Advancing While Firing

[Zack]

I was rewatching the Lionheart Filmwork's project No Retreat From Destiny on YouTube and noticed that when Confederate soldiers are advancing and firing the front rank passes the just discharged rifle to the man behind him who hands forward a loaded gun.

I know this was a practice when soldiers were stationary and in a prepared position (as at Fredericksburg), but is there any evidence to suggest this was a practice while the unit was actively advancing? Or, for that matter, engaging in a firefight from a not-prepared position?

BTW If you haven't checked out No Retreat From Destiny you absolutely should. It's currently on YouTube in its entirety.

 

[RedRover]

I have not seen reference to this, but cannot say it was not done, but as you mention it was not part of a particular drill manual. That said, for the advancing reenactors in the picture, it certainly was safer than having the rear rankers firing too!

However, firing advancing in close order was occasionally practiced during the war. At Chickamauga the history of the 124th Ohio notes on September 19 the attack of Johnson's division, McCook's corps; in column of regiments; the front regiment fired and fell to the ground to reload, "while the next regiment rushes over them only to repeat what those had done who had gone before." [Lewis, 1894, 59-60.]

Next, from "Steedman and his men at Chickamauga" is mentioned that after Steedman's division attacked the Confederate far left at the Horseshoe Ridge on the afternoon of Sept. 20, the Confederates of Patton Anderson's brigade, and Bushrod Johnson's Division, etc. attacked them over the broken and wooded ground in columns, sometimes up to eight lines deep, and the front rank would fire, fall to the ground to reload, and the rear ranks would bound over them to fire and drop as they in turn were passed…

This seems like a blending of the close-order drill of the time (the men in ranks, columns, etc.), with the "skirmish drill" in which the men were trained to fire and take cover to reload, etc., while their comrades advanced beyond them, etc. General Sherman says this was standard by 1864:

"Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoevring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and of every cover." [Sherman, Memoirs, 394.]

 

[Old Soldier]

It was practiced by light infantry and rifle regiments from the start - the origin of 'fire and movement'. This was especially in woods and 'close country' where the standard line formations could not be used. It was practised and developed during the American Wars and the Revolution. It took time and developed through hard experience. It was not considered as 'real' fighting by regular army staff - merely 'skirmishing' - and this thought was common thoughout Europe and the Americas.

In the set battle - fought to the existing rules on selected ground - it was not a practical consideration over open ground. You have to remember that these formations were organised in companies (100 men) as a minimum formation, their rifles were muzzle-loaders - one shot, followed by a reload (never practised on the move) - and in close formation, hence the 'volley and charge with bayonet' drills. Once they had battle experience, it could be used, as described above. It needed a lot of experience, control, discipline - and nerve, by those participating.

It was slightly different for cavalry but there was still the movement - usually flanking - with a (carbine) volley followed by 'draw sword and charge'. US cavalry were different from European cavalry as they tended to use the carbine and pistol a lot more, over longer ranges and were more likely to have a breech-loader/revolver. Many operated as mounted infanty too - much looser formations which could make use of 'fire and movement' like light infantry - but faster over the ground.

Fire and movement was a tactic of many small armies, particularly well-equipped partisans. In regular armies, the lessons learned from combat were often ignored or forgotten in peacetime. The tactical use of smaller (platoon) units as a central theme for training was first practiced by the British Army after the hard lessons learned during the South African War (1899-1901). Most other armies still relied on the company. These all tended to dissolve into section units (10-15 men) from 1916 onwards on the Western Front.

 

[1SGDan]

From my series on the Tullahoma Campaign

Letters Not Written in Blood - The Tullahoma Campaign | South & Western Theaters

The Fight Continues – Liberty Gap June 25th and 26th On the morning of the 25th the Confederate commander was preparing to renew the fight that would stall the Union troops in the Gap. To accomplish his role in the plan as he understood it Cleburne reinforced Liddell with three regiments and...

civilwartalk.com

The 49th Ohio advanced from its reserve position in four ranks and used "advanced firing"* to move the Confederates from their protected position. The 49th was joined by the 77th Pennsylvania and 79th Illinois to drive the Confederates back to their original line. *

*Advanced firing is a technique that allows a regiment to move forward while at the same time provide maximum sustained firepower. The regiment is formed and four ranks and the front rank fires and then is passed by the other three. The process is repeated until the first rank again moves to the front after reloading.

