If marksmanship skills didn't matter for line infantry esp in volley fire, why did soldiers bother aiming on their iron sights using proper stances?

[wausaubob]

part of the issue that is often overlooked in the smoothbore vs rifle debate is the quality and wear and tear of the actual guns.
The smoothbores many of Grants men carried where old and worn guns when they where imported from Europe... and then used for up to 1½ years in an active war.
The guns captured was obviously also used in the same war, but many where Enfield's that where new guns when imported.
It also was a step in the direction of standardization on 577/58 cal.
So even without the potential combat multiplier from rifling the exchange of guns was a good idea.

And the western officers seemed to be aware of the difference. If an officer had served in Mexico and on the Pacific coast he probably had more contact with the soldiers and non commissioned officers and probably learned more about rifles, (and small unit tactics).

 

[wausaubob]

part of the issue that is often overlooked in the smoothbore vs rifle debate is the quality and wear and tear of the actual guns.
The smoothbores many of Grants men carried where old and worn guns when they where imported from Europe... and then used for up to 1½ years in an active war.
The guns captured was obviously also used in the same war, but many where Enfield's that where new guns when imported.
It also was a step in the direction of standardization on 577/58 cal.
So even without the potential combat multiplier from rifling the exchange of guns was a good idea.

General Lee's choices after the battle of Gettysburg are an indication that he thought rifle fire had become much more lethal by July 1863.

 

[thomas aagaard]

General Lee's choices after the battle of Gettysburg are an indication that he thought rifle fire had become much more lethal by July 1863.

or his army had become smaller, and both sides better at fighting and less likely to run at the first sign of trouble.

Also, the fire was most likely become more effective... at the range fire was actually given. Out to about 150 yards at the most.
Even with a modern rifle it is still very easy to miss at 100yards, when firing standing.

What there is no evidence of is the ordinary infantry units by some miracle learned how to shot at 200+ yards. Because you don't learn that in combat, but by structured instruction.

 

[wausaubob]

or his army had become smaller, and both sides better at fighting and less likely to run at the first sign of trouble.

Also, the fire was most likely become more effective... at the range fire was actually given. Out to about 150 yards at the most.
Even with a modern rifle it is still very easy to miss at 100yards, when firing standing.

What there is no evidence of is the ordinary infantry units by some miracle learned how to shot at 200+ yards. Because you don't learn that in combat, but by structured instruction.

I think it happened in some units. Some of the soldiers did know how to handle a rifle and they taught their units. My recollection is at least in the US army there were shooting competitions. If the effective range of the rifles was 200 yards, because the minie ball stayed true up to that distance, that would be a big change from the 100 yard range of the muskets. That might a change from 20 seconds to close on the enemy line to 40 seconds.
The survivors of the early battles learned how to shoot. And they became aware that their unit's proficiency mattered with respect to their chances of survival.
The number of officers killed in combat could be an indication that there were marksmen in both armies.

 

[Old Soldier]

part of the issue that is often overlooked in the smoothbore vs rifle debate is the quality and wear and tear of the actual guns.
The smoothbores many of Grants men carried where old and worn guns when they where imported from Europe... and then used for up to 1½ years in an active war.
The guns captured was obviously also used in the same war, but many where Enfield's that where new guns when imported.
It also was a step in the direction of standardization on 577/58 cal.
So even without the potential combat multiplier from rifling the exchange of guns was a good idea.

There are a number of reports of Union troops armed with smooth-bore/imported guns happy to pick up a rebel p53 on the battlefield and throw their own issue weapon away - even the newer M1861/63s.

 

[FortWorthJim]

This post from Reddit is making me inquisitive.



He does bring a good point about one thing-why did soldiers prior to World War 1 esp in the era of 1 bullet guns like Napoleonic and American Civil War bother learning proper stances and how to hold a rifle if warfare in the time used nonstop volleys after volleys while in formation because you'd be too blinded to shoot because of the smoke from shooting guns creating fog in the battle field? If that was true, why did soldiers bother even aiming on their iron sights as they began their volleys?

If individual aiming was useless, why not have soldiers just fire their guns at random from the hip or some other sloppy random shooting method? Why did soldiers still train to lay their eyes near the rifle as they shot like modern hunters do while aiming at deer and other prey? If volleys were used during this time because speed of shooting bullets and reloading ASAP to shoot again was the key to victory, why bother teaching soldiers on how to hold rifles in a specific way during the gunpowder eras when guns contained only a single bullet esp in the Napoleonic Wars and before Abraham Lincoln was assassinated? Most of all why did American Civil War soldiers, Revolutionary War troops, and Napoleonic armies bother aiming on their iron sights if gun accuracy was so poor and armies were expected to close in and shoot nonstop volleys where speed of reloading guns was of utmost important? Esp if the battlefield was expected to be covered with smoke thus blinding soldiers? Why no armies ever did volley fire at the hips or some random disorganized way if accuracy was based on how close you were to the enemy and the smoke blinded soldiers' vision? Why bother even aiming on your iron sights at all in such circumstances esp with the method of fighting in this era?

