A Blunder From Beginning to End

[CMWinkler]

A Blunder From Beginning to End
By TERRY L. JONES

Disunion follows the Civil War as it unfolded.

From the moment Ulysses S. Grant took control of the Union Army in March 1864, he went on the offensive. Offensives, in fact: With his forces already pressing down into Virginia and Tennessee, he planned to open a new front by attacking Mobile, Ala.

Soon, though, concerns over developments in Mexico forced him to alter those plans. In violation of the Monroe Doctrine, France's Napoleon III had deposed Benito Juárez and established a puppet government under Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian. Both Napoleon and Maximilian were sympathetic to the rebel cause, and President Lincoln wanted to establish a Union presence in Texas to prevent them from aiding the Confederacy or expanding into the American Southwest. Bowing to the president's wishes, Grant canceled the Mobile operation and ordered Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks to invade Texas along the Red River Valley, in the northeast part of the state.

For the rest: http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.co...-beginning-to-end/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0

 

[NedBaldwin]

The beginning of the article is a wrong.

As I have pointed out in other threads, the orders for Banks to establish a union presence in Texas came in the summer of 1863; he failed in his first try at Sabine in September; he succeeded at the other end of the Texas coast in November; after which Lincoln was satisfied.

Grant did NOT order Banks to invade Texas; Grant's orders to Banks where to take Shreveport (not in texas) and then get back to New Orleans.

 

[Rebforever]

The beginning of the article is a wrong.

As I have pointed out in other threads, the orders for Banks to establish a union presence in Texas came in the summer of 1863; he failed in his first try at Sabine in September; he succeeded at the other end of the Texas coast in November; after which Lincoln was satisfied.

Grant did NOT order Banks to invade Texas; Grant's orders to Banks where to take Shreveport (not in texas) and then get back to New Orleans.

I will have to check on this.

 

[Stephen Terry]

O.R., I, xxxiv, part 2, p 610-11

NASHVILLE, TENN., March 15, [18?]* 1864.

(Received Grand Ecore, 26th.

Major General N. P. BANKS,

Commanding Department of the Gulf, New Orleans:

Inclosed herewith I send you copy of General Orders, Numbers 1, assuming command of the armies of the United States. You will see from the order it is my intention to establish headquarters for the present with the Army of the Potomac. I have not fully determined upon a plan of campaign for this spring, but will do so before the return of our veteran troops to the field. It will, however, be my desire to have all parts of the Army, or rather all the armies, act as much in concert as possible. For this reason I now write you.

I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi River. It is also important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible. This done, send Brigadier General A. J. Smith whit his command back to Memphis as soon as possible. This force will be necessary for movements east of the Mississippi. Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten to fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of the-of March, even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition. Should your expedition prove successful, hold Shreveport and the Red River with such force as you may deem necessary, and return the balance of your troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans.

I would not at present advise the abandonment of any portion of territory now held west of the Mississippi, but commence no move for the further reacquisition of territory unless it e to make that now ours more easily held. This, of course, is not intended to restrain you from making any disposition of your troops or going anywhere to meet and fight the enemy wherever he may be in force. I look upon the conquering of the organized armies of the enemy as being of vastly more importance than the mere acquisition of territory.

It may be a part of the plan for the spring campaign to move against Mobile. It certainly will be if troops enough can be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements. In this case, New Orleans will be the point of departure for such an expedition. There is one thing, general, I would urge, and don't know but what you have already, and that is of supplying your army as far as possible from the country occupied. Mules, horses, forage, and provisions can be paid for, where taken from persons who have taken the amnesty oath prescribed by the President (if the oath be taken before the loss of property), with both economy and convenience. I have directed General Steele to make a real move as suggested by you instead of a demonstration, as he thought advisable.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

 

[rbasin]

I will have to check on this.

Wasn't Grant's instruction was basically, do whatever the hell you want, but I want Sherman's troops with him for the Atlanta campaign, and a force ready to go for Mobile?

