General Samuel Curtis, a Misused Asset?

[LematLemat]

The Civil War career of General Samuel R. Curtis is something of an enigma. An Iowa Republican, West Pointer, and Mexican War veteran, in the early days of the war Curtis was quickly made colonel of the 2nd Iowa Infantry and soon thereafter promoted to brigadier general. Unlike most federal commanders who were later prominent in the Trans-Mississippi, Curtis was a significant commander in a time when that theater was seen as militarily vital and still gained the attention of the press. His victory at Pea Ridge in March of 1862 was one of the first major successes of the Union Army during the conflict, and Curtis made major general as a result. It appeared that Curtis' star was in the ascendant, with his major general's date of rank being equal to that of Ulysses Grant, Don Carlos Buell, and John Pope, among others.

However, Curtis' fame and rise soon quickly fell without a distinct cause. His campaign through the northern parts of Arkansas saw his army capture the Arkansas river port of Helena in July, but soon after much of his command was transferred to other armies, principally the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio. Rather than gaining an increased command of prominence, Curtis saw his contemporaries surpass him in their careers. He would be relegated to the relative backwater of the Department of the Missouri and then would be further demoted to the even more-distant Department of Kansas, in both positions his authority was largely administrative, with the only notable military occurrences being occasional raids of Confederate cavalry and the ever-lingering Confederate-aligned partisans.
He would only resume field command in October of 1864 during Price's Missouri Campaign, famously winning the Battle of Westport and seriously damaging Price's army with an aggressive pursuit. Ultimately, however, one of the Union Army's most senior major generals would only fight two major battles almost three years apart.

My question is, why was Curtis so seemingly sidelined? Surely it could not be for want of political connections, given his having been one of the earliest Republicans to hold a congressional seat; the Civil War career of John C. Frémont, another early Republican, was only vanquished by his own resignation despite several military controversies. Curtis was a West Pointer as well, having graduated 27th of 33 in the Class of 1831. Was it his relative old age of 57 that precluded his having major field commands throughout the war, a lack of a strong relationship with Henry Halleck, or a combination of those factors among others?

 

[DanSBHawk]

Good post. I've wondered about Curtis as well. Maybe someone who's read the recent Curtis bio can give some input.

 

[tony_gunter]

The Civil War career of General Samuel R. Curtis is something of an enigma. An Iowa Republican, West Pointer, and Mexican War veteran, in the early days of the war Curtis was quickly made colonel of the 2nd Iowa Infantry and soon thereafter promoted to brigadier general. Unlike most federal commanders who were later prominent in the Trans-Mississippi, Curtis was a significant commander in a time when that theater was seen as militarily vital and still gained the attention of the press. His victory at Pea Ridge in March of 1862 was one of the first major successes of the Union Army during the conflict, and Curtis made major general as a result. It appeared that Curtis' star was in the ascendant, with his major general's date of rank being equal to that of Ulysses Grant, Don Carlos Buell, and John Pope, among others.

However, Curtis' fame and rise soon quickly fell without a distinct cause. His campaign through the northern parts of Arkansas saw his army capture the Arkansas river port of Helena in July, but soon after much of his command was transferred to other armies, principally the Army of the Tennessee and the Army of the Ohio. Rather than gaining an increased command of prominence, Curtis saw his contemporaries surpass him in their careers. He would be relegated to the relative backwater of the Department of the Missouri and then would be further demoted to the even more-distant Department of Kansas, in both positions his authority was largely administrative, with the only notable military occurrences being occasional raids of Confederate cavalry and the ever-lingering Confederate-aligned partisans.
He would only resume field command in October of 1864 during Price's Missouri Campaign, famously winning the Battle of Westport and seriously damaging Price's army with an aggressive pursuit. Ultimately, however, one of the Union Army's most senior major generals would only fight two major battles almost three years apart.