 

[JerryD]

I know from reading accounts of the Battle of Pratt Street, otherwise known as the Baltimore riot in April 1861, the troops after they came under fire were ordered to trail arms and run and load at the same time.

 

[Dan Kohli]

I think this might be a good time to read the period infantry manuals. I will be looking at Casey's.

 

[Zack]

Figured I might link it out - here's a cued link to what I'm describing of passing rifles between ranks during an advance. You can see it most clearly with the guy just to the right of the flagbearer. It can be seen again at 54:50

 

[Rhea Cole]

General Willich of the Army of the Cumberland served 20 years in the Prussian Army. During his academy days, Clausewitz was the commandant. He fought in both the revolt vs Prussian king & the Paris uprising. In Paris, his second in command was Karl Marx. Marks & Engles broke with Willich because he was too radical.

Willich was the editor of a German language News Paper. He volunteered & became a grneral. While sitting in Libby Prison awaiting exchange, he came up with a continuous fire drill.

The commands were given in German. Imagine a brigade front, four ranks deep. Each file of four is spaced far enough apart to let a man pass. The man in the rear passes forward to the head of the file & fires. As he reloads, #4 steps in front of him & fires… etc., etc. on the opening day of the Tullahoma Campaign, the opposing CSA infantry was dumbfounded at the steady rolling fire as it advanced on them. At Chickamauga, Willich's continuous fire was successfully used in a withdrawal.

 

[Old Soldier]

Imagine a brigade front, four ranks deep. Each file of four is spaced far enough apart to let a man pass. The man in the rear passes forward to the head of the file & fires. As he reloads, #4 steps in front of him & fires… etc., etc.

That is still within the drills and organisation of line infantry and would have been done on a regiment basis at least and would require a lot of manpower. I would call it 'Advancing the Line through fire' (a la 'Zulu') rather than 'fire and movement' or even 'continuous fire' - mainly because the first rank to fire would have to have enough time to reload AND move forward - ie a volley every 30 seconds. Equally, in order for the following ranks to pass through, the line would have to be 'double spaced' (arms length) apart which, although it would increase the length covered, would reduce the volume of fire and make it vulnerable to a close order attack.

As for trailing arms and reloading on the march - again - try it! Bullets whistling around you and crossing broken ground and bodies. Easier said than done

I do not doubt that both were used, and used effectively, but either tactic would have to be organised by a very confident and plausible officer (Willich) and subordinates, officers who were to go against established proceedure and able justify it to higher command (or hide it from them!) - and practiced by the unit until second nature.

 

[Rhea Cole]

From my series on the Tullahoma Campaign

Letters Not Written in Blood - The Tullahoma Campaign | South & Western Theaters

The Fight Continues – Liberty Gap June 25th and 26th On the morning of the 25th the Confederate commander was preparing to renew the fight that would stall the Union troops in the Gap. To accomplish his role in the plan as he understood it Cleburne reinforced Liddell with three regiments and...

civilwartalk.com

The 49th Ohio advanced from its reserve position in four ranks and used "advanced firing"* to move the Confederates from their protected position. The 49th was joined by the 77th Pennsylvania and 79th Illinois to drive the Confederates back to their original line. *

*Advanced firing is a technique that allows a regiment to move forward while at the same time provide maximum sustained firepower. The regiment is formed and four ranks and the front rank fires and then is passed by the other three. The process is repeated until the first rank again moves to the front after reloading.

The advance by fire drill was an innovative technique developed by Gen Willich. The fourth man in the file advanced & fired. As he reloaded, the last man in the file stepped forward until the first man was in the rear rank from which he steppe d forward etc., etc.

 

[unionblue]

From my series on the Tullahoma Campaign

Letters Not Written in Blood - The Tullahoma Campaign | South & Western Theaters

The Fight Continues – Liberty Gap June 25th and 26th On the morning of the 25th the Confederate commander was preparing to renew the fight that would stall the Union troops in the Gap. To accomplish his role in the plan as he understood it Cleburne reinforced Liddell with three regiments and...

civilwartalk.com

The 49th Ohio advanced from its reserve position in four ranks and used "advanced firing"* to move the Confederates from their protected position. The 49th was joined by the 77th Pennsylvania and 79th Illinois to drive the Confederates back to their original line. *

*Advanced firing is a technique that allows a regiment to move forward while at the same time provide maximum sustained firepower. The regiment is formed and four ranks and the front rank fires and then is passed by the other three. The process is repeated until the first rank again moves to the front after reloading.

