500,000 PFD instead of 425,000 PFD as it historically was on that date.

This doesn't overload the supply of replacement weapons, and it does provide a major benefit - it's about 4-5 extra divisions for the field armies.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

I agree that these were major problems, but I'm not sure I would quite call it a mistake. Reason being that the federal and state governments had a hard enough time equipping the first 75,000, and at least as far as arms, things weren't a whole lot better for the 300,000. One has to wonder what that larger first recruitment would look like, and what they would be able to accomplish.

I wonder if financial considerations-a weak money market at that particular moment-may have played a part in the suspension of recruiting.

 

[Saphroneth]

I wonder if financial considerations-a weak money market at that particular moment-may have played a part in the suspension of recruiting.

They might have done, and I have seen it argued that they did, but not so much a money market as a lack of funds. But historically speaking the amount of money on hand was never going to be enough to fund the war without something extra done (I think historically it was the issuance of demand notes?) and that's the error if so.

Like, I'm not arguing that the decision wasn't driven by factors that made sense at the time - just that those factors were short sighted, unless the Union could really win the whole war by about the middle of June.

 

[atlantis]

Both sides had significant numbers of citizens who did not want to join the fight. How then do you raise the troops absent conscription.
Did the EP not trigger the need for the draft by suppressing white enlistment. The EP turned the war into a rich man's war and a poor man's fight for union soldiers.

 

[atlantis]

They might have done, and I have seen it argued that they did, but not so much a money market as a lack of funds. But historically speaking the amount of money on hand was never going to be enough to fund the war without something extra done (I think historically it was the issuance of demand notes?) and that's the error if so.

Like, I'm not arguing that the decision wasn't driven by factors that made sense at the time - just that those factors were short sighted, unless the Union could really win the whole war by about the middle of June.

If Bull Run had resulted in union Victory maybe it could have ended by middle of August.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

They might have done, and I have seen it argued that they did, but not so much a money market as a lack of funds. But historically speaking the amount of money on hand was never going to be enough to fund the war without something extra done (I think historically it was the issuance of demand notes?) and that's the error if so.

Like, I'm not arguing that the decision wasn't driven by factors that made sense at the time - just that those factors were short sighted, unless the Union could really win the whole war by about the middle of June.

I think demand notes (1861-1862) were discontinued at about the same time as the suspension of recruiting, and replaced with United States Notes which were legal tender for most purposes except the payment of import fees or the like.

 

[Saphroneth]

I think demand notes (1861-1862) were discontinued at about the same time as the suspension of recruiting, and replaced with United States Notes which were legal tender for most purposes except the payment of import fees or the like.

That's the one.

Both sides had significant numbers of citizens who did not want to join the fight. How then do you raise the troops absent conscription.

The 1862 volunteer call didn't have much trouble! I'm arguing here for, like, an 8% increase at most in the size of the army in 1862, and for that to be sustained.

If Bull Run had resulted in union Victory maybe it could have ended by middle of August.

I mean June 1862, for the record, but I think the idea of an 1861 victory due to First Bull Run is frankly fantasy. The Union has to advance so far that there's time for the Confederates to retrench - don't forget that the cause of the desire for First Bull Run to be fought then is that all the three-month volunteers are expiring.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

If Bull Run had resulted in union Victory maybe it could have ended by middle of August.

I don't see how a Union victory by the middle of August, 1861 is possible. Richmond is about 90 miles away from Manassas Junction and McDowell's three month volunteers are about to go home. I reckon the best the Union could hope for would be to force the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston to retreat south of the Rappahannock. Jeff Davis is surely not about to throw in the towel after losing a single battle of relatively small scale in one theater.

 

[atlantis]

I don't see how a Union victory by the middle of August, 1861 is possible. Richmond is about 90 miles away from Manassas Junction and McDowell's three month volunteers are about to go home. I reckon the best the Union could hope for would be to force the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston to retreat south of the Rappahannock. Jeff Davis is surely not about to throw in the towel after losing a single battle of relatively small scale in one theater.

The confederate forces would have fallen apart; Davis would have fled Richmond and the confederacy would have unraveled in short order.

 

[atlantis]

That's the one.


The 1862 volunteer call didn't have much trouble! I'm arguing here for, like, an 8% increase at most in the size of the army in 1862, and for that to be sustained.


I mean June 1862, for the record, but I think the idea of an 1861 victory due to First Bull Run is frankly fantasy. The Union has to advance so far that there's time for the Confederates to retrench - don't forget that the cause of the desire for First Bull Run to be fought then is that all the three-month volunteers are expiring.

Colonel that kind of defeatist talk will not do. Don't worry about 90-day volunteers, stop/loss order will take care of that.

 

[Saphroneth]

The confederate forces would have fallen apart; Davis would have fled Richmond and the confederacy would have unraveled in short order.

Why? It's not like Lincoln fled Washington. Everyone thought it would be a quick war, but that's because everyone thought the other side would collapse...

Colonel that kind of defeatist talk will not do. Don't worry about 90-day volunteers, stop/loss order will take care of that.

There were regiments which didn't fight at Bull Run because their time had run out. You think they're going to tamely go along with orders of an unprecedented and illegal sort to continue fighting after their terms of service have expired? Even if this doesn't produce a mutiny (by a very large fraction of the army, who are, I'll remind you, armed) it massively increases desertion as the men of the army go home because they've done their contracted time.

 

[atlantis]

Why? It's not like Lincoln fled Washington. Everyone thought it would be a quick war, but that's because everyone thought the other side would collapse...



