Chancellorsville Chancellorsville, A Recipe For Disaster For The ANV!

[dlavin]

The word invincibility comes to mind when thinking about the Gettysburg campaign as as result of Chancellorsville.

That and I thought Vicksburg was on the mind of Lee and Davis. Moving North would help alleviate pressure on Vicksburg.

 

[John Winn]

Isn't a sub-text of this argument that the South just didn't have the overall man power to win a long war? Whether its Chancellorsville or not, sooner or later they would run out of quality men to direct the army at all levels.

I think Lee definitely saw that and it was likely the main motivating factor in mounting his second invasion. He seemed to have the Union on the ropes and the army was motivated so give it your all for that knockout punch 'cause you might not make it too many more rounds.

 

[jackt62]

I'm not sure whether it is proper to say that the ANV's victory in itself was a recipe for disaster going forward to Gettysburg. After Chancellorsville, Lee was in a delectable quandry (if I can call it that). That is, after having once again thwarted a federal army and pushing it north of the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, Lee could either stand pat, raid north, or advise transferring part of his forces to the western theater and the defense of Vicksburg. Therefore, the victory at Chancellorsville did not preordain a defeat at Gettysburg but simply provided Lee with options for future military action. The strategic decisions that Lee did or did not make after that battle should more properly be debated as potential "recipes for disaster."

 

[cash]

The word invincibility comes to mind when thinking about the Gettysburg campaign as as result of Chancellorsville.

There's a lot to be said for that. Add to that the results of the first day at Gettysburg.

That and I thought Vicksburg was on the mind of Lee and Davis. Moving North would help alleviate pressure on Vicksburg.

I know there are historians who put this forward, but that's really not supportable. Nothing in Lee's writings suggests he thought he would be alleviating pressure on Vicksburg. The only thing that comes close was his view that it would prevent reinforcements from being sent to Grant. Lee was hoping to strike a nearly decisive blow that would lead to Lincoln's defeat and the ascendancy of the Peace Party in the North.

"First of all, it would pull the Army of the Potomac out of its fortified lines and disarrange all its plans for a summer offensive in Virginia. That alone would justify a march north. At the same time, it would free Lee of the defensive strictures of the Rappahannock line and allow him to maneuver at will. Once across the Potomac hungry Rebels could feast in a land of plenty, and the ravaged fields and farms of Virginia would have an opportunity for renewal. In the larger scheme of things, Northern morale and will were sure to be shaken by the prospect of a Confederate army--a winning Confederate army--marching into its heartland. 'If successful this year,' Lee had predicted to his wife on April 19, 'next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North. The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis.' A successful campaign in Pennsylvania--even the army's simply remaining there for some length of time--ought to give voice to the Northern peace movement. And a success there might even impress the European powers sufficiently to push them toward intervention or at least mediation. However he made the case, nothing in Lee's correspondence or recollections suggests that he raised any hopes among his listeners that by marching into Pennsylvania he would pry Grant loose from Vicksburg. The argument that time and distance precluded the Confederates from sending reinforcements to Vicksburg that spring surely applied in the reverse direction to the Federals. In any case, it was too much to expect that the threat of a Confederate invasion of the North would paralyze Yankee efforts on every other war front. It was possible that an invasion would prevent the Yankees from sending (as Lee put it) 'troops designed to operate against other parts of the country,' but that was the most that could be hoped for." [Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg, pp. 14-15]

 

[War Horse]

There's a lot to be said for that. Add to that the results of the first day at Gettysburg.



I know there are historians who put this forward, but that's really not supportable. Nothing in Lee's writings suggests he thought he would be alleviating pressure on Vicksburg. The only thing that comes close was his view that it would prevent reinforcements from being sent to Grant. Lee was hoping to strike a nearly decisive blow that would lead to Lincoln's defeat and the ascendancy of the Peace Party in the North.