The "Minie ball" was horribly ineffective in the Civil War, but that's underappreciated. It was invented by the Frenchman Etienne Claude Minie and was a brilliant solution to the problem of making a muzzle-loading rifle as quick to load as a muzzle-loading smoothbore. Minie designed his hollow-based bullets with an iron cup in the base to force the expansion of the bullet into the rifling grooves. It was discovered by US ordnanceman Burton testing factory-specification Springfield rifles before the US Civil War that with rifle bores and bullets that both met specification the iron cup or plug - sometimes of wood or ceramic - in the base was not necessary to achieve sufficient expansion to engage the rifling. Rifles at specification with ammunition at specification were demonstrated to be capable of remarkable feats of accuracy at ranges exceeding 500 yards.
In the Crimean War, an undersized defending force of British soldiers highly trained as marksmen shredded a strong Russian attack at great range, earning the Minie rifle the name of "Destroying Angel". So far, so good.

Unfortunately, in the US Civil War, neither side trained its troops in rifle marksmanship, and especially not in the accurate estimation of target range. Minie type rifles had very slow muzzle velocities of about 950 feet per second, well under the speed of sound. Such a bullet takes a full second to travel just 300 yards, and in that period of time due to the force of gravity the bullet would drop 17 feet. Seventeen feet! Springfield rifle sights were preset at 100, 300, and 500 yards. A bullet fired at a target actually at 300 yards with the sight set at 300 yards, using a rifle and ammunition both at specification, had a high chance of hitting the target if otherwise properly aimed, but the arc of the bullet through the air meant that almost no one between the shooter and his target 300 yards away was in any danger of being hit, nor anyone more than a handful of yards beyond the target. This illustrates the importance of correct estimation of range to the accuracy of a gunpowder rifle musket, as they were called, and no one was trained in that task in either American army.

There was yet another problem that rendered even otherwise skilled marksman ineffective, and that is that while BG James Ripley, the US Chief of Ordnance worked miracles to ramp up production of Springfield rifles (and import other rifles such as the British Enfield and Austrian Lorenz), the speeding up of production and the use of subcontractors meant that few rifles or bullets actually met specification, and a Burton Minie bullet without a plug in the base to force expansion would not, solely from combustion gases, expand enough to engage rifling if there was more than about 1/1000 of an inch of tolerance, and the gaps were often multiples of that. The consequence was conical bullets that didn't spin, increased powder fouling, and gross inaccuracy with even shorter effective ranges.

On the other hand, the Minie type bullet was quick to load, effective out to about smoothbore range, 100 yards or so, if actually fired at that range could do considerable damage, and actual engagement ranges in most battles were within that range, so infantry fire caused most wounds and deaths. It just wasn't because the Minie ball was so effective

As for why similar designs aren't used in modern firearms, it's because the Minie style of bullet was a solution to loading speeds in muzzle-loading rifles, and muzzle-loaders were obsolescent in 1866 and obsolete by 1870. Breechloading firearms don't need bullets that slide easily down the barrel but expand to grip rifling.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

As mentioned, using the sights while volley firing was necessarily limited... and they were practically worthless in rapid firing by file (that mode generally used in battle lines)... Line infantry in the previous decades had, in fact, employed the firelock musket... which did not even have rear sights...

The rifle-musket of the 1850s could be fired rapidly, practically unaimed, like the musket, OR, as a rifle, aiming at an individual target at distance, as necessary.

When acting as light infantry or riflemen, viz. in skirmish order, firing at will, etc., the rifles' sights were of tremendous advantage. The previous distinction between infantry, light infantry, and riflemen in previous wars was eliminated in the 1860s.. with any rifle armed troops capable of acting as line infantry, or skirmishers or riflemen as necessary: viz. either delivering rapid firing as with the old muskets... or careful aimed fire like riflemen generally... as necessary or appropriate.

The principal tactics employed by both armies from the commencement was Hardee's "rifle and light infantry" tactics of 1855...

View attachment 548207

Both armies redesignated this system as their common "infantry tactics" generally...

View attachment 548208View attachment 548209

General Sherman observed in his memoirs, that the troops deployed in regular lines, but in the fighting often in the looser order, where the men could make better use of their rifle's accuracy if possible...

View attachment 548206

Rifles and Rifle Practice

www.google.com

For the Union Army...

Rules for the management and cleaning of the rifle musket, model 1863, for the use of soldiers : with descriptive plates : United States. War Dept : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

Springfield armory, April 28, 1863, adopted by the War department for the government of the United States troops.

archive.org

General Bragg had a system of conducting musketry instruction for the Army of Tennessee in 1863.

Incredible sources there with the Sherman quote, thank you very much! I knew Hardee's Manual before, but I've not quite been able to contrast it with direct accounts of how actual combat would have played out.

 

[RedRover]

Incredible sources there with the Sherman quote, thank you very much! I knew Hardee's Manual before, but I've not quite been able to contrast it with direct accounts of how actual combat would have played out.

Sherman's memoirs are pretty good. Lots of military lessons learned, as he wrote it while yet the commanding general of the Army.

There are myriad accounts of combat from the veterans. From regimental histories, letters. etc. All the troops were trained by Hardee's, or variant like Casey's. Where infantry previously might be disordered by any loss of the touch of elbows, or disorder in or among the ranks, under these light infantry systems (now just designated infantry) the troops were instructed to remain organized in spite of any disorder of the ranks and files, etc. Or even their extension into single rank at extended order... or even as skirmishers, with the line even more widely spaced.

