Artillery Gettysburg 3d day

[Dick583]

I have a question. On the third day at Gettysburg Pickett's charge was preceded by a artillery barrage under Porter Alexander. It proved not very effective because it mostly fell too long. My question is why a part of the batteries were not placed in Gettysburg so that they could provide enfilading fire.

 

[Mark Roth]

I don't claim to be an expert, but I have not heard of Civil War era armies putting guns inside towns, except during sieges. There's just too much to go wrong for no real benefit, especially with little to no time to prepare emplacements

 

[rpkennedy]

I have a question. On the third day at Gettysburg Pickett's charge was preceded by a artillery barrage under Porter Alexander. It proved not very effective because it mostly fell too long. My question is why a part of the batteries were not placed in Gettysburg so that they could provide enfilading fire.

Due to line of sight issues, the number of guns in Gettysburg able to deploy and fire on Cemetery Hill was limited and would be completely dominated by the Union artillery on the hill facing north. It would have been suicidal. As an example of what happened when Confederate artillery deployed under the guns of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, look at Latimer's Battalion on Benner's Hill.

Ryan

 

[redbob]

I believe that space on the line was limited to the point that at least one battery (Hardaway's Alabama Battery) was firing their Whitworth guns from the position of where the Peace Monument is now.

 

[Larryh86GT]

Welcome to the forum.

 

[rpkennedy]

I believe that space on the line was limited to the point that at least one battery (Hardaway's Alabama Battery) was firing their Whitworth guns from the position of where the Peace Monument is now.

And those Whitworths were the only guns with the range to fire from the north and stay out of the range of the guns on Cemetery Hill. Unfortunately for the Confederates, there were only 2 of them.

Ryan

 

[mofederal]

Hello and welcome to the talk forum from Southeast Missouri located on the banks of the muddy Mississippi River.

 

[dixie1861]

Welcome!!!

 

[JOHN42768]

Welcome, enjoy

 

[FZ11]

I have a question. On the third day at Gettysburg Pickett's charge was preceded by a artillery barrage under Porter Alexander. It proved not very effective because it mostly fell too long. My question is why a part of the batteries were not placed in Gettysburg so that they could provide enfilading fire.

Good Question answered above. Alexander could have could have fired his 150 or so guns at better angles so as to partially enfilade the Federal position. I think Alexander fired mostly straight on.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

Good Question answered above. Alexander could have could have fired his 150 or so guns at better angles so as to partially enfilade the Federal position. I think Alexander fired mostly straight on.

Actually I think Alexander does a reasonably good job in a difficult position, his problems many. Specifically:

1) To the north of the aim point for his barrage is Cemetary Ridge. It is a good platform for the Union guns and Henry Hunt (the Union artillery commander and one of the best artillerists of the war) has noticed this. Therefore a significant number of Union batteries have been placed there. This limits enfilade fire from the north - as previously noted by rpkennedy.
2) To the south of the aim point is Little Round Top. There is a battery of rifled guns up there that effectively controls or at least hinders southern enfilade points. Terrain here is alo not optimum for enfilade fire from the south.
3) He (unlike Ewells artillery) has unfamiliar ammunition. It's not so much faulty as different to what they are used to. Worse, correct instruction in its use does not arrive until after the army has retreated.
4) There is a slightest of rises running between where the two (three) divisions will attack. This cuts line of sight in many places, further rendering enfilade fire difficult.
5) Pendleton starts meddling and removes some of the guns assigned him without telling him.
6) Pendleton (?) (at least it is claimed it was Pendleton) orders the ammunition trains to pull further back without telling anyone, fearing they will be under Union counter fire. That only Hancock's guns are engaging in counter battery fire (He overrides Hunt's orders on the six (?) batteries directly under his control) is apparently irrelevant.

 

[FZ11]

Oh! The Minutia! 1) No. RP's correct response is re the questioner's thought that the northern location of the town of Gettysburg would provide a better position for enfilade fire. That was answered above. The Lee/Alexander grand barrage is South of Gettysburg roughly across from the Federal positions on Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge. Alexander can position his guns on the Confederate rightmost position to fire on the Federal leftmost positions thus providing a better amount of angle/enfilade on the Federal leftmost position. He can do the same, firing from his left, toward the Federal right. Alexander fired more straight at the Federal position so his overs did not strike along the Federal position but beyond the Federal line. P.S. Hunt was THE best artillerist of the war. 2) That's Hazlett then Rittenhouse's guns. Alexander needs another battery to engage Hazlett/Rittenhouse. Excuse me,but Alexander's guns were north of Little Round Top.... soooo....they would be firing South not North as you state. 3) The Ammo was the Ammo. That's what they had to fire. Should have fired slightly in echelon to observe their first ammo strikes then corrected. 4) Not buyin' it! Alexander was a free moral agent to position his pieces so as not to fire into the dirt,don't you think? 5) Agree. 6)Agree. Not tryin' to beat up Alexander. Just makin' some points.

 

[Sgt.DedHed]

Possibly moving them north a bit and angling them. A southward swing would have exposed his right flank to enfilade.

 

[WJC]

Welcome! Thanks for making this interesting question your first post! Enjoy!

 

[mikeck]

Would there have been a concern about Union Cavalry in the vicinity of the actual town? I may be wrong but that town would be a bit to the rear of the far left if the Confederate flank. Union Cavalry was obviously near the battlefield and in fact ran into Stuart scouting the flanks.