 

[NedBaldwin]

Wasn't Grant's instruction was basically, do whatever the hell you want, but I want Sherman's troops with him for the Atlanta campaign, and a force ready to go for Mobile?

In the message above yours Stephen Terry has copied the first order from Grant to Banks.

Some key points in that order:

• "I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi River."
  • This is Grant's concept of the purpose of the campaign
• "Should you find that the taking of Shreveport will occupy ten to fifteen days more time than General Sherman gave his troops to be absent from their command, you will send them back at the time specified in his note of the-of March, even if it leads to the abandonment of the main object of your expedition."
  • He permits Banks to hang onto Smith's men for 10 - 15 extra days if he thinks he can take Shreveport
• "Should your expedition prove successful, hold Shreveport and the Red River with such force as you may deem necessary, and return the balance of your troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans."
  • Banks was to take Shreveport and hold it, then return to New Orleans ('balance of your troops' after subtracting those to hold Shreveport was kind of small).
• "I would not at present advise the abandonment of any portion of territory now held west of the Mississippi, but commence no move for the further acquisition of territory unless it be to make that now ours more easily held."
  • No further acquisition of territory = no new move into Texas.
• "It may be a part of the plan for the spring campaign to move against Mobile." It certainly will be if troops enough can be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements."
  • "may be" = Grant hadn't decided on it for sure at this point.

 

[Drew]

It should also be noted this campaign was set in motion before Grant's elevation to command of the armies. The order posted above should be seen more as acquiesence than advocacy. He was dubious about it pretty much from the get go.

 

[rickvox79]

I was just reading this yesterday. Interesting article, thanks for posting it again.

 

[NedBaldwin]

It should also be noted this campaign was set in motion before Grant's elevation to command of the armies. The order posted above should be seen more as acquiesence than advocacy. He was dubious about it pretty much from the get go.

Before it was set in motion, Grant referred to the campaign in the following way:

"While I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it."

He doesn't seem to have been dubious about the idea, just reluctant to give up troops from operations to the east.

 

[rhp6033]

The French intervention in Mexico was just part of the justification for what has become known as the "Red River Campaign". Another were the frequent pleas of Unionists in Texas for protection, and the constant maneuvering by cotton buyers and speculators for any activity which would give them access to the region's cotton. On top of this was Lincoln's plan to re-admit Lousianna to the Union if enough of the population would sign the loyalty oath, thereby giving him that state's electoral votes in the upcoming 1864 elections.

The cotton angle is a story in itself. New Orleans had been filled by cotton purchasers and speculators seeking their fortune by acquiring cotton and selling it to the idle mills in New England and Great Britain. Even Benjamin Butler's brother was involved, using his "infuence" to get through some deals which weren't exactly legal. Union rules forbade the buying of Confederate cotton since the payment would provide funds to support the Confederate armies, and Confederate rules prohibited the selling of cotton to the Union in the hope that the idle mill workers would presssure their government to end the war. But practicallity won out - cotton was a fungible commodity and once bailed, there was little to indicate it's source. Lots of Confederate cotton slipped through the lines into the hands of the purchasers and factors who claimed it was purchased from loyal Unionist cotton farmers. But even Kirby Smith was in on the game, allowing government-owned Confederate cotton to be sold in exchange for medicine and supplies, or funds from which they could be purchased.

Now cotton, as I said, is a fungible commodity. There are certain grades of cotton, but within those grades one bale of cotton is pretty identical to the next. The way cotton was stored prior to sale acknowledges that fact - a cotton farmer would bring his crop in to a riverport town and store it in a warehouse, along with the cotton of many other farmers and the government itself. A notation would be made on the warehouse books that so many units were on deposit for the farmer of which grade. The farmer would be issued a receipt with the same information, which soon became a negotiable instrument, with cotton receipts being transferred from one to another as if they were cash.

