The Davis plan

[atlantis]

As I understand the war plan of Davis was to defend the borders. He has taken a lot of criticism on this but what other options did he have.

 

[JerryD]

The American Revolution was won on the offense at Yorktown with a combined US and French Army and a combined French and Spanish fleet offshore plus Dutch financial aid . Also the British where fighting a two front
war in the Indian subcontinent a far more important war objective then North America. The American Revolution became absorbed in the Seven Years War . The Colonial Rebels most likely would not if won independence with out the tremendous aid give to them by France, Soanin and the

There is no such thing as an exclusively defensive war, but the AR is an example of a defensive strategy that worked, with limited offensive thrusts when opportunity presents itself. This is the essence of the Fabian strategy.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

The opportunity for a successful secession came in the two months between the formation of the Confederacy (February 8, 1861) by South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas and the attack on Ft. Sumter (April 12-14, 1861). If the South had said that secession would not affect commercial navigation on the Mississippi and in its territorial waters in the Gulf and the Atlantic, there would not have been the eruption of war fever that Grant witnessed in Galena and Illinois and throughout the Midwest when Ft. Sumter was fired upon. Instead, the South, at Davis' urging, imposed on absolute embargo on all water-borne trade between the Midwest and the rest of the world. Davis' plan for his new nation showed a complete indifference to the economic interests of what would be the South's most important neighbors. He seems to have thought that questions of money and commerce had no part in war where anyone but the South was concerned.

 

[JerryD]

The opportunity for a successful secession came in the two months between the formation of the Confederacy (February 8, 1861) by South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas and the attack on Ft. Sumter (April 12-14, 1861). If the South had said that secession would not affect commercial navigation on the Mississippi and in its territorial waters in the Gulf and the Atlantic, there would not have been the eruption of war fever that Grant witnessed in Galena and Illinois and throughout the Midwest when Ft. Sumter was fired upon. Instead, the South, at Davis' urging, imposed on absolute embargo on all water-borne trade between the Midwest and the rest of the world. Davis' plan for his new nation showed a complete indifference to the economic interests of what would be the South's most important neighbors. He seems to have thought that questions of money and commerce had no part in war where anyone but the South was concerned.

Are you sure of this? I thought Davis did say he would agree with open navigation of the Mississippi. The issue was, even with the promise, could we trust a foreign country when river access was so important.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

Good question, JerryD. I may be wrong. My source is

 

[atlantis]

The border in Virginia was reasonably well defended. Tennessee and Arkansas borders were not. Was this a result of relocating the CS capital to Richmond instead of say Atlanta?

 

[NedBaldwin]

There is no such thing as an exclusively defensive war, but the AR is an example of a defensive strategy that worked, with limited offensive thrusts when opportunity presents itself. This is the essence of the Fabian strategy.

seems to me that victory in the AR came when the US received the support of the Spanish and French who went on the offensive against the british -- helping the Yorktown campaign and also capturing from the British Mobile, Baton Rouge, Natchez, Pensacola, the Bahamas, Minorca and the Carribean islands of Dominica, Grenanda, and Saint Kitts

 

[leftyhunter]

There is no such thing as an exclusively defensive war, but the AR is an example of a defensive strategy that worked, with limited offensive thrusts when opportunity presents itself. This is the essence of the Fabian strategy.

The ARW is an example of a war won because of limited British troops fighting both in North America and the Indian subcontinent which is logistically challenging at best plus massive foreign military intervention in the last few years of the war in favor of the Colonial Rebels.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

There is no such thing as an exclusively defensive war, but the AR is an example of a defensive strategy that worked, with limited offensive thrusts when opportunity presents itself. This is the essence of the Fabian strategy.

The ARW is an example of a war won because of limited British troops fighting both in North America and the Indian subcontinent which is logistically challenging at best plus massive foreign military intervention in the last few years of the war in favor of the Colonial Rebels.

