A larger pre-war US regular army.

[Saphroneth]

Historically speaking the US regular army was typically (1) very small and (2) split up a lot. Regular armies have a tendency to be more skilled than volunteer forces for quite some time into a war, because they've had a long period of usually quite uninterrupted training and they're used to the rigours of army life (plus they're, well, usually well officered by trained officers).

The hypothesis I'm considering here is that, for some reason - perhaps related to the San Juan Islands incident in 1859 or the boarding crisis in 1858 - the US decides that it needs a larger regular army. In the case of the San Juan Islands incident, this could be - say - a newspaper which loudly declares that if Britain had declared war upon the United States then a division of British regulars could have been in Washington before a regiment of US regulars.

Whatever the reason, Congress authorizes an increase in the size of the US Regular Army. Perhaps this is by means of converting each existing regiment from what the British would call a "one battalion" structure into a two-and-a-half battalion structure, each regiment consisting of two field battalions and one depot battalion used for training recruits (and the same for the artillery and cavalry regiments).
This would lead to an army of about 40,000 men, which is still less than a fifth the size of the contemporary British Army; it's hardly huge.
This would naturally cost, but it only really has to hold for a few years; this would also mean more production of (and issuance of) Springfield rifles of the M1855 type.


The practical upshot of this is that when the Civil War actually breaks out there's a fairly substantial force of Regular Army available. Some number of the officers would obviously Go South, but the upshot for the North is that there's nearly 24,000 more regular troops than historical on the outbreak of war - and these would be of a high quality, as opposed to the expansion of the Regular Army after the war started which wasn't quite so good.

These could be used either to give each major US formation in the summer of 1861 a fairly hefty hard core of infantry (a la the Mexican-American War) or have most of the bonus regular manpower concentrated around Washington for an alternate First Bull Run. With that much Regular manpower it might actually mean First Bull Run is a Union victory, and the war is short...

 

[steve59p]

Wouldn't that presume that most/all of the new troops were based in/loyal to the north, which might not be the case? Otherwise both sides would have larger forces available and since the south seems to have contributed disproportionately despite their smaller overall population so it might largely balance out. However having a larger military infrastructure would probably mean that its in a better condition to ramp up production of rifles and the like markedly faster than OTL.

I think something like the Pig War is probably too late as you could start setting things in motion but many of those new recruits probably wouldn't have much experience when it comes to the war - although still better than nothing.

 

[Saphroneth]

Wouldn't that presume that most/all of the new troops were based in/loyal to the north, which might not be the case?

Historically most of the rank-and-file were loyal, though the officers weren't so much. I'd assume the same would apply here - at most you'd have a thousand or so regular enlisted going south.

I think something like the Pig War is probably too late as you could start setting things in motion but many of those new recruits probably wouldn't have much experience when it comes to the war - although still better than nothing.

It has the possibility for a year and a half of peacetime training in an existing military structure, which would be enough to make them very good compared to 90-day militia or volunteers.

 

[steve59p]

Historically most of the rank-and-file were loyal, though the officers weren't so much. I'd assume the same would apply here - at most you'd have a thousand or so regular enlisted going south.


It has the possibility for a year and a half of peacetime training in an existing military structure, which would be enough to make them very good compared to 90-day militia or volunteers.

I stand corrected on the 1st point. On the 2nd I would say that assumes that Congress not only makes such a decision but then implements it very quickly. Suspect in real life, after disputes over costs, where all the new troops and bases would be etc things might be only in their early stages by the time OTL CW started.

One other factor here is that such a larger force, especially if thought to be overwhelmingly loyal, would that prompt the southern hotheads to rebel earlier, before this force becomes fully active or possibly mean more responsible elements decide they can't win a quick war for independence and either desist or consider other routes?

Another possibility with a larger US army, especially if in response to the tension in 1858/59 and with people like Steward sounding off about seizing Canada what is the British response? Probably not too revelant as a war with the US is extremely unlikely but could see a general raising of tensions.

