A different "what if" idea.

[wausaubob]

What if the federal government had forced reunification sooner? What if in 1863 the US had conducted successful operations to close Mobile Bay and the Cape Fear River to blockade runners?

Would the administration have allowed some slavery to continue if there was a freedom date after which all children born to an enslaved woman were considered free?

Congress might have gone along with a New Jersey or West Virginia type plan in several states as long as the eventual 27-9 ratio necessary for a constitutional amendment could be reached.

Lives would have been saved. Investment money would have spent on physical improvements, instead of repairing railroads. Many parts of the Confederacy would have been spared ruin. International immigration would have accelerated one or two years earlier.

 

[Hawke_]

The Confederate leadership were going to fight until their ability to do so was physically broken, one way or another. They weren't the ones missing meals as the blockade tightened, after all.

As for the second point, the Emancipation Proclamation was probably the end of slavery as a whole; there just wouldn't be enough slavery left to prevent its abolition. Even McClellan came to see compensated emancipation as a realistic necessity circa July 1862.

I would imagine the only way you get Union victory in 1863 is if the Peninsula Campaign works, Chattanooga falls in 1862 somehow, and the Deep South is crippled and open to invasion that year. Such cataclysms might make them open to negotiation, but if not it'd at least mean the Union can finish them off inside the year. There might also be no Emancipation Proclamation in this case, and "Restoring the Union as near to possible as how it was" might remain policy.

But the war had still fueled a fire in the heart of the abolition movement, so phased or immediate abolition would probably still be a necessity.

 

[wausaubob]

The Confederate leadership were going to fight until their ability to do so was physically broken, one way or another. They weren't the ones missing meals as the blockade tightened, after all.

As for the second point, the Emancipation Proclamation was probably the end of slavery as a whole; there just wouldn't be enough slavery left to prevent its abolition. Even McClellan came to see compensated emancipation as a realistic necessity circa July 1862.

I would imagine the only way you get Union victory in 1863 is if the Peninsula Campaign works, Chattanooga falls in 1862 somehow, and the Deep South is crippled and open to invasion that year. Such cataclysms might make them open to negotiation, but if not it'd at least mean the Union can finish them off inside the year. There might also be no Emancipation Proclamation in this case, and "Restoring the Union as near to possible as how it was" might remain policy.

But the war had still fueled a fire in the heart of the abolition movement, so phased or immediate abolition would probably still be a necessity.

I was thinking that the administration might have taken a different course after Vicksburg and Gettysburg and accelerate the operational pace, not slow it down. But Halleck was advising the President, and he didn't do anything fast.

If the US closes Mobile Bay, and expands the North Carolina enclave far enough to sever the Weldon RR, maybe the US can peal a few more states from the Confederacy. Virginia would be the key.

 

[Hawke_]

I was thinking that the administration might have taken a different course after Vicksburg and Gettysburg and accelerate the operational pace, not slow it down. But Halleck was advising the President, and he didn't do anything fast.

If the US closes Mobile Bay, and expands the North Carolina enclave far enough to sever the Weldon RR, maybe the US can peal a few more states from the Confederacy. Virginia would be the key.

It would make sense for such a course to end the war faster via negotiations, but I suggest the problem with that analysis is that you're using your rational brain to try and project a pattern of behavior onto Jeff Davis and the planter class that controlled the Confederacy.

An accelerated tightening of the blockade would be devastating for the Confederacy, but nothing made them surrender except for the dissolution of all their major field armies (half a year after Lincoln won reelection, too). Irrationality and resistance to compromise is baked into the actors who had the power to end the war by negotiation.

By the time of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, I don't think that the war being won in the remaining months of the year is on the table with basically any realistic course of events. I don't see surrender without Bragg and/or Lee's armies being destroyed, and I don't see any realistic opportunity for that in the time remaining.

 

[wausaubob]

No one cares about a "What if" scenario in which the US wins and both opponents save lives and money. This is what I expected.

 

[milhistbuff1]

Since ANV was heavily supplied from Atlanta, severing the Weldon/Virginia & TN Roads would likely do significant damage to their ability to fight. Has me thinking of Jeff Hunt's comments on Gen. French's late July move through Manassas Gap being made with more celerity/strength to trap Lee in No. Va.