This included maneuvering at the double-quick time..., in column, line, or deploying or ploying between the two...

And the skirmish drill, with the files extended, etc....

Ira Dodd of the 26th New Jersey noted that it was learning the skirmish drill which made the troops capable of the necessary tactical flexibility for modern war...

From the 1892 drill regulations of the Army...

When commanders thought it was advantageous or necessary to concentrate the troops in close order, even in dense columns of attack, they did so. When they thought it was to advantage, or necessary, to form them in extended order, like a skirmish line... they did so. When necessary to form in a mere skirmish line, so it was... and they could change the order as necessary, at the double quick...

In any case, however formed, in column or line, on the battlefield, the maneuvering units were covered by deployed skirmish lines.




An excellent singular case of this flexibility per the new "infantry" tactics (the rifle and light infantry tactics) is the 20th Maine Volunteers' defense of the US left flank on Little Round Top at Gettysburg on July 2, 1862. Col. Chamberlain formed his men into line in the customary manner. With the line established, he then formed them on the ground in the best manner to defend it... viz. the flank threatened, he had the men extended a pace or two, taking advantage of cover...

1863-07-06 Chamberlain's Gettysburg battle report

By Joshua L. Chamberlain, Published on 07/06/63

digitalmaine.com

And he formed a couple companies forward of his line as skirmishers.


Hardee's/Casey's gives instruction on loading and firing kneeling or lying down, etc.

This came in handy, the men of the 20th in their fighting defense of the hillside against fierce Confederate attacks they piled up rocks and loaded and fired lying down behind them...

Captain Prince of the 20th noting the rebs were equally extended, and covered by the ground...

This did not lead to confusion, as like most of the troops of the time, they had been instructed in skirmish drill, where the men would have to fight in scattered groups, extended order, under cover, etc. etc.

During the subsequent fighting for the hillside, his line became even more extended... to avoid being outflanked, and due to casualties...

Chamberlain describes his line being "shattered" and formed in small "squads" before the final charge... Chamberlain to Gerrish, 1882: Maine.


and in their final charge, with the bayonet, he had them close up somewhat and sweep down the hill...Chamberlain noted that at the time of this charge, the men were directed to take five pace intervals, viz. "ordered 'bayonets fixed,' and 'forward' at a run" and that "I directed the whole Regiment to take intervals at 5 paces by the left flank, & change direction to the right, all this without checking our speed … while the left [wing] swept around …"

This was done so quickly, the Confederates in their front, equally extended and covered by the rocks and trees, had no time to close up and meet the 20th with a line of bayonets...



Where column attacks were considered of necessity, with the men formed in masses, they could be made...

There were also occasions where regiments formed in double column (two company front, the rest of the companies doubled behind, or in ca. 8-10 ranks) made assaults without deploying into line of battle... or before they could do so. General Halleck noted that on occasions where the double-column, or "column of attack" was employed, it was 8 to 10 ranks deep.

In the assault on Kennesaw Mountain in June, 1864 Newton's US division, made its attack through the woods with the regiments formed in double-columns, 10 ranks deep each.

Here's a Julian Scott painting of a Union regiment advancing into action in double-column... before deploying into line of battle...

Similarly, some of the troops of Pickett's and Pettigrew's charge at Gettysburg, advanced to the attack in line, but ployed into double columns to advance faster without disorder. The commander of the 8th Ohio opposite Pettigrew noted this, except for a regiment on the extreme left, which continued to advance in line against his position:

Or Like Hardee's Corps at the Battle of Atlanta. Gen. Grenville Dodge, USA:

Either these columns would overwhelm the enemy skirmishers, and drive through weak points in their lines, or they would be lashed by fire, and recoil and/or deploy into line of battle to trade fire with an enemy line in front...

So while two ranks was the common standard line of battle, and the mode in the drill, there were plenty of occasions where one rank was employed, or even several, as occasion, terrain, etc. dictated.

Where necessary, they even doubled up into four or more ranks, to deliver an even hotter fire... the men in rear loading and handing up the guns for a rapid and continuous fire... like that delivered by the Confederates at Maryes' heights at Fredericksburg...

Similarly, among the Union troops of Schofield at the Battle of Franklin, behind their breastworks they were four deep, delivering a blazing and continuous fire, as only the front men fired, the three, or more behind them loading so the front man could fire as fast as he could be handed them...

And where necessary, the troops could form in a single rank. or single rank in extended order akin a skirmish line. For example, General Bate's Division in the works on Shy's Hill at Nashville in December, 1864. The men were posted several paces apart in the works. And in fact they were so extended as to be overrun by the Union SKIRMISH LINE preceding their actual assaulting units in line!

 

[Old Soldier]

I love that first illustration. no action shots in those days, just the sketch artist and illustrator. Imean ALL of them in straight lines and all in step running up that slope! The last two are far more realistic.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Have to admit that I am somewhat bemused at some of the assertions about rifled muskets in this thread. Sweeping pronouncements are made without citations of any kind. That is odd because there is a source that documents the range & accuracy of almost every Civil War long gun.

