Federal / Confederate Corps / Division Flexibility

[tony_gunter]

During the Vicksburg Campaign, Grant was given complete flexibility in selecting corps commanders (except for McClernand) and rearranging the composition of his corps and divisions.

How much flexibility did Pemberton have? I find it odd that Pemberton finds himself at Champion Hill with his most experienced battlefield commander (Featherston) sitting in garrison while nearly half his army in the field reports to a man who has never been in a major battle (Carter Stevenson).

 

[Samwisep86]

It seems like Pemberton didn't get a lot of choice in the makeup of his divisions (or didn't feel like he could), since one Division commander (Loring) hated his guts and decided to join Johnston's Army without telling him (basically causing the conditions for the Big Black River fight).

 

[Rhea Cole]

In order to answer the question, the chains of command in the Mississippi Valley have to graphed.

Major General Grant was both the commander of both the Department of the Tennessee & the Army of Tennessee. His authority extended from Cairo IL down the Mississippi Valley to Mississippi. Banks at Port Hudson did not report to Grant. Both Grant & Banks reported to Halleck, who commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi.

After Vicksburg, Grant became commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi & Sherman in turn.

Union Vicksburg Chain of Command

• • Union Commander: Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
  • Union Department: Department of the Tennessee (formed in Oct. 1862)
  • Union Army: Army of the Tennessee
  • Key Corps Commanders:
    • XIII Corps: Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand
    • XV Corps: Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
    • XVII Corps: Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson

The Department of the Tennessee was a massive administrative and geographical command created in October 1862, stretching from Cairo, Illinois, down to northern Mississippi. This department provided Grant with the necessary manpower (numbering roughly 31,000 to 45,000 troops) and logistical freedom to launch his operations against Vicksburg.


Confederate Chain of Command

• • Commander in Chief: President Jefferson Davis. Davis viewed Vicksburg as the absolute key to the Confederacy and ordered Pemberton to hold the city at all costs.
  • Department Commander: General Joseph E. Johnston. As commander of the Department of the West, Johnston was Pemberton's superior. He advocated for a more mobile defense and attempting to relieve the city with a separate force, but was ultimately unable to stop Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's overwhelming advance.
  • Army of Vicksburg Commander: Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Pemberton was tasked with defending the fortress city but was forced to divide his forces and was ultimately outmaneuvered by Grant.
  • Divisional Commanders:Pemberton's army was organized into four primary infantry divisions:
    • Major General Carter L. Stevenson
    • Major General John H. Forney
    • Major General Martin L. Smith
    • Major General John S. Bowen

What paralyzed the Confederate operations at Vicksburg was meddling by President Davis. Pemberton received direct orders from the Commander & Chief over the head of General Joseph Johnston, the department commander. Davis' delusional belief in his military genius muddled command decisions in the Western Theater.

Davis prevented Joesph Johnston from exercising his authority as departmental commander. Pemberton, for his part, chose to follow orders from the president & ignore repeated commands from his immediate superior. We know how that worked out.

Pemberton was an army commander. Many of the commanders in Mississippi & adjacent territories did not report Pemberton. They reported to the Department Commander, Johnston. He had no authority to issued orders nor change commanders.

The TransMississippi was in a separate department. Neither Johnston nor Pemberton commanded any forces across the river.

Grant reported to Halleck. That had some problematical issues, however, the telegraph did not extend below Memphis. As a result, however much Halleck wished to meddle with & outright frustrate Grant's out of the box operations, events out raced his orders. Famously a staff officer showed up at Grant's HQ during the siege of Vicksburg with orders for Grant to send a significant reinforcement to the floundering siege at Port Hudson. A Nelsonian blind eye was turned & the staff officer was never seen again.

Grant was dealing with political influences. Major General McClerland of Illinois was very useful politically & from his ability to rally men to the ranks. One of Grant's strengths was that he followed Lincoln's orders without complaint. Once McClerland had both out lived his political & military utility, into the trash can he went.

That being said, it was Grant's duty as both department & army commander to recommend deserving officers for promotion & those found to be wanting to be passed over or dismissed. That was routine.

If you want to know what Grant's telegraphic messages to & from Washington were, let me introduce the Eckert Collection at the Huntington Library in California.

