3 rounds a minute

Would it be pretty customary for regiments in all of the big battles we hear about to fight, withdraw, rearm and get back on the line? Or when you are out, are you typically done for the day?
I have read of numerous incidents where a regiment went through several cartridge boxes worth of ammunition, either being withdrawn from the fight to resupply or having it brought to them, depending on the circumstances. In the battle for the Spotsylvania Mule Shoe, the Federal troops had crates of ammunition strapped to mules and carried to the front; the Confederates brought them up by hand. It could be a deadly task, in that instance both sides using ravines to stay out of the fire pelting the rear.

As to rate of fire, I recall that while holding off an attack at Pigeon Hill, Kennesaw Mountain, Cockrell's Missouri Brigade reported firing 60 rounds per man in an hour of fighting, so exactly one round per minute. That despite reportedly sticking their ramrods in the dirt for ease of loading. They were fighting from behind earthworks, however, and they were experienced, so it's possible their fire was so slow because they were actually taking time to aim.
 
As to rate of fire, I recall that while holding off an attack at Pigeon Hill, Kennesaw Mountain, Cockrell's Missouri Brigade reported firing 60 rounds per man in an hour of fighting, so exactly one round per minute. That despite reportedly sticking their ram rods in the dirt for ease of loading. They were fighting from behind earthworks, however, and they were experienced, so it's possible their fire was so slow because they were actually taking time to aim.
Experience doesn't necessarily mean you learn to aim - it's a skill that needs to be taught, and if you never do get taught you can't really pick it up on the battlefield. It's also not going to slow them down by that much, because aiming only takes a few seconds - with the Snider-Enfield or the Martini-Henry it was ten aimed rounds per minute, which means that aiming clearly took less than six seconds with those weapons.

It's possible that what was going on there was that they had a large number of men loading for a small number of picked shooters (i.e. men who had picked up the skill prewar). That would mean those men were firing rapidly, perhaps four or five times a minute if not more.
 
I have read of numerous incidents where a regiment went through several cartridge boxes worth of ammunition, either being withdrawn from the fight to resupply or having it brought to them, depending on the circumstances. In the battle for the Spotsylvania Mule Shoe, the Federal troops had crates of ammunition strapped to mules and carried to the front; the Confederates brought them up by hand. It could be a deadly task, in that instance both sides using ravines to stay out of the fire pelting the rear.
And who moved the ammunition from the ord wagons to the firing line? When the ammo arrived at the firing line, how was it distributed? You can imagine all sorts of answers, but how was it supposed to work and how did it work in reality?
 
As to rate of fire, I recall that while holding off an attack at Pigeon Hill, Kennesaw Mountain, Cockrell's Missouri Brigade reported firing 60 rounds per man in an hour of fighting, so exactly one round per minute. That despite reportedly sticking their ramrods in the dirt for ease of loading. They were fighting from behind earthworks, however, and they were experienced, so it's possible their fire was so slow because they were actually taking time to aim.
Looked up the source. Brig. Gen. Francis M. Cockrell says in his OR that "The engagement along my front lasted nearly an hour. A portion of Colonel McCown's regiment [3rd/5th MO] fired sixty rounds to the man." At one point a couple men in the regiment (two brothers, actually) volunteered to to run back and grab more ammunition.

Experience doesn't necessarily mean you learn to aim - it's a skill that needs to be taught, and if you never do get taught you can't really pick it up on the battlefield.
Right, but I mean to say that they might've taken time to aim at individual targets rather than simply load and fire in the general direction of the enemy as quickly as possible.

It's possible that what was going on there was that they had a large number of men loading for a small number of picked shooters (i.e. men who had picked up the skill prewar). That would mean those men were firing rapidly, perhaps four or five times a minute if not more.
That could be, but I'm not aware of any accounts stating that they did so. Another possibility is that the intensity of the fighting was not consistent for 60 minutes straight, but rose at certain points, the fire quickening then and lessening at other times. It also might have slowed when beginning to run low on ammunition, before the said resupply came.
 
And who moved the ammunition from the ord wagons to the firing line? When the ammo arrived at the firing line, how was it distributed? You can imagine all sorts of answers, but how was it supposed to work and how did it work in reality?
Can't say this is the way it was always done, but here are several Confederate accounts from the Bloody Angle at Spotsylvania.

