Missionary Ridge

I recall reading that Bragg allowed a long portion of the defensive trench fortification line to be built along the forward face of the ridge, where Union guns could punish it. It should have been built along the crest of the ridge where Union shells would either hit the forward face of the ridge or would have gone over the fortification line.
That would be at least a small part of the problem, maybe more than a small part.
 
I recall reading that Bragg allowed a long portion of the defensive trench fortification line to be built along the forward face of the ridge, where Union guns could punish it. It should have been built along the crest of the ridge where Union shells would either hit the forward face of the ridge or would have gone over the fortification line.
That would be at least a small part of the problem, maybe more than a small part.
I believe it was the other way around. The Confederate entrenchments were not on the military crest. Jim Ogden (above) points out that the misaligned lines were on that part of the Ridge commanded by Cleburne. Also, not to be forgotten, were the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and the late order to withdraw. Much like the initial Confederate assault at Franklin, the retreating soldiers deterred firing from the main line atop the Ridge and allowed the Union attackers to purse closely relatively unscathed. Throw in the line of sight problems from the poorly positioned main line and you have a breakthrough..

I have studied Missionary Ridge in books and on the ground but I am by no means an expert. I defer to and page @uaskme
 
After the siege of Chattanooga was lifted it was over, not if but when. Even Lookout and Missionary wouldn't have helped them. Unless they had pursued and destroyed the Army of the Cumberland after Chickamauga in late September the only hope for a decisive Confederate victory was maintaining an iron grip on choking the army to death.
 
I don't think Bragg had much of a choice but maybe keeping his force concentrated and positioned further behind the ridge.
To just withdraw without a fight would probably trigger a crisis in the army.
 
I believe it was the other way around. The Confederate entrenchments were not on the military crest. Jim Ogden (above) points out that the misaligned lines were on that part of the Ridge commanded by Cleburne. Also, not to be forgotten, were the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and the late order to withdraw. Much like the initial Confederate assault at Franklin, the retreating soldiers deterred firing from the main line atop the Ridge and allowed the Union attackers to purse closely relatively unscathed. Throw in the line of sight problems from the poorly positioned main line and you have a breakthrough..

I have studied Missionary Ridge in books and on the ground but I am by no means an expert. I defer to and page @uaskme
Actually there were 3 lines of fortifications on the 25th. Skirmish line down in the plain. Rifle pits on a shelf which extended from the base of the Ridge. Then fortifications on top of the ridge. The top fortifications in the center of the ridge were started by Cleburne on the 24th. Bragg instructed him to do so that morning, 24th and he did on the geographic crest. Latter that day others dug in on the geographic crest except Manigault. He told Bragg's head engineer that he was defending that area and would deploy as he wished. What people don't understand is that the Confederates had been on Missionary Ridge for 2 months. Only fortified the top of the Ridge on the day before the battle and day of. Bragg sent Walkers Division from Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge extending his right after Grants demonstration on Orchard Knob on the 23rd. The Federals first offensive movement. Artillery was placed on the top 24th and 25th. Due to the terrain each tube had 1 ammo chest. Some pieces could fire 4 rounds per minute so possible empty a chest, 3" gun has 32 projectiles, in 8 minutes. Double Quick mile is 10 minutes. Federal infantry was 1 1/4 miles from the ridge. Also Alexander says on Lookout his ammo performed about 2 out of 9 times. Most Federals describe the barrage has a light show. It had some effect but not the desired.

Anderson who commanded Hindman's division asked Breckinridge if he could deploy all of his Troops at the top. He was refused. So, Confederates dig in only to find out, they only have 1 wagon of tools per the Army. So, obviously they didn't prepare properly for a direct assault. Had time to 2 months. Why not, is a long story. Federals had a 2 to 1 manpower advantage, But that wasn't the reason they lost. It might have been a mistake to deploy on the geographic crest, because it didn't work. However they continued to do it during the ATL Campaign. Missionary Ridge was hard to defend but with effort, which they didn't use, could of had a different result.

