Interesting. Napolean was defeated because the winter set in at Moscow, so did another leader of the Germanic race lose due to the cold. And look at Hood racing north toward Nashville in an icy cold front one winter. Sherman's troops obeyed a mightier maxim than all these. You can't go against mother nature without defeating yourself.
I would compare/contrast Napoleon with Hannibal. The latter decided not to try and take his opponent's capitol (Rome) because he had so thoroughly defeated them in battle. Their only option should have been to surrender and sue for terms. The Roman's adopted the "Fabian" strategy and strung out the war until they found a winning strategy.
As soon as Hannibal crossed into "Italy", he was done. He had destroyed a few armies and the Romans kept coming. He had no reinforcements to speak of.
But only against the Romans. Conventional wisdom of the day and of almost any other day, would hold that when your country is invaded and army after army is crushed into non existance, that your only option is to surrender. Perhaps is Hannibal had been wiling to roll the dice and attempt an assault on Rome itself, he might have forced a surrender. We'll never know.
Nope. What he should have surmised is that as he got into Italy, the Romans had an almost inexhaustible number of soldiers. He destroyed armies, and the Romans kept coming.
Sherman's performance at Shiloh could hardly be characterized as being a "defensive badass", as he and Grant were certainly caught with their pants down.
Sherman misreading enemy intentions has nothing to do with his defensive abilities once engaged. He directed both his division and McClernand's division in a brutal defense that drew enemy reserves into the fray early, badly disrupting the enemy plans.
There was no question of Sherman being a fighter. Preparation was a key part of maintaining a defensive position, however. Ignoring the incoming reports of a pending attack was negligent, IMO.
That's a line of argument that goes really deep into the weeds really fast. Grant was on the offensive. Offensive armies didn't typically throw up earthworks on the move at that point in the war. I don't see anyone giving Lee grief for not throwing up earthworks at Sharpsburg 6 months later. Was Lee a dummy too?
The natural entrenchments of the sunken road and the heights above the Burnside bridge, even Nicodemus Heights at Sharpsburg. Howard at Chancellorsville may be a better analogy, for which he was criticized.That's a line of argument that goes really deep into the weeds really fast. Grant was on the offensive. Offensive armies didn't typically throw up earthworks on the move at that point in the war. I don't see anyone giving Lee grief for not throwing up earthworks at Sharpsburg 6 months later. Was Lee a dummy too?
I think Shiloh speaks more to Sherman's two weaknesses: he lacked battlefield vision (intuition, a sense of what the other commander would do given the operational situation), and when things went sideways he tended to deflect blame onto others (McClernand at Shiloh, Morgan at Chickasaw Bayou, McPherson at Snake Creek Gap, Thomas at Atlanta).
Sherman was aligned on natural defenses as well at Shiloh Church. Again, you're getting into counter-factual argument that can lead down strange rabbit holes. For example, it could be argued that if federal troops entrench at PIttsburg Landing, Johnston simply waits until they begin to move on Corinth to counter-attack, resulting in Johnston picking the ground fought upon, and federal troops taking more casualties, not fewer.
I think this is correct. And Grant had agents observing the Confederate build up further west than Pittsburgh Landing. But the Confederates blocked them and Grant did not get correct reports of the enemy shielding build up zones. The Confederates did a good job hiding their forces. So the information Sherman was getting was not confirmed by reports from headquarters. It was an intelligence failure by men not experienced in the demands of high command.
Command and control was certainly a problem on both sides during the battle considering the war was still in its infant stage. I referenced more of the warnings of the skirmishes to Sherman's front prior to the battle.
I would not state this is a rabbit hole in that Sherman failed to heed the aforementioned warnings of the impending attack prior to the battle. I also did not state Sherman should have entrenched, considering that did not occur on the battlefield. (Although Beauregard was initially reluctant to attack because he expected to face entrenched federals who were alarmed to Confederate activity). There were several wooded areas between clearings providing a natural defense, which hindered coordinated attacks during the battle.
First reference for this quote comes decades after the battle and it doesn't fit with what Sherman writing that day so I find the quote doubtful
He did not allow them to sit idle. This is a lie put forth about Sherman.
If you can stomach it, his memoirs aren't terrible. As with any memoir you have to take it with a grain of salt but it might be helpful to let the man speak for himself - if only to add to the overall understanding of the man. You seem to know what a bunch of other folks have said about him, why not see what he says for himself?
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