"First of all, it would pull the Army of the Potomac out of its fortified lines and disarrange all its plans for a summer offensive in Virginia. That alone would justify a march north. At the same time, it would free Lee of the defensive strictures of the Rappahannock line and allow him to maneuver at will. Once across the Potomac hungry Rebels could feast in a land of plenty, and the ravaged fields and farms of Virginia would have an opportunity for renewal. In the larger scheme of things, Northern morale and will were sure to be shaken by the prospect of a Confederate army--a winning Confederate army--marching into its heartland. 'If successful this year,' Lee had predicted to his wife on April 19, 'next fall there will be a great change in public opinion at the North. The Republicans will be destroyed & I think the friends of peace will become so strong as that the next administration will go in on that basis.' A successful campaign in Pennsylvania--even the army's simply remaining there for some length of time--ought to give voice to the Northern peace movement. And a success there might even impress the European powers sufficiently to push them toward intervention or at least mediation. However he made the case, nothing in Lee's correspondence or recollections suggests that he raised any hopes among his listeners that by marching into Pennsylvania he would pry Grant loose from Vicksburg. The argument that time and distance precluded the Confederates from sending reinforcements to Vicksburg that spring surely applied in the reverse direction to the Federals. In any case, it was too much to expect that the threat of a Confederate invasion of the North would paralyze Yankee efforts on every other war front. It was possible that an invasion would prevent the Yankees from sending (as Lee put it) 'troops designed to operate against other parts of the country,' but that was the most that could be hoped for." [Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg, pp. 14-15]

"He also explains the Lee made decisions based on his understanding of his opposing General. In this case Lee thought he would square off against Mr. F. J. Hooker. Lee felt Hooker was so demoralized after his defeat at Chancellorsville that he would not be at his best in their next meeting. That being said he also felt the moral of the AOP would be one of a demoralized army. Lee's insight into the AOP was sharpened by his reading in Northern papers of numerous regiments of two-year men and thousands of nine-month short-termers being mustered out that spring. It was said these losses would be made good by the newly instituted conscription in the North. However that might be, Lee expected all this to produce a good deal of confusion in the Federal ranks in the coming weeks, and he wanted to take advantage of it. In short, the AOP and its commander, looked just then to be fair game, another good reason for assuming the aggressive."

Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg Page 14.

All very good reasons. However what appeared to be a weakened and vulnerable army was in fact an army that had less than par leaders. Many of those leaders were gone. The fighting spirit existed all along, mismanagement of the army lead to the defeats it had endured. A new group of officers had now been promoted. These officers were much better suited for their new ranks. This includes Meade (who took Lee totally by surprise, He thought he would face Hooker.) Wesley Merritt, George Armstrong Custer and Elon Farnsworth to name just a few. It was certainly not the demoralized army Lee expected to face.

War Horse, Off the top of my head Oct, 6, 2016

 

[thomas aagaard]

"of numerous regiments of two-year men and thousands of nine-month short-termers being mustered out that spring.

According to my information there where no 2 year contracts signed in 61.

There where 87,588 9 month contracts signed from august 62 and they would be going home...

 

[cash]

According to my information there where no 2 year contracts signed in 61.

There where 87,588 9 month contracts signed from august 62 and they would be going home...

Your information is incorrect. The Second Maine very famously had 2-year contracts, mustering in on May 28, 1861 and mustering out on June 9, 1863, with the exception of the men who had signed 3-year contracts and were moved to the 20th Maine.

 

[Drew]

But Lee did predict it:

"On June 26, Jed Hotchkiss closed his daily diary entry by noting, 'Gen. Lee wrote to Gen. Ewell that he thought the battle would come off near Fredericks City or Gettysburg.'

Yet, Lee had no idea the AoP was in the vicinity until nearly midnight, June 28th, at least according to Stephen Sears.

"Early on June 28, before the arrival of the spy Harrison at his camp, General Lee had ordered a concerted movement across the Susquehanna and against Harrisburg."

- Gettysburg, Stephen W. Sears, page 133

Either Hotchkiss or Sears doesn't know what he's talking about. They can't both be right.

 

[War Horse]

According to my information there where no 2 year contracts signed in 61.

There where 87,588 9 month contracts signed from august 62 and they would be going home...

This time your argument is with Stephen Sears not me!

 

[War Horse]

Yet, Lee had no idea the AoP was in the vicinity until nearly midnight, June 28th, at least according to Stephen Sears.

"Early on June 28, before the arrival of the spy Harrison at his camp, General Lee had ordered a concerted movement across the Susquehanna and against Harrisburg."

- Gettysburg, Stephen W. Sears, page 133

Either Hotchkiss or Sears doesn't know what he's talking about. They can't both be right.

I'd put my money on Sears any day.

 

[Bee]

Yet, Lee had no idea the AoP was in the vicinity until nearly midnight, June 28th, at least according to Stephen Sears.