Many of you have probably seen the Claud E. Fuller Collection of US Army long guns at Chickamauga visitor center.

The Fuller Gun Collection - Chickamauga & Chattanooga National Military Park (U.S. National Park Service)

www.nps.gov

Those who haven't will definitely include the Fuller Collection in your planned visit.

The Rifled Musket by Claude E. Fuller is a singular reference book, quite unlike any other. Everyone should have a copy. Out of print, it is available used. With free sign up, it is online at:

The Rifled Musket : Fuller, Claud E. : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

archive.org

In 1860 the Ordinance Department tested a large number of smoothbore & rifled long arms. Individual serving soldiers fired singly & in squads at 6' X 6' paper targets. The soldiers were not sharpshooters.

In The Rifled Musket Fuller reproduces the 1860 tests. In this page at 100 yards only 35-40 of the smoothbore balls reached the target at 100 yards. A number of them barely made it that far.

Compare the smoothbore results at 100 yards with rifled muskets at 300 yards. Fifty shots fired, fifty hits. With a stiff breeze from right to left, at 500 yards scored forty three hits. Notice that unlike the smoothbore, the shots are clustered above the 3' line.

Link to CWT post listing results of the test firings:

The Rifle-Musket vs. The Smoothbore Musket | Small Arms & Ammunition

This is from The Rifle-Musket vs. The Smoothbore Musket, a Comparison of the Effectiveness of the Two Types of Weapons Primarily at Short Ranges. by Justin Stanage. The data is actually coming from Claud E. Fuller, The Rifled Musket, which was published in 1958. The data in Fuller is from...

civilwartalk.com

In the contemporary debate about the new US Army rifle that is replacing M-16 derivatives lethality at long range is a vexed issue. Now, just as during the Civil War, small arms engagements are inside 300 yards.

As can clearly be seen in the 1860 Ordinance Department tests, rifled muskets were effective at 300 yards.

As you would expect, short barreled carbines were much less effective at that range. It is sobering to consider the effective range that Buford's breechloading carbines engaged Heath's infantry at Gettysburg.

Fuller also included an encyclopedic listing of every long gun type purchased by the U.S., pages of ammunition types & the only definitive description of the exploding rifle bullets used by both sides at Gettysburg they I know of.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The "Minie ball" was horribly ineffective in the Civil War, but that's underappreciated. It was invented by the Frenchman Etienne Claude Minie and was a brilliant solution to the problem of making a muzzle-loading rifle as quick to load as a muzzle-loading smoothbore. Minie designed his hollow-based bullets with an iron cup in the base to force the expansion of the bullet into the rifling grooves. It was discovered by US ordnanceman Burton testing factory-specification Springfield rifles before the US Civil War that with rifle bores and bullets that both met specification the iron cup or plug - sometimes of wood or ceramic - in the base was not necessary to achieve sufficient expansion to engage the rifling. Rifles at specification with ammunition at specification were demonstrated to be capable of remarkable feats of accuracy at ranges exceeding 500 yards.
In the Crimean War, an undersized defending force of British soldiers highly trained as marksmen shredded a strong Russian attack at great range, earning the Minie rifle the name of "Destroying Angel". So far, so good.

Unfortunately, in the US Civil War, neither side trained its troops in rifle marksmanship, and especially not in the accurate estimation of target range. Minie type rifles had very slow muzzle velocities of about 950 feet per second, well under the speed of sound. Such a bullet takes a full second to travel just 300 yards, and in that period of time due to the force of gravity the bullet would drop 17 feet. Seventeen feet! Springfield rifle sights were preset at 100, 300, and 500 yards. A bullet fired at a target actually at 300 yards with the sight set at 300 yards, using a rifle and ammunition both at specification, had a high chance of hitting the target if otherwise properly aimed, but the arc of the bullet through the air meant that almost no one between the shooter and his target 300 yards away was in any danger of being hit, nor anyone more than a handful of yards beyond the target. This illustrates the importance of correct estimation of range to the accuracy of a gunpowder rifle musket, as they were called, and no one was trained in that task in either American army.

There was yet another problem that rendered even otherwise skilled marksman ineffective, and that is that while BG James Ripley, the US Chief of Ordnance worked miracles to ramp up production of Springfield rifles (and import other rifles such as the British Enfield and Austrian Lorenz), the speeding up of production and the use of subcontractors meant that few rifles or bullets actually met specification, and a Burton Minie bullet without a plug in the base to force expansion would not, solely from combustion gases, expand enough to engage rifling if there was more than about 1/1000 of an inch of tolerance, and the gaps were often multiples of that. The consequence was conical bullets that didn't spin, increased powder fouling, and gross inaccuracy with even shorter effective ranges.

On the other hand, the Minie type bullet was quick to load, effective out to about smoothbore range, 100 yards or so, if actually fired at that range could do considerable damage, and actual engagement ranges in most battles were within that range, so infantry fire caused most wounds and deaths. It just wasn't because the Minie ball was so effective

As for why similar designs aren't used in modern firearms, it's because the Minie style of bullet was a solution to loading speeds in muzzle-loading rifles, and muzzle-loaders were obsolescent in 1866 and obsolete by 1870. Breechloading firearms don't need bullets that slide easily down the barrel but expand to grip rifling.

