A couple questions about Johnston's strategy?

[WalkingTurtles]

How effective do you think Johnston's strategy of continuing to withdraw from Sherman as he slowly flanked his way to Atlanta would have been had he stayed in command? Resaca, New Hope Church, Kennesaw Mountain, Noonday Church, Picketts Mill - The Union Army sustained healthy casualties in these engagements. Could he have abandoned Atlanta effectively - with all that ammunition - while keeping an effective fighting force in the field - coupled with more strong defensive engagements?

Also, was there anything Johnston could have done to hold at Kennesaw Mountain? Anyone he could have shifted over to challenge Schoefield near the Chattahoochee River? That seemed like the ideal place to bunch up Sherman.

 

[cash]

How effective do you think Johnston's strategy of continuing to withdraw from Sherman as he slowly flanked his way to Atlanta would have been had he stayed in command? Resaca, New Hope Church, Kennesaw Mountain, Noonday Church, Picketts Mill - The Union Army sustained healthy casualties in these engagements. Could he have abandoned Atlanta effectively - with all that ammunition - while keeping an effective fighting force in the field - coupled with more strong defensive engagements?

It would have been very effective when he fought the climactic battle of Key West, Florida.

Also, was there anything Johnston could have done to hold at Kennesaw Mountain? Anyone he could have shifted over to challenge Schoefield near the Chattahoochee River? That seemed like the ideal place to bunch up Sherman.

Nope.

Johnston's best chance was in North Georgia at Rocky Face Ridge. Once he retreated south of that, he was a goner.

 

[wausaubob]

It could have gone better for Johnston. But McPherson could have also cut him off from Atlanta on one occasion.
It is possible that Sherman had better spies and scouts then he acknowledges. And he had been there once before.

 

[Greywolf]

Johnston really wanted to attack when he had a clear advantage/potential for victory. That was both a good and a bad thing. Maybe in his mindset it was fear of failure, maybe it was that he understood with a reduced and battered army he had no chance to do anything positive against Sherman. I do know if you study his attacks at Seven Pines and Bentonville, they were well conceived with a good chance of success. I will also give him credit for the plan that Hood used at Peach Tree Creek. All of these instances are when he had clear potential to strike a solid blow to the enemy. He didn't know he would be relieved for Hood. For all he knew he would be fighting against Sherman all through the deep south. Nothing was clear, Sherman didn't have to go to Savannah, he could have done something entirely different. I seriously doubt Johnston would have headed up to Tenn. and destroy his own army. No, he would have faced Sherman waiting for the right opportunity to strike, and it would have come at some point. Success, now that's another story......

 

[WJC]

How effective do you think Johnston's strategy of continuing to withdraw from Sherman as he slowly flanked his way to Atlanta would have been had he stayed in command? Resaca, New Hope Church, Kennesaw Mountain, Noonday Church, Picketts Mill - The Union Army sustained healthy casualties in these engagements. Could he have abandoned Atlanta effectively - with all that ammunition - while keeping an effective fighting force in the field - coupled with more strong defensive engagements?
Also, was there anything Johnston could have done to hold at Kennesaw Mountain? Anyone he could have shifted over to challenge Schoefield near the Chattahoochee River? That seemed like the ideal place to bunch up Sherman.

I believe that the results would have been largely the same.

 

[Mr. King]

Johnston lost the campaign just a few weeks after he was put in command. Bragg, being Davis' right hand, discussed a plan with the cabinet and proposed it to Johnston. The choice was his. All he had to do was accept it.
It was basically a repeat of Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky in 1862, which worked wonders, retarding the Union progress in the West 6 months or a year.
Bragg proposed that Johnston side step Sherman (who was gathering his forces and still sitting idle) and place his army in the Smokey Mountains, somewhere in or around Knoxville. Here, he would be joined by Longstreet's 2 divisions from the ANV, who were wintering just to the North, along with Bushrod Johnson's division. This would give him an effective strength of nearly 75,000 men.
His objective would be to lure Sherman away from his goal of Atlanta, by severing his supply line and gobbling up garrisons all over East Tennessee. It was also proposed that he act in concert with Forrest & S.D. Lee's 14,000 horseman, and that they could all converge on Nashville from East & West.
Johnston was elated at the thought of keeping Longstreet, but he had no intention to take any kind of offensive. He was told that Longstreet would only join him for an offensive movement.