After the war, Thomas Eckert, who commanded the U.S. Military Telegraph Station in Washington D.C. took the ledger books home with him… all of them. Code books included. It quite a source.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

You probably want to know what Assistant Secretary of War Dana was reporting from Grant's HQ. Here are the bespoke signal ledgers where Dana's eyes only dispatches to Lincoln were recorded.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

Union & Confederate Commanders' Bios

Link

Commanders of the Vicksburg campaign - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

A listing of commanders serving during the Vicksburg campaign.

www.nps.gov

 

[Samwisep86]

Samwisep86, in order to answer your question, the chains of command in the Mississippi Valley have to graphed.

Major General Grant was both the commander of both the Department of the Tennessee & the Army of Tennessee. His authority extended from Cairo IL down the Mississippi Valley to Mississippi. Banks at Port Hudson did not report to Grant. Both Grant & Banks reported to Halleck, who commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi.

After Vicksburg, Grant became commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi & Sherman in turn.

Union Vicksburg Chain of Command

• • Union Commander: Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
  • Union Department: Department of the Tennessee (formed in Oct. 1862)
  • Union Army: Army of the Tennessee
  • Key Corps Commanders:
    • XIII Corps: Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand
    • XV Corps: Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
    • XVII Corps: Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson

The Department of the Tennessee was a massive administrative and geographical command created in October 1862, stretching from Cairo, Illinois, down to northern Mississippi. This department provided Grant with the necessary manpower (numbering roughly 31,000 to 45,000 troops) and logistical freedom to launch his operations against Vicksburg.


Confederate Chain of Command

• • Commander in Chief: President Jefferson Davis. Davis viewed Vicksburg as the absolute key to the Confederacy and ordered Pemberton to hold the city at all costs.
  • Department Commander: General Joseph E. Johnston. As commander of the Department of the West, Johnston was Pemberton's superior. He advocated for a more mobile defense and attempting to relieve the city with a separate force, but was ultimately unable to stop Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's overwhelming advance.
  • Army of Vicksburg Commander: Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Pemberton was tasked with defending the fortress city but was forced to divide his forces and was ultimately outmaneuvered by Grant.
  • Divisional Commanders:Pemberton's army was organized into four primary infantry divisions:
    • Major General Carter L. Stevenson
    • Major General John H. Forney
    • Major General Martin L. Smith
    • Major General John S. Bowen

What paralyzed the Confederate operations at Vicksburg was meddling by President Davis. Pemberton received direct orders from the Commander & Chief over the head of General Joseph Johnston, the department commander. Davis' delusional belief in his military genius muddled command decisions in the Western Theater.

Davis prevented Joesph Johnston from exercising his authority as departmental commander. Pemberton, for his part, chose to follow orders from the president & ignore repeated commands from his immediate superior. We know how that worked out.

Pemberton was an army commander. Many of the commanders in Mississippi & adjacent territories did not report Pemberton. They reported to the Department Commander, Johnston. He had no authority to issued orders nor change commanders.

The TransMississippi was in a separate department. Neither Johnston nor Pemberton commanded any forces across the river.

Grant reported to Halleck. That had some problematical issues, however, the telegraph did not extend below Memphis. As a result, however much Halleck wished to meddle with & outright frustrate Grant's out of the box operations, events out raced his orders. Famously a staff officer showed up at Grant's HQ during the siege of Vicksburg with orders for Grant to send a significant reinforcement to Porter's floundering command at Port Hudson. A Nelsonian blind eye was turned & the staff officer was never seen again.

Grant was dealing with political influences. Major General McClerland of Illinois was very useful politically & from his ability to rally men to the ranks. One of Grant's strengths was that he followed Lincoln's orders without complaint. Once McClerland had both out lived his political & military utility, into the trash can he went.

That being said, it was Grant's duty as both department & army commander to recommend deserving officers for promotion & those found to be wanting to be passed over or dismissed. That was routine.

If you want to know what Grant's telegraphic messages to & from Washington were, let me introduce the Eckert Collection at the Huntington Library in California.

After the war, Thomas Eckert, who commanded the U.S. Military Telegraph Station in Washington D.C. took the ledger books home with him… all of them. Code books included. It quite a source.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

You probably want to know what Assistant Secretary of War Dana was reporting from Grant's HQ. Here are the bespoke signal ledgers where Dana's eyes only dispatches to Lincoln were recorded.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

Union & Confederate Commanders' Bios

Link

Commanders of the Vicksburg campaign - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

A listing of commanders serving during the Vicksburg campaign.

www.nps.gov

Thanks for the post, but I think tony was asking the question, not me.