1860 Ordinance Bureau test results for rifled musket at 300 yards. Fifty out of fifty hits. With a stiff breeze from right & rear at 500 yards 43 hits.

At 100 yards only 30-40 hits out of fifty fired. Of them about 1/2 were below the 3' center line & barely reaching the target.

As the1860 Ordinance Bureau test results clearly indicate, rifled muskets outranged smoothbores by an order of magnitude.

Re: The Rifled Musket by Claude E. Fuller.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Sherman's memoirs are pretty good. Lots of military lessons learned, as he wrote it while yet the commanding general of the Army.

There are myriad accounts of combat from the veterans. From regimental histories, letters. etc. All the troops were trained by Hardee's, or variant like Casey's. Where infantry previously might be disordered by any loss of the touch of elbows, or disorder in or among the ranks, under these light infantry systems (now just designated infantry) the troops were instructed to remain organized in spite of any disorder of the ranks and files, etc. Or even their extension into single rank at extended order... or even as skirmishers, with the line even more widely spaced.

This included maneuvering at the double-quick time..., in column, line, or deploying or ploying between the two...

View attachment 548546

And the skirmish drill, with the files extended, etc....

View attachment 548547

Ira Dodd of the 26th New Jersey noted that it was learning the skirmish drill which made the troops capable of the necessary tactical flexibility for modern war...

View attachment 548552


From the 1892 drill regulations of the Army...

View attachment 548548


When commanders thought it was advantageous or necessary to concentrate the troops in close order, even in dense columns of attack, they did so. When they thought it was to advantage, or necessary, to form them in extended order, like a skirmish line... they did so. When necessary to form in a mere skirmish line, so it was... and they could change the order as necessary, at the double quick...

In any case, however formed, in column or line, on the battlefield, the maneuvering units were covered by deployed skirmish lines.




An excellent singular case of this flexibility per the new "infantry" tactics (the rifle and light infantry tactics) is the 20th Maine Volunteers' defense of the US left flank on Little Round Top at Gettysburg on July 2, 1862. Col. Chamberlain formed his men into line in the customary manner. With the line established, he then formed them on the ground in the best manner to defend it... viz. the flank threatened, he had the men extended a pace or two, taking advantage of cover...


View attachment 548555

1863-07-06 Chamberlain's Gettysburg battle report

By Joshua L. Chamberlain, Published on 07/06/63

digitalmaine.com

And he formed a couple companies forward of his line as skirmishers.


Hardee's/Casey's gives instruction on loading and firing kneeling or lying down, etc.


View attachment 548557

This came in handy, the men of the 20th in their fighting defense of the hillside against fierce Confederate attacks they piled up rocks and loaded and fired lying down behind them...

View attachment 548550

Captain Prince of the 20th noting the rebs were equally extended, and covered by the ground...

View attachment 548551

This did not lead to confusion, as like most of the troops of the time, they had been instructed in skirmish drill, where the men would have to fight in scattered groups, extended order, under cover, etc. etc.

During the subsequent fighting for the hillside, his line became even more extended... to avoid being outflanked, and due to casualties...
View attachment 548549

Chamberlain describes his line being "shattered" and formed in small "squads" before the final charge... Chamberlain to Gerrish, 1882: Maine.


and in their final charge, with the bayonet, he had them close up somewhat and sweep down the hill...Chamberlain noted that at the time of this charge, the men were directed to take five pace intervals, viz. "ordered 'bayonets fixed,' and 'forward' at a run" and that "I directed the whole Regiment to take intervals at 5 paces by the left flank, & change direction to the right, all this without checking our speed … while the left [wing] swept around …"

This was done so quickly, the Confederates in their front, equally extended and covered by the rocks and trees, had no time to close up and meet the 20th with a line of bayonets...



Where column attacks were considered of necessity, with the men formed in masses, they could be made...

There were also occasions where regiments formed in double column (two company front, the rest of the companies doubled behind, or in ca. 8-10 ranks) made assaults without deploying into line of battle... or before they could do so. General Halleck noted that on occasions where the double-column, or "column of attack" was employed, it was 8 to 10 ranks deep.

In the assault on Kennesaw Mountain in June, 1864 Newton's US division, made its attack through the woods with the regiments formed in double-columns, 10 ranks deep each.

Here's a Julian Scott painting of a Union regiment advancing into action in double-column... before deploying into line of battle...

Similarly, some of the troops of Pickett's and Pettigrew's charge at Gettysburg, advanced to the attack in line, but ployed into double columns to advance faster without disorder. The commander of the 8th Ohio opposite Pettigrew noted this, except for a regiment on the extreme left, which continued to advance in line against his position:

Or Like Hardee's Corps at the Battle of Atlanta. Gen. Grenville Dodge, USA:

Either these columns would overwhelm the enemy skirmishers, and drive through weak points in their lines, or they would be lashed by fire, and recoil and/or deploy into line of battle to trade fire with an enemy line in front...

View attachment 548553


So while two ranks was the common standard line of battle, and the mode in the drill, there were plenty of occasions where one rank was employed, or even several, as occasion, terrain, etc. dictated.