 

[wausaubob]

The Confederate leadership were going to fight until their ability to do so was physically broken, one way or another. They weren't the ones missing meals as the blockade tightened, after all.

As for the second point, the Emancipation Proclamation was probably the end of slavery as a whole; there just wouldn't be enough slavery left to prevent its abolition. Even McClellan came to see compensated emancipation as a realistic necessity circa July 1862.

I would imagine the only way you get Union victory in 1863 is if the Peninsula Campaign works, Chattanooga falls in 1862 somehow, and the Deep South is crippled and open to invasion that year. Such cataclysms might make them open to negotiation, but if not it'd at least mean the Union can finish them off inside the year. There might also be no Emancipation Proclamation in this case, and "Restoring the Union as near to possible as how it was" might remain policy.

But the war had still fueled a fire in the heart of the abolition movement, so phased or immediate abolition would probably still be a necessity.

If we expand the possibilities, the US administration had methods to get around the intransigence of the Confederate government.
The administration could have negotiated in private with state officials in Virginia. Or Grant and Meade could have been authorized to make an offer of some terms to the Confederate generals, with some practiced leaks to put more pressure on the Richmond government.
Perhaps instead of a war between the US and the British Empire the British could have been involved in back channel communication of possible terms for reunification with some additional time allowed to abolish slavery.

 

[wausaubob]

If the US and the British develop a set of terms for reunification and the eventual abolition of slavery, eventually the terms are going to leak to the London and New York newspapers. if that had happened it might have weakened Confederate morale.

 

[Hawke_]

If we expand the possibilities, the US administration had methods to get around the intransigence of the Confederate government.
The administration could have negotiated in private with state officials in Virginia. Or Grant and Meade could have been authorized to make an offer of some terms to the Confederate generals, with some practiced leaks to put more pressure on the Richmond government.
Perhaps instead of a war between the US and the British Empire the British could have been involved in back channel communication of possible terms for reunification with some additional time allowed to abolish slavery.

I still have somewhat the same boring view as before; trying to get the Confederates to act in rational self-interest is trying to square a circle. After the dramatic psychological lift of the 1862 Virginia campaign, I imagine that they simply must be destroyed and would not permit any other peace.

If Virginia state officials or others might be pried away, I would assume that would advance the timetable by making up lost military success, but that the remaining regions would still fight against all reason.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

My opinion is that an earlier Union victory (which I think was possible by mid 1864 IF the Peninsula campaign had succeeded) would have led to a slightly earlier demise of slavery rather then prolonging it. If McClellan had been able to take Richmond and keep it in 1862, that would have probably decisively tilted the whole strategic calculus in favor of the Union. It probably chops a year off the war right there. And in that scenario, Lincoln is going to be issuing the Emancipation Proclamation under vastly more favourable circumstances than was the case in OTl. Just think of it, the fall of Richmond will effectively destroy slavery in most of Virginia alone by years's end.

 

[Hawke_]

My opinion is that an earlier Union victory (which I think was possible by mid 1864 IF the Peninsula campaign had succeeded) would have led to a slightly earlier demise of slavery rather then prolonging it. If McClellan had been able to take Richmond and keep it in 1862, that would have probably decisively tilted the whole strategic calculus in favor of the Union. It probably chops a year off the war right there. And in that scenario, Lincoln is going to be issuing the Emancipation Proclamation under vastly more favourable circumstances than was the case in OTl. Just think of it, the fall of Richmond will effectively destroy slavery in most of Virginia alone by years's end.

I'm optimistic enough to give an 1863 victory if the Peninsula Campaign succeeds, whether that's by defeating the Seven Days or crossing the James from Harrison's Landing. There was no Danville line to sustain Lee then, and Lee's overall numeric disadvantage was appalling if he could be fixed into a siege and contained by both Pope and McClellan.

Losing Virginia would have a massively discombobulating effect on Confederate operations across the seaboard and East Tennessee, how Corinth crippled resistance in the West; Vicksburg lasted as long as it did thanks largely to sheer logistical obstacles that would not exist campaigning down the Eastern seaboard, and in conditions that radically amplified the effectiveness of Confederate cavalry. I would not expect the Carolinas and Georgia to resist a north-south invasion in 1862-1863 radically better than they resisted Sherman's south-north invasion in 1864, despite the fact their defensive forces would probably not be quite so pathetic as Johnston's were.