As you know Cleburne was sent to the North end of Missionary Ridge about 2 o'clock on the 24th because of Sherman crossing the Tennessee River. Hardee and his engineer was sent North about 11 o'clock. Hardee placed Cleburne's brigades on the top of 4 hills and planned to use artillery as plunging fire between the slopes. Sherman ends up going to an adjoining hill so there isn't much activity on the 24th. After dark Cleburne pulls his 3 brigades up to the geological crest of the Ridge after he is ordered to stay and fight the next day. Then about 2AM Bragg decides not to defend Lookout Mtn and those troops march 15 miles to the northern end of Missionary Ridge. They get there daybreak and after. Some stragglers thru out the 25th. Sherman is reinforced overnight. Grant sent him 3 more Divisions to go with the 4 he had on the 24th. Grant's tactics were based on Sherman, reason he moves from MS to get here. Again, Cleburne had 3 Brigades with him. His 4 was at least a mile and a half away. 25th his line is extended by another Division. On the 25th Sherman uses 1 division which has 3 brigades, 800, 200 and 200. Then he used 2 other Brigades all Brigade level assaults. Grant saw the stragglers moving north and decided to order another demonstration to the rifle pits. Ordered Troops to STOP there. He has 3 Federal Divisions and a couple of Brigades down in the plain. They fire 6 cannon as the signal to step off. All of them together. Result was the Cumberlanders assault.

Basically what happened. Here shortly the usual cabal will respond that Grant was ordained by God and all of this is wrong.
 
I believe it was the other way around. The Confederate entrenchments were not on the military crest. Jim Ogden (above) points out that the misaligned lines were on that part of the Ridge commanded by Cleburne. Also, not to be forgotten, were the Confederate rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge and the late order to withdraw. Much like the initial Confederate assault at Franklin, the retreating soldiers deterred firing from the main line atop the Ridge and allowed the Union attackers to purse closely relatively unscathed. Throw in the line of sight problems from the poorly positioned main line and you have a breakthrough..

I have studied Missionary Ridge in books and on the ground but I am by no means an expert. I defer to and page @uaskme
Yes indeed, there were three lines of defense. Only the top one should have been on the military crest, and a long portion of it was just shy of the crest.
 
Actually there were 3 lines of fortifications on the 25th. Skirmish line down in the plain. Rifle pits on a shelf which extended from the base of the Ridge. Then fortifications on top of the ridge. The top fortifications in the center of the ridge were started by Cleburne on the 24th. Bragg instructed him to do so that morning, 24th and he did on the geographic crest. Latter that day others dug in on the geographic crest except Manigault. He told Bragg's head engineer that he was defending that area and would deploy as he wished. What people don't understand is that the Confederates had been on Missionary Ridge for 2 months. Only fortified the top of the Ridge on the day before the battle and day of. Bragg sent Walkers Division from Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge extending his right after Grants demonstration on Orchard Knob on the 23rd. The Federals first offensive movement. Artillery was placed on the top 24th and 25th. Due to the terrain each tube had 1 ammo chest. Some pieces could fire 4 rounds per minute so possible empty a chest, 3" gun has 32 projectiles, in 8 minutes. Double Quick mile is 10 minutes. Federal infantry was 1 1/4 miles from the ridge. Also Alexander says on Lookout his ammo performed about 2 out of 9 times. Most Federals describe the barrage has a light show. It had some effect but not the desired.

Anderson who commanded Hindman's division asked Breckinridge if he could deploy all of his Troops at the top. He was refused. So, Confederates dig in only to find out, they only have 1 wagon of tools per the Army. So, obviously they didn't prepare properly for a direct assault. Had time to 2 months. Why not, is a long story. Federals had a 2 to 1 manpower advantage, But that wasn't the reason they lost. It might have been a mistake to deploy on the geographic crest, because it didn't work. However they continued to do it during the ATL Campaign. Missionary Ridge was hard to defend but with effort, which they didn't use, could of had a different result.

