Bryce
Sergeant
- Joined
- Jun 2, 2011
- Location
- Washington, D.C.
what I said was hyperbole. That was an unfortunate mistake.
what I said was hyperbole. That was an unfortunate mistake.
I appreciate your being professional enough to admit that.I agree with you that what I said was hyperbole. That was an unfortunate mistake.
In the interval, Frank varney had appeared on the scene. Grants lieutenants in the West had become available. And most importantly grant under fire was available. They all called into question two things. Grant veracity and grant abilities.
I don't think he's objective. I think he decided on some level that he would use sources that fit his early opinion of rent.
All interesting but I've read the books. And I've read Rhea's assessments of Grant and Lee. They are far from unequivocally positive about Grant and they are very far from an obsequious parroting of Badeau and Porter.As I may have mentioned, Gordon and I had a subdued continual fight over his lack of objectivity. In the same chapter, he would condemn a Warren and Burnside for doing things and then write about Hancock doing the same things and give him a free pass
But the worst problem was over general grant. I objected to his using the three same sources over and over again – – Adam bandeau, Grant's memoirs, and Horace Porter. I believed at the time and I still think that they're tainted sources and can't be relied upon.
Disagreements came to a head when Grant handed me the chapters of a new manuscript which later became "on to Petersburg." There was an eight year interval between this new manuscript and grants previous manuscript on cold Harbor.
In the interval, Frank varney had appeared on the scene. Grants lieutenants in the West had become available. And most importantly grant under fire was available. They all called into question two things. Grant veracity and grant abilities.
I assure you that Gordon did not take anything they said into account. He acted as though nothing has been published.
I became especially upset when I read his chapter which stated on what date Grant decided to march to Petersburg. Gordon was basing his estimates on his usual three sources.
I'll stay here that grant's decision to march to Petersburg was one of the most brilliant decisions of the entire war. I would say it ranks with his decision to send a fleet pass the Vicksburg batteries so that he could land his army on the east side of the Mississippi.
But the big question is how soon was he capable of making that decision. If he made it a day or two after June 3, then that implies that it was in the back of his mind all along. If he made it around June 8, then it seems Less of brilliant decision.
I got in touch with Joseph Rose. I asked him to read a variety of other sources who were contemporaneous and who wrote on a daily basis,and quote from them. What they said on each day between June third and June 13, 1865
Joseph created a spreadsheet which made it clear that Gordon was miscalculating
Gordon ignored what Rose said.
I complained to garden editor at LSU press and of course I shouldn't have done that. This created a barrier between Gordon and me. This barrier continues to exist to this state.
I don't think he's objective. I think he decided on some level that he would use sources that fit his early opinion of rent.
Another brilliant plan of grants can be found in the official records volume 46 part one. His original plan which is dated March 24, 1865for the ninth offensive was radically different from what he decided to do. Originally he planned to send nearly the entire army of the Potomac and three divisions of the army of the James and the Calvalry as well across hatchers run. This meant he would hold the Petersburg lines with a minimal force.
In my opinion, this was a grand maneuver that reminded me of the campaign grant launched after he crossed the Mississippi.
But Grant changed the plan three or four days later and adopted a much more conservative and much safer plan. He replaced the second and fifth army, corps in the trenches with three divisions from the army of the James, which had secretly transferred from north of the James. He sent the 2 army of the Potomac corps across hatchers run along with Sheridan's newly arrived cavalry
There was nothing wrong with that idea. Warren believed that Grant should have sent the infantry and the Calvary up the road from DEWITT courthouse to five Forks. That's what I think too
The second plan instead called for pinning the Confederates down in the white Oak Road line by pressing the second army and the fifth army corps up against their lines.
This robbed the attacking force of the infantry that was needed. It meant that everything depended on the success of the cavalry.
Grants objectives for the cavalry was originally to tear up the southside railroad. Later he changed the objective to luring a substantial part of the ANV out of the white Oak line into the open field, where Sheridan could defeat it.
I don't think this second plan was brilliant at all. In fact, I think it was making the same mistake that he did over and over again during the siege of Petersburg
Grand lieutenants in the west is a dissertation written by a colleague and friend of mine who used to teach at Cape Girardeau, Missouri. It's a wonderful dissertation, but it's never been publish.
Woodworth is worthless
Woodworth is worthless
Do you ever post anything that's accurate?To be fair though, he's a social historian rather than a military one. It's not surprising he lacks any grasp on theory of operations etc.
