Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
I have to say that this is actually an incorrect number for 1862. As of 1862 the British army's peacetime strength is indeed about 225,000, but that's all professionals, and the militia (114,000), yeomanry (for which I have no figures, though the number is small) and volunteers (163,000 in 1863) amount to about another 280,000 part-time soldiers.At any given moment, the British Army had a peacetime strength of around 225,000 men, including 75,000 professionals and 150,000 part-time soldiers.
In the event of a crisis, the militia and volunteers can be activated; some of the militia will garrison certain posts in the Empire, freeing up British regulars for the crisis response, while other militia and volunteers will serve for home defence. During a crisis these militia units in particular could be continuously embodied for several years, and also provided a useful source of partially-trained battle casualty replacements which could be further trained by depot companies in Britain (attached to the battalions overseas) and then forwarded once trained.
Here there's a caveat - if the Union posts 100,000 troops along the mutual border, then I don't think the British and Canadians will invade the Union. If the Union posts 10,000 men along the mutual border, however, I think under those circumstances the British would invade simply to cause further pain to the Union and accelerate the possibility of the Union giving up and thus a peace acceptable to the British.While the British and Canadians will probably not launch their own invasions, they will not easily be attacked.
But the real problem is British naval power. Merely breaching the blockade transforms the war in favor of the Confederacy. But it must also be said the Union mobilization was always relatively halfhearted - fighting with one hand behind its back, as Shelby Foote put it. It would be interesting if the threat posed by Britain prompts an earlier and more intense escalation of Northern mobilization, though the Union is not to be favored against Britain in an industrial contest for a couple more decades by this point.
During the first half of 1862 specifically, which is the Trent period, Union mobilization goes from being at the maximum possible for practical reasons (i.e. as of January 1862 the Union has every man it can arm in service) to, due to a shutdown in recruitment and massive imports of weapons and Marshall and Mills iron (for the production of rifle barrels at Springfield) being somewhat under-mobilized compared to what is possible. In the event of a British cancellation of imports and a British blockade, though, I don't think the Union can actually mobilize any more troops than it did historically because it simply will not be able to give them firearms.