Best All-Around Performance By Both Sides?

Not to incite a riot but let me add Sharpsburg. Both sides gave the best they had. At the end of the day both armies were still toe to toe. All gave some, some gave all.
McClellan was handed an opportunity to annihilate the ANV on a golden platter and failed to do so. He had Lee's plans thanks to the lost orders, had him outnumbered at least 2:1, and with his army divided and his back against a river and still failed to win. I would put Sharpsburg in the biggest blunder by a general category. The troops on both sides certainly performed well and slugged it out toe to toe but, IMO, McClellan squandered the single best chance of the war to deliver a knockout blow to Lee and the ANV.
I would consider Spotsylvania and The Wilderness the best all-around performances on both sides of the war, at least in the eastern theatre.
 
McClellan was handed an opportunity to annihilate the ANV on a golden platter and failed to do so. He had Lee's plans thanks to the lost orders, had him outnumbered at least 2:1, and with his army divided and his back against a river and still failed to win. I would put Sharpsburg in the biggest blunder by a general category. The troops on both sides certainly performed well and slugged it out toe to toe but, IMO, McClellan squandered the single best chance of the war to deliver a knockout blow to Lee and the ANV.
I would consider Spotsylvania and The Wilderness the best all-around performances on both sides of the war, at least in the eastern theatre.
Respectfully disagree on a number of those points. Like I said I don't want to start a riot. Or digress the thread.
 
I have to say I favor Brice's Crossroads. Forrest used the weather as an auxiliary weapon - don't know as that was done before! He also used a very dangerous maneuver that a West Point man would never have used - could easily have had the tables turned on him. It wasn't all unequal - Sturgis wasn't all that bad and he had good officers with him. A J Smith and Benjamin Grierson weren't afraid of Forrest and had a good idea of how to beat him - turn loose the USCT they had. But...Sturgis didn't trust them. He boasted he'd bring Sherman Forrest's hair, but turned out the other way around! I've always maintained Smith and Grierson had the right idea and that was to use the colored troops - they wanted a piece of Forrest mighty bad! But, as my favorite admiral, Nelson, once said, "When the enemy is making a mistake we must not interrupt him too soon!" Sturgis made that mistake. And...Forrest's psychological warfare proved devastating for this general. He pursued the Federals like the hound of the Baskervilles. Every time Sturgis thought he had a minute to rest, there was Forrest and they had to run. "For God's sake, if Mr Forrest will let me alone, I will let him alone!" Forrest kept up this baleful pursuit until he himself literally fell out of his saddle! After Brice's Crossroads Sturgis was used up and Sherman finally sent him out west Indian fighting. He wasn't even good at that and finally had to hang up his uniform. When he heard A J Smith was going to be the next in line to go after Forrest, he began wringing his hands and pacing the floor. Finally he yelled, "It can't be done! They can't whip Old Forrest!"

Altogether, this battle displayed Forrest's talent for war like no other.
 
At Brice's Cross Roads, a Federal force of 7,800 had been defeated by less than half that number.
Sturgis lost 223 killed,394 wounded, and 1623 captured. Forrest captured 16 of his 18 guns, and the entire train of 250 vehicles, complete with 184 horses, rations and ammunition. He reported having 3,500 engaged, and puts his own loss at 492 . This comprehensive Victory greatly enhanced Forrest's reputation.
 
Never understood why Bragg attacked across that river on Jan. 2. imho he shoulda kept sidling around Rosecrans right like he started to on Dec. 31. I'm no pro on this fight. Just always made me wonder...

As a backdrop to that attack, General Bragg feared as an opponent, General Breckinridge, who was ordered to make the assault on January 2nd, even though he believed it to be a "forlorn hope."
 
Second Manassas and Vicksburg were great campaigns, but one also has to note how out of depth Pope and Pemberton proved to be respectively.
Bragg (I always get in trouble giving him the benefit of the doubt, but here goes... :D) was in a bit of a hard spot. He can't stay in Kentucky unless he is joined by those thousands of recruits he brings weapons in for - and he can't convince those recruits to join if they know he can't sustain his force there indefinitely and will eventually have to retreat, bringing them essentially into exile. His raid was successful overall: get in, capture some garrisons and supplies, and get out relatively intact before Buell figures out his true numerical advantage. It just didn't cut it in the newspapers...