By the way, I went and checked Rhea's vol. 5 and his discussion of the emergence of the plan to cross the James. Rhea relies primarily on Grant's message to Halleck on June 5 stating exactly that [OR Vol. XXXVI Part 3 at 598]. Moreover, in n. 3 to p. 62-63 Rhea categorically rejects Porter's account of the plan and when Grant had it in mind.As I may have mentioned, Gordon and I had a subdued continual fight over his lack of objectivity. In the same chapter, he would condemn a Warren and Burnside for doing things and then write about Hancock doing the same things and give him a free pass
But the worst problem was over general grant. I objected to his using the three same sources over and over again – – Adam bandeau, Grant's memoirs, and Horace Porter. I believed at the time and I still think that they're tainted sources and can't be relied upon.
Disagreements came to a head when Grant handed me the chapters of a new manuscript which later became "on to Petersburg." There was an eight year interval between this new manuscript and grants previous manuscript on cold Harbor.
In the interval, Frank varney had appeared on the scene. Grants lieutenants in the West had become available. And most importantly grant under fire was available. They all called into question two things. Grant veracity and grant abilities.
I assure you that Gordon did not take anything they said into account. He acted as though nothing has been published.
I became especially upset when I read his chapter which stated on what date Grant decided to march to Petersburg. Gordon was basing his estimates on his usual three sources.
I'll stay here that grant's decision to march to Petersburg was one of the most brilliant decisions of the entire war. I would say it ranks with his decision to send a fleet pass the Vicksburg batteries so that he could land his army on the east side of the Mississippi.
But the big question is how soon was he capable of making that decision. If he made it a day or two after June 3, then that implies that it was in the back of his mind all along. If he made it around June 8, then it seems Less of brilliant decision.
I got in touch with Joseph Rose. I asked him to read a variety of other sources who were contemporaneous and who wrote on a daily basis,and quote from them. What they said on each day between June third and June 13, 1865
Joseph created a spreadsheet which made it clear that Gordon was miscalculating
Gordon ignored what Rose said.
I complained to garden editor at LSU press and of course I shouldn't have done that. This created a barrier between Gordon and me. This barrier continues to exist to this state.
I don't think he's objective. I think he decided on some level that he would use sources that fit his early opinion of rent.
Another brilliant plan of grants can be found in the official records volume 46 part one. His original plan which is dated March 24, 1865for the ninth offensive was radically different from what he decided to do. Originally he planned to send nearly the entire army of the Potomac and three divisions of the army of the James and the Calvalry as well across hatchers run. This meant he would hold the Petersburg lines with a minimal force.
In my opinion, this was a grand maneuver that reminded me of the campaign grant launched after he crossed the Mississippi.
But Grant changed the plan three or four days later and adopted a much more conservative and much safer plan. He replaced the second and fifth army, corps in the trenches with three divisions from the army of the James, which had secretly transferred from north of the James. He sent the 2 army of the Potomac corps across hatchers run along with Sheridan's newly arrived cavalry
There was nothing wrong with that idea. Warren believed that Grant should have sent the infantry and the Calvary up the road from DEWITT courthouse to five Forks. That's what I think too
The second plan instead called for pinning the Confederates down in the white Oak Road line by pressing the second army and the fifth army corps up against their lines.
This robbed the attacking force of the infantry that was needed. It meant that everything depended on the success of the cavalry.
Grants objectives for the cavalry was originally to tear up the southside railroad. Later he changed the objective to luring a substantial part of the ANV out of the white Oak line into the open field, where Sheridan could defeat it.
I don't think this second plan was brilliant at all. In fact, I think it was making the same mistake that he did over and over again during the siege of Petersburg
You must be thinking of someone differentTo be fair though, he's a social historian rather than a military one. It's not surprising he lacks any grasp on theory of operations etc.
Maybe Joanne Woodward.You must be thinking of someone different
Varney is the one who is worthless. He made numerous false accusations against Woodworth for allegedly sole-sourcing Grant's Memoirs. Readers of Varney need to check his notes and verify his claims. They're a mess.Woodworth is worthless
Yes he is.Varney is the one who is worthless
And Lloyd Lewis was a Jungian philosopher.To be fair though, he's a social historian rather than a military one. It's not surprising he lacks any grasp on theory of operations etc.
Why?Woodworth is worthless
Aren't you following? He's a "social" historian. Somebody should alert TCU.Why?