Buxton R. Conerly of the 16th Mississippi, Harris' Brigade, says in his account of the battle:

"During the day, our ammunition ran short, and General Harris called for volunteers to go to the rear and inform General Ewell. Several men started to go, but none went far before they fell dead. Holden Pearson of our Company E, seeing these men fall, told General Harris he would go. The general gave his reluctant consent but looked as if he should never see him alive again. Keeping himself covered behind the trenches and moving rapidly from traverse to the left, he got to a point where he could leave the line in a depression in the rear. He arrived safely at General Ewell's headquarters on the field and informed him of the situation. He told General Ewell how to get the ammunition to us through the depression and soon, passing down the line from man to man, came a stream of cartridges tied up in pieces of tent cloth. Thus we kept supplied during the remainder of the engagement, which continued nearly all night."​


David Holt of the 16th Mississippi, in his memoir, A Mississippi Rebel in the Army of Northern Virginia:

"We received our ammunition from hand to hand as it passed up from the left of the line. About dark the men in the section to my right began to call for more ammunition. "Dave Holt," said the captain, "pass cartridges over the traverse!" And I fell heir to what seemed to me a real suicidal job. But, as the captain had ordered me to the task, I did not complain. I secured a lot of packs (they were done up ten in a pack and tied with stout cord) and strung them on a ramrod. The man on the other side of the traverse spread down a rubber poncho. I called out, "Are you ready?" and, as he answered "Ready," I threw myself up on top of the traverse and poured the packs onto the poncho, the work being repeatedly interrupted by the charges of the Yanks. When they had been repelled, and I had loaded my guns, I would again accumulate packs of cartridges to pass over as they were called for. I kept at the job until way into the night when the firing slackened and no further calls for ammunition came."​

Brig. Gen. Nathaniel H. Harris reported:

"Great difficulty was experienced in procuring supplies of ammunition, man after man being shot down while bringing it in. And here I cannot refrain from mentioning the gallant conduct of Courier A. W. Hancock and Private F. Dolan of the Forty-eighth Mississippi, who repeatedly brought in ammunition under this dreadful fire."​
 
A couple of years back, I tried loading firing e times in a minute. I then realized what the soldiers of the CW went through.
I did not tear off the paper cartridge with my teeth but tore it off with my fingers. I fired, in all about twenty rounds. I was trying for speed. (never did fire three inside of a minute) Not in the excitement of a hostile battle but in a state of non-violence. I spilled powder all over me and the ground. One round only traveled about ten feet. I was shooting at a baffle box to see the effect of a .58 Minie ball.
Some only entered a 1/4" in the pine board. Again it was due to the spilling of the powder from the paper cartridge or from not raming the lead bullet down sufficiently. Also several times, the percussion cap did not fire into the nipple hole sufficiently and I had to clean out the hole in the nipple. This made me appreciate the men in conflict and the troubles the encountered in the heat of battle.
 
Trained Prussians could even get 4 volleys in a minute if they were lucky enough. I guess it was really rare in the struggle of the fight and 3 were the maximum. But those were trained troops.
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But the 4-5 rounds pr. min by the Prussians was by using self-priming muskets... so not comparable.
 
If you expect the soldier to do that in an American army, generally speaking, you won't have much luck.
One of the things about the slow-firing pace I mentioned above with the British was that they were doing this in open order, usually in skirmish order
.
I don't... thought my view on american marksmanship was pretty clear...

Iam point out that some armies prioritized aiming over rate of fire... and the danish army was one of them. With the heavy skirmish line the standard formation for actual fighting.
 
At Gettysburg, ammunition was brought to the front either in its original packing box (100 pounds) or dumped into a blanket. When the ammunition began to run low, a soldier on the line could be detailed to return to the regiment's dedicated ammunition wagon, which was brought as close to the front as possible without overly exposing the wagon. Often in the heat of a large battle, a regiment could get by on ammunition taken from the dead and wounded. When it was impractical or impossible to retrieve additional ammunition, the rate of fire was reduced. It was expected that a unit that was completely out of ammunition, or nearly so, would be relieved.

The fight on Culp's Hill was instructive. The Confederates had to send men a mile or so back across Rock Creek to get ammunition, and on the return the ammunition had to be held above the waist-deep water level of the creek. Meanwhile the Union forces were sufficiently strong to continually rotate units in and out of the line - those resting in the rear would be resupplied from ammunition wagons that were only a short distance away on the Baltimore Pike.
 
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