I also think that that extent of catastrophe for the Confederacy - all three major industrial centers and both major rail junctions reduced in the first year of major operations - might just compel them not to fight to the last day.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

I'm optimistic enough to give an 1863 victory if the Peninsula Campaign succeeds, whether that's by defeating the Seven Days or crossing the James from Harrison's Landing. There was no Danville line to sustain Lee then, and Lee's overall numeric disadvantage was appalling if he could be fixed into a siege and contained by both Pope and McClellan.

Losing Virginia would have a massively discombobulating effect on Confederate operations across the seaboard and East Tennessee, how Corinth crippled resistance in the West; Vicksburg lasted as long as it did thanks largely to sheer logistical obstacles that would not exist campaigning down the Eastern seaboard, and in conditions that radically amplified the effectiveness of Confederate cavalry. I would not expect the Carolinas and Georgia to resist a north-south invasion in 1862-1863 radically better than they resisted Sherman's south-north invasion in 1864, despite the fact their defensive forces would probably not be quite so pathetic as Johnston's were.

I also think that that extent of catastrophe for the Confederacy - all three major industrial centers and both major rail junctions reduced in the first year of major operations - might just compel them not to fight to the last day.

I don't share your optimism re a Union victory in 1863. I don't think it is outright impossible mind you, just unlikely. Everything would have to go right for the Union for that to occur. Still, I think we agree that losing Virginia in 1862 would have been fatal for the Confederacy. The only issue in contention then would be in estimating how long it will take them to bleed out.

 

[SgtTB]

Likely that McClellan could have ended it on "conservative war aims" in 62/63 and then the Republicans would have been chopped at the knees and not gotten their political aims enshrined. Moderate states would return sooner in the same way they left later.


Slavery would be left legal but ended slowly like Brazil (and really every other nation).

 

[wausaubob]

My opinion is that an earlier Union victory (which I think was possible by mid 1864 IF the Peninsula campaign had succeeded) would have led to a slightly earlier demise of slavery rather then prolonging it. If McClellan had been able to take Richmond and keep it in 1862, that would have probably decisively tilted the whole strategic calculus in favor of the Union. It probably chops a year off the war right there. And in that scenario, Lincoln is going to be issuing the Emancipation Proclamation under vastly more favourable circumstances than was the case in OTl. Just think of it, the fall of Richmond will effectively destroy slavery in most of Virginia alone by years's end.

That's an interesting possibility. My take is that if Mobile Bay and the Cape Fear River are closed to blockade runners, then the blockade can concentrate on Charleston.
To me that creates a possible offer to the cotton growers to end the blockade if the administrations goals will be realized after reunification. The possible threat is that the US would not fight the war to completion for several more years and allow the blockade to continue.
To make it work the US would have needed a much better system of setting up cotton reserve areas where the former slaves had their own schools. churches, band stands and police force. But post war events demonstrated that even areas policed by the former slaves would have been subject to attack, and the northern voters were unlikely to pay to defend them. Some fixed rent would have to paid to landowners to comply with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.

 

[wausaubob]

Likely that McClellan could have ended it on "conservative war aims" in 62/63 and then the Republicans would have been chopped at the knees and not gotten their political aims enshrined. Moderate states would return sooner in the same way they left later.


Slavery would be left legal but ended slowly like Brazil (and really every other nation).

The problem there is that Maryland and Missouri were likely to end slavery by state action. That would create a ratio of 21/13 paid labor states to slave labor states, with Kentucky and Delaware likely to vote for national development on issues that did not impact slavery directly.
With West Virginia, Nevada and Nebraska appearing as possible additional paid labor states, if reunification takes place the remaining 13 slave labor states can't win in Congress, and the Democrats can't win anything if the 3/5ths compromise remains in place disabling the southern population, part of which remains enslaved.

 

[35th MA InfRegt]

That's an interesting possibility. My take is that if Mobile Bay and the Cape Fear River are closed to blockade runners, then the blockade can concentrate on Charleston.
To me that creates a possible offer to the cotton growers to end the blockade if the administrations goals will be realized after reunification. The possible threat is that the US would not fight the war to completion for several more years and allow the blockade to continue.
To make it work the US would have needed a much better system of setting up cotton reserve areas where the former slaves had their own schools. churches, band stands and police force. But post war events demonstrated that even areas policed by the former slaves would have been subject to attack, and the northern voters were unlikely to pay to defend them. Some fixed rent would have to paid to landowners to comply with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution.

