A musing

[Elennsar]

If Lee and Grant had fought it out in the open field - would Grant have been able to (assuming his subordinates had done as he wished in terms of attacking, or at least as far as that can be reasonably expected - Burnside rising to the occasion seems rather more unlikely than say, Warren doing so) - would he have been able to take crush Lee with the armies the two had as of the Wilderness?

Lee is outnumbered roughly two to one - but would he be decisively crushed? That's a question I'm not sure on.

What could have happened? If Lee was simply pinned to the Richmond defenses earlier, that might shave a few months off the war - but I'm not entirely sure.

 

[ole]

In pinning Lee to Petersburg, Grant had him exactly where Grant wanted him.

I don't think Lee would have been quite so pushable pre-Gettysburg, so Grant's great skill is somewhat diminished by the condition of his opponent. But then, Grant was Grant -- he'd have tried the same thing even if Lee had equal numbers and supplies.

And that brings up a corollary what if: the open field. Like Antietam? Grant wouldn't have fed troops in piece-meal; he'd have loosed the dogs of war -- all of them.

 

[captainrlm]

I thought Lee had a quote like "The last thing we want is a siege, because if it gets to that, it's only a matter of time" yet his forces were still forced into a siege instead of open warfare.

What I am not sure of is why did it end up being a siege anyway? Was it because Grant got to Petersburg and threatened that important city, so the Confederates had to "circle the wagons" there and try to fight to the end?

Or did the Confederates (Lee) make a conscious decision on thier own choosing that convinced Grant to lay a siege to them?

I'm not familiare enough with all the tactical operations that led to the siege to even guess at that, but I admit I've never thought to ask that question until I read this thread.

 

[Elennsar]

And that brings up a corollary what if: the open field. Like Antietam? Grant wouldn't have fed troops in piece-meal; he'd have loosed the dogs of war -- all of them.

Yes, somewhere like Antietam. Somewhere without entrenchments or meaningful obstacles to manuevering large bodies of troops.

I'm not sure if Grant would have been able to (with no offense to Grant - its my opinion that doing this sort of thing is just really, really tough) shatter Lee's army so completely that it would be surrender time.

What I am not sure of is why did it end up being a siege anyway? Was it because Grant got to Petersburg and threatened that important city, so the Confederates had to "circle the wagons" there and try to fight to the end?

I'm not familiar enough to say with confidence - but I think that's the case. Lee was better off the further he was from being pinned down defending Richmond and Petersburg (plain and simple, even if he could remain supplied, it was not the best use of his army).

 

[footeghost]

I believe Gen Lee knew if his armies could not at least cause a negotiation early thus his successes early against men he knew were his inferiors to him in battle at least that the war would eventully be lost. Grant I don't know if he was Lee's equal in some ways, but Lee had to know in finaly facing Grant, the recources etc himself knowing this General would never quit untill the job was done period. I feel Lee as Elennsar said did not in the end use his forces as best he could have. Waging a Gurrilla type of tactics spreading his people out would have been better. What Grant had I think over Lee besides everything was victory at ANY cost whatever it took and a mandate from Lincoln to do so. What a burden he must have lived through, a great man.

 

[johan_steele]

IMO Lee did everything he could to avoid an open battle where Grant could bring his superior Arty to bear. He knew first hand the effect of that arty and had learned the lesson well... he had also taught it at Fredricksburg.

Lee also knew the effect of guerrilla warfare, he had been an instructor and knew how the US military had won every guerrilla war it had fought up to that point. He had watched his men die by the thousands and if I had my druthers I would say Lee was a bit bitter towards the CS govt; blaming them for at least part of the inevitable defeat. It also must be remembered that Lee was not an enthusiastic Secessionist and what he saw of the CS govt only alienated him futher from it. That's just my opinion but I do believe it had a bearing on his actions. I think he knew full well the effect a guerrillla war would have had on the CS. It was over and he knew it, his men (the ones who had actually done the fighting and dieing) knew it but there were those who didn't know it... many of those who accused him and his ANV of not doing enough. The "stay behinders" and loud mouths who had started the train wreck and who had never stood to and toed the line with his men.

 

[Elennsar]

IMO Lee did everything he could to avoid an open battle where Grant could bring his superior Arty to bear. He knew first hand the effect of that arty and had learned the lesson well... he had also taught it at Fredricksburg.

The problem - not to say that would mean Lee wouldn't want to minimize the Union artillery still further - is that as demonstrated at Gettysburg - artillery on the offensive was of relatively limited usefulness compared to on the defense.

 

[trice]

Lee also knew the effect of guerrilla warfare, he had been an instructor and knew how the US military had won every guerrilla war it had fought up to that point. He had watched his men die by the thousands and if I had my druthers I would say Lee was a bit bitter towards the CS govt; blaming them for at least part of the inevitable defeat. It also must be remembered that Lee was not an enthusiastic Secessionist and what he saw of the CS govt only alienated him futher from it. That's just my opinion but I do believe it had a bearing on his actions. I think he knew full well the effect a guerrillla war would have had on the CS. It was over and he knew it, his men (the ones who had actually done the fighting and dieing) knew it but there were those who didn't know it... many of those who accused him and his ANV of not doing enough. The "stay behinders" and loud mouths who had started the train wreck and who had never stood to and toed the line with his men.

Men like Grant and Lee had seen what that type of war could be like at short range. The nitty-gritty in Mexico would have made them both aware of it, and Lee had spent enough of Comancheros, Kiowas, Commanches, etc. in Texas.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

The bitter diehards like Early might have welcomed it, but more as part of "war to the death" for the sake of killing and maiming as many Yankees as possible rather than for a realistic assessment of what good it would do for the South (or the Confederate cause).

 

[Glorybound]

What I am not sure of is why did it end up being a siege anyway? Was it because Grant got to Petersburg and threatened that important city, so the Confederates had to "circle the wagons" there and try to fight to the end?

That's a great question. It became a siege because Lee stopped moving and dug in. He had a smaller army, under-supplied, underfed, who had already butted heads with a doggedly-determined General Grant several times during the Overland Campaign. Lee knew Grant was not about to let up and further clashes out in the open, so to speak, would have whittled the ANV down to nothing and the end of the Confederacy pdq.

Lee took his stand at Petersburg also so that he could protect Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy. Petersburg was a good place for Lee to stop, probably the last place he could stop and hold on, (and still receive supplies) at least for a while, and achieve those two objectives if only temporarily. And IMO Lee knew for whom the bells tolled already when he dug in at Petersburg, but he fought the good fight like the consummate, professional warrior that he was.




Lee