Discussion "Aim Low" - Why?

I don't know. I think the shot/kill and wound ratios would be very hard to compare and qualify. I just know there were bodies piled on top of each other several layers deep in many of these CW battles. The carnage during the Revolution was bad but it became obscene during the Civil War. I think of Cleburne's or Cheatham's men. Pickett's Mill, Kennesaw Mtn. dead angle, Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh etc.
In some cases we have numbers and can establish an upper bound for hit rate, by assuming all wounding casualties (WIA or KIA) came from small arms fire (i.e. we assume that no casualties resulted from artillery). The result tends to be one in 150 to one in 200 small arms rounds fired resulted in a wounding or killing hit.

That's Gettysburg and Stones River, specifically.


This should not actually be surprising. The number of casualties is high because the number of people fighting is large, but the amount of training that took place is quite minor. If you had the kind of hit rates that could be managed with rifles in contemporary battles (Inkerman) at greater ranges (typical ranges at Inkerman being much greater than the ~100-150 maximum ranges of most Civil War firefights) then you'd see ten times the casualty rate from the same number of rounds fired meaning that battles would be much shorter.


At battles like Waterloo, meanwhile, there were extremely large numbers of dead and wounded with smoothbore muskets - and at battles like the Horns of Hattin, there were large numbers of dead from melee weapons. The ability of men to kill on the field has never been in dispute in battles, the question is hit rate, rate of fire and range at which those can be achieved.
 
The main difference between the napoleonic battles and Civil War battles were the weapons used. The tactics seem very similar. The rifle could cause casualties at a much greater distance than the musket. The same could be said about the artillery used. The main arguement is whether the distant casualties were caused by marksmanship or accident, given the poor training in marksmanship. During the Crimean battles, Alma and Inkerman, the British skirmishing troops were credited with individual targeting out to 600 yards, which is what they were trained to do. The line fire was equally ranged by both Brits and French which totally outranged the Russian smoothbores.

It is also true that visibility has a role to play in this ranging as volley fire does produce much smoke and some of the battles were in close country. When this is the case, the main casualty count will be within seeing distance. The rifle round also produced more horrific wounds than ball.

I have read some authors who claim that a rifle with bayonet fixed was impossible to load. This is a load of ... as bayonets were usually fixed long before the enemy was within range. More difficult - maybe. I have also seen paintings showing men loading (with bayonet fixed) within 10 yards of the enemy in the attack - but then the artist was rarely there.
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The general rule was final volley (under 100yards) and IN with the bayonet and butt while the opposition was still reeling - VERY napoleonic.
 
The main arguement is whether the distant casualties were caused by marksmanship or accident, given the poor training in marksmanship.
I'm not sure many distant casualties happened full stop! There were certainly sharpshooters, but this happened in the Napoleonic Wars too (Wellington had plenty of rifles) and the open-fire range from non-sharpshooters is pretty short even in good situations for it - and at times when line formations give fire at longer ranges, it's of little consequence. On one occasion (from memory) a line regiment gives fire at long range, exhausts their ammunition and retires, and their targets don't appear to have noticed.

There are exceptions, mostly Cleburne's men, who did give effective long-range fire and seemed to their Union opponents in the engagement in question to be many times stronger than they were.
 
I suppose it all hangs on what we call 'distant'. The artillery would usually be used to cause those casualties, as in napoleonic warfare. It does seem that the two sides did not make the most of their rifles.
 
I would tend to make the following definition:

Very close range firing - within 20 yards or so, essentially part of an "assault" action where the sides happen to be shooting instead of stabbing. At this range you could close all the remaining distance at a walk before your enemy has finished reloading, you're in easy bayonet charge range.

Close range musketry - within about 100-150 yards, similar to the Napoleonic Wars. This is "point blank" range where the performance of a smoothbore (percussion) musket is basically the same as a rifle and you don't need to account for bullet drop as a levelled musket will strike regardless.

Long range musketry - anything outside that. With a rifle-musket and the appropriate training you can reach out to about 600-900 yards, though it's obviously easier to fire on formed troops than individuals in skirmish formation.


To my understanding, even men armed with rifles in the ACW tended to consider close range musketry the longest range, and it is a long way if you're looking at someone on the other side of it. The exception is "sharpshooters".
 
Looking at this from the outside, that is the impression I have got, that the 'musketry' was no advance over the smoothbore days. Sure they had sharpshootes too, but they seem to have had specialist weapons, including Whitworths, not the issue rifle. I appreciate there was a lack of instruction - and instructors - in the early days, the emphasis being on drills and the battle in line, but it never seems to get any better.
 
This is probably for systemic reasons. Musketry training for long range firing is hard and you need to teach skills such as range estimation, but this is something that not every European army realized (the French had a rule-of-thumb system, the Austrians didn't work it out, nor did the Russians, but the British did and the Prussians got it during the Civil War timeframe) and the US Army's pre-war role and experiences gave them neither the numbers nor the need to do any of the intellectual working-out required. And the drill book they used was pre-rifle.

Then - well, it's not in the drill book, it's not something that's "known information", there's no way for the knowledge to be disseminated army-wide and it's bloody hard to even notice the lack because it's a lack of something new. You simply don't notice there's anything there to be missing, and neither side had strong enough drivers to make the improvement.