@1SGDan ,

I was a member of the 49th Ohio (Reenacted) back in the day, and we loved doing this maneuver during reenactments. Our Confederate counterparts always remarked how surprised they were when thinking our line was 'empty' after firing a volley, rising up only to be given another full volley so quickly! Great technique we enjoyed recreating.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

 

[RedRover]

From my series on the Tullahoma Campaign

Letters Not Written in Blood - The Tullahoma Campaign | South & Western Theaters

The Fight Continues – Liberty Gap June 25th and 26th On the morning of the 25th the Confederate commander was preparing to renew the fight that would stall the Union troops in the Gap. To accomplish his role in the plan as he understood it Cleburne reinforced Liddell with three regiments and...

civilwartalk.com

The 49th Ohio advanced from its reserve position in four ranks and used "advanced firing"* to move the Confederates from their protected position. The 49th was joined by the 77th Pennsylvania and 79th Illinois to drive the Confederates back to their original line. *

*Advanced firing is a technique that allows a regiment to move forward while at the same time provide maximum sustained firepower. The regiment is formed and four ranks and the front rank fires and then is passed by the other three. The process is repeated until the first rank again moves to the front after reloading.

Some credited Gen. August Willich of the US Army of developing this as a specific tactic in the west.

(from Porter, Lorle, "A People Set Apart..." 1999).


the 125th Ohio used this tactic at Chickamauga, note that the four-ranks were made by doubling up the files, leaving an interval between them through which the men passed...

From 125th Ohio history, 1895.

In the book "Gateway to the Confederacy" the authors state that after General Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland he ordered Willich's tactics abandoned (at least at drill), and Casey's regulation resorted to, etc., and in action, as Sherman notes, at least as regards the initial deployments.

 

[thomas aagaard]

the 4 ranks system is basically just going back to how things was done in in the 17th century and in some armies into the early 18th, where you had to do this slower more complex system to keep up a steady rate of firing.
But as the rate of fire became higher (going from matchlocks to flintlock, from bandoliers to paper cartridges, from wood ramrods to steel ramrods) this system with often 6+ ranks was dropped and first 4 ranks, then for for more than 100 years 3 ranks became the norm.(in the drill books anyway) and then two ranks.

No question that this system can work, with well trained men.
But the reason you don't find a lot of this in the acw drill books, is because a battalion is suppose to be doing one thing only. It can be moving (screened by its skirmishers) or it can be firing.

If we look in both scotts old Evolution of the line for brigade tactics and in casey's vol 3 then we find the examples of "fire and movement" for close ordered formations.
One is "to retreat by alternate battalions" where half your battalions face to the rear and then move "forward" (so away from the enemy) then after the relevant distance turn around and open fire. And the other battalions then retreat the same way.

The important point is the fact that the battalion is the main tactical unit.

What we see in some European armies (including the prussian) is that the company (of 200-250men) is the main tactical unit.
That fire and movement is done in close order with one company firing and another moving. But also that it can be done within the company. with haft the 4 platoons firing and the other half moving. (and you can also go down to the platoon level)

But just as important. By 1850 the "german" skirmish line is much heavier than the French one we see in acw drill books. The, by the book, danish one got is about 2½ time the men pr. distance of front than an (by the book) American one.
And this heavy skirmish line is suppose to do the bulk of the fighting. 25%-50% of a company would be in the skirmishline, the rest some distance behind ready to provide support or replace the skirmishline when they need a break.
So Willich did have some clear examples of other ways to attack from his "German" military experience. And then did some good work putting both this experience and his knowledge of the specific condition in north America to good use.

 

[Old Soldier]

The basic firing line was 4 deep. Wellington was throwing caution to the wind at Waterloo, when he ordered his line infantry to be just 2 ranks deep. It certainly increased firepower for the first two volleys! However - the 'square' still relied on 4 ranks - two kneeling and standing with bayonets - to keep the cavalry at bay (a la pike) and the rear two ranks firing through them.