Where necessary, they even doubled up into four or more ranks, to deliver an even hotter fire... the men in rear loading and handing up the guns for a rapid and continuous fire... like that delivered by the Confederates at Maryes' heights at Fredericksburg...

Similarly, among the Union troops of Schofield at the Battle of Franklin, behind their breastworks they were four deep, delivering a blazing and continuous fire, as only the front men fired, the three, or more behind them loading so the front man could fire as fast as he could be handed them...

And where necessary, the troops could form in a single rank. or single rank in extended order akin a skirmish line. For example, General Bate's Division in the works on Shy's Hill at Nashville in December, 1864. The men were posted several paces apart in the works. And in fact they were so extended as to be overrun by the Union SKIRMISH LINE preceding their actual assaulting units in line!

Thank you, this earns a bookmark! I had heard the accounts of countless enlisted men, but with the exception of Miller's Photographic History of the Civil War, I've seen little of high ranking officers or generals giving personal accounts of tactics... definitely something to dive into. My response will pale in comparison to yours, but I thoroughly enjoyed it!

- As regarding one of the images you provided, it's among my favorites of formations, from Matthew Brady's team - here's a better digitalized version:

Union soldiers at bayonet drill in a camp during the American Civil War, c. 1861-1865. Attributed to Mathew Brady.

Julian Scott is also great... As I'm here, could you provide any help with these formations? I keep seeing them, and despite what I have read of Hardee's Manual and general knowledge I've been unable to to explain or provide evidence in detail of the nature of the tactics depicted in the following images:

Harper's Weekly July 20th, 1861. Page 452. the 11th Indiana Zouaves deployed as skirmishers.

Normally I might take a Harper's Weekly lithograph that doesn't necessarily seem to be directly made from a photograph with a grain of salt, if you've seen some of the proportions and depictions in some lithographs, but it's also in this James Hope painting:

A Fateful Turn, Captain James Hope - a depiction of Antietam, one of multiple by someone who was there, all of which feature a fair bit of skirmish tactics, and in this particular case, the very same one from the lithograph, that prone skirmish column:

Detail on the bottom left. Any help?

 

[Saphroneth]

So the skills that you need in order to be an effective combat shooter with a minie rifle are:


- The raw ability to actually load and fire the rifle, inculcated by drill. This is actually something a number of ACW soldiers struggled with due to insufficient drill.
This can be trained through drilling.
- The ability to set and use the sights for a known range. That is, once you know the range, set the sights, line up the sights with the target and shoot at a target (say, 200 yards)
This can be practiced by shooting competitions.
- The ability to adjust for adverse conditions and otherwise make sure that your shot is not thrown off by the things that make musketry less than perfect - things like adjusting for wind, allowing for the range being between the sight settings you have, not being thrown off by the snap of the percussion cap, pressing rather than pulling the trigger and so on.
Each of these things needs to be taught separately and is a situation where live fire drill is helpful, but it's not sufficient - you also need to learn how much to adjust for wind at various ranges, when to bother, and so on. That's an intellectual exercise as much as anything.
- The ability to determine the range to a target at an unknown distance.
This is actually really important for firing out past about 150 yards, though before that it's less important. The greater the range the more your range estimation matters, and learning how to estimate range is actually a hard but learnable skill - but it is one you have to be taught, nobody intuitively knows the difference between 175 and 200 yards, and in your lessons you need to get feedback on whether you were right.

- The ability to combine those things to produce a shot against an enemy (who is at unknown range).

For that final part, as far as is possible you need all of the other bits already. If you're missing one of these things then that will be the weak point - perfectly lining up your sights at an enemy of a known 200 yard range and then pulling the trigger so hard you tug the rifle out of alignment is a miss, not correctly lining up the sights is a miss, assuming the enemy is 250 yards away when you're really 200 is a miss, and loading the ball before the cartridge is certainly a miss.


Importantly, the hardest parts here are the parts which you are not going to learn by any means short of military training. That military training can happen in peacetime, but these skills are not going to come by raw experience if you're hunting a deer in the backwoods. You don't shoot a deer from 200 yards with a musket - you'd go home hungry. Instead you get as close as you can to make a hit as likely as possible, because the deer can't shoot back...



US military training in this period, especially of volunteers, did not emphasize shooting at unknown ranges or systematic training of marksmanship and range estimation. That's no shame on the US, about half of Great Powers didn't (Britain did, Prussia adopts it in this period, the French had a halfway-there system, Austria didn't and to my understanding Russia did not).

 

[RedRover]

Thank you, this earns a bookmark! I had heard the accounts of countless enlisted men, but with the exception of Miller's Photographic History of the Civil War, I've seen little of high ranking officers or generals giving personal accounts of tactics... definitely something to dive into. My response will pale in comparison to yours, but I thoroughly enjoyed it!

- As regarding one of the images you provided, it's among my favorites of formations, from Matthew Brady's team - here's a better digitalized version:

View attachment 548616

Union soldiers at bayonet drill in a camp during the American Civil War, c. 1861-1865. Attributed to Mathew Brady.

Julian Scott is also great... As I'm here, could you provide any help with these formations? I keep seeing them, and despite what I have read of Hardee's Manual and general knowledge I've been unable to to explain or provide evidence in detail of the nature of the tactics depicted in the following images:

View attachment 548617
Harper's Weekly July 20th, 1861. Page 452. the 11th Indiana Zouaves deployed as skirmishers.

