Most "Intelligent" General...?

And he was lucky that Confederate commanders muffed their intelligence. A S Johnston was not aware of how close Buell really was - like right behind the next Indian mound.
It's so difficult to comprehend the masses of troops on both sides -- infantry, artillery, cavalry and support going head to head in the very limited battlefield on which they fought. The peach orchard, bloody pond, the sunken road and the hornets nest. The noise, smoke, yells, screams of 10s of thousand men desperately fighting for there lives and their buddies. It must have been one heck of a cage match.
 
And he was lucky that Confederate commanders muffed their intelligence. A S Johnston was not aware of how close Buell really was - like right behind the next Indian mound.
Grant had no idea that Johnston would leave his fortifications at Corinth and take the initiative.

But it was early in the war and commanders were making assumptions that turned out to be in error.

Grant almost got flummoxed with that assumption.
 
Grant had no idea that Johnston would leave his fortifications at Corinth and take the initiative.

But it was early in the war and commanders were making assumptions that turned out to be in error.

Grant almost got flummoxed with that assumption.
Flushed with the victories at Forts Henry and Donelson no doubt
 
MODERATOR'S NOTE:

Folks please don't use abbreviations too frequently, as there are folks who have no military background or familiarity as to what "BMI" or "S2" means.

Remember, we got kids, teens, adults and grand-parents who come here and take advantage of the information/knowledge here.

Its ok to use abbreviations after posting it in full once -- but, starting out, please be including all of us -- not just some of us.

Please know that you can return to any of your posts made previously and edit. Use the "edit" feature on the bottom of the posting window to do such.

Much appreciated!

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
Aug. 24, 2014 9:53 a.m.
 
Good point M E Wolf. For those who are not familiar with the term S2 I can explain some what. The S2 section, be it at battalion to army or higher is responsible for providing the commanders with intelligence. They also collect information and forward it up the chain of command.

A typical S2 section will receive a flood on information coming from subordinate units. The S2 section will also receive a great deal of information and intelligence coming down from higher headquarters as well as information from other staff sections. There is often so much information that a commander would spend his or her entire day just reading it. The S2 section uses its training and guidance form the commander to put all the information into a form that will allow the commander to make timely command decisions. The S2 section will also provide appropriate intelligence to the rest of the staff so that the other staff sections will operate based on the most current intelligence. Finally the S2 section will provide relevant intelligence to subordinate commanders and their staff sections.

Although this sounds very easy it is not. I have been a battalion level S2 officer and it was challenging assignment. You end up standing like a deer in headlights, trying to explain to the battalion commander why the brigadier general had more current intelligence than he/she did and why all the other battalion commanders laughed at him/her at the last briefing.
 
Thanks- I'll look into that a bit more.
I guess if we have a thread about the most intelligent general then we would need one to contrast it such has the least intelligent general. I suppose McCllean would have the dubious honor of being at least in the top 5 list.
Leftyhunter
 
Seems to me that intelligence means thinking intelligently. Well, yeah, there was that kind that was fed to you. But intelligently meant, to me, using whatever information you got to your advantage. Intelligence or information and what you make of it.
 
It's an interesting and provocative concept for a thread. I'm glad you brought it up, simply because it is sure to provoke a fair amount of interesting response. I personally don't know how "intelligence" could be evaluated after 150 years, but I'll enjoy everyone's thoughts on the matter. Thank you.
 
Good point M E Wolf. For those who are not familiar with the term S2 I can explain some what. The S2 section, be it at battalion to army or higher is responsible for providing the commanders with intelligence. They also collect information and forward it up the chain of command.

A typical S2 section will receive a flood on information coming from subordinate units. The S2 section will also receive a great deal of information and intelligence coming down from higher headquarters as well as information from other staff sections. There is often so much information that a commander would spend his or her entire day just reading it. The S2 section uses its training and guidance form the commander to put all the information into a form that will allow the commander to make timely command decisions. The S2 section will also provide appropriate intelligence to the rest of the staff so that the other staff sections will operate based on the most current intelligence. Finally the S2 section will provide relevant intelligence to subordinate commanders and their staff sections.

Although this sounds very easy it is not. I have been a battalion level S2 officer and it was challenging assignment. You end up standing like a deer in headlights, trying to explain to the battalion commander why the brigadier general had more current intelligence than he/she did and why all the other battalion commanders laughed at him/her at the last briefing.
10 - 4, good buddy! :-)
 
MODERATOR'S NOTE:

Please keep the focus on who the "Most Intelligent General" to Civil War only.

Again, we're not given a criteria as to what qualifies as "Intelligent."

Coup-de-OEil as defined by Scott's Military Dictionary:
The seeing at a glance of the eye, the features of the country or the position of the enemy. The term also implies the judicious selection of the most advantageous position for an encampment or a field of battle.

Perhaps defining which General had the 'book smarts' and able to take it and apply it to battlefield command?


Would it be a General that was the person of innovation, such as introduction of new tactics, weapon improvement(s), or different deployment techniques?

When posting -- please define what makes your General the "Most Intelligent General."

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
Aug. 25, 2014 10:57 p.m.

 
For M E Wolf's additional definitions, I think we have a number of generals who could read the topography well and use it to their advantage. Jeb Stuart had a particularly good eye for the lay of the land. Forrest was excellent with this: one example is at Fallen Timbers he didn't just use obstacles but had a specific type of area in mind - he chose where the battle would be. It was slightly uphill, tangled with fallen logs and brambles, and muddy - boggy places would form all over here. He knew infantry was behind him and they would have hard going. Sure enough, he saw the line breaking up as the men approached and when they were disorganized enough he charged. Sherman apparently never got it and thought his men had run for no reason - Forrest had all the advantages! Another good one was the combination of land features and weather, at Brice's Crossroads. It might have been the first time in the CW that weather was consciously used as a weapon against the enemy! Forrest knew Mississippi in June - hot and muggy - and knew the Union soldiers would be running in wool.
 