As you know Cleburne was sent to the North end of Missionary Ridge about 2 o'clock on the 24th because of Sherman crossing the Tennessee River. Hardee and his engineer was sent North about 11 o'clock. Hardee placed Cleburne's brigades on the top of 4 hills and planned to use artillery as plunging fire between the slopes. Sherman ends up going to an adjoining hill so there isn't much activity on the 24th. After dark Cleburne pulls his 3 brigades up to the geological crest of the Ridge after he is ordered to stay and fight the next day. Then about 2AM Bragg decides not to defend Lookout Mtn and those troops march 15 miles to the northern end of Missionary Ridge. They get there daybreak and after. Some stragglers thru out the 25th. Sherman is reinforced overnight. Grant sent him 3 more Divisions to go with the 4 he had on the 24th. Grant's tactics were based on Sherman, reason he moves from MS to get here. Again, Cleburne had 3 Brigades with him. His 4 was at least a mile and a half away. 25th his line is extended by another Division. On the 25th Sherman uses 1 division which has 3 brigades, 800, 200 and 200. Then he used 2 other Brigades all Brigade level assaults. Grant saw the stragglers moving north and decided to order another demonstration to the rifle pits. Ordered Troops to STOP there. He has 3 Federal Divisions and a couple of Brigades down in the plain. They fire 6 cannon as the signal to step off. All of them together. Result was the Cumberlanders assault.

Basically what happened. Here shortly the usual cabal will respond that Grant was ordained by God and all of this is wrong.
Ammo quality problem was it faulty fuses or powder quality. I agree the two months were wasted with regards to getting prepared.
 
There are several accounts from the 9th Ohio and others in their brigade, as well as Willich's men, who speak of having to move through two lines of entrenchments (the first being the rifle pits). Most state they were really only under fire for a relatively short time, and almost everything went over their heads once they passed the pits.

I'd be happy to post some if anyone is interested.
 
Another consideration….. the crest of the ridge is quite narrow. This made it difficult- perhaps impossible- to shift units/ guns quickly.
So…. a hasty and very static defensive position, with artillery rendered ineffective due to inability to depress elevation.
 
Ammo quality problem was it faulty fuses or powder quality. I agree the two months were wasted with regards to getting prepared.
They had both. Shells exploded early or not at all. Confederates here, had stopped firing over their own troops. Fear of an early detonation. Fuses they couldn't get the burn rate consistent. Chemical compound on the fuses.
 
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Here are three lesser-known quotes from the perspective of Van Derveer's and Willich's brigades. The first is from a postwar memoir I edited while the other two were letters written home within days of the action.

Pvt Frederick Finnup, 9th Ohio, from "The Story of My Life"

Hooker started at them at the foot of Lookout Mountain and his men drove the enemy before them to the top of the mountain, but it was only accomplished by hard fighting. Hooker's orders had been to stop when he got near the top, but his men flushed with success, and as it happened to be drizzly rain that day, a fog settled just around the foot of the mountain. This gave his men a good chance and they gradually worked their way round it. Now it got the enemy in a tight place. If they stayed much longer on top, they could be captured. They concluded to leave, and by dark Hooker's soldiers had gained the day. It was a great sight to see Hooker's men fighting above the clouds! That night cheer after cheer went up from these brave men on the mountain and hundreds of campfires around the mountain. Thomas' army lay down in the valley and a good look on all day, but our day hadn't come yet. But the next day was our turn. We moved along Missionary Ridge down in the valley while the enemy marched their men all morning along the top. To their right, Sherman was at work and fought hard. He
had the hardest fighting to do, but he kept forcing them back, and the enemy had to send reinforcements there. All at once a shot was fired off from one of our forts - this was the signal for us, and on we moved, made a desperate charge, drove them out of their breastworks. At the foot of the ridge while on this charge, a bomb shell exploded over my head. The force of it knocked me down, but I soon recovered and found a soldier by my side. A piece of the shell had cut his leg wide open from the knee down. He asked me, "What shall I do? Oh! Look at my leg!" I told him I couldn't do anything for him and he should go to the rear, and he started off on his hands and knees. I would like to have helped him, but there were some of the regiment detailed, and it wouldn't do for two or three men to stay behind every time a man got shot, or else there wouldn't be many left to fight. This man belonged to another regiment - had he went with his regiment, likely he might not have been hit. His regiment had gone ahead and he had stayed behind.

We lay behind the enemy's breastworks. They had fallen back - I should say were driven - up on top of the ridge. There they had their forts and 40 guns were directed on us down in the valley. It seemed as if it was impossible for us to advance up the mountainside. They made it very hot for us and the orders came, "Forward!" Over the breastwork we jumped, and now was another run for life. It went so quick that they as a general thing overshot us. On this run I come near being hit again with a piece of shell. It just grazed my head, but it had lost its force. I now was at the foot of the mountain. It went up very steep now, but to our right the troops had got up first in a hollow and took them in the flank, so we soon got on top. We were scattered some, but quick reformed. And well it was, for the enemy had got reinforcements and made a desperate assault, and came near driving us off again. But through hard fighting we held our ground till reinforced, and drove them before us. About this time their whole line had been taken; 40 pieces of cannon fell in our army's hands!