 

[Saphroneth]

As far as my thoughts go, a possible timeline here is:

September 1859: During the heightened worry around the San Juan crisis, Congress authorizes an expansion of each existing regiment of the Regular Army from ten companies (for the infantry and mounted regiments) or twelve (in the artillery) to a total of twenty-four per regiment, organized into a ten-company first battalion, a ten-company second battalion and a four-company depot battalion (except for in the artillery, where there was to be a combined training depot). The process of expansion and recruitment up to the new authorized strength takes time, and there are quarrels about the cost (which is largely paid by means of an increased tarriff).

This increases the establishment of the Army to ca. 42,000, though it is under establishment even in early 1861.

Lincoln's election goes largely as per the historical, and the secessions begin - the greater worry about "larger Federal army" is matched by greater outrage over "larger tarriff" and Lincoln's still been elected

April 1861: Fort Sumter is compelled to surrender; the garrison was of two companies of the 1st Artillery, not one.
President Lincoln orders the concentration of the army for means of combatting the insurrection; more states secede (i.e. the historical set) and a call for volunteers goes out on both sides. Several hundred of the regulars attempt to desert and go south over the next few weeks, but only about 400-500 make it - the rest are caught and placed in arrest.

All told, the Regular Army at this point has a strength of about 36,000 Aggregate Present, and the depot battalions are raided to bring the fighting battalions up to strength.


How this is used is an interesting question. One possibility is that each brigade of Volunteers at First Bull Run has a battalion of Regulars attached to it effectively as guides, and honestly even with just an average of a year's uninterrupted training that Regular battalion would be an enormous improvement to the fighting powers of each volunteer brigade.

(75,000 volunteer infantry and 20 battalions of regular infantry is about enough for one regular battalion per volunteer brigade of 4 regiments across the whole continent.)

 

[archieclement]

It goes against the military philosophy of the day, people then wanted to stay together, and a battalion wouldnt change the fighting strength that much

Now if one did as German army did in WW2 parceling out experienced men especially as NCO's at company and platoon level..........

 

[Saphroneth]

It goes against the military philosophy of the day, people then wanted to stay together, and a battalion wouldnt change the fighting strength that much

A battalion in this setup is an 8-10 company organization the same size as the actual regular infantry org at the historical First Bull Run. Functionally speaking most US regiments fought as a battalion anyway, until they were so depleted that brigades were of battalion strength instead.
Also, the British Army fought entirely in battalions, so I don't think it's against the philosophy of the day overall.

Now if one did as German army did in WW2 parceling out experienced men especially as NCO's at company and platoon level..........

The best way to stiffen new troops is to mix them with experienced ones, and the British did enormously well in Spain and Portugal (and at Waterloo) mixing regular battalions with Portugese or Dutch-Belgian or Hanoverian battalions; in the 19th century combining homogenous battalions to make a mixed brigade actually works.

 

[archieclement]

A battalion in this setup is an 8-10 company organization the same size as the actual regular infantry org at the historical First Bull Run. Functionally speaking most US regiments fought as a battalion anyway, until they were so depleted that brigades were of battalion strength instead.
Also, the British Army fought entirely in battalions, so I don't think it's against the philosophy of the day overall.


The best way to stiffen new troops is to mix them with experienced ones, and the British did enormously well in Spain and Portugal (and at Waterloo) mixing regular battalions with Portugese or Dutch-Belgian or Hanoverian battalions; in the 19th century combining homogenous battalions to make a mixed brigade actually works.

I haven't came across anyone having the success of mixing formations as the German army, between them providing experienced leadership at the lowest level and stressing initiative at the lowest levels, enabled them late in the war to throw mismatched units, usually units already under-strength, into Kampfgruppes that despite never having trained together were usually effective fighting forces despite it.