As I noted, I have no memory of any such battle as you decribed, where the opposing armies, men and officers performed almost equally well.

While I too, am an admirer of Bragg to a certain extent, but, i believe Bragg, only thought he was in a tough spot. When, in actual fact, the would have all the volunteers he needed After, he defeated Buell's army. He was across Buell's line of retreat and could have forced the Army of the Cumberland, to attack him on ground of his own choosing, instead of turning away to fulfill some political duties that should have been left to be performed, after a great confederate victory.

From my memory, I believe that during the pursuit phase, after the Battle of Gettysburg, both Meade and Lee were equally successful in accomplishing their goals; Lee of retreating back to Va. as quickly as possible and Meade in seeing that that the ANV Left Pa. as soon as possible and the officers and men of both armies accomplished their mission equally well.
 
As I noted, I have no memory of any such battle as you decribed, where the opposing armies, men and officers performed almost equally well.

While I too, am an admirer of Bragg to a certain extent, but, i believe Bragg, only thought he was in a tough spot. When, in actual fact, the would have all the volunteers he needed After, he defeated Buell's army. He was across Buell's line of retreat and could have forced the Army of the Cumberland, to attack him on ground of his own choosing, instead of turning away to fulfill some political duties that should have been left to be performed, after a great confederate victory.

From my memory, I believe that during the pursuit phase, after the Battle of Gettysburg, both Meade and Lee were equally successful in accomplishing their goals; Lee of retreating back to Va. as quickly as possible and Meade in seeing that that the ANV Left Pa. as soon as possible and the officers and men of both armies accomplished their mission equally well.

Buell did not have to attack Bragg when the latter was between him and Louisville. Bragg would eventually have to move to feed his army. And that's what happened. Buell's supply line went through Nashville to the Union navy controlled Cumberland river at that point. The finer points of the logistics involved were lost on the politicians of course.
Lee wouldn't have been able to sit in one place too long in Pennsylvania either, but the political pressure on Meade to attack would have been immense so the idea attributed to Longstreet (get between the AoP and Washington and dig in) might have had a better chance. Still, the biggest difference between a raid and an invasion is an invader can secure his supplies with detachments to hold and occupy the territory behind him.

I agree with your first sentence. It's a tough call; battles are almost by definition events which can't work perfectly.
That the close-to-stalemate slugfests like Shiloh, Murfreesboro (Dec 31), the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania have come up in this context is interesting.
 
Buell did not have to attack Bragg when the latter was between him and Louisville. Bragg would eventually have to move to feed his army. And that's what happened. Buell's supply line went through Nashville to the Union navy controlled Cumberland river at that point. The finer points of the logistics involved were lost on the politicians of course.
Lee wouldn't have been able to sit in one place too long in Pennsylvania either, but the political pressure on Meade to attack would have been immense so the idea attributed to Longstreet (get between the AoP and Washington and dig in) might have had a better chance. Still, the biggest difference between a raid and an invasion is an invader can secure his supplies with detachments to hold and occupy the territory behind him.

I agree with your first sentence. It's a tough call; battles are almost by definition events which can't work perfectly.
That the close-to-stalemate slugfests like Shiloh, Murfreesboro (Dec 31), the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania have come up in this context is interesting.

I was somewhat thinking the fight at the Mule Shoe. Close run fight. I think for this looking for were both Armies were fighting top notch you have to look at close run fights. They were close run either because each side was fighting top notch or making similar amounts of mistakes.
 
