- Joined
- Jan 16, 2015
One of the oddest and most unwieldy formations to be seen at Gettysburg must have been the "close column by division." At least portions of three Eleventh Corps brigades (Von Gilsa, Kryzanowski and Ames) went on to the battlefield using that formation, as attested by members of the 119th New York, 26th Wisconsin, 153rd Pennsylvania and 17th Connecticut.
The formation seems to be bad for either offense or defense. A regiment would present a front of only two companies, with the remaining eight companies being blocked and unable to fire. Such a mass of men would also make a nice target for an artillery solid shot, like pins in a bowling alley, or else to receive concentrated infantry fire from a standard two-rank enemy line. Fortunately for the Union cause, there were no recorded instances of a direct artillery strike, but the 26th Wisconsin barely had time to deploy into a line formation before being set upon by Doles' Georgia brigade.
It took a review of Hardee's Rifle and Infantry Tactics to determine what the formation probably looked like. The term "division" in this formation does not mean the standard definition of a division (comprised of two or more brigades), but rather just two companies side-by-side, in a column, like this:
F-A (First Division)
I-D (Second Division)
H-C (Third Division - Color Division)
K-E (Fourth Division)
B-G (Fifth Division)
"En Masse" or "In Mass," from what I gather, meant contracting the space between the Divisions, which resulted in an even tighter and more compact formation.
Lt. J. Clyde Miller of the 153rd Pennsylvania (Bachelder Papers 3:1025) helped confirm what the formation looked like, and he described a particular problem that occurred on July 1 as his regiment was trying to move forward from near the Alms House to Barlow's Knoll. For some reason, Companies F and A were in the rear and the Color Division was in front that day. So when Capt. Henry Oerter gave the command for the "First Division" to deploy as skirmishers, the Color Division obeyed by moving forward. When Col. Von Gilsa saw the colors moving out toward the skirmish line, he rode up to the regiment and demanded to know (with an expletive) why the color division was deploying. Lt. Miller exercised quick leadership to fix the problem. He ordered Companies F and A to march to the left and right respectively, followed by a forward movement, and concluding with a right and left oblique respectively to place Companies F and A back out in front of the regiment as skirmishers.
Did the Eleventh Corps really need to burden itself with an infantry formation that seemed better suited to a parade ground than a battlefield?
The formation seems to be bad for either offense or defense. A regiment would present a front of only two companies, with the remaining eight companies being blocked and unable to fire. Such a mass of men would also make a nice target for an artillery solid shot, like pins in a bowling alley, or else to receive concentrated infantry fire from a standard two-rank enemy line. Fortunately for the Union cause, there were no recorded instances of a direct artillery strike, but the 26th Wisconsin barely had time to deploy into a line formation before being set upon by Doles' Georgia brigade.
It took a review of Hardee's Rifle and Infantry Tactics to determine what the formation probably looked like. The term "division" in this formation does not mean the standard definition of a division (comprised of two or more brigades), but rather just two companies side-by-side, in a column, like this:
F-A (First Division)
I-D (Second Division)
H-C (Third Division - Color Division)
K-E (Fourth Division)
B-G (Fifth Division)
"En Masse" or "In Mass," from what I gather, meant contracting the space between the Divisions, which resulted in an even tighter and more compact formation.
Lt. J. Clyde Miller of the 153rd Pennsylvania (Bachelder Papers 3:1025) helped confirm what the formation looked like, and he described a particular problem that occurred on July 1 as his regiment was trying to move forward from near the Alms House to Barlow's Knoll. For some reason, Companies F and A were in the rear and the Color Division was in front that day. So when Capt. Henry Oerter gave the command for the "First Division" to deploy as skirmishers, the Color Division obeyed by moving forward. When Col. Von Gilsa saw the colors moving out toward the skirmish line, he rode up to the regiment and demanded to know (with an expletive) why the color division was deploying. Lt. Miller exercised quick leadership to fix the problem. He ordered Companies F and A to march to the left and right respectively, followed by a forward movement, and concluding with a right and left oblique respectively to place Companies F and A back out in front of the regiment as skirmishers.
Did the Eleventh Corps really need to burden itself with an infantry formation that seemed better suited to a parade ground than a battlefield?