The basic tactics were the same until the introduction of breech-loading weapons - as the Austro-Hungarians found out the hard way at Königgrätz in 1866, as the Prussians had their Dreyse needle guns - and the Austrians their muzzle-loading Lorenz rifles - each with tactics to suit their weapons - Austrians had to stand up after each shot to reload their rifles! (This was their drill - and their first encounter with an enemy with breech-loading rifles as general issue) In the centre the Prussians routed 38 out of 49 infantry battalions of four Austrian corps! Neither artillery nor cavalry provided direct support to the Prussian infantry as they were on wooded land - ideal for their breech-loading tactics - despite being outnumbered. (Prussian losses - 9,172 (dead, wounded, missing, PoW). Austrian losses - 44,000 (dead, wounded, missing) plus 22,170 PoW)

If combat is a hard lesson, defeat is an excellent teacher. If you do not adapt and adopt - you will never win. The British army adopted the Snider breech-loader conversions in 1866, the French began issuing the Chassepot in 1866 and converting older rifles to a 'snider-type' action and Austro-Hungary started the issue of the Werndl–Holub in 1867.

 

[thomas aagaard]

The basic firing line was 4 deep. Wellington was throwing caution to the wind at Waterloo, when he ordered his line infantry to be just 2 ranks deep. It certainly increased firepower for the first two volleys!

You got that the wrong way around.

The British drill was for 3 ranks. not 4.
But by the mid 18th century we start to se only two ranks used. And Wellington used two ranks true out the war in Spain.
(the same was usually the case during the 18thy century wars in north america)

At Waterloo the British did deploy in 4 ranks. But this was because the battlefield was very very small compared to the number of troops. And yes, it also helped make it quicker to form a 4 deep square.

The basic tactics were the same until the introduction of breech-loading weapons - as the Austro-Hungarians found out the hard way at Königgrätz in 1866, as the Prussians had their Dreyse needle guns - and the Austrians their muzzle-loading Lorenz rifles - each with tactics to suit their weapons

Austrian tactics where in no way tactics that suited their weapon.
They had arguably the best rifle musket in general use. And it that had a very clear advantage over the Dreyse when firing at more than 200yards. But it require soldiers trained in marksmenship to use this advantage.

In Italy in 1859 they did have tactics that was suited for it. Based on firepower from the infantry line.
But after the war was lost, they concluded that simply using the Lorenz as a glorified bayonet holder was a better solution. It was also much cheaper, since there would be no real need for marksmanship training.

The Prussians did have tactics that was perfect for their gun.
(A gun that got an effective range that is not that much better than a smoothbore musket.)
But their Heavy skirmish lines could devastate attack columns at less than 100-150 yards. And Austrian (and to some extent Danish in 1864) tactics played right into their hands.

Had Prussia ended up in a war against the brits, they would have been in trouble. Since British infantry could deliver effective fire at 400+ yards. And the Prussians would have to get within 200. And this was something that they very well knew.

 

[Old Soldier]

Austrian tactics where in no way tactics that suited their weapon.
They had arguably the best rifle musket in general use. And it that had a very clear advantage over the Dreyse when firing at more than 200yards. But it require soldiers trained in marksmenship to use this advantage.

But that was the point. Like the early years of the Civil War, they either did not have this training or no opportunity to use it. The generals did not have the expertice either. They still used the line as their basic formation - but had no similar targets presented to them! The Prussians had the practice and experience in their weapons and tactics earlier against similar opposition and knew what to expect from them - they stayed in that wood - they were just the advance guard holding a bridgehead. The Austrians went in after them instead of luring them out, flanking them, or waiting for the main force to arrive (Lack of information? Impatience?). There was a successful flanking attack, but they did not press the advantage - as they should have done. Any late flanking movement was hammered by the arrival of the main force (like Waterloo and Bluecher). There was also some very decisive actions made by the Prussians at regimental level too in both the advance guard and the main force.

As it was, the Austrian artillery out-ranged the Prussian's and their cavalry was considered superior too. Did the Austrian generals bother with the reports they must have had from the Danish wars? This defeat was not just through the weapons and tactics, but the training, tactical thinking and command structure of the general staff. The guys in the firing line just paid for their mistakes. The same could be said about the battles at the start of the Civil War.

BTW - Austro-Hungary did not sign the Geneva Convention (1864) so their medical staff were considered combatants and retreated with the army - leaving thousands of wounded on the battlefield to die of their wounds.