My question is, why was Curtis so seemingly sidelined? Surely it could not be for want of political connections, given his having been one of the earliest Republicans to hold a congressional seat; the Civil War career of John C. Frémont, another early Republican, was only vanquished by his own resignation despite several military controversies. Curtis was a West Pointer as well, having graduated 27th of 33 in the Class of 1831. Was it his relative old age of 57 that precluded his having major field commands throughout the war, a lack of a strong relationship with Henry Halleck, or a combination of those factors among others?

Halleck was a jerk?

I think some of it had to do with the same communication failures that Grant experienced: Halleck seems to have had the dispatches addressed to him presented in digest format by his aides. This resulted in Halleck feeling like his subordinates weren't communicating to him when they were.

To make matters worse, Halleck hated politicians, especially radical politicians. As an abolitionist Republican, Curtis qualified. Curtis' eager attempts to establish freedmen policies in a very conservative department drew the ire of politicians and conservative subordinates alike, and they conspired to accuse him of corruption. Curtis' sloppy bookkeeping of freedmen accounts didn't do him any favors, and he spent several months sidelined trying to clear his name. By the time he returned, there just wasn't any room left for him in the major theaters.

I'm sure his age didn't help matters.

 

[jackt62]

Curtis seemed to begin with a respectable career in the west, particularly given his leadership and victory at Pea Ridge. Having read his biography a while ago, my recollection is that he afterwards ran afoul of the wrong folks including Grant, which basically relegated him to secondary roles until the 1864 Price raid in Missouri allowed him to shine once more.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Breckod wrote a good review of the recent Curtis bio.

Member Review - Union General: Samuel Ryan Curtis and Victory in the West, by William Shea | Civil War Books, Stories, & Media

William Shea has a long background in writing about the Trans-Mississippi theater of the Civil War, co-authoring the book on Pea Ridge with Earl Hess in the early 90s and writing another book on the Battle of Prairie Grove in 2009. The Pea Ridge book is probably the main reason that any Civil...

civilwartalk.com

He mentions some of the issues that Tony brought up. Namely, communication issues with Halleck and political issues.

 

[Belfoured]

Breckod wrote a good review of the recent Curtis bio.

Member Review - Union General: Samuel Ryan Curtis and Victory in the West, by William Shea | Civil War Books, Stories, & Media

William Shea has a long background in writing about the Trans-Mississippi theater of the Civil War, co-authoring the book on Pea Ridge with Earl Hess in the early 90s and writing another book on the Battle of Prairie Grove in 2009. The Pea Ridge book is probably the main reason that any Civil...

civilwartalk.com

He mentions some of the issues that Tony brought up. Namely, communication issues with Halleck and political issues.

I bought the book based on that review and it's very well done. In addition to the military aspects of Curtis's career it's an excellent study of his political and civil engineering accomplishments.

 

[tony_gunter]

Breckod wrote a good review of the recent Curtis bio.

Member Review - Union General: Samuel Ryan Curtis and Victory in the West, by William Shea | Civil War Books, Stories, & Media

William Shea has a long background in writing about the Trans-Mississippi theater of the Civil War, co-authoring the book on Pea Ridge with Earl Hess in the early 90s and writing another book on the Battle of Prairie Grove in 2009. The Pea Ridge book is probably the main reason that any Civil...

civilwartalk.com

He mentions some of the issues that Tony brought up. Namely, communication issues with Halleck and political issues.

I never quite understood why he made such a big deal about Grant. The only testy exchanges Grant had with Curtis were about commerce on the river, and Curtis was fighting to clear his name while Grant was working his way up to army command.

I don't see Grant harboring any ill will toward Curtis, it's just by the time he returned, there really wasn't much open for a man of his rank.

 

[archieclement]

Would seem more misbehaving then misused. He was appointed postions, that he then would upset the leadership.

 

[tony_gunter]

Would seem more misbehaving then misused. He was appointed postions, that he then would upset the leadership.