It now got dusk and fighting stopped. Right before us lay several dead and wounded and it was ordered for each company to clear their front, so I helped carry a rebel soldier, the only wounded soldier I helped carry during the whole war. He was shot in the hip. The first thing he asked me was to give him a pipe full of tobacco. I did so, and I got him a light. He seemed to enjoy it very much. We then took him and laid him as gently as possible on the stretcher and carried him to a log house, but it was full of suffering fellows. And we lay him down on the porch outside and a doctor came to ask him where he was shot and tend to his wounds. The agonies of the wounded soon drove us away. We went back to our companies. I here beheld one of the greatest sights of my life. All along Missionary Ridge as well as Lookout Mountain was lit up with thousands of campfires. Cheer after cheer went up along the line over the great victory we had.

Lt. David Schaeffer, 35th Ohio, letter to his wife 1 Dec 1863 (David Schaeffer Papers, Dayton Public Library)


On the afternoon of Monday, Nov. 23rd we were ordered out with two days' rations and a hundred rounds of cartridges to the man. This _____ it meant battle. We took our position in front of and about a half mile from our first camp. Here we bivouacked for the night, having neither tents nor blankets, and as the night was very cold, and wood very scarce, you may know that the night was spent rather uncomfortably. Lookout Mountain lay off to our right, the base being not over ?/4 of a mile distant. During the night the whole side of the mountain was dotted over with rebel fires plainly visible to us in the valley. The next morning came with a cold drizzling rain which continued nearly the whole day. The top of Lookout was completely enveloped in a thick heavy fog which hung over it and around the peak like a cloud. Up to this time there had been but little firing from Lookout. On our left a fierce struggle had taken place just before we were ordered out on the picket line. In this Maj. Birch of the 93rd was killed. About 11 o'clock AM of the 24th, heavy firing suddenly opened on the opposite side of Lookout, proving beyond a doubt that Gen. Hooker had begun his part of the grand drama. Louder and louder grew the thundering tones of the heavy artillery, while the sharp cracking volleys of musketry told but too plainly of the desperate struggle taking place. We of the 14th Corps which lay in the valley could only stand and wonder and speculate as to the final assault. But we felt assured that "fighting Joe Hooker" as the boys called him would do, and was doing all that a brave, able commander could. After about an hour's duration, during which Lookout Mountain fairly trembled with the thundering _____ of artillery and musketry the noise of battle gradually grew nearer and nearer. Just as we were eating dinner about 1PM General Thomas and staff rode up and dismounted. Gen. Thomas took his position within about ten feet of where I was eating my dinner of hardtack and beans. You may be sure that I was an intimated observer of every moment of the grand old hero. The musketry firing still seemed to be nearing the point of Lookout Mountain which however could not be seen from the valley below because of the mist. I observed General Thomas adjust his field glass to his eye directing it to the point around which the rebels, if being driven would have to retreat. Presently I saw him take his glass down, and turning to one of his staff, said "they are coming round the point." Again putting his glass to his eye after looking a moment said, still holding his glass to his eye, "They are coming. Hooker is driving them." This was spoken in a low tone of voice, but which I distinctly heard. We with the naked eye could not see the gray uniform of the rebels because of the mist. Pretty soon a dark compact line was seen swinging round the same point. The dark blue dress of the men could be distinctly seen by us. The moment the blue coats were recognized by our men, a shout went up from twenty thousand throats making Lookout and the valley ring again. It must have made the rebels tremble, for such a shout was never heard before by man. The battle lasted until dark put an end to the conflict. Hooker had driven the rebels from their strong works and had established himself in a safe position behind the enemy's _____ works. A little after midnight we were suddenly startled by the roar of artillery and musketry. The rebels had made an attack suddenly, endeavoring to drive Hooker from his advanced positions, but were easily repulsed. The night attack as seen by us in the valley was beautiful. The night was particularly dark. The flashes of the guns along the side of the mountain seemed like _____ of fireflies and had it not been for the fact that perhaps hundreds of brave men were being killed or wounded I should have enjoyed the panoramic sight. After being repulsed in the midnight attack the rebels withdrew, leaving Hooker in full possession of the mountains. The next day (25th) about 10am Gen. Thomas attacked on our extreme left. The roar of artillery and musketry was most appalling showing that the battle was fierce and obstinate. Oh, thought I, how many poor unfortunate men of both armies are being sacrificed upon the altar of cruel war? How many thousands of widows and orphans will be made by this day's battle, God only knows. The roar of the battle grew louder and