Knowing when to press the attack, and knowing when to slow your pace.

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

Ever since I've been reading about the Civil War I've been trying to understand why certain battles were won and lost. Every battle is different, which means you can't apply the same concepts you would to every other battle. I believe at Bristoes Station A.P. Hill moved to fast at some point in the battle and it ended up costing him victory. At Chancellorsville Joe Hooker had a chance to really hurt Lee's army if he pressed the attack, but instead got cold feet and decided to dig in. My question is this, from the prespective of a Civil War General, what were things to look for (besides the obvious) when pressing the attack, and holding off in a less aggressive fashion.

 

[Pat Answer]

Really good question - and I suspect as you do that the answer would always depend on the situation. John Keegan once identified the 'essence' of battlefield command as what one does with the reserves, given that what happens on the front line once the fighting starts represents a kind of relinquishing of 'control'. Generals would be depending on reports from subordinates, trying to gauge which units are running out of ammunition, say, or giving signs that men are getting close to psychological and/or physical breaking points. At which time the location of the nearest fresh troops could of course mean the difference between victory or defeat. I'll have to look up where but I remember reading this was a skill cultivated by good generals known as "feeding a fight", basically trying to be the last one with fresh units to throw in.

Speaking of the "obvious," though many today tend not to believe it, the majority of commanders knew the frontal assault was not a great way to deal with a prepared position, unless meant to be a holding move to support a flanking attack. But difficulties in coordinating attacks continued to play havoc with the plans of even the best generals throughout the war. So growing experience would begin to tell combat managers what was likely to be possible, that a simple plan carried out with conviction beat the confusion of an intricate, complex one, and when to cut losses to regroup for another day.

By no means an exhaustive, and perhaps not even a helpful, answer to a good question - but quick thoughts offered anyway.

 

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

Really good question - and I suspect as you do that the answer would always depend on the situation. John Keegan once identified the 'essence' of battlefield command as what one does with the reserves, given that what happens on the front line once the fighting starts represents a kind of relinquishing of 'control'. Generals would be depending on reports from subordinates, trying to gauge which units are running out of ammunition, say, or giving signs that men are getting close to psychological and/or physical breaking points. At which time the location of the nearest fresh troops could of course mean the difference between victory or defeat. I'll have to look up where but I remember reading this was a skill cultivated by good generals known as "feeding a fight", basically trying to be the last one with fresh units to throw in.

Speaking of the "obvious," though many today tend not to believe it, the majority of commanders knew the frontal assault was not a great way to deal with a prepared position, unless meant to be a holding move to support a flanking attack. But difficulties in coordinating attacks continued to play havoc with the plans of even the best generals throughout the war. growing experience would begin to tell combat managers what was likely to be possible, that a simple plan carried out with conviction beat the confusion of an intricate, complex So one, and when to cut losses to regroup for another day.

By no means an exhaustive, and perhaps not even a helpful, answer to a good question - but quick thoughts offered anyway.

Really good question - and I suspect as you do that the answer would always depend on the situation. John Keegan once identified the 'essence' of battlefield command as what one does with the reserves, given that what happens on the front line once the fighting starts represents a kind of relinquishing of 'control'. Generals would be depending on reports from subordinates, trying to gauge which units are running out of ammunition, say, or giving signs that men are getting close to psychological and/or physical breaking points. At which time the location of the nearest fresh troops could of course mean the difference between victory or defeat. I'll have to look up where but I remember reading this was a skill cultivated by good generals known as "feeding a fight", basically trying to be the last one with fresh units to throw in.

Speaking of the "obvious," though many today tend not to believe it, the majority of commanders knew the frontal assault was not a great way to deal with a prepared position, unless meant to be a holding move to support a flanking attack. But difficulties in coordinating attacks continued to play havoc with the plans of even the best generals throughout the war. So growing experience would begin to tell combat managers what was likely to be possible, that a simple plan carried out with conviction beat the confusion of an intricate, complex one, and when to cut losses to regroup for another day.

By no means an exhaustive, and perhaps not even a helpful, answer to a good question - but quick thoughts offered anyway.

That's such an awesome way of putting it, thank you.

 

[Sheltowee]

Would anyone agree that the best commanders possessed a higher degree of "battlefield intuition"? I think Pat Answer alludes to this quality.

What are some notable examples of success (and failure) of commanders just "sensing" a movement- when perhaps intelligence suggested otherwise?

 

[bayouace]

Would Lee allowing Jackson to make his flanking move with so much of his army at Chancellorsville be in that answer?

 

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

Would anyone agree that the best commanders possessed a higher degree of "battlefield intuition"? I think Pat Answer alludes to this quality.

What are some notable examples of success (and failure) of commanders just "sensing" a movement- when perhaps intelligence suggested otherwise?

Agreed, but what is battlefield intuition? Why do some have it and others dont?

 

[Belfoured]

Ever since I've been reading about the Civil War I've been trying to understand why certain battles were won and lost. Every battle is different, which means you can't apply the same concepts you would to every other battle. I believe at Bristoes Station A.P. Hill moved to fast at some point in the battle and it ended up costing him victory. At Chancellorsville Joe Hooker had a chance to really hurt Lee's army if he pressed the attack, but instead got cold feet and decided to dig in. My question is this, from the prespective of a Civil War General, what were things to look for (besides the obvious) when pressing the attack, and holding off in a less aggressive fashion.

Good question. The only thing I'd clarify is that if by "moved too fast" at Bristoe you mean that Hill failed to do basic recon of what he had opposing him, that's what he did wrong.

 

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

Good question. The only thing I'd clarify is that if by "moved too fast" at Bristoe you mean that Hill failed to do basic recon of what he had opposing him, that's what he did wrong.

