Same battle. (Fair Oaks is a railroad station slightly to the north of Seven Pines crossroads.) Longstreet was apparently at fault for changing his marching orders; he advanced on the Williamsburg Road, rather than on the Nine Mile Road as planned by Joe Johnston. Changing the route delayed Huger's Division from its assigned role, thereby diminishing the Confederate assault on General Keyes' IV Corps at Seven Pines. Longstreet was technically overseeing the Right Wing, which included D.H. Hill and Benjamin Huger's Divisions. So Longstreet was in a superior position to cast blame elsewhere for the coordination screw-up.Doesn't Fair Oaks and Seven Lines refer to the same battle? Another question is did Longstreet blame Huger for his own mistake?
John
One thing I don't like about these counter factuals is that they raise all sorts of issues about what variables you include or ignore. For example - as it was the attack pretty much did "destroy" the IV Corps but the two divisions of the III Corps were back from the point of attack and from Couch , so who knows how that would have played out. And what "command of the field" would have meant is an ambiguous proposition. FWIW, in his report Johnston stated only "Had Major-General Huger’s division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes’ corps would have been destroyed.” It's also worth keeping in mind that the Federal left was a "defense in depth" in the sense of having successive division linesSame battle. (Fair Oaks is a railroad station slightly to the north of Seven Pines crossroads.) Longstreet was apparently at fault for changing his marching orders; he advanced on the Williamsburg Road, rather than on the Nine Mile Road as planned by Joe Johnston. Changing the route delayed Huger's Division from its assigned role, thereby diminishing the Confederate assault on General Keyes' IV Corps at Seven Pines. Longstreet was technically overseeing the Right Wing, which included D.H. Hill and Benjamin Huger's Divisions. So Longstreet was in a superior position to cast blame elsewhere for the coordination screw-up.
Good point about the defense in depth. I do think Huger was unfairly blamed and that if he had been able to attack as planned there was a small chance for success.One thing I don't like about these counter factuals is that they raise all sorts of issues about what variables you include or ignore. For example - as it was the attack pretty much did "destroy" the IV Corps but the two divisions of the III Corps were back from the point of attack and from Couch , so who knows how that would have played out. And what "command of the field" would have meant is an ambiguous proposition. FWIW, in his report Johnston stated only "Had Major-General Huger’s division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes’ corps would have been destroyed.” It's also worth keeping in mind that the Federal left was a "defense in depth" in the sense of having successive division lines
Good points, exacerbated by Johnston giving verbal orders to Longstreet and ambiguous written orders to others. His plan was already complex by definition and his sloppy approach to issuing orders pretty much ensured confusion.Longstreet may have tried to disregard his own responsibility, but Seven Pines/Fair Oaks once again shows that the ability of CW armies to properly execute battle plans, to effectively coordinate brigades and divisions, and to communicate orders and instructions promptly and faithfully was beyond the capacity of many commanders, particularly that early in the war. (Not that things improved all that well later on either.)