louder as new forces became engaged. About 11 o'clock word came that Sherman was hard pressed. Accordingly our division, Baird's, was ordered over to his support. But before reaching him word came that Sherman was more than holding his own, and therefore did not need our support. So our course was changed, and we took our position in front of and a little to the left of Fort Wood in a cornfield with a strip of thickly timbered woodland in our front. Here we remained until between three and four o'clock, when orders came that at a given signal, which was six guns in quick succession from Fort Wood, the whole line was to advance on the rebel works. Here then was work, deadly work too, for us men. We could plainly see the rebel line of rifle pits at the _____ of Mission Ridge. The top of the ridge was also in plain view with its line of breastworks extending the whole length of the ridge. Seeing these things and knowing that battery after battery was planted at short intervals all along the ridge, we felt a kind of sinking sensation at the thought of being called upon to storm such a position. But if we in the valley should feel a tremor passing over us upon observing the strong and almost insurmountable works we were to storm, what must have been the sensation of the rebel troops, who from the top of the ridge could plainly see with the naked eye all the preparations which were going on for the attack? We knew we had a brave enemy to fight, for they were Americans. They knew from their experience at Chickamauga that an enemy was in their front who knew no such thing as failure. We knew that as we advanced through the open field between the thin strip of woods and the line of rifle pits at the foot of the ridge we would be exposed to the shot, shells, canister and musketry which could not fail to thin our ranks. But the work was before us, and it must and would be performed. At the given signal, Col. Boynton stepped to the front of the regiment, and in his full voice said, "Men of the 35th Ohio, remember that the 35th never turns its back to the enemy! Forward!" Every man instantly sprang to his feet and started forward. At the point where we crossed the field was a full half mile wide. Across this, on perfectly level ground we were to make the charge. The 35th formed part of the first line, so that we were in a position to see all. We were three lines deep. Though the task before us seemed to be a desperate one, yet not a man faltered. For my part, I felt a kind of chilling sensation run through me when the order "forward" was given, but it lasted only for a moment. I felt that I was in the hands of God, and in him I trusted. So breathing a prayer, not that I might be spared, but that I might have strength and courage to do my whole duty, I started forward with the regiment. As soon as we reached the open field the artillery on the ridge opened out on us. Soon the shells were screeching through the air and bursting all around us. Then the command, "Double quick, march!" was given and off we started with a _____ and a yell. At this the rebels behind the breastworks at the foot of the ridge gave us a scattering volley and then broke and ran up the ridge as fast as their legs could carry them. Meanwhile the artillery from the top of the ridge was throwing shells and grape canister among us most _____. The sight of fleeing rebels gave us courage and away we went amongst the bursting shells, yelling with all our might. Twice was the dirt thrown in my face by exploding shells. When within about twenty yards of the breastworks, a shell whizzed passed me so close that I felt the force of the air, striking the ground right in our company and _____ three feet of and a little to the _____ exploded. So great was the concussion that it knocked four of our men down, and almost _____ me off my feet, scattering the dirt and gravel over me, but strange as it may seem doing no damage save a few light scratches and breaking a musket in the hands of one of our men. As soon as I had recovered from the shock I sprang forward, waving my sword in one hand and my cap in the other and shouted to the men to come on and I assure you they were not slow in obeying. As soon as we reached the breastworks we lay down behind it to take breath. While lying there I noticed one battery of their guns planted directly in our front which was being worked as rapidly as possible. I saw the _____ run out a piece and fire it, looking directly at it and being in our immediate front, I plainly saw the shell the moment it left the gun. It seemed like a dark speck creating kind of a vacuum as it passed through the air. Of course the sight was only for the moment, but it was as distinct as anything could be. I have read of similar occurrences in Napoleon's wars. The projectile can only be seen when the sun is in direct line with the guns. In this instance I plainly felt the force of the air as it passed over me. It struck the ground a few feet back of me and exploded, doing us no harm. The breastwork seemed to shelter us somewhat from the grape and canister and bursting shells which now came thicker than ever. The scene as we lay behind the breastworks was awfully grand. Every second a shell would fly hissing over our heads and burst behind us, tearing up the dirt at a terrible _____. _____ we had become sufficiently _____. The command was given, "forward!", this time for the top of the ridge. A _____ time we had to run the