 

[huskerblitz]

Samwisep86, in order to answer your question, the chains of command in the Mississippi Valley have to graphed.

Major General Grant was both the commander of both the Department of the Tennessee & the Army of Tennessee. His authority extended from Cairo IL down the Mississippi Valley to Mississippi. Banks at Port Hudson did not report to Grant. Both Grant & Banks reported to Halleck, who commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi.

After Vicksburg, Grant became commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi & Sherman in turn.

Union Vicksburg Chain of Command

• • Union Commander: Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant
  • Union Department: Department of the Tennessee (formed in Oct. 1862)
  • Union Army: Army of the Tennessee
  • Key Corps Commanders:
    • XIII Corps: Maj. Gen. John A. McClernand
    • XV Corps: Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman
    • XVII Corps: Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson

The Department of the Tennessee was a massive administrative and geographical command created in October 1862, stretching from Cairo, Illinois, down to northern Mississippi. This department provided Grant with the necessary manpower (numbering roughly 31,000 to 45,000 troops) and logistical freedom to launch his operations against Vicksburg.


Confederate Chain of Command

• • Commander in Chief: President Jefferson Davis. Davis viewed Vicksburg as the absolute key to the Confederacy and ordered Pemberton to hold the city at all costs.
  • Department Commander: General Joseph E. Johnston. As commander of the Department of the West, Johnston was Pemberton's superior. He advocated for a more mobile defense and attempting to relieve the city with a separate force, but was ultimately unable to stop Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's overwhelming advance.
  • Army of Vicksburg Commander: Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Pemberton was tasked with defending the fortress city but was forced to divide his forces and was ultimately outmaneuvered by Grant.
  • Divisional Commanders:Pemberton's army was organized into four primary infantry divisions:
    • Major General Carter L. Stevenson
    • Major General John H. Forney
    • Major General Martin L. Smith
    • Major General John S. Bowen

What paralyzed the Confederate operations at Vicksburg was meddling by President Davis. Pemberton received direct orders from the Commander & Chief over the head of General Joseph Johnston, the department commander. Davis' delusional belief in his military genius muddled command decisions in the Western Theater.

Davis prevented Joesph Johnston from exercising his authority as departmental commander. Pemberton, for his part, chose to follow orders from the president & ignore repeated commands from his immediate superior. We know how that worked out.

Pemberton was an army commander. Many of the commanders in Mississippi & adjacent territories did not report Pemberton. They reported to the Department Commander, Johnston. He had no authority to issued orders nor change commanders.

The TransMississippi was in a separate department. Neither Johnston nor Pemberton commanded any forces across the river.

Grant reported to Halleck. That had some problematical issues, however, the telegraph did not extend below Memphis. As a result, however much Halleck wished to meddle with & outright frustrate Grant's out of the box operations, events out raced his orders. Famously a staff officer showed up at Grant's HQ during the siege of Vicksburg with orders for Grant to send a significant reinforcement to Porter's floundering command at Port Hudson. A Nelsonian blind eye was turned & the staff officer was never seen again.

Grant was dealing with political influences. Major General McClerland of Illinois was very useful politically & from his ability to rally men to the ranks. One of Grant's strengths was that he followed Lincoln's orders without complaint. Once McClerland had both out lived his political & military utility, into the trash can he went.

That being said, it was Grant's duty as both department & army commander to recommend deserving officers for promotion & those found to be wanting to be passed over or dismissed. That was routine.

If you want to know what Grant's telegraphic messages to & from Washington were, let me introduce the Eckert Collection at the Huntington Library in California.

After the war, Thomas Eckert, who commanded the U.S. Military Telegraph Station in Washington D.C. took the ledger books home with him… all of them. Code books included. It quite a source.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

You probably want to know what Assistant Secretary of War Dana was reporting from Grant's HQ. Here are the bespoke signal ledgers where Dana's eyes only dispatches to Lincoln were recorded.