I read once to really realize the accomplishments of the Germans as a fighting force, you need to look at the last years when everything was against them, instead of the early years when everything was in their favor......I tend to agree

Wouldnt see why putting experienced NCO's at the lowest levels wouldnt have worked if implemented in a earlier period, the stressing initiative at the lowest levels would have been somewhat out of place to leaders except perhaps Lee

 

[Saphroneth]

I haven't came across anyone having the success of mixing formations as the German army, between them providing experienced leadership at the lowest level and stressing initiative at the lowest levels, enabled then late in the war to throw mismatched units, usually units already under-strength, into Kampfgruppes that despite never having trained together were usually effective fighting forces despite it.

I read once to really realize the accomplishments of the Germans as a fighting force, you need to look at the last years when everything was against them, instead of the early years when everything was in their favor......I tend to agree

Though surely the British in the 19th century are a better direct comparison? They took experienced regular infantry, mixed them with "militia"-level forces without much training at the brigade level, and effectively produced good combined brigades.

There's not really a way the Union can spend years doing division-doubling in advance of the ACW, or have the year of fully-mobilized training that helped build the Barbarossa force, but they can have a roughly 2:1 or 3:1 ratio of regular infantry to enthusiastic volunteers in the early 1861 period.

 

[archieclement]

The problem with concentrating experience in one unit as a battalion to lead, instead of dispersing the experience through the whole regt, is the battalion has to be out front to provide the example taking the highest causalities, break the batt you break the regt,,,,,,

 

[Saphroneth]

The problem with concentrating experience in one unit as a battalion to lead, instead of dispersing the experience through the whole regt, is the battalion has to be out front to provide the example taking the highest causalities, break the batt you break the regt,,,,,,

That's not generally how it works in 19th century combat, and the reason for that is that a brigade forms a line of battle. (See: Wellington's Peninsular career, and his time in India too).
Besides, the main benefit from this might not even be combat so much as that the regulars are less likely to get lost or straggle. An extra ~8,000 effective troops at First Bull Run would have a huge impact given the scale of the fighting.

 

[jackt62]

Notwithstanding any practical effects of increasing the regular pre-war army, the American people were not conditioned to accept any large (or larger) regular military force. Maybe it was only a national myth, but Americans were traditionally against a large standing army, largely frowned on the institution of West Point, and believed that raising volunteer forces to meet any emergency was the way to go. And that of course, is more or less what happened up until the United States became the major global power following WWII. Yes, I know, the United States had to resort to conscription from the ACW onwards, in order to attain sufficient forces that volunteering alone could not reach (the conscript armies of both World Wars, National Army and the Army of the United States). But that doesn't negate the fact that until the beginning of the Second World War, the regular army of the United States was relatively small (16th in the world) and not designed to deal with major threats.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm naturally aware of the extent to which the US avoided having a substantial regular army. This is actually one reason why I constructed the idea of having two-battalion regiments instead of one-battalion ones, because it's just an "organizational" change to provide the same-sized actual "home defence" army and one during a period when the British Army has itself expanded by something like 50%.

 

[thomas aagaard]

In 1848 rebellions happened in a number of European states.
In Copenhagen the new Danish king agreed to give the people a Constitution.
At the same time a "German" rebellion happened in the duchies of Sleswig and Holstein. They wanted the two duchies to become an independent state. outside of the Danish whole-state.

The prince of Nor (who arguable should have been the duke instead of Danish the King) joined the rebellion, showed up at the main army base in the duchies, wearing a danish generals uniform and declared that the king was in the hands of rebels and that the Sleswig-Holstein government was the danish government in exile. And then he started giving orders.

Going by memory, 4 line battalions (of 18), one Jäger battalion (of 5) and one artillery (of 2)regiment joined the rebels.
Most officers in the mentioned units did stayed loyal to the king but the rank and file mostly joined also.

Since the men was doing their mandatory service so was from the duchies the two situations is not directly comparable.
(after the war the army learned their lesson, and units made up of men from the duchies where stationed in Denmark proper and when the 1864 broke out the privates from Holstein was disarmed and send home)
--

With an expended regular army they would likely have been forced to do active recruiting in the south and with rank and file who might not care about the political issue (poor men, immigrants and similar) or even be pro CSA and pro CSA officers they might have ended up with some units joining the csa.