I was somewhat thinking the fight at the Mule Shoe. Close run fight. I think for this looking for were both Armies were fighting top notch you have to look at close run fights. They were close run either because each side was fighting top notch or making similar amounts of mistakes.
I initially thought about posting the mule shoe. A twenty-one hour slug fest in the rain, mud, blood, trenches.
The previous day as to draw attraction here, not elsewhere, the old 3rd corps was sent into a field. Lee's artillery, the ones withdrawn to the new line that night, pounded them unmercifully. They got mauled. Theses guys were vets from '61. After getting word to withdraw, Kearney and Hooker's old troops fell back into the woods and disappeared for a few days. No a.a.r.'s. Nothing. Removed themselves with no repercussions from Grant or Meade. These are Sickles old troops...
These guns were removed during the night to a new line established by Lee. Both the May 12 fight and the May 11th fight mattered little in the long run. Of course Grant did not know all this. Just guys doing as ordered because ordered. Hats off gents.
 
I initially thought about posting the mule shoe. A twenty-one hour slug fest in the rain, mud, blood, trenches.
The previous day as to draw attraction here, not elsewhere, the old 3rd corps was sent into a field. Lee's artillery, the ones withdrawn to the new line that night, pounded them unmercifully. They got mauled. Theses guys were vets from '61. After getting word to withdraw, Kearney and Hooker's old troops fell back into the woods and disappeared for a few days. No a.a.r.'s. Nothing. Removed themselves with no repercussions from Grant or Meade. These are Sickles old troops...
These guns were removed during the night to a new line established by Lee. Both the May 12 fight and the May 11th fight mattered little in the long run. Of course Grant did not know all this. Just guys doing as ordered because ordered. Hats off gents.
This would be my pick as well. Men at their absolute best and worst at the same time. Cannot imagine a battle more intense.
 
Battles like the Mule Shoe certainly demonstrate the courage of the troops, but I think "all-around performance" would have to include command, tactics, maneuver, etc.

That said, I agree it's hard to find a battle where both sides were at their best in all those areas.
 
Also thought of the Mule Shoe because the men on either side fought so stubbornly, but things didn't exactly go as planned. It was a close run affair initially, right after the Federal breakthrough, but the momentum broke down and ended in a stalemate after the Confederate counterattacks. The Federals couldn't organize a massed assault after being pushed out, other than piecemeal attacks. And, IIRC, Burnside's attack on the Mule Shoe's right flank was easily repulsed.

On the Confederate side, Ed Johnson's division was almost captured to a man and a lot of artillery was lost without firing a shot because, IIRC, Lee ordered that it be moved just prior to the Federal assault, only to send it back at the last moment. However, John B. Gordon, Robert E. Rodes and their troops did some of their best fighting counterattacking and holding the ground throughout the day.

Overall, though, it wasn't much more of a stalemate than the Wilderness.
 
This is an interesting thread but some responses have not addressed the original question of finest all around performance by both sides. Instead, some responses have been about a favorite all around performance by a specific commander, perhaps the poster's favorite commander.

Well, I'm no different.....

My favorite (and thus the "finest" :smile: )all around performance by a specific commander is Stuart's temporary corps command at Chancellorsville.

I will also nominate Stuart for the finest all around cavalry performance of the war during the retreat from Gettysburg. I will heartily agree that commanders like Forrest and Custer were inspiring and brave men who performed some fine mounted actions. But I believe no bold raid or heroic charge can rank as a finer, or more important, cavalry action than the fighting withdrawal from Gettysburg.
 
Yeah, kinda gotta agree. Jackson's Corps minus two top Leaders, under a new one from a different branch leading commands of two different branches, neither if which is in his field, plus under dog artillery and attacking and entrenched veteran foe supported by dug in artillery on ground of their own choosing.
Rebs don't stand a chance.
 
The implication being politics?

Not so much politics, as perhaps personal vendetta. After the failure of his Kentucky venture in the fall of 1862, Bragg was particularly spiteful towards those of his subordinate generals, like Breckinridge and Buckner, who he perceived to be part of the "Kentucky" contingent. The battle of Stones River was fought not long after Bragg's withdrawal from Kentucky.
 
Well, to my mind, it was more of a campaign instead of a single battle, but I'd have to say the first part of the Atlanta Campaign, before Johnston was replaced, was very evenly "matched" with each commander expertly using his strengths against his opponent's weaknesses. I am not implying that the ultimate outcome, the loss of Atlanta, would not still have been the result, but it would have been an interesting "what if" to play out. Just my "2-cents"...
 
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