Link

CONTENTdm

hdl.huntington.org

Union & Confederate Commanders' Bios

Link

Commanders of the Vicksburg campaign - Vicksburg National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

A listing of commanders serving during the Vicksburg campaign.

www.nps.gov

I find it odd you start the chain of command with Davis for the Confederacy and not Lincoln for the Union. In addition, as commander-in-chief there can be no meddling as they are the top of the food chain, sort of speak. They are the top of the chain of command and they can decide pretty much anything in regards to the military.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I find it odd you start the chain of command with Davis for the Confederacy and not Lincoln for the Union. In addition, as commander-in-chief there can be no meddling as they are the top of the food chain, sort of speak. They are the top of the chain of command and they can decide pretty much anything in regards to the military.

It is odd. David intervened directly into the operations in Johnston's department & Pemberton's army commands. That is why he is listed without the Secretary of War & what we call the chief of staff that should be listed in the chain of command.

Lincoln, on the other hand, behaved like a commander in chief. He made policy but did not tell Grant how to carry it out. While it was politically important to keep McClernard it was Grant's job to deal with it. When no longer necessary, Lincoln let Grant deal with it as he felt necessary.

As posted up thread, you can read the official telegraphic traffic & Dana's eye's only dispatches to Lincoln to see how oversight from Washington was handled. No need to speculate.

 

[67th Tigers]

Legally, only the President can appoint corps commanders. Did Halleck ask Grant who he wanted appointed?

Checking, there were four subordinate major-generals in Grant's department (McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson, with that order of seniority), and they simply all got designated to a corps by General Order 210 from the War Dept in Lincoln's name. The corps were numbered in line with seniority.

Grant's letter to McPherson of 19th December indicates this was imposed by Halleck et al., and it appears Halleck has simply assigned each subordinate Major-General to be a corps commander. Thus it wasn't really any selection by Grant...

 

[tony_gunter]

I find it odd you start the chain of command with Davis for the Confederacy and not Lincoln for the Union. In addition, as commander-in-chief there can be no meddling as they are the top of the food chain, sort of speak. They are the top of the chain of command and they can decide pretty much anything in regards to the military.

Not anything technically. Congress has their dirty mitts in there too.

 

[tony_gunter]

Legally, only the President can appoint corps commanders. Did Halleck ask Grant who he wanted appointed?

Checking, there were four subordinate major-generals in Grant's department (McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut and McPherson, with that order of seniority), and they simply all got designated to a corps by General Order 210 from the War Dept in Lincoln's name. The corps were numbered in line with seniority.

Grant's letter to McPherson of 19th December indicates this was imposed by Halleck et al., and it appears Halleck has simply assigned each subordinate Major-General to be a corps commander. Thus it wasn't really any selection by Grant...

Halleck basically asked Grant who he wanted.

As a result, Lew Wallace was diverted from the department at the last minute, McPherson got an unexpected bump up to corps command.

 

[huskerblitz]

Sure sucks to have oversight, doesn't it?

It is odd. David intervened directly into the operations in Johnston's department & Pemberton's army commands. That is why he is listed without the Secretary of War & what we call the chief of staff that should be listed in the chain of command.

Lincoln, on the other hand, behaved like a commander in chief. He made policy but did not tell Grant how to carry it out. While it was politically important to keep McClernard it was Grant's job to deal with it. When no longer necessary, Lincoln let Grant deal with it as he felt necessary.

As posted up thread, you can read the official telegraphic traffic & Dana's eye's only dispatches to Lincoln to see how oversight from Washington was handled. No need to speculate.

I think a current forum member would disagree.

 

[tony_gunter]

By the way, total brain misfire about Featherston. He was only a brigade commander and was in the field under Loring. Maybe I was thinking of Forney, but his only major battle was bull run.

But maybe the general point still stands, why is Carter Stevenson, relatively inexperienced, in command of half the army in the field? I don't see a lot of options though. Pemberton was toast.

 

[Mississippian1861]

Confederate Chain of Command

• • Commander in Chief: President Jefferson Davis. Davis viewed Vicksburg as the absolute key to the Confederacy and ordered Pemberton to hold the city at all costs.
  • Department Commander: General Joseph E. Johnston. As commander of the Department of the West, Johnston was Pemberton's superior. He advocated for a more mobile defense and attempting to relieve the city with a separate force, but was ultimately unable to stop Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's overwhelming advance.
  • Army of Vicksburg Commander: Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton. Pemberton was tasked with defending the fortress city but was forced to divide his forces and was ultimately outmaneuvered by Grant.
  • Divisional Commanders:Pemberton's army was organized into four primary infantry divisions:
    • Major General Carter L. Stevenson
    • Major General John H. Forney
    • Major General Martin L. Smith
    • Major General John S. Bowen

What paralyzed the Confederate operations at Vicksburg was meddling by President Davis. Pemberton received direct orders from the Commander & Chief over the head of General Joseph Johnston, the department commander. Davis' delusional belief in his military genius muddled command decisions in the Western Theater.