Perhaps the Confederates felt that the risk of losing artillery to a Union cavalry force would not be worth the risk? Or worth the infantry detached to support?

Also, I'm not sure they would have had time to redeploy the artillery as well as the ammunition to that area.

I'm not sure if the juice was worth the squeeze. I would imagine if the Union was receiving truly effective fire from confederate batteries, they would have targeted them for counter battery fire anyway. Was no point in reality since the confederate guns were not particularly effective.

Just brainstorming

 

[WJC]

I believe Alexander addressed your questions in his memoirs.

The great criticism which I have to make on the artillery operations of the day is upon the inaction of the artillery of Ewell's corps. Our position on the exterior line... placed us under many & serious disadvantages. But it gave us one single advantage. It enabled us to enfilade any of the enemy's positions, near the center of their line, with our artillery fire. Now a battery established where it can enfilade others need not trouble itself about aim. It has only to fire in the right direction & the shot finds something to hurt wherever it falls. No troops, infantry or artillery, can long submit to enfilade fire. But, both the infantry & artillery lines which we were to attack could have been enfiladed from somewhere in our lines near Gettysburg.​

He goes on to say:

I never had an idea of the possibility of this being done at the time, for I had but the vaguest notion of where Ewell's corps was. And Ewell's chief doubtless had as vague ideas of my situation & necessities. But Gen. Lee's chief should have known, & given every possible energy to improve the rare & great chance to the very utmost. Only one of Ewell's five fine battalions... participated in our bombardment at all. It only fired a few dozen shots, for, apparently, it could not see what it was doing. But every shot was smashing up something, &, had it been increased & kept up, it is hard to say what might have resulted.​

<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.), p. 251.>

 

[FZ11]

I believe Alexander addressed your questions in his memoirs.

The great criticism which I have to make on the artillery operations of the day is upon the inaction of the artillery of Ewell's corps. Our position on the exterior line... placed us under many & serious disadvantages. But it gave us one single advantage. It enabled us to enfilade any of the enemy's positions, near the center of their line, with our artillery fire. Now a battery established where it can enfilade others need not trouble itself about aim. It has only to fire in the right direction & the shot finds something to hurt wherever it falls. No troops, infantry or artillery, can long submit to enfilade fire. But, both the infantry & artillery lines which we were to attack could have been enfiladed from somewhere in our lines near Gettysburg.​

He goes on to say:

I never had an idea of the possibility of this being done at the time, for I had but the vaguest notion of where Ewell's corps was. And Ewell's chief doubtless had as vague ideas of my situation & necessities. But Gen. Lee's chief should have known, & given every possible energy to improve the rare & great chance to the very utmost. Only one of Ewell's five fine battalions... participated in our bombardment at all. It only fired a few dozen shots, for, apparently, it could not see what it was doing. But every shot was smashing up something, &, had it been increased & kept up, it is hard to say what might have resulted.​

<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.), p. 251.>

Excellent research. Thanks!

 

[James N.]

Welcome to the forums from the host of the Stonewall Jackson Forum, and like Old Jack another artillery enthusiast!

 

[mikeck]

Excellent research. Thanks!

Wow..very intersri

I believe Alexander addressed your questions in his memoirs.

The great criticism which I have to make on the artillery operations of the day is upon the inaction of the artillery of Ewell's corps. Our position on the exterior line... placed us under many & serious disadvantages. But it gave us one single advantage. It enabled us to enfilade any of the enemy's positions, near the center of their line, with our artillery fire. Now a battery established where it can enfilade others need not trouble itself about aim. It has only to fire in the right direction & the shot finds something to hurt wherever it falls. No troops, infantry or artillery, can long submit to enfilade fire. But, both the infantry & artillery lines which we were to attack could have been enfiladed from somewhere in our lines near Gettysburg.​

He goes on to say:

I never had an idea of the possibility of this being done at the time, for I had but the vaguest notion of where Ewell's corps was. And Ewell's chief doubtless had as vague ideas of my situation & necessities. But Gen. Lee's chief should have known, & given every possible energy to improve the rare & great chance to the very utmost. Only one of Ewell's five fine battalions... participated in our bombardment at all. It only fired a few dozen shots, for, apparently, it could not see what it was doing. But every shot was smashing up something, &, had it been increased & kept up, it is hard to say what might have resulted.​

<Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.), p. 251.>

Wow...that's interesting. Trying to visualize the map in my head, I guess I didn't realize that Ewells Corp was far enough north to visually direct enfillade Fire. That makes sense though and Lee's army learned what the AoP had learned (and would continue to repeatedly): coordinating combined arms attacks on a fixed enemy position is complicated

 

[WJC]

Wow..very intersri


Wow...that's interesting. Trying to visualize the map in my head, I guess I didn't realize that Ewells Corp was far enough north to visually direct enfillade Fire. That makes sense though and Lee's army learned what the AoP had learned (and would continue to repeatedly): coordinating combined arms attacks on a fixed enemy position is complicated

Thanks for your response.
Remember that this was a conclusion he came to after visiting Gettysburg years after the battle. Like anyone involved in battle, at the time he had a very narrow focus.
He later points out his belief- again after visiting the battlefield- that the attack should have been made on the "bend of the fishhook just west of Gettysburg" where "assaulting lines cannot be enfiladed, and, on the other hand the places selected for assault may be enfiladed, & upon shorter ranges than any other parts of the Federal lines." <Gary W. Gallagher, Editor, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander.(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.), p. 252.>
This is my favorite book on the Civil War. I highly recommend it.