(Though I've sometimes thought that if only one army imported the Hythe method over a winter period, then that army would win the Civil War that summer.)
 
This is probably for systemic reasons. Musketry training for long range firing is hard and you need to teach skills such as range estimation, but this is something that not every European army realized (the French had a rule-of-thumb system, the Austrians didn't work it out, nor did the Russians, but the British did and the Prussians got it during the Civil War timeframe) and the US Army's pre-war role and experiences gave them neither the numbers nor the need to do any of the intellectual working-out required. And the drill book they used was pre-rifle.

Then - well, it's not in the drill book, it's not something that's "known information", there's no way for the knowledge to be disseminated army-wide and it's bloody hard to even notice the lack because it's a lack of something new. You simply don't notice there's anything there to be missing, and neither side had strong enough drivers to make the improvement.

(Though I've sometimes thought that if only one army imported the Hythe method over a winter period, then that army would win the Civil War that summer.)
Both sides in the Difference of Opinion had copies of the French and British training manuals, had officers who had seen it done and could have printed and issued thousands of them. Not to mention that the press reported widely and in detail the methods. At least one Union General had done the course as a common soldier in the British army.
 
Both sides in the Difference of Opinion had copies of the French and British training manuals, had officers who had seen it done and could have printed and issued thousands of them. Not to mention that the press reported widely and in detail the methods. At least one Union General had done the course as a common soldier in the British army.
I wasn't aware that the press reported the Hythe method widely and in detail? And I know that many Union soldiers would have done the course, the issue is that it's something where there's no existing mechanism for it to be distributed army-wide. You need to make one.
 
Both sides in the Difference of Opinion had copies of the French and British training manuals, had officers who had seen it done and could have printed and issued thousands of them. Not to mention that the press reported widely and in detail the methods. At least one Union General had done the course as a common soldier in the British army.
It wasn't that but the fact they didn't have the TIME to do all the training. It was hard enough getting enough men together. 1861 was a bad year for the Union in the East - they were not expecting a 'rapid response'.
 
It wasn't that but the fact they didn't have the TIME to do all the training. It was hard enough getting enough men together. 1861 was a bad year for the Union in the East - they were not expecting a 'rapid response'.
I don't think this works - the musketry training didn't get inculcated over the winter either, despite a period of months during which Training Was Happening.
 
Given the existing infrastructure was taken up supplying the army in the field withdrawing troops to train centrally was not an option. But training instructors and sending them out to train instructors within the units was possible and the manuals could have been printed and disseminated. Not initially to train all infantrymen of course but at least a support company in each regiment to act not as snipers per se but with sufficient training and skill to act in lieu of light artillery thus keeping enemy guns and cavalry at a distance. The Indian and Crimean experience showed that was the most effective use of superior long range rifle musket fire when supporting musket armed troops, notwithstanding reports of skilled individuals picking off individual targets.
 
@yulzari - can I request a citation of the Hythe method being explained in detail in a contemporary newspaper, as mentioned? That's new information to me.


Given the existing infrastructure was taken up supplying the army in the field withdrawing troops to train centrally was not an option.
Nor was that necessary in the British Army. At Hythe they trained teachers, and found no difficulty in training the men.
 
When shooting skeet it's better to over lead a bit as the clay bird may fly into the tailend of the shot string and you get a hit. If you shoot behind the clay bird you will miss every time. Shoot high you miss, shoot low you have a chance to hit something perhaps with the round bouncing off the ground for a hit.
 
It wasn't that but the fact they didn't have the TIME to do all the training. It was hard enough getting enough men together. 1861 was a bad year for the Union in the East - they were not expecting a 'rapid response'.
They had all the time they needed. Maybe not before their first fight in 1861, but between campaigns there where sometimes month of downtime.
 
When shooting skeet it's better to over lead a bit as the clay bird may fly into the tailend of the shot string and you get a hit. If you shoot behind the clay bird you will miss every time. Shoot high you miss, shoot low you have a chance to hit something perhaps with the round bouncing off the ground for a hit.
Battle is not a clay bird shoot. The opposition fire back.
 
@yulzari - can I request a citation of the Hythe method being explained in detail in a contemporary newspaper, as mentioned? That's new information to me.



Nor was that necessary in the British Army. At Hythe they trained teachers, and found no difficulty in training the men.
I cannot comment upon the American press but the Times was commonly taken by the major American press as a source of news as were the other major British and French ones. The manual went with the school and was a public document and one should note that Vincennes pre dated Hythe and the French manual and system were reported in both the French and British press and copies of both manuals were given to the US military. None of this was secret.
 
I cannot comment upon the American press but the Times was commonly taken by the major American press as a source of news as were the other major British and French ones. The manual went with the school and was a public document and one should note that Vincennes pre dated Hythe and the French manual and system were reported in both the French and British press and copies of both manuals were given to the US military. None of this was secret.
It may not have been secret, but there's a world of difference between "US newspapers are talking about this training method in great detail" and "this was reported in foreign newspapers as something they say is really good". A groundswell of press support for the method in the US is exactly the kind of thing to breach the Not Invented Here barrier, while it being a thing the British were talking about years ago is not.

I'd taken you to mean the US press was doing this.
 

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