When Banks traveled up the Red River he had with him several cotton buyers who wanted to make purchases from the local farmers. But Grant's officers were told that they were to seize any "Confederate Government-owned cotton" which would be brought back to New Orleans and sold to support the local operations there (contrary to War Dept. Regulations which required it to be turned over to the commissary-general for sale to help finance the entire war effort). But Banks required the assistance of Porter's river navy, so a large number of sailors and the boats needed to transport cotton were under Porter's control. The Navy had different rules - government cotton was considered a "war prize", the proceeds of which were to be divided mostly among the officers and crew of the vessel capturing it. Banks didn't see a problem with this, assuming that the Navy would only seize the cotton on the riverfront docks, and the Army would seize the cotton inland of the shore. But Porter's Navy sent scout boats well ahead of the main body, and the crew members would claim the cotton for the Navy, with no attempt to determine if it was government-owned cotton or privately owned. The sailors, upon finding a cache of cotton, would paint each bale from a stencil marked "CSA" (for government-owned cotton), and then cross that out and underneath it paint "USN" for the U.S. Navy. This led at least one wag to comment that the paint proved it was the property of the "Cotton-Stealing Association" of the U.S. Navy, a comment which even caused Porter to chuckle.

Banks was already in Alexandria Louisianna on the Red River when he received the orders from Grant. Taking into account the days lost in transit of the order, Grant's order gave Banks a little over a week to capture Shreveport and dispatch A.J. Smith's forces back to Sherman's control. But this imparted no sense of urgency in Banks, who took the time to hold a military review at Alexandria, take the oath of allegiance from the citizens there, and conduct elections toward bringing Lousinna back into the Union. Only then did he depart from the river path and march inland into the Pines Wilderness, only to be soundly defeated at Sabine Crossroads/Mansfield. On his retreat back to New Orleans, he found the river to be too shallow for Porter's gunboats to run the "falls" (rapids), so in the end all the cotton had to be abandoned (set on fire or weighted and sunk in the river).

 

[Drew]

"While I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it."

That looks like diplomacy to me. Where did you find it?

 

[NedBaldwin]

The French intervention in Mexico was just part of the justification for what has become known as the "Red River Campaign". Another were the frequent pleas of Unionists in Texas for protection, and the constant maneuvering by cotton buyers and speculators for any activity which would give them access to the region's cotton. On top of this was Lincoln's plan to re-admit Lousianna to the Union if enough of the population would sign the loyalty oath, thereby giving him that state's electoral votes in the upcoming 1864 elections.

None of that was the actual justification for the campaign.

... Grant's officers were told that they were to seize any "Confederate Government-owned cotton" which would be brought back to New Orleans and sold to support the local operations there (contrary to War Dept. Regulations which required it to be turned over to the commissary-general for sale to help finance the entire war effort).

That should read Banks officers -- since it was he who told them to do that.

The Navy had different rules - government cotton was considered a "war prize", the proceeds of which were to be divided mostly among the officers and crew of the vessel capturing it. Banks didn't see a problem with this...

He did see a problem with it and complained about Porter turning the campaign into a cotton stealing fest.

Banks was already in Alexandria Louisianna on the Red River when he received the orders from Grant. Taking into account the days lost in transit of the order, Grant's order gave Banks a little over a week to capture Shreveport and dispatch A.J. Smith's forces back to Sherman's control. But this imparted no sense of urgency in Banks, who took the time to hold a military review at Alexandria, take the oath of allegiance from the citizens there, and conduct elections toward bringing Lousinna back into the Union.

He was waiting for Porter to get his boats over the rapids, which was what was causing the delay in the campaign.

On his retreat back to New Orleans, he found the river to be too shallow for Porter's gunboats to run the "falls" (rapids), so in the end all the cotton had to be abandoned (set on fire or weighted and sunk in the river).

The truth is that Porter got a lot of cotton out and received a nice pay out for it.

 

[NedBaldwin]

That looks like diplomacy to me. Where did you find it?

Its Grant to Sherman from mid-February found in the Official Records.

 

[Stephen Terry]

That looks like diplomacy to me. Where did you find it?