There were regiments which didn't fight at Bull Run because their time had run out. You think they're going to tamely go along with orders of an unprecedented and illegal sort to continue fighting after their terms of service have expired? Even if this doesn't produce a mutiny (by a very large fraction of the army, who are, I'll remind you, armed) it massively increases desertion as the men of the army go home because they've done their contracted time.

Mutiny, desertion are punishable by death. 90 days is for federal service, state service can be until you age out so it was possible to request governors to keep those units on hand but as state troops, makes command and control more difficult but it would do as a stop gap measure until more federal units come on line.
Davis would have no choice but to flee as I don't see Johnston or Beauregard having what it takes at that stage of the conflict to keep a beaten army together.
If McDowell had thrown everything at once instead of piece meal, he could have shattered the confederate forces clearing the way to Richmond. Everyone at CWT keeps telling me if Richmond falls it is game over.

 

[Saphroneth]

Mutiny, desertion are punishable by death. 90 days is for federal service, state service can be until you age out so it was possible to request governors to keep those units on hand but as state troops, makes command and control more difficult but it would do as a stop gap measure until more federal units come on line.

This is totally unworkable. Quite apart from anything else, desertion might officially be punishable by death but it didn't prevent enormous amounts of it happening anyway in the historical Civil War (sometimes more than a third of the entire Union army was absent); this particularly applies to units that are asked to do more than their official terms of service (because they're not actually deserting, per se - they're going home in accordance with the terms of service for which they signed up).

Your remedy for this is for governors to arbitrarily extend the terms of units which consist of their voters! That's unlikely to fly.

The Union army has more troops, it's called for five hundred thousand volunteers. The first 75,000 are going to say that if they wanted to continue to serve then they'd have re-enlisted, and they didn't; it's someone else's turn. This is why regiments literally march away from McDowell's army before the battle - they are going home to be mustered out of service.

Davis would have no choice but to flee as I don't see Johnston or Beauregard having what it takes at that stage of the conflict to keep a beaten army together.
If McDowell had thrown everything at once instead of piece meal, he could have shattered the confederate forces clearing the way to Richmond. Everyone at CWT keeps telling me if Richmond falls it is game over.

The problem here is that the army is fundamentally not capable of what you want it to do. McDowell knew this. He knew the army was green and not capable of an offensive campaign; his plan of action is about as good as it can be given the circumstances, because it at least avoids running head-on into strong enemy defences, and his campaign aim was to push the Confederates back to the Rappahannock and take pressure off DC - not to take Richmond.


And the way to Richmond is not cleared by a Confederate defeat at Bull Run. You have over a hundred miles to advance and you can't supply the army near Richmond; the Union army is not fitted out for an offensive campaign. Their only viable means of supply is down the rail line, but the Confederates have plenty of time to wreck the rail lines near Richmond (like, more than a week, in fact I'd be surprised if it's less than two).

"McDowell had hoped to have his army at Centreville by 17 July, but the troops, unaccustomed to marching, moved in starts and stops. Along the route soldiers often broke ranks to wander off to pick apples or blackberries or to get water, regardless of the orders of their officers to remain in ranks."

And you're planning on keeping this force together and win the war in one blow? Doubtless.


As for the "piece meal", where are you expecting McDowell to have pulled a drilled and effective army out of? This sort of thing takes time - these are his most disciplined and drilled troops and they're not very good because it takes a long time to make a drilled and effective army. The Union hasn't really exercised its divisions as divisions.

 

[atlantis]

This is totally unworkable. Quite apart from anything else, desertion might officially be punishable by death but it didn't prevent enormous amounts of it happening anyway in the historical Civil War (sometimes more than a third of the entire Union army was absent); this particularly applies to units that are asked to do more than their official terms of service (because they're not actually deserting, per se - they're going home in accordance with the terms of service for which they signed up).

Your remedy for this is for governors to arbitrarily extend the terms of units which consist of their voters! That's unlikely to fly.

The Union army has more troops, it's called for five hundred thousand volunteers. The first 75,000 are going to say that if they wanted to continue to serve then they'd have re-enlisted, and they didn't; it's someone else's turn. This is why regiments literally march away from McDowell's army before the battle - they are going home to be mustered out of service.



The problem here is that the army is fundamentally not capable of what you want it to do. McDowell knew this. He knew the army was green and not capable of an offensive campaign; his plan of action is about as good as it can be given the circumstances, because it at least avoids running head-on into strong enemy defences, and his campaign aim was to push the Confederates back to the Rappahannock and take pressure off DC - not to take Richmond.


And the way to Richmond is not cleared by a Confederate defeat at Bull Run. You have over a hundred miles to advance and you can't supply the army near Richmond; the Union army is not fitted out for an offensive campaign. Their only viable means of supply is down the rail line, but the Confederates have plenty of time to wreck the rail lines near Richmond (like, more than a week, in fact I'd be surprised if it's less than two).

"McDowell had hoped to have his army at Centreville by 17 July, but the troops, unaccustomed to marching, moved in starts and stops. Along the route soldiers often broke ranks to wander off to pick apples or blackberries or to get water, regardless of the orders of their officers to remain in ranks."

And you're planning on keeping this force together and win the war in one blow? Doubtless.


As for the "piece meal", where are you expecting McDowell to have pulled a drilled and effective army out of? This sort of thing takes time - these are his most disciplined and drilled troops and they're not very good because it takes a long time to make a drilled and effective army. The Union hasn't really exercised its divisions as divisions.

If McDowell thought it hopeless, why was he planning to advance to the Rappahannock. You can supply the army via the Rappahannock. The Rappahannock is halfway to Richmond, from Fredericksburg to Richmond you have a railroad for supply.
The rebel army was weaker than the union army.