Davis was forced to play the hand he was dealt. In many ways, I think the confederacy's strategic situation was similar to Imperial Japan's in 1941. Their war effort was dependent on vital resources that could only be found abroad. So in Japan's case, this meant an audacious offensive in late 1941 to conquer and secure regions rich in oil, rubber and other essentials. In the CSA's case, this meant keeping every port possible open for blockade runners to bring in goods from Europe. Davis simply could not ignore the importance of these ports and so had to invest considerable men and artillery defending them. Even then, ports were lost, most critically New Orleans and Norfolk.
Also, both Japan and the CSA hoped to win a decisive victory early on with a goal of, not conquering the USA, but of demoralizing it and bringing on a truce. Japan hoped the attack on Pearl Harbor would do the trick; for the CSA, it was First Manassas. Once the hope of a singular demoralizing victory vaporized, both Japan and the CSA were doomed to a prolonged war of attrition where their opponent could threaten them from many directions, requiring a dispersal of military resources, and doomed as well to strangulation by the US Navy, which grew stronger every year. In both cases, it was a war that could not be won...but it was a a war that they just maybe could survive. The only hope left was that war weariness would bring the USA to a point where the people no longer wanted to see the war continue.
Ultimately, it was their own populace who paid the price: in 1865 due to the many Union columns (most notably Sherman's) advancing at will and wreaking destruction; in 1945 due to the successful use of the new atomic bomb.

Actually the situation for Japan was far worse because they also had to fight the British Commonwealth forces in the China India Burma Theatre , the Australians, New Zealand and Dutch in the South Pacific plus the Chinese Army and guerrillas in China. Of course late in the war The Soviet Army attacked the Japanese and easily defeated them.
The Confederates had to fight a numerically and materially superior opponent plus local Unionist guerrillas and free lance bandits in Confederate territory . That makes it difficult to have a plan.
Leftyhunter

 

[NedBaldwin]

The border in Virginia was reasonably well defended. Tennessee and Arkansas borders were not. Was this a result of relocating the CS capital to Richmond instead of say Atlanta?

Didnt the CSA loose more of virginia (western virginia, northern, tidewater) in the first year than was lost of Arkansas? With Tennesee the cluster f at Fort Donelson was the problem. Before that the border seemed well defended to me

 

[jackt62]

If the South had said that secession would not affect commercial navigation on the Mississippi and in its territorial waters in the Gulf and the Atlantic, there would not have been the eruption of war fever that Grant witnessed in Galena and Illinois and throughout the Midwest when Ft. Sumter was fired upon.

Maybe, but not probable. The problem is that the south was late to secede by about 10 years for the issue of commerical navigation on the Mississippi to have that effect. By 1860 midwest and western states and territories were already becoming more dependent on east-west railroad transportation rather than north-south waterborne traffic. Unlike 1850, New York had become a more important commercial destination for the midwest than was New Orleans.

 

[JerryD]

The ARW is an example of a war won because of limited British troops fighting both in North America and the Indian subcontinent which is logistically challenging at best plus massive foreign military intervention in the last few years of the war in favor of the Colonial Rebels.
Leftyhunter

Which does not change the fact that the Americans fought primarily on the defensive, and were successful at it.

 

[jackt62]

The border in Virginia was reasonably well defended. Tennessee and Arkansas borders were not. Was this a result of relocating the CS capital to Richmond instead of say Atlanta?

The territorial defense of Virginia was always more feasible than were the western borders regardless of the capital's location. To be sure, Richmond's status was important in favoring the flow of resources to military operations in Virginia. But the more compact geographic playing field, the beneficial network of east-west waterways, and proximity to agricultural supplies in the Shenandoah Valley were some important advantages that the Confederacy had in the eastern seat-of-war.