If I understand you correctly, you are envisioning a scenario whereby the Union suspends offensive operations by land (or perhaps delays then) after capturing/neutralizing Mobile and Cape Fear while telling the Confederates they will continue the blockade by land until such time as the South agrees to negotiate?

If that is a correct interpretation of your scenario, I would think the likelihood of the Union adopting this approach would be slight. Voters and the politicians they elect tend to measure success in war by looking at how much ground and how many enemy cities their side has captured since the war started. A suspension or slow-rolling of offensive land operations intended to gain ground is going to look an awful lot like stalemate to the voters at election time, possibly even outright defeat. Lincoln would want to avoid that kind of scenario.

If I have not understood you correctly, perhaps you could clarify the scenario?

 

[wausaubob]

If I understand you correctly, you are envisioning a scenario whereby the Union suspends offensive operations by land (or perhaps delays then) after capturing/neutralizing Mobile and Cape Fear while telling the Confederates they will continue the blockade by land until such time as the South agrees to negotiate?

If that is a correct interpretation of your scenario, I would think the likelihood of the Union adopting this approach would be slight. Voters and the politicians they elect tend to measure success in war by looking at how much ground and how many enemy cities their side has captured since the war started. A suspension or slow-rolling of offensive land operations intended to gain ground is going to look an awful lot like stalemate to the voters at election time, possibly even outright defeat. Lincoln would want to avoid that kind of scenario.

If I have not understood you correctly, perhaps you could clarify the scenario?

We are in "What if" land. Otherwise I agree it gets very complicated very fast.

 

[wausaubob]

If I understand you correctly, you are envisioning a scenario whereby the Union suspends offensive operations by land (or perhaps delays then) after capturing/neutralizing Mobile and Cape Fear while telling the Confederates they will continue the blockade by land until such time as the South agrees to negotiate?

If that is a correct interpretation of your scenario, I would think the likelihood of the Union adopting this approach would be slight. Voters and the politicians they elect tend to measure success in war by looking at how much ground and how many enemy cities their side has captured since the war started. A suspension or slow-rolling of offensive land operations intended to gain ground is going to look an awful lot like stalemate to the voters at election time, possibly even outright defeat. Lincoln would want to avoid that kind of scenario.

If I have not understood you correctly, perhaps you could clarify the scenario?

One other thing. if the Confederate decline to negotiate, the offer of terms can be scientifically leaked to the press. That could solidify Democratic support and British support for continuing and accelerating the war.

 

[Hawke_]

We are in "What if" land. Otherwise I agree it gets very complicated very fast.

If you are meaning to discuss a world where major land operations are constrained to maximum-value, minimum risk actions as well as the targeting of port cities to the exclusion of Bull Run and the like, rather than as a supplement, I think that that coercing the Confederacy back in is feasible. At least in part. f

I think that the blood toll of warfare and the thrill of victories strengthened the Confederate leadership enough they would ultimately never make peace until destroyed. But denying those, alotting greater resources in service of the aims of the Anaconda, and making the war both boring and hopeless while making peace attractive might well have peeled off some of the states of the Upper South.

That was the basic concept of Scott's Anaconda before Lincoln insisted on Bull Run, and what McClellan hoped to rescue via his 'strategy of overwhelming.' In that case, it would be a question of kabinetkrieg and 'soft war' against hard war. While I suspect soft war could have worked in theory, it seems unlikely that the Union could realistically implement it given the cultural and political conditions of the day.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

What if the federal government had forced reunification sooner? What if in 1863 the US had conducted successful operations to close Mobile Bay and the Cape Fear River to blockade runners?

Would the administration have allowed some slavery to continue if there was a freedom date after which all children born to an enslaved woman were considered free?

Congress might have gone along with a New Jersey or West Virginia type plan in several states as long as the eventual 27-9 ratio necessary for a constitutional amendment could be reached.

Lives would have been saved. Investment money would have spent on physical improvements, instead of repairing railroads. Many parts of the Confederacy would have been spared ruin. International immigration would have accelerated one or two years earlier.

Interesting idea, @wausaubob. There's a good chance that might have happened in the "what if" you described.