gauntlet, as we had about _____ hundred yards of open ground to _____ over before us along the foot of the ridge and be subject to an enfilading fire from a battery on our left. But we soon made it, and with but one man (Col. Boynton) slightly wounded. As we were double quicking over this _____ I passed by a large stump behind which I saw one of Co ___'s men _____. Having my sword in my hand and it being no time for _____ I gave him a slap with the broad side of my sword on his _____ of _____ and _____ him up. He sprang up quick as _____ and went forward with the regiment. When we reached the foot of the ridge we were out of danger from the artillery, as they could not depress their guns enough to reach us. But then the musket balls came thick, and fast enough to make up for this. And we had the most difficult part of the task before us. The ridge in front of us was probably three hundred feet high, and very abrupt. On the top was the battery of three guns, before spoken of, planted in a redoubt built of logs, and behind those logs, as we afterward learned, was twelve regiments of rebels under the immediate command of General Bragg himself. These were in our immediate front, but we started to carry the ridge by storm, even without orders, and so at it we went with a shout. Slowly but steadily we worked our way up the steep, rocky face of the ridge. Being active and long-winded, I was soon far in advance of the whole line, having none but the color bearer with me. When we arrived within about fifty or seventy five feet from the top, I ordered the color bearer to halt a moment to take breath. We stopped behind a large rock for protection, but I soon found that sheltering behind the rock with bullets and shells and grape and canister flying around thick would not do, so stepping out, I said to the color bearer, come on! without waiting for the advance to reach us. Just as I stepped out, one of Co C's men (Kumler) came up to me. Looking up to the top I saw a color bearer standing by the works. Turning to Kumler I said, "shoot that man holding the colors." _____ to the order he fired, and the next moment himself dropped to my feet, having been shot through the head with a musket ball. Then turning, being still fifty feet in advance of the line, waving sword in one hand and cap in the other, I shouted "come on 35th!" I can't tell why I was so far in advance of the line when my position rightly was behind the men to see that none skulked. But I _____ to be _____ by an irresistible force, perfectly oblivious to all danger which I did not see nor hear. The next moment I was in the redoubt with not a single man with me. Here I had no doubt but that I would have a hand to hand fight, but I think I hear you say, if you thought to find the rebels in strong force in the redoubt, why did you venture there all alone? To which I answer, I can't tell, but as before stated I was impelled by an invisible power. To my utter astonishment, when I got inside of the redoubt, I saw the rebels on a full run on the crest of the ridge, the men of their line not being more than twenty steps from me. As soon as I saw them I gave them the contents of my revolver, firing six shots in quick succession. Then I sat down under one of the cannon, completely exhausted. Up to this time I had not felt the fatigue consequent upon climbing over such a rocky and up such a steep hill. I immediately reloaded my revolver and started after the rebels again. By this time a dozen different regiments was represented on the ridge, all completely disorganized. As fast as the men came up, whether they belonged to the 35th or some other regiment, I placed them in line behind the breastworks. As I passed over the ground where I first saw the fleeing rebels I found two dead having been shot through the head, and two more wounded, and as mine was the only shots fired at them from this point, it is pretty evident that my shots were not all wasted. So precipitate was their flight that one of the pieces of artillery which they abandoned was loaded, not having had time to discharge it. They made a stand at a short distance from this battery which they had abandoned, and for a few minutes they fought like tigers. There being no field officer present and _____ that instant work was absolutely necessary, as they were about to turn the battery on us, I took it upon myself to have the men fix bayonets preparatory to making a charge, when looking round I saw Maj. Budd of our regiment standing beside a large tree. I instantly sprang to him and said, Maj. Budd, order a charge immediately or we would be driven from this point. This was a little out of the _____ military tactics, but there was no time to _____ on ceremony. I saw that we were in imminent danger as the rebels in another minute would turn the artillery on us. The major evidently saw and realized the danger too, for he immediately called out, "Charge, men! Double quick!" The men sprang over the logs and with bayonets fixed charged in most gallant style, driving the rebels away before they could make use of the artillery. In this charge one of the bravest men of Co H fell mortally wounded in the left breast and dropped by my side. Seeing him fall and finding that he was very badly hurt, I stopped and helped him up and supported him away to prevent his being tramped upon. I helped carry him part of the way down the ridge, and there left him in the care of the ambulance corps, and returned.