Davis prevented Joesph Johnston from exercising his authority as departmental commander. Pemberton, for his part, chose to follow orders from the president & ignore repeated commands from his immediate superior. We know how that worked out.

Pemberton was an army commander. Many of the commanders in Mississippi & adjacent territories did not report Pemberton. They reported to the Department Commander, Johnston. He had no authority to issued orders nor change commanders.

The TransMississippi was in a separate department. Neither Johnston nor Pemberton commanded any forces across the river.

A few corrections:

Pemberton commanded the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, which was subordinate to Johnston's Department of the West, which also included Bragg's Army of Tennessee.

Pemberton had command of (as of April '63):

The First District was Northeastern MS under Daniel Ruggles. HQ at Colubmus MS. Composed of a brigade of cavalry, plus some state troops and a few heavy artillery companies, its main job was watch the Federal garrison at Corinth and protect the Mobile and Ohio Railroad and the CS depots at Columbus.

The Second District was Vicksburg and the surrounding area under Carter Stevenson. It had the bulk of the CS forces in the Department with Stevenson's Divison, Smith's Division, Forney's (later Bowen's) Division, and part of Maury's (later Forney's) Division.

The Third District was the District of East Louisiana and had a division size force of five brigades plus cavalry and heavy artillery under Franklin Gardner. HQ at Port Hudson.

The Fourth District was interior Mississippi with HQ at Jackson under John Adams with odds and ends of a few detached regiments and state troops.

The Fifth District was Northwestern MS under James Chalmers. HQ at Grenada. Composed of a few cavalry regiments and state troops that were spread very thinly, mostly gathering supplies and conscripts and watching for raids out of Memphis.

William Loring had a floating divisional size command of three brigades at Fort Pemberton.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

I find it odd you start the chain of command with Davis for the Confederacy and not Lincoln for the Union. In addition, as commander-in-chief there can be no meddling as they are the top of the food chain, sort of speak. They are the top of the chain of command and they can decide pretty much anything in regards to the military.

I guess one should say that Davis "over-controlled" military situations rather than "meddling" with them.

 

[JohnG0609]

By the way, total brain misfire about Featherston. He was only a brigade commander and was in the field under Loring. Maybe I was thinking of Forney, but his only major battle was bull run.

But maybe the general point still stands, why is Carter Stevenson, relatively inexperienced, in command of half the army in the field? I don't see a lot of options though. Pemberton was toast.

Forney had been seriously wounded in the left arm at the Battle of Dranesville. The wound would not heal and he required multiple surgeries and he wasn't really fit for field duty. I have not yet come across the thought process of sending him to Vicksburg from Mobile and substituting Buckner. Forney temporarily took over Price's division at BBR Bridge in February, then Bowen was detached to Grand Gulf in March. On 04/18 Green was ordered from BBR bridge to Bowen's support. Forney followed to Grand Gulf in command of the division only to be ordered back to Snyder's Mill to take over from the departing Dabney Maury. Leaving Bowen to command the division (again). I suspect there had been some friction between Green and Bowen over command of the 1st Missouri brigade.

Stevenson, while not having led his division in combat, had led the division competently in East Tennessee. Marching them to Cumberland Gap and back. Interestingly, Stevenson had been Loring's Chief of Staff in Northwest Virginia.

To answer your question as to what authorities Pemberton possessed over major generals, I would say as much as he wanted.
Recall that he: 1. Reorganized Lovell out of a division and a job
2. Moved Van Dorn from Infantry corps command to Cavalry corps command
3. Ordered Gardner up from Port Hudson to Jackson to take command of arriving brigades (then turned him back)
4. Did not retain Maury when the government asked if he could spare him for East Tennessee
5. Substituted Forney for Maury, giving Bowen back the division.