At that point, Johnston just stopped responding to Richmond. The beautiful plan fell by the wayside. It might have stopped Grant's entire grand strategy. If they could have crushed the Nashville depot and garrison before Sherman could catch them, Grant may have been sending 20,000 men West from the AOP again, and addition troops from all over the map, trying to fix Johnston. Either way, Atlanta and the Overland Campaign may not have happened.

 

[WalkingTurtles]

I believe that the results would have been largely the same.

I don't see Johnston forcing a major action like Hood did at Peachtree Creek or Ezra Church, and I definitely see him being more prepared to deal effectively with 28 cars of munitions. I definitely think Atlanta is still lost, however, I think Johnston is more than supplied and capable to defend Sherman's march to the sea, or present an actual threat to Tennessee.

 

[Greywolf]

Johnston lost the campaign just a few weeks after he was put in command. Bragg, being Davis' right hand, discussed a plan with the cabinet and proposed it to Johnston. The choice was his. All he had to do was accept it.
It was basically a repeat of Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky in 1862, which worked wonders, retarding the Union progress in the West 6 months or a year.
Bragg proposed that Johnston side step Sherman (who was gathering his forces and still sitting idle) and place his army in the Smokey Mountains, somewhere in or around Knoxville. Here, he would be joined by Longstreet's 2 divisions from the ANV, who were wintering just to the North, along with Bushrod Johnson's division. This would give him an effective strength of nearly 75,000 men.
His objective would be to lure Sherman away from his goal of Atlanta, by severing his supply line and gobbling up garrisons all over East Tennessee. It was also proposed that he act in concert with Forrest & S.D. Lee's 14,000 horseman, and that they could all converge on Nashville from East & West.
Johnston was elated at the thought of keeping Longstreet, but he had no intention to take any kind of offensive. He was told that Longstreet would only join him for an offensive movement.

At that point, Johnston just stopped responding to Richmond. The beautiful plan fell by the wayside. It might have stopped Grant's entire grand strategy. If they could have crushed the Nashville depot and garrison before Sherman could catch them, Grant may have been sending 20,000 men West from the AOP again, and addition troops from all over the map, trying to fix Johnston. Either way, Atlanta and the Overland Campaign may not have happened.

hmmm...what date was this plan proposed? I suppose we are talking early 1864?

 

[Greywolf]

I don't see Johnston forcing a major action like Hood did at Peachtree Creek or Ezra Church, and I definitely see him being more prepared to deal effectively with 28 cars of munitions. I definitely think Atlanta is still lost, however, I think Johnston is more than supplied and capable to defend Sherman's march to the sea, or present an actual threat to Tennessee.

Peachtree Creek was Johnston's plan, he was relieved just a few days before that event. Who knows what would have happened if Johnston had stayed in command but I think the best move would have been to stay with Sherman in the deep south.

 

[WalkingTurtles]

hmmm...what date was this plan proposed? I suppose we are talking early 1864?

Could Lee have survived Overland without Longstreet?

 

[JeffBrooks]

Bragg proposed that Johnston side step Sherman (who was gathering his forces and still sitting idle) and place his army in the Smokey Mountains, somewhere in or around Knoxville. Here, he would be joined by Longstreet's 2 divisions from the ANV, who were wintering just to the North, along with Bushrod Johnson's division. This would give him an effective strength of nearly 75,000 men.

How would such a force have been supplied? It was hard enough to keep Longstreet's two divisions fed in that region. Adding most of the Army of Tennessee would have made the task impossible. Men would have starved and been rendered unable to fight. Desertions would have skyrocketed. Moreover, the horses and mules also would have gone hungry, making it impossible to move the wagons and artillery.

 

[WalkingTurtles]

Peachtree Creek was Johnston's plan, he was relieved just a few days before that event. Who knows what would have happened if Johnston had stayed in command but I think the best move would have been to stay with Sherman in the deep south.

It was a good plan, however miscommunication caused almost three hours of delays that were crucial. Even the though the plan was sound, Hood probably should have tabled it, because of the command upheaval.