Ah! Didn't know that, thank you.

 

[Belfoured]

Ah! Didn't know that, thank you.

He basically blundered into the equivalent of an ambush by Warren and II Corps.

 

[jackt62]

Would Lee allowing Jackson to make his flanking move with so much of his army at Chancellorsville be in that answer?

That trait is best described as "audaciousness," and it fits Lee perfectly. Lee had an uncanny ability to assess his opponent's strengths and weaknesses; that and his willingness to take calculated risks were a hallmark of Lee's leadership. Dividing his army into separate parts to maneuver and attack the enemy was a tactic that Lee used, not only at Chancellorsville, but also at 2nd Manassas and the Maryland and Pennsylvania incursions. He was often successful but came very close to the edge of failure in many of those cases, had his opponent been made of stronger stuff.

 

[jackt62]

Agreed, but what is battlefield intuition? Why do some have it and others dont?

Most of the West Point trained officers of that era had personal knowledge of each other, either as classmates or from service in the "old army." For officers who ended up on different sides during the CW, that knowledge often provided an advantage and insight into the mindset and thinking of their opponent. A good example is Sherman's delight when learning that Hood was to take over command of the AOT from Joe Johnston. Sherman's awareness of Hood's abilities and aggressive military thinking allowed Sherman to prepare for the type of direct assaults that he would be facing from the AOT, in contrast to Johnston's policy of maneuver and withdrawal.

 

[jackt62]

Trying to understand why certain battles are won or lost is not open to simplistic or consistent explanations. Commanders such as McClellan and Hooker conceived well developed schemes for engaging their enemy in the case of the Peninsula and Chancellorsville campaigns. But their executions were flawed, and while the reasons for that are too many to go into detail right now, one can look to the level or lack thereof stamina, fortitude, and grit of the respective army commanders. Of course, many battle plans are flawed to begin with; the example of Hill's Bristoe assault is one example, which can be attributed to as already noted, the lack of pre-battle reconnaissance. To enlarge on that thought, knowledge of terrain, opposing troop strength and dispositions are important considerations that a reasonable commander must take into account before developing his own attack plan, battle formation, and the ability to call up supports and/or reserves when and where needed.

 

[Kentucky Derby Cavalier.]

Trying to understand why certain battles are won or lost is not open to simplistic or consistent explanations. Commanders such as McClellan and Hooker conceived well developed schemes for engaging their enemy in the case of the Peninsula and Chancellorsville campaigns. But their executions were flawed, and while the reasons for that are too many to go into detail right now, one can look to the level or lack thereof stamina, fortitude, and grit of the respective army commanders. Of course, many battle plans are flawed to begin with; the example of Hill's Bristoe assault is one example, which can be attributed to as already noted, the lack of pre-battle reconnaissance. To enlarge on that thought, knowledge of terrain, opposing troop strength and dispositions are important considerations that a reasonable commander must take into account before developing his own attack plan, battle formation, and the ability to call up supports and/or reserves when and where needed.

Well put, another thing I've wondered is how many battles were won simply by luck.

 

[jackt62]

Well put, another thing I've wondered is how many battles were won simply by luck.

Luck, or to put it another way, circumstances, always count. Also not to forget that the strength and actions of the opposing side play a large role, no matter how capable your own force and actions are.

 

[Belfoured]

That trait is best described as "audaciousness," and it fits Lee perfectly. Lee had an uncanny ability to assess his opponent's strengths and weaknesses; that and his willingness to take calculated risks were a hallmark of Lee's leadership. Dividing his army into separate parts to maneuver and attack the enemy was a tactic that Lee used, not only at Chancellorsville, but also at 2nd Manassas and the Maryland and Pennsylvania incursions. He was often successful but came very close to the edge of failure in many of those cases, had his opponent been made of stronger stuff.

You hit on what I think is a key point. Lee appears to have understood his opponent in the first part of the war, so the aggressive (even "risky") tactics against McClellan, Pope, and Hooker for the most part reflect that. Of course, Lee sometimes missed the mark even in that regard. So he had to be talked out of continuing his offensive on September 18, 1862 by none other than Stonewall Jackson and again on May 4, 1863 when he had to be dissuaded from undertaking a bloody debacle against Hooker's strong defensive alignment. The most glaring example was Gettysburg. Having assessed Meade as a dangerous opponent not to be treated lightly, his actions during the battle failed to reflect that.

 

[Belfoured]

Luck, or to put it another way, circumstances, always count. Also not to forget that the strength and actions of the opposing side play a large role, no matter how capable your own force and actions are.

You first point reminds me of the quote attributed to Branch Rickey - "luck is the residue of design". And your second point reminds me of the quote attributed to Pickett when asked why the July 3 charge failed - "I always thought the Union army had something to do with it." Or the NHL aphorism - "the other guys are good enough to play in this league, too."

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Agreed, but what is battlefield intuition? Why do some have it and others dont?

Some people are just more aggressive than others, luckier than others, had better recon, better at "reading" their opponents. Some can be taught, some can be learned from experience, and some is probably just inate ability.

 

[jackt62]

he had to be talked out of continuing his offensive on September 18, 1862 by none other than Stonewall Jackson

If I recall correctly, the reverse occurred after the battle at Fredericksburg; Jackson wanted to pursue the defeated AotP across the river but Lee cautioned against it.

 

[Belfoured]

If I recall correctly, the reverse occurred after the battle at Fredericksburg; Jackson wanted to pursue the defeated AotP across the river but Lee cautioned against it.

Ole Jack was probably trying to make up for his close call on the ANV's right on December 13.

 

[carptrash]

Several times while reading through this thread I was reminded that chess adage, "Play the board, not your opponent."