NOTE

Upon picking up Alfred Amlin (the name of the soldier wounded) the bullet which struck him fell to the ground, which I picked up and put in my pocket where I carried it for twenty years when I lost it. Just as the charge was ordered suddenly there appeared before me a fine looking young man dressed in a suit of gray. Throwing up his hands, he called out, "I surrender! I surrender! Where shall I go?" Pointing down the ridge with my sword I said, "go down the ridge as fast as you can go," which he did. I don't know what became of him. By this time it was getting dark, and the rebels having been driven from all points, the firing ceased. In this last charge, Lt. Mather received a buckshot wound just above the knee under the bone. This will disable him for some time, and it leaves me in command of the company. In this battle Co H had only two men severely and one man mortally wounded besides Lieut. Mather. This is truly wonderful seeing that we were in the front line, and ascended the ridge at the highest and most difficult point. The 35th had three commissioned officers and fifteen men wounded, and six men killed. This was one of the greatest victories won that was ever achieved by any army. In looking over the field, noting the natural strength and advantages of the rebel position and added to this the additional strength made as by their redoubts and breastworks, it seems almost incredible that we should have succeeded in charging the ridge. To the old 14th Corps more than to any other is undoubtedly due this grand victory, occupying the center and capturing the ridge without orders, just at a moment when Sherman on our left was being hard pressed, having been driven from several positions which he had gained, the tide at once changed. The force in his front was compelled to withdraw being threatened on its right flank, they became demoralized and fled in confusion. I am fully satisfied that if the 14th Corps had occupied the ridge as the rebels did, all the troops in the rebellion could not have dislodged it. Yet they are brave men. Commanded by brave, competent officers. It looks to me like a special interposition of divine providence on the side of justice and humanity. We spent the night on the ridge. I had not tasted a mouthful of food since early morning, our cook having failed to bring us our beans. (We learned afterward that the cook and beans had been captured by Genl Forrest and his staff, who ate the beans intended for us.) You may be sure that I was hungry. But all I had for supper was hardtack and coffee, which I ate with dead and wounded men lying all around me. It would be impossible for me to give you anything like a true description of my feelings as I paced up and down the ridge. I could not sleep, as had no blanket to cover me and the night was chilly-cold, and even if I had had a good warm bed, my nerves were so utterly unstrung by what I had passed through, that I could not even sit still, much less sleep, so nearly the whole night was spent in walking up and down the ridge. In this fight, although we were the assaulting party and fought under great disadvantage, yet the rebel loss was fully ten to our one.

Letter from "Z" dated 27 Nov 1863 to the Louisville Anzeiger, published 6 Dec 1863; located in August Willich's Gallant Dutchmen, by Joseph Reinhart

Now began the hard work. The 6 shots resounded and in an instant our column advanced. We went at the double quick until we were at the first line of the Rebels' fortifications, which they had left in a hurry. Up to then we had few losses of human life. Joe Bernhardt, a young soldier of the 9th company, we lost immediately while deploying in line of battle. He was shattered by a cannon ball.

After we had rested some at the first fortifications the voice of our old Blücher [General Willich] resounded: "Second line forward." [We] rose as one man [and] stormed toward the mountain, slowly but surely, hardly paying attention to the murderous crossfire of the rifles and cannon of the Rebels. Always going forward, the enemy fire was always stronger, however, here it was about victory or death. After some time we arrived under the enemy fire. Everyone pulled their strength together again, and [we] were not checked until we arrived in front of the Rebels' breastworks, whose ranks broke, and we planted our flag on the ridge at the strongest position of the enemy. This jubilation, the hurrahs that broke out there appeared to be without end. The Rebels, who did not receive our mercy here, ran in a hurry from there in order to get out of range of our bullets. Willich's brigade was the first to climb up to the crest of the ridge and it was the flags of the 32nd Indiana and the 15th Ohio regiments that first floated on the fortifications. Wood's and Sheridan's divisions and a part of Thomas' [Palmer's] Corps took part in the charge.