 

[Jimklag]

Johnston lost the campaign just a few weeks after he was put in command. Bragg, being Davis' right hand, discussed a plan with the cabinet and proposed it to Johnston. The choice was his. All he had to do was accept it.
It was basically a repeat of Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky in 1862, which worked wonders, retarding the Union progress in the West 6 months or a year.
Bragg proposed that Johnston side step Sherman (who was gathering his forces and still sitting idle) and place his army in the Smokey Mountains, somewhere in or around Knoxville. Here, he would be joined by Longstreet's 2 divisions from the ANV, who were wintering just to the North, along with Bushrod Johnson's division. This would give him an effective strength of nearly 75,000 men.
His objective would be to lure Sherman away from his goal of Atlanta, by severing his supply line and gobbling up garrisons all over East Tennessee. It was also proposed that he act in concert with Forrest & S.D. Lee's 14,000 horseman, and that they could all converge on Nashville from East & West.
Johnston was elated at the thought of keeping Longstreet, but he had no intention to take any kind of offensive. He was told that Longstreet would only join him for an offensive movement.

At that point, Johnston just stopped responding to Richmond. The beautiful plan fell by the wayside. It might have stopped Grant's entire grand strategy. If they could have crushed the Nashville depot and garrison before Sherman could catch them, Grant may have been sending 20,000 men West from the AOP again, and addition troops from all over the map, trying to fix Johnston. Either way, Atlanta and the Overland Campaign may not have happened.

You make "sidestepping" Sherman sound like child's play. Bragg's plan has no way of succeeding without Sherman's cooperation. And Sherman wanted nothing more than for Johnston to come out of his fieldworks into the open which he would have to do to follow Bragg's brain f**t.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Lee and Johnston both had similar strategies, both for the 1864 campaign in particular and the war in general. Both recognized that, given the enormous disparity of resources between North and South, the only way for the South to win the war (barring foreign intervention) was by holding out long enough and demoralizing the Northern population to such a degree that they forced their political leadership to give up the fight. 1864 was the ideal time to achieve this, given the presidential election in the North.

But both had different approaches. Lee's approach was to attempt to win dramatic and decisive battlefield victories over the principal enemy field army - on occasion he seems to have contemplated the possibility of destroying the enemy army in a Cannae-like victory and capturing Washington City itself. His thinking was that this would so dishearten the Northerners that they would agree to peace. His attempts to achieve this not only ultimately failed, but cost his army extreme casualties that the South could not afford.

Johnston, on the other hand, focused on preserving his manpower and resources of his army, so as to keep his force a potent one for as long as possible. So long as the Confederate armies remained undefeated and the prospects of the war ended anytime soon appeared remote, eventually the North would give up. Where Lee felt the need to take risks, Johnston felt the need to remain cautious, to strike the enemy only when success appeared likely enough to warrant possible damage to his forces.

Johnston's strategy, like Lee's, was not successful. What's different is that, due to the nature of his removal from command, the defenders of Johnston have always been able to claim that his strategy would have worked if only he had been given a fair chance to achieve it. Hood, for his part, attempted a version of the Lee Strategy in Georgia and Tennessee, which resulted in the destruction of his army. Since Lee never was removed from command, he doesn't get the "get out of jail free" card that Johnston was given by history.

I've given this question an enormous amount of thought over the years, given that the idea of Johnston remaining in command if the plot of my novel Shattered Nation. But it's a very interesting question that has not received the attention it deserves. Was there a "Lee Strategy" and a "Johnston Strategy" and perhaps also a "Longstreet Strategy" and "Beauregard Strategy"? I think there were and that historians need to more closely examine them.

 

[WJC]

I don't see Johnston forcing a major action like Hood did at Peachtree Creek or Ezra Church, and I definitely see him being more prepared to deal effectively with 28 cars of munitions. I definitely think Atlanta is still lost, however, I think Johnston is more than supplied and capable to defend Sherman's march to the sea, or present an actual threat to Tennessee.

Thanks for your response.
And in the end, Sherman takes Atlanta and turns north....

 

[Greywolf]

Lee and Johnston both had similar strategies, both for the 1864 campaign in particular and the war in general. Both recognized that, given the enormous disparity of resources between North and South, the only way for the South to win the war (barring foreign intervention) was by holding out long enough and demoralizing the Northern population to such a degree that they forced their political leadership to give up the fight. 1864 was the ideal time to achieve this, given the presidential election in the North.

But both had different approaches. Lee's approach was to attempt to win dramatic and decisive battlefield victories over the principal enemy field army - on occasion he seems to have contemplated the possibility of destroying the enemy army in a Cannae-like victory and capturing Washington City itself. His thinking was that this would so dishearten the Northerners that they would agree to peace. His attempts to achieve this not only ultimately failed, but cost his army extreme casualties that the South could not afford.