Normally I might take a Harper's Weekly lithograph that doesn't necessarily seem to be directly made from a photograph with a grain of salt, if you've seen some of the proportions and depictions in some lithographs, but it's also in this James Hope painting:

View attachment 548619

A Fateful Turn, Captain James Hope - a depiction of Antietam, one of multiple by someone who was there, all of which feature a fair bit of skirmish tactics, and in this particular case, the very same one from the lithograph, that prone skirmish column: View attachment 548620
Detail on the bottom left. Any help?

In the Skirmish drill from Hardee's/Casey's, the "line" divides into groups of four men (two files, front and rear rankers in the 2 rank line of battle), called "comrades in battle." These four men always stick together, or within several paces of each other. When the skirmish line is fully extended, the gaps are between the groups of four.

In the above diagram, the first platoon of company line is deployed as skirmishers, from its left file... A whole company, or whole battalion/regiment, could be deployed as skirmishers on the same principles.

The strongest, or most compact skirmish lines, have the groups of four near enough each other as to appear like a single-rank line of battle in extended order...

At the foremost extension, there was to be no more than 40 paces (about 100 feet) between groups of four, where a skirmish line is at its maximum extension. The groups of four acting quite independently of each other...

Skirmish lines can be maneuvered just like a line of battle, and by essentially the same commands as a line of battle... Forward, right or left face, etc. etc.

In combat, they could fire from a stationary position (the men firing at will, and alternating their fire between file partners so one remains loaded at all times). Or could advance firing. The skirmishers always firing at will. And from more or less cover, lying, kneeling, or standing as necessary or proper, without concern about keeping a perfect, linear alignment.

So in combat, firing advancing forward, the file partners (front and rear rankers in the primitive line of battle), alternate advancing. A front ranker would fire... his rear ranker would rush ahead say 10-12, or more, paces and take cover... covering with his weapon the front as his front ranker reloads and advances toward him, and as to pass in front of him... the rear ranker firing before the front ranker passes in front of him...

This is very similar to modern light infantry tactics, viz. the "bounding overwatch"...

A principal difference with the 1860s being, the skirmishers were to remain silent. The signal that the man in rear was reloaded being his coming up to his covering file partner... who then fires as his partner bounds forward to the next cover to now provide the cover... etc. etc. This was done by files, independently... And consequently, while so advancing, the "skirmish line" would not have a singular front... but more of a "general direction"... and some groups of four might move more easily, quickly forward, than others, etc. In other words, if one part of a skirmish line is "pinned down" as it might be termed, unlike a line of battle, this did not impede the balance of the skirmish line, which would continue to advance, scour the ground, etc. and develop the position of the enemy in front, and the exposed points, etc. before a line of battle or column, behind them, stumbled into it...

In fire advancing such movement thus continues to be executed by each file; the skirmishers keep united, and endeavor, as much as possible, to preserve the "general direction" of their alignment. And the skirmish line could similarly keep up a firing while marching in retreat...

Confederate veteran W.L. Sheppard here illustrates skirmisher firing in retreat...

So, if a line of skirmishers was marching in file, by a right or left face---forward march, called marching "by a flank" etc. and had to open fire, and keep it up, while passing over ground in that order... the skirmish drill provides for it... (something like what is today called a "latteral peel")...

You can see the man in this Harper's image rolling on his back to tip up his muzzle while ramming...

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

In the Skirmish drill from Hardee's/Casey's, the "line" divides into groups of four men (two files, front and rear rankers in the 2 rank line of battle), called "comrades in battle." These four men always stick together, or within several paces of each other. When the skirmish line is fully extended, the gaps are between the groups of four.

View attachment 548622

In the above diagram, the first platoon of company line is deployed as skirmishers, from its left file... A whole company, or whole battalion/regiment, could be deployed as skirmishers on the same principles.

View attachment 548631
View attachment 548630


The strongest, or most compact skirmish lines, have the groups of four near enough each other as to appear like a single-rank line of battle in extended order...

View attachment 548624

At the foremost extension, there was to be no more than 40 paces (about 100 feet) between groups of four, where a skirmish line is at its maximum extension. The groups of four acting quite independently of each other...


View attachment 548623


View attachment 548632
View attachment 548633


Skirmish lines can be maneuvered just like a line of battle, and by essentially the same commands as a line of battle... Forward, right or left face, etc. etc.

In combat, they could fire from a stationary position (the men firing at will, and alternating their fire between file partners so one remains loaded at all times). Or could advance firing. The skirmishers always firing at will. And from more or less cover, lying, kneeling, or standing as necessary or proper, without concern about keeping a perfect, linear alignment.

So in combat, firing advancing forward, the file partners (front and rear rankers in the primitive line of battle), alternate advancing. A front ranker would fire... his rear ranker would rush ahead say 10-12, or more, paces and take cover... covering with his weapon the front as his front ranker reloads and advances toward him, and as to pass in front of him... the rear ranker firing before the front ranker passes in front of him...

This is very similar to modern light infantry tactics, viz. the "bounding overwatch"...