And what was the fruit of our labor? In the line of Willich's Brigade, 17 mostly heavy guns were captured; in the whole division 47, together with munitions, horses, etc. Many prisoners were taken. The whole Rebel army retreated in the greatest hurry pursued by Hooker's and Sherman's troops.

The casualties of our regiment amounted to 8 [9] killed and 38 [35] wounded. Under the first [category is] our Major Jacob Glass of Madison, Indiana, and our color bearer, Sgt. Schulz [Cpl. Heinrich Scholtz] among the latter; several have since died from their wounds. Major Glass was buried today.

Our friend Jacob Bauer of the 9th Ohio, a brave soldier, sadly is also one of the killed. [Anton] Kotzleb {Kurtzleb] lost an arm.

Otherwise I have nothing else to report at this time.
 
Actually there were 3 lines of fortifications on the 25th. Skirmish line down in the plain. Rifle pits on a shelf which extended from the base of the Ridge. Then fortifications on top of the ridge. The top fortifications in the center of the ridge were started by Cleburne on the 24th. Bragg instructed him to do so that morning, 24th and he did on the geographic crest. Latter that day others dug in on the geographic crest except Manigault. He told Bragg's head engineer that he was defending that area and would deploy as he wished. What people don't understand is that the Confederates had been on Missionary Ridge for 2 months. Only fortified the top of the Ridge on the day before the battle and day of. Bragg sent Walkers Division from Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge extending his right after Grants demonstration on Orchard Knob on the 23rd. The Federals first offensive movement. Artillery was placed on the top 24th and 25th. Due to the terrain each tube had 1 ammo chest. Some pieces could fire 4 rounds per minute so possible empty a chest, 3" gun has 32 projectiles, in 8 minutes. Double Quick mile is 10 minutes. Federal infantry was 1 1/4 miles from the ridge. Also Alexander says on Lookout his ammo performed about 2 out of 9 times. Most Federals describe the barrage has a light show. It had some effect but not the desired.

Anderson who commanded Hindman's division asked Breckinridge if he could deploy all of his Troops at the top. He was refused. So, Confederates dig in only to find out, they only have 1 wagon of tools per the Army. So, obviously they didn't prepare properly for a direct assault. Had time to 2 months. Why not, is a long story. Federals had a 2 to 1 manpower advantage, But that wasn't the reason they lost. It might have been a mistake to deploy on the geographic crest, because it didn't work. However they continued to do it during the ATL Campaign. Missionary Ridge was hard to defend but with effort, which they didn't use, could of had a different result.

As you know Cleburne was sent to the North end of Missionary Ridge about 2 o'clock on the 24th because of Sherman crossing the Tennessee River. Hardee and his engineer was sent North about 11 o'clock. Hardee placed Cleburne's brigades on the top of 4 hills and planned to use artillery as plunging fire between the slopes. Sherman ends up going to an adjoining hill so there isn't much activity on the 24th. After dark Cleburne pulls his 3 brigades up to the geological crest of the Ridge after he is ordered to stay and fight the next day. Then about 2AM Bragg decides not to defend Lookout Mtn and those troops march 15 miles to the northern end of Missionary Ridge. They get there daybreak and after. Some stragglers thru out the 25th. Sherman is reinforced overnight. Grant sent him 3 more Divisions to go with the 4 he had on the 24th. Grant's tactics were based on Sherman, reason he moves from MS to get here. Again, Cleburne had 3 Brigades with him. His 4 was at least a mile and a half away. 25th his line is extended by another Division. On the 25th Sherman uses 1 division which has 3 brigades, 800, 200 and 200. Then he used 2 other Brigades all Brigade level assaults. Grant saw the stragglers moving north and decided to order another demonstration to the rifle pits. Ordered Troops to STOP there. He has 3 Federal Divisions and a couple of Brigades down in the plain. They fire 6 cannon as the signal to step off. All of them together. Result was the Cumberlanders assault.

Basically what happened. Here shortly the usual cabal will respond that Grant was ordained by God and all of this is wrong.
Great post my rebel friend.
 

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