"Early on June 28, before the arrival of the spy Harrison at his camp, General Lee had ordered a concerted movement across the Susquehanna and against Harrisburg."

- Gettysburg, Stephen W. Sears, page 133

Either Hotchkiss or Sears doesn't know what he's talking about. They can't both be right.

It was my understanding that Lee knew that the AoP was somewhere in the vicinity, but in the immediate, he did not know where. It was also my understanding that Lee wanted to bring the war North, so to have it on Northern soil, as it had already ravaged Virgina. This is an understanding from a collection of sources such as video, articles, etc.

 

[War Horse]

It was my understanding that Lee knew that the AoP was somewhere in the vicinity, but in the immediate, he did not know where. It was also my understanding that Lee wanted to bring the war North, so to have it on Northern soil, as it had already ravaged Virgina. This is an understanding from a collection of sources such as video, articles, etc.

It's an accurate assessment. Lee also thought he would be facing a demoralized army lead by a demoralized Hooker.

 

[Drew]

It was my understanding that Lee knew that the AoP was somewhere in the vicinity, but in the immediate, he did not know where. It was also my understanding that Lee wanted to bring the war North, so to have it on Northern soil, as it had already ravaged Virgina. This is an understanding from a collection of sources such as video, articles, etc.

No and yes. He did want to bring the war north but he did NOT know in late June that the AoP was on the scene. Remember, this was all immediate to the episode in which Lincoln removed Hooker from command and replaced him with Meade. The latter moved the Army quickly, Lee didn't know until nearly midnight, June 28th. He'd already executed the orders toward Harrisburg and learning of the AoP in the vicinity, his immediate orders were to turn everyone around and concentrate the Army at Chambersburg. That changed, but it was his initial reaction to the news of the AoP's near arrival.

I don't know it, but suspect maybe Hotchkiss' 'diary' was written well after the fact. Lee on June 26th predicting battle at Gettysburg makes absolutely no sense.

 

[cash]

Yet, Lee had no idea the AoP was in the vicinity until nearly midnight, June 28th, at least according to Stephen Sears.

"Early on June 28, before the arrival of the spy Harrison at his camp, General Lee had ordered a concerted movement across the Susquehanna and against Harrisburg."

- Gettysburg, Stephen W. Sears, page 133

Either Hotchkiss or Sears doesn't know what he's talking about. They can't both be right.

Incorrect. Lee was expecting the Army of the Potomac to come north at some point. Before the night of June 28 he didn't know when.

 

[cash]

No and yes. He did want to bring the war north but he did NOT know in late June that the AoP was on the scene. Remember, this was all immediate to the episode in which Lincoln removed Hooker from command and replaced him with Meade. The latter moved the Army quickly, Lee didn't know until nearly midnight, June 28th. He'd already executed the orders toward Harrisburg and learning of the AoP in the vicinity, his immediate orders were to turn everyone around and concentrate the Army at Chambersburg. That changed, but it was his initial reaction to the news of the AoP's near arrival.

I don't know it, but suspect maybe Hotchkiss' 'diary' was written well after the fact. Lee on June 26th predicting battle at Gettysburg makes absolutely no sense.

It makes perfect sense. Just look at a map and see the road network. Lee didn't predict a date for battle, merely a place.

 

[Drew]

Incorrect. Lee was expecting the Army of the Potomac to come north at some point. Before the night of June 28 he didn't know when.

Well of course he was expecting it! Any yes, before the night of June 28 he didn't no when or where they would be.

What is your point?

 

[cash]

Well of course he was expecting it! Any yes, before the night of June 28 he didn't no when or where they would be.

What is your point?

The point is both are correct.

 

[Drew]

It makes perfect sense. Just look at a map and see the road network. Lee didn't predict a date for battle, merely a place.

I'm sorry, it makes no sense, given he'd already ordered his Army to Harrisburg. And again, he initially ordered it back to Chambersburg and not Gettysburg.

 

[War Horse]

All I can say is if Lee had set a trap for the Union army he wouldn't have needed to recall his troops to concentrate at Gettysburg. He obviously didn't know the exact proximity of the Union army. JMO

 

[cash]

I'm sorry, it makes no sense, given he'd already ordered his Army to Harrisburg. And again, he initially ordered it back to Chambersburg and not Gettysburg.

It makes all the sense in the world. Going to Harrisburg meant the AotP had to come after him.