I think all commanding generals suffered that to some extent, because Lincoln wouldn't centralize policy.

Look at Grant and GO 100, McClellan and his "soft war" policies that upset the abolitionists. Butler and the outrage he generated in New Orleans. War policy needs to be set at the top so the army commanders can … you know … command the army.

It's a little outrageous that Lincoln's policies lagged behind Congress, and Congress' policy lagged behind the generals at the front line.

 

[major bill]

I think part of this was Curtis served in a theater that did not get a lot of attention. This does not mean the Curtis did not perform well.

 

[Pollaco]

I dont know the details but he had "difficulties" with Missouri's Governor William Gamble. What those difficulties were, I cannot say. By the spring of 1863 he was removed from Missouri and given command of the Department of Kansas.

 

[archieclement]

I dont know the details but he had "difficulties" with Missouri's Governor William Gamble. What those difficulties were, I cannot say. By the spring of 1863 he was removed from Missouri and given command of the Department of Kansas.

Well he was an abolishionist in a US state where slavery was legal, consequently should been protected by US authorities........Think he quarreled over use of Missouri Militia which were under state control as well. As well nature of war here tended to be republican vrs democrat, so coming across overtly political such as abolitionist is going to alienate the democrat majority, as well Republicans who were not radical on slavery.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

War policy needs to be set at the top so the army commanders can … you know … command the army.

It's a little outrageous that Lincoln's policies lagged behind Congress, and Congress' policy lagged behind the generals at the front line.

Policy wasn't lagging behind so much as some generals were going rogue based on their personal beliefs. Lincoln was advancing policy slowly and deliberately for the sake of public relations.

That said, the lack of a strong central military figure to work with Lincoln and Staunton to direct policy and strategy was a problem. Halleck wasn't the right man for that role either.

 

[tony_gunter]

Policy wasn't lagging behind so much as some generals were going rogue based on their personal beliefs. Lincoln was advancing policy slowly and deliberately for the sake of public relations.

That said, the lack of a strong central military figure to work with Lincoln and Staunton to direct policy and strategy was a problem. Halleck wasn't the right man for that role either.

One does not set policy by burying one's head in the sand,

The lack of any clear centralized policy on captured goods, territory, slaves and cotton at the outbreak of war led to conflicts that generals at the front lines should have never faced.

 

[archieclement]

One does not set policy by burying one's head in the sand,

The lack of any clear centralized policy on captured goods, territory, slaves and cotton at the outbreak of war led to conflicts that generals at the front lines should have never faced.

But there was a rather clear centralized policy to slavery.......it was legal in US states till individual states banned it. Because regardless of passage of 13th, it wasnt ratified and law until end of 1865.

Same really with citizens, regardless of their views, their rights should been protected as US citizens.

The clear centralized policy was and should certainly been the Constitution which offered those protections, regardless of a generals personal opinions.

The real confliction centrally would been suspending habius corpus....which to me shouldn't been much a confliction, as saying one can detain someone with no evidence or charge.....certainly shouldn't mean one should detain people with no evidence or charge..........

 

[tony_gunter]

The clear centralized policy was and should certainly been the Constitution

And it was, before the slavers took to shootin'

We are talking about war policy.

 

[archieclement]

And it was, before the slavers took to shootin'

We are talking about war policy.

Actually US law and Constitution continue through the war........and were still to be upheld

 

[tony_gunter]

Actually US law and Constitution continue through the war........and were still to be upheld

That's not how war works, and it failed the test early when the question arose about how to treat prisoners. Under the constitution they'd be jailed and executed for murder.

Oh, and thanks for bringing to mind another war policy Lincoln failed to establish early in the war and was established by generals on the front lines who should have been concerned with leading the army not setting policy: prisoner treatment / exchange.

 

[archieclement]

Actually constitution allows legal process and protection during wartime........

Certainly allowing not prosecuting is part of the legal process.