For M E Wolf's additional definitions, I think we have a number of generals who could read the topography well and use it to their advantage. Jeb Stuart had a particularly good eye for the lay of the land. Forrest was excellent with this: one example is at Fallen Timbers he didn't just use obstacles but had a specific type of area in mind - he chose where the battle would be. It was slightly uphill, tangled with fallen logs and brambles, and muddy - boggy places would form all over here. He knew infantry was behind him and they would have hard going. Sure enough, he saw the line breaking up as the men approached and when they were disorganized enough he charged. Sherman apparently never got it and thought his men had run for no reason - Forrest had all the advantages! Another good one was the combination of land features and weather, at Brice's Crossroads. It might have been the first time in the CW that weather was consciously used as a weapon against the enemy! Forrest knew Mississippi in June - hot and muggy - and knew the Union soldiers would be running in wool.

I am of the belief that Confederate General Wade Hampton had such an 'eye' for details.

On the Union side, Generals Jno. Buford, Geo. Stoneman, Thomas Devin, Wm. Gamble, Wesley Merritt, Emory Upton,
seemingly had 'the eye.'

M. E. Wolf
 
I am of the belief that Confederate General Wade Hampton had such an 'eye' for details.

On the Union side, Generals Jno. Buford, Geo. Stoneman, Thomas Devin, Wm. Gamble, Wesley Merritt, Emory Upton,
seemingly had 'the eye.'

M. E. Wolf

Wesley Merritt sure gets forgotten and he wasn't bad a'tall!
 
It's going to be hard to beat the advantage the BMI afforded the AoP, but is that the best use of intelligence during the war?

What about Lee's use of Stuart to determine the AoP's positions/disposition and then defeat it, despite often being outnumbered? Or at Chancellorsville, where he was able to determine that the VI Corps was not moving, and therefore able to attack the Union flank- which he found out about through use of local informants?

Any other examples?
From Steve Sears book on Chancellorsville I would argue it wasn't so much that Jackson as brilliant on his attack on the 11th corps but the staff officers being of the AoP being negligent. A Captain in a Oh artillery unit saw Jackson's men advance towards the 11th Corp and warned the staff officers but they ignored him. One could argue that Gen. Howard made a basic mistake in not having a adequate picket line at least a few hundred yards away to guard against a surprise attack such has the Union suffered at Pitts Landing . Which leads to the classic military question "was the victor that good or the defeated force that bad"?
One could argue that CSA intel at Gettysburg was bad. Would a division or more of CSA troops march to Gettysburg in search of shoes if they knew that a huge portion of the AoP was also heading to Gburg and would be there not much much time after they arrived? Gen. Bufford seemed to have good intel and knew the CSA would arrive at Gburg and sent couriers to locate reinforcements ASAP. It has been argued that Stuart (and we have had at least one thread about this ) failed to use his men to provide effective recon to the AnV instead of trying to make up for Brandy Station by trying to conduct some spectacular cav action.
It appear that both Gen. Curtis in the battle of Pea Ridge and latter Gen. Herron in the battle of Paririe Grove had good intel. They both knew that Mo was going to be attacked so they set out for Ar with smaller forces and both beat larger forces. Gen. Curtis so defeated Gen. van Doren that he was able to march all the way to Helena, Ar and in doing so lived off the land which may of inspired Sherman two years latter to do the same in Ga.
Leftyhunter
 
.... Gen. Curtis so defeated Gen. van Doren that he was able to march all the way to Helena, Ar ....
There is a danger in overselling here.
Pea Ridge was in March. In April Van Dorn took most of his remaining troops across the Mississippi to join the Confederate forces at Corinth. It was after Van Dorn left that Curtis marched for Helena.
 
There is a danger in overselling here.
Pea Ridge was in March. In April Van Dorn took most of his remaining troops across the Mississippi to join the Confederate forces at Corinth. It was after Van Dorn left that Curtis marched for Helena.
Which leads to an unrelated but important point. By the spring of 1862 with the CW just a year old there simply was not enough CSA troops to protect both Ar and Ms. No the Union could not occupy all of Ar but at least the major cities and waterways. If Union troops wanted to travel through Ar there was only so much the CSA could do.
What good did Van Doren do going to Cornith? At the end of the day Gen. Halleck shows up with 100k men and the CSA forces can either retreat or die -they chose to retreat.
Leftyhunter
 
But the (to use its later designation) Army of Tennessee could still use the manpower, and Tennessee's (where it went under Bragg) importance to the Confederacy outweighed Arkansas's.

Speaking of which, Bragg seems to have been a rather erratically informed general, especially with him getting minimal if any information in Kentucky from his subordinates. Not sure how good his ability to process what he got was, but there's no Stuart in this theater any more than there is an obedient senior command.
 
Which leads to an unrelated but important point. By the spring of 1862 with the CW just a year old there simply was not enough CSA troops to protect both Ar and Ms. No the Union could not occupy all of Ar but at least the major cities and waterways. If Union troops wanted to travel through Ar there was only so much the CSA could do.
Though even after Van Dorn left the state, Hindman was able to keep Curtis from taking Little Rock in 1862.
 

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