A principal difference with the 1860s being, the skirmishers were to remain silent. The signal that the man in rear was reloaded being his coming up to his covering file partner... who then fires as his partner bounds forward to the next cover to now provide the cover... etc. etc. This was done by files, independently... And consequently, while so advancing, the "skirmish line" would not have a singular front... but more of a "general direction"... and some groups of four might move more easily, quickly forward, than others, etc. In other words, if one part of a skirmish line is "pinned down" as it might be termed, unlike a line of battle, this did not impede the balance of the skirmish line, which would continue to advance, scour the ground, etc. and develop the position of the enemy in front, and the exposed points, etc. before a line of battle or column, behind them, stumbled into it...

In fire advancing such movement thus continues to be executed by each file; the skirmishers keep united, and endeavor, as much as possible, to preserve the "general direction" of their alignment. And the skirmish line could similarly keep up a firing while marching in retreat...

View attachment 548625
View attachment 548626

Confederate veteran W.L. Sheppard here illustrates skirmisher firing in retreat...
View attachment 548634


So, if a line of skirmishers was marching in file, by a right or left face---forward march, called marching "by a flank" etc. and had to open fire, and keep it up, while passing over ground in that order... the skirmish drill provides for it...

View attachment 548628


View attachment 548627

You can see the man in this Harper's image rolling on his back to tip up his muzzle while ramming...

View attachment 548629

Thank you, this is very valuable information. I've wondered about this for quite some time, and hadn't been able to find quite what I had looked for elsewhere. I have not much more to add. This clears up a good amount.

 

[Old Soldier]

Skirmishing was a totally different ballgame to Line of Battle. It is what the British termed 'Fire and Movement' which follows exactly those period manuals say. It was the preferred tactic of the Rifle regiments and also employed by the light infantry regiments when operating in close country although all infantry were trained to do so. It became the standard tactic after 1900 and is still used.

 

[Saphroneth]

Skirmishing was a totally different ballgame to Line of Battle. It is what the British termed 'Fire and Movement' which follows exactly those period manuals say. It was the preferred tactic of the Rifle regiments and also employed by the light infantry regiments when operating in close country although all infantry were trained to do so. It became the standard tactic after 1900 and is still used.

I should note that the distinction between types of infantry regiment was dropped in IIRC the 1840s or early 1850s - the only remaining distiction was the colour of the dress but they were all trained as light infantry. This is how you get the 88th "Connaught Rangers" and a random other set of line infantry regiments shaking out into skirmish order at Inkerman and firing on Russian gunners at 600-800 yards with lethal effect.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

I should note that the distinction between types of infantry regiment was dropped in IIRC the 1840s or early 1850s - the only remaining distiction was the colour of the dress but they were all trained as light infantry. This is how you get the 88th "Connaught Rangers" and a random other set of line infantry regiments shaking out into skirmish order at Inkerman and firing on Russian gunners at 600-800 yards with lethal effect.

If I recall at the start of the Civil War, units like the 1st US Dragoons were redesignated to "Cavalry" - the previous distinctions obsolete. Did all of these changes occur at similar times for all branches, from the 1840s-60s? And interestingly of course, armies like the British still seemed to largely keep the old names, even if they no longer meant a distinction - not that it was a new thing, as "Grenadiers" for instance in 1830, to the extent of my knowledge was decades far removed from the original Grenadiers by that point and were not armed any differently in most militaries to regular infantry.

 

[RedRover]

Thank you, this is very valuable information. I've wondered about this for quite some time, and hadn't been able to find quite what I had looked for elsewhere. I have not much more to add. This clears up a good amount.

I would only add that within any given battalion/regiment, any part of it could be deployed as skirmishers, as necessary...

The Rebellion record

www.google.com

And whole battalions/regiments, or even whole brigades, etc. could be deployed as skirmishers...

The Rebellion record

www.google.com

History of the Twenty-fourth Michigan of the Iron Brigade, Known as the Detroit and Wayne County Regiment ...

www.google.com

The history of her regiments, and other military organizations

www.google.com

The Union Army: Cyclopedia of battles

www.google.com

Even whole Divisions...

The Left-Armed Corps

The Left-Armed Corps collects and annotates a unique and little-known body of Civil War literature: narrative sketches, accounts, and poetry by veterans who lost the use of their right arms due to wounds sustained during the conflict and who later competed in left-handed penmanship contests in...

www.google.com

 

[Saphroneth]

If I recall at the start of the Civil War, units like the 1st US Dragoons were redesignated to "Cavalry" - the previous distinctions obsolete. Did all of these changes occur at similar times for all branches, from the 1840s-60s? And interestingly of course, armies like the British still seemed to largely keep the old names, even if they no longer meant a distinction - not that it was a new thing, as "Grenadiers" for instance in 1830, to the extent of my knowledge was decades far removed from the original Grenadiers by that point and were not armed any differently in most militaries to regular infantry.

There's a very, very good reason for keeping the name, albeit one not well understood - which is that esprit de corps, the measure of a unit's pride in itself, is a big part of what develops cohesion.

It is literally the case that if you took a bunch of militia from Surrey (capable of the drill, but otherwise unexceptional) and put them in The Guards, then even if they're still in their old uniforms they fight like Guards because they're in The Guards.

And this literally happened, it's at Waterloo.