Johnston, on the other hand, focused on preserving his manpower and resources of his army, so as to keep his force a potent one for as long as possible. So long as the Confederate armies remained undefeated and the prospects of the war ended anytime soon appeared remote, eventually the North would give up. Where Lee felt the need to take risks, Johnston felt the need to remain cautious, to strike the enemy only when success appeared likely enough to warrant possible damage to his forces.

Johnston's strategy, like Lee's, was not successful. What's different is that, due to the nature of his removal from command, the defenders of Johnston have always been able to claim that his strategy would have worked if only he had been given a fair chance to achieve it. Hood, for his part, attempted a version of the Lee Strategy in Georgia and Tennessee, which resulted in the destruction of his army. Since Lee never was removed from command, he doesn't get the "get out of jail free" card that Johnston was given by history.

I've given this question an enormous amount of thought over the years, given that the idea of Johnston remaining in command if the plot of my novel Shattered Nation. But it's a very interesting question that has not received the attention it deserves. Was there a "Lee Strategy" and a "Johnston Strategy" and perhaps also a "Longstreet Strategy" and "Beauregard Strategy"? I think there were and that historians need to more closely examine them.

Very interesting, thanks for adding.

 

[Greywolf]

Lee and Johnston both had similar strategies, both for the 1864 campaign in particular and the war in general. Both recognized that, given the enormous disparity of resources between North and South, the only way for the South to win the war (barring foreign intervention) was by holding out long enough and demoralizing the Northern population to such a degree that they forced their political leadership to give up the fight. 1864 was the ideal time to achieve this, given the presidential election in the North.

But both had different approaches. Lee's approach was to attempt to win dramatic and decisive battlefield victories over the principal enemy field army - on occasion he seems to have contemplated the possibility of destroying the enemy army in a Cannae-like victory and capturing Washington City itself. His thinking was that this would so dishearten the Northerners that they would agree to peace. His attempts to achieve this not only ultimately failed, but cost his army extreme casualties that the South could not afford.

Johnston, on the other hand, focused on preserving his manpower and resources of his army, so as to keep his force a potent one for as long as possible. So long as the Confederate armies remained undefeated and the prospects of the war ended anytime soon appeared remote, eventually the North would give up. Where Lee felt the need to take risks, Johnston felt the need to remain cautious, to strike the enemy only when success appeared likely enough to warrant possible damage to his forces.

Johnston's strategy, like Lee's, was not successful. What's different is that, due to the nature of his removal from command, the defenders of Johnston have always been able to claim that his strategy would have worked if only he had been given a fair chance to achieve it. Hood, for his part, attempted a version of the Lee Strategy in Georgia and Tennessee, which resulted in the destruction of his army. Since Lee never was removed from command, he doesn't get the "get out of jail free" card that Johnston was given by history.

I've given this question an enormous amount of thought over the years, given that the idea of Johnston remaining in command if the plot of my novel Shattered Nation. But it's a very interesting question that has not received the attention it deserves. Was there a "Lee Strategy" and a "Johnston Strategy" and perhaps also a "Longstreet Strategy" and "Beauregard Strategy"? I think there were and that historians need to more closely examine them.

I feel like Johnston would have lost Atlanta, maybe it would have taken longer than Hood however. The interesting thing is what happens after that? Would he continue to stay in contact with Sherman or would he pull a Hood? I believe he would have stayed with Sherman which opens up a myriad of possibilities. Would Sherman have attempted his march with Johnston still in contact with him? Interesting to think about.

 

[cash]

Peachtree Creek was Johnston's plan, he was relieved just a few days before that event. Who knows what would have happened if Johnston had stayed in command but I think the best move would have been to stay with Sherman in the deep south.

That's Johnston's claim. Unfortunately, all we have is Johnston's claim on it.

 

[cash]

Could Lee have survived Overland without Longstreet?

Lee likely couldn't have survived the Wilderness without Longstreet.

 

[Saruman]

Johnston, on the other hand, focused on preserving his manpower and resources of his army, so as to keep his force a potent one for as long as possible. So long as the Confederate armies remained undefeated and the prospects of the war ended anytime soon appeared remote, eventually the North would give up. Where Lee felt the need to take risks, Johnston felt the need to remain cautious, to strike the enemy only when success appeared likely enough to warrant possible damage to his forces.

Johnston's approach would have worked in Russia, but the Confederacy could not trade territory for time. Invading Union forces liberated slaves and destroyed the peculiar institution in the areas they gained control of. The Confederates would have found it extremely difficult to re-establish the institution in those areas after a period of Union occupation.