 

[leftyhunter]

Didnt the CSA loose more of virginia (western virginia, northern, tidewater) in the first year than was lost of Arkansas? With Tennesee the cluster f at Fort Donelson was the problem. Before that the border seemed well defended to me

It's more a matter of the Union didn't have the opportunity to invade Tennessee until Kentucky was secured vs Tennessee borders where well defended. Arkansas was not a strategic priority for the Union although after the battle of Pea Ridge General Curtis did seize Helena. An army of 500 to 750k men can't defend the borders of a country that is well two thousand miles long including it's coasts. We're talking from Virginia to the New Mexico Territory plus the entirety of the Texas coast line all the way to Virginia. Either the Confederate Army success on the offense or it looses.
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

Didnt the CSA loose more of virginia (western virginia, northern, tidewater) in the first year than was lost of Arkansas? With Tennesee the cluster f at Fort Donelson was the problem. Before that the border seemed well defended to me

It's more a matter of the Union didn't have the opportunity to invade Tennessee until Kentucky was secured vs Tennessee borders where well defended. Arkansas was not a strategic priority for the Union although after the battle of Pea Ridge General Curtis did seize Helena. An army of 500 to 750k men can't defend the borders of a country that is well two thousand miles long including it's coasts. We're talking from Virginia to the New Mexico Territory plus the entirety of the Texas coast line all the way to Virginia. Either the Confederate Army success on the offense or it looses.
Leftyhunter

Which does not change the fact that the Americans fought primarily on the defensive, and were successful at it.

Yes it does because until late in the war General Washington was in despair of winning. Without foreign intervention the Colonial Rebels would of lost. Fighting on the defensive can buy time but only for so long. The logical outcome of defensive warfare is defeat.
Leftyhunter

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

jackt62 is describing what happened AFTER the Civil War, not in the 1850s. Cleveland's history is representative:
"Cleveland's railroad era officially began on 3 Nov. 1849 when the CC&C's lone engine was coupled onto a string of flatcars near River St. The CLEVELAND HERALD commented, "The whistle of the locomotive will be as familiar to the ears of the Clevelander as the sound of church bells." The CC&C opened its first segment, 36 mi. to Wellington, in July 1850 and completed the remaining line into Columbus the following February. Its first Cleveland depot stood on the lakefront near W. 9th St. That same month, the Cleveland & Pittsburgh, which traced its corporate origins back to the 1836 charter of the Cleveland, Warren & Pittsburgh, dispatched trains over its new 26-mi. line between Cleveland and Hudson. By 1853 that carrier had entered Pittsburgh. Also, a 62-mi. branch, initially organized in 1851 as the Cleveland, Mt. Vernon & Delaware Railroad, opened in 1852 between Hudson and Millersburg via Akron."

RAILROADS | Encyclopedia of Cleveland History | Case Western Reserve University

RAILROADS. While water traffic on both Lake Erie and the OHIO & ERIE CANAL did much to develop Cleveland, it took the appearance of the railroad to ma...

case.edu

The largest part of the financial Panic of 1857 was the discovery by U.S. and foreign investors that the promises of east-west railroad transportation - which had absorbed almost all of the finance capital raised during the decade - were still promises only.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Good question, JerryD. I may be wrong. My source is
View attachment 465525

Not familiar with that book. That is right up my ally, for sure. I am going to have to order a copy.

By the way, if you guys haven't read it, there is a good article from Merton Coulter which was published in 1916 on the impact of the war on trade in the Mississippi Valley. It can be found here:

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[Lost Cause]

None at all. Wars are almost always win in the offense not the defense. Their is no such thing has the Confederacy winning a defensive war. If the Confederate Navy can't break the blockade then slavery dies since the Southern economy is based on slaves producing export crops to Western Europe. The Confederacy itself is to large to build extensive fortifications and fortifications can be overwhelmed by a larger opponent.
Leftyhunter

War of 1812.

 

[LetUsHavePeace]

Not familiar with that book. That is right up my ally, for sure. I am going to have to order a copy.

By the way, if you guys haven't read it, there is a good article from Merton Coulter which was published in 1916 on the impact of the war on trade in the Mississippi Valley. It can be found here:

Accept Terms and Conditions on JSTOR

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.

www.jstor.org

Thx. for the Coulter.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Thx. for the Coulter.

No problem.

 

[leftyhunter]

War of 1812.

Not really has the British were once again fighting a two front war on the Indian Subcontinent . The US did try offensive warfare in Canada but that didn't work out. The war of 1812 was more of a stalemate but yes the US kept it's independence but had to leave British Canada alone.
Leftyhunter