It's from a letter to Sherman. O.R., I, xxxii, part 2, p 424-5

NASHVILLE, February 18, 1864.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Expedition against Meridian:

Inclosed I send you copy of dispatches between General Halleck and myself relative to a movement up Red River on your return from your present expedition. Whilst I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it.

Your troops will want rest for the purpose of preparing for a spring campaign, and all the veterans should be got off on furlough at the very earliest moment. This latter I would direct even if you have to spare troops to go up Red River.

Unless you go in command of the proposed expedition, I fear any troops you may send with it will be entirely lost from further service in this command. This, however, is not the reason for my suggestion that you be sent; your acquaintance with the country, and otherwise fitness were the reasons. I can give no positive orders that you send no troops up Red River, but what I do want is their speedy return if they do go, and that the minimum number necessary be sent. I have never heard a word from Steele since his department has been placed in the military division. Do not know what he proposes nor the means he has for executing.

The time necessary for communicating between here and Vicksburg being so great, you will have to act in this matter according to your own judgment, simply knowing my views.

Is it possible that Banks will entrust such an expedition to the command of McClernand? I have so little confidence in his ability to command that I would not want the responsibility of entrusting men with him, without positive orders to do so. I send this by special messenger, who will await your return to Vicksburg, and who will bear any letters you may have for me.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Grant's 2nd orders t Banks, written March 31:

Major General N. P. BANKS:

First. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defense of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

Second. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with 4,000 men,if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

Third. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to 10,000 men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last returns, this would give you a force of over 30,000 effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add 5,000 men from Mississippi. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrated at least 25,000 men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these, and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.​

 

[NedBaldwin]

Note what Grant write in paragraph 2 (the one starting with 'Second').
How can the campaign be possibly about invading Texas given what Grant wrote?

 

[Drew]

Notice the dates of Grant to Sherman and 2nd Grant to Banks. He works for Halleck on the former, hence his diplomacy in the written order. Halleck works for him on the latter. My guess Grant's made a side deal to go for Shreveport, leave a garrison and send the main force for Mobile, abandoning, if even temporarily the Texas scheme. But that's just a guess. The Texas angle was certainly part of the thinking as the campaign was developed in the many months preceding.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Notice the dates of Grant to Sherman and 2nd Grant to Banks. He works for Halleck on the former, hence his diplomacy in the written order. Halleck works for him on the latter. My guess Grant's made a side deal to go for Shreveport, leave a garrison and send the main force for Mobile, abandoning, if even temporarily the Texas scheme. But that's just a guess. The Texas angle was certainly part of the thinking as the campaign was developed in the many months preceding.

History should not be invented by guesswork.

Halleck had written Grant in January: "If the forces of Smith, Price, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red river as a line of defense, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere." This is the same idea expressed by Grant in his first order to Banks in March.

 

[NedBaldwin]

More on why Texas was not really the purpose of the Red River campaign:

"It is the policy of the Government to maintain a force in Texas, but the condition of this policy will be satisfied if a single point be held." -- C.T. Christensen (staff officer of Canby) to Banks, May 17, 1864.​

A single point had been held in Texas since the beginning of November 1863.

 

[NedBaldwin]

An issue with the Red River campaign that gets constantly underrepresented is Confederate strength. The NY Times blog post for example makes it appear that the only confederate opposition was "a 7,000-man Confederate army under Gen. Richard Taylor". But during the campaign other troops were brought in -- about 6,000 Texas cavalry (brigades of Major, Bagby, and Bee [arrived before battle of Mansfield] as well as the brigades of Woods and Parsons [arrived after battle of Mansfield]); 5,000 men of Churchill's Missouri and Arkansas infantry divisions; close to 1,000 in Hawthorne's Arkansas brigade; and around 2,000 Louisiana cavalry (Lidell's brigade, Vincent's brigade). Thus during the second week of April 1864, Confederate strength in northwestern Louisiana grew to around 20,000 even though Taylor never had all of it together at one time.