Of the brigadiers, Tilghman had probably the shortest combat resume. 30 mins at Fort Henry and the rearguard action at Abbeville. Actually it was probably Buford, who had not come into Confederate service until after the Kentucky campaign, tried to organize a Kentucky cavalry brigade, and got run off to Mississippi by Bragg. Pemberton continued his banishment by sending him to Port Hudson and trying to organize a brigade for him. Rust was ordered to the Trans-Mississippi. Pemberton broke up that brigade and the balance went to Buford (with a couple of KY regiments added) and the rest to Tilghman.

 

[67th Tigers]

Halleck basically asked Grant who he wanted.

As a result, Lew Wallace was diverted from the department at the last minute, McPherson got an unexpected bump up to corps command.

When?

I can see Grant lobbying Halleck to make McPherson a MG ahead of any awards for Corinth etc. back in October. I can see Grant asking that neither Wallace nor McClernand be ordered to his department on 14th December, because they ranked the existing senior officers, but we know this was ignored.

Wallace, for his part, had been tasked with the court-of-inquiry for Buell, and was so tasked a month before the order to form Corps.

 

[tony_gunter]

When?

I can see Grant lobbying Halleck to make McPherson a MG ahead of any awards for Corinth etc. back in October. I can see Grant asking that neither Wallace nor McClernand be ordered to his department on 14th December, because they ranked the existing senior officers, but we know this was ignored.

Wallace, for his part, had been tasked with the court-of-inquiry for Buell, and was so tasked a month before the order to form Corps.

Charles Hamilton was promoted to date in September. James B McPherson promoted to date a month later.

Halleck asks Grant if he's situated with his commanders, and he replies that he would be happy to have Lew Wallace if he had less rank, but adding him now would upend his command structure.

Grant makes plans to add him by telling Dodge he will need to give up his post and come to the front, but Halleck diverts Wallace to keep Grant's command structure intact.

 

[Bradley]

Pemberton was an army commander. Many of the commanders in Mississippi & adjacent territories did not report Pemberton. They reported to the Department Commander, Johnston.

Pemberton was in command of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana. All of the army commanders in Mississippi (such as Van Dorn, Smith, Stevenson, Gardner, etc.) were subordinate to Pemberton and reported to him, not to Joseph Johnston. At pretty much no point during his tenure in Mississippi prior to Champion Hill was Pemberton in command of an army in the field. He attended a few reviews, he inspected the fortifications and garrisons of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. That's about it. Most of the rank and file probably never laid eyes on Pemberton more than once or twice.

 

[Bradley]

It seems like Pemberton didn't get a lot of choice in the makeup of his divisions (or didn't feel like he could), since one Division commander (Loring) hated his guts and decided to join Johnston's Army without telling him (basically causing the conditions for the Big Black River fight).

Pemberton was pretty well stuck with what he had, to the extent that I suspect in Pemberton's estimation that Loring ranked far higher than previous subordinates Lovell, Van Dorn, Price, Beall, etc., none of whom he was able to get rid of but almost certainly would have liked to.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

In addition, as commander-in-chief there can be no meddling as they are the top of the food chain, sort of speak. They are the top of the chain of command and they can decide pretty much anything in regards to the military.

If messages are supposed to follow the chain of command up then they should follow the chain of command down. Giving instructions directly to subordinates of subordinates rather than through the intermediate levels of command is a good way to foster resentment among those whom you are circumventing, and - as with David and Johnston both talking to Pemberton - lead to conflicting orders.

For example, an army commander should not be giving orders directly to division commanders or artillery battery commanders, except in an emergency. Orders should go through the corps commander. This was the source of much of the tension between Grant and Meade during the Overland Campaign.

I guess one should say that Davis "over-controlled" military situations rather than "meddling" with them.

Micro-managing.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

If messages are supposed to follow the chain of command up then they should follow the chain of command down. Giving instructions directly to subordinates of subordinates rather than through the intermediate levels of command is a good way to foster resentment among those whom you are circumventing, and - as with David and Johnston both talking to Pemberton - lead to conflicting orders.

For example, an army commander should not be giving orders directly to division commanders or artillery battery commanders, except in an emergency. Orders should go through the corps commander. This was the source of much of the tension between Grant and Meade during the Overland Campaign.



Micro-managing.